Index

Addyston Pipe and Steel Company, 95–97

Advertising, 57–60

Airline industry, 20

Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), 60–63

American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), 26

American Tobacco Company, 67

Antitrust cases

Addyston Pipe and Steel Company, et al., United States v. (1897), 95n

Addyston Pipe and Steel Company et al. v. United States (1899), 95n

Aluminum Company of America, United States v. (1939), 61n

Aluminum Company of America, United States v. (1945), 61n, 62n

AT&T, United States v. (1981), 26n

AT&T, United States v. (1982), 26n

Borden Company (1958), xiiin, 71–73

Borden Company v. FTC (1967), 71–73

Broadcast Music v. CBS (1979), xv

Brown Shoe Company, United States v. (1962), xivn, 78n

Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat (1977), xv

Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics (1988), xv

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. (1977), xv, 75–76

E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., United States v. (1956), 3n

Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. and United States Homes Credit Corp. (1969), xiiin

Grinnell Corp., United States v. (1966), 3n

Illinois Brick v. Illinois (1979), xv

International Business Machines Corp., United States v. (1969), xiv,14–15

Lorain Journal, United States v. (1951), 9–10

Matsushita Electric Industries v. Zenith Radio (1986), xv

Microsoft Corp., United States v. (1998), 1–12

Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service (1984), xv

Ready-to-eat cereal companies, 55–57

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States (1909), 39n

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States (1911), 39n

Staples, FTC v. (1997), 88n

United Shoe Machinery, United States v. (1953), xiv, 12n

United Shoe Machinery, United States v. (1968), 12n

Utah Pie Company v. Continental Baking Company (1967), 79n

Antitrust establishment, 24–25

Antitrust policy

cost-benefit determinations, 5

current status of, vii–viii

due process and, 99–101

efficiency, effects of, 101–05

failure of, 105–06

as industrial policy, 25–26

information needs of, 104

legal monopolies and, 45–46

mergers and, xiii, 81–82

property rights and, 99–106

protectionism through, 23–25

public interest theory of, xi

reduced competition, definition of,69

regulatory aspects, 23–25

special-interest aspects, 23–25

traditional, 13, 16, 17–18

see also Barriers to entry; Competition theory; Monopoly theory; Rule-of-reason principle

Antitrust revisionism

administrative reforms, viii, xii, 19

barriers-to-entry doctrine and, xii–xiii, 51–67

concentration doctrine and, 83–86

efficiency, concerns re, xiv, 13–14, 18–19

insufficiency of, 84–85

legal monopolies, antitrust cases against, 46

Reagan administration proposals, xv

see also Repeal of antitrust laws

Antitrust revolution, xv

Apple Corp., 4, 8

Areeda, Phillip, xiiin, 51n, 65n

Armentano, Dominick T., 14n, 37n, 41n,46n,65n,67n, 97n, 99n, 103n

Asch, Peter, 37n

Ayanian, Robert, 59n

Bain, Joseph S., 16n, 51n

Barriers to entry, 57–68

advertising, 57–60

Aluminum Company of America case, 60–63

capital costs, 63–64

efficiency as, 60–63

legal monopolies and, 50

monopolies as, 35–39, 51–68

predatory practices, 64–67

product differentiation, 51–57

Ready-to-eat cereal industry case, 55–57

Baxter, William, 15

Baumol, William, xiin, 24n

Benson, Bruce, xi

Bingaman, Anne K., xvi, 1

Bittlingmayer, George, 96

Bloch, Harry, 59n

Bock, Betty, 66n

Borden Company, 71–73

Bork, Robert H., viiin, xin, 9–10, 13n, 82n,88n,96,103n

Bowman, Ward, 79n

Brown Shoe Company, 78–79

Brozen, Yale, xiv, 16n, 58n

Bush administration, xv–xvi

Byrns, Ralph T., 54n

Caffey, Francis G., 61–62

Calvani, Terry, 76n

Cartels, 37

Carter, John R., 16n

Cast-iron pipe industry, 95–97

Caves, Richard, 71n

Chernow, Ron, 41n

Chevron, 25

Civil Aeronautics Act (1938), 20

Civil Aeronautics Board, 20

Clayton Act (1914), 18, 69, 79

section 2, 18, 69

section 7, 18, 69

Clinton administration

antitrust policy of, xv, 1

Comanor, William S., 59n

Compaq Computer Corp., 7

Competition

entrepreneurial process and, 53–55

interfirm cooperation and, 18

public perception of, xii

traditional definition of, 53

Competition theory, xii

criticism of, 33–35

equilibrium assumptions of, 34

errors of, 34–35

Concentration doctrine, 83–86

Consumers

predatory practices, support for, 65–66

product differentiation, support for, 52

property rights of, 100–01

Contract integration, 93

Cordato, Roy E., 104n

Cost and benefits, subjective nature of, 83

Cowling, Keith, 43n

Crandall, Robert W., 27

Craven, John V., 54n

Cross subsidization, 28

Dell Computer Corp., 7

Demsetz, Harold, xiv, 15n

Deregulation

of air carriers, 20–21

of telecommunications industry, 26–29

Dewey, Donald, 91n

DiLorenzo, Thomas J., xin, xiin, 23n

Douglas, George, 19n

Due-process concerns, 99–101

Duke, Paul R., 92n

Easterbrook, Frank H., ixn

Efficiency

antitrust policy, effects of, 101–05

antitrust revisionism concerns re, 13–14

as barrier to entry, 13

price fixing and, 16

and resource use, 16

and welfare theory, 103–04

Entrepreneurial process, 53–55

Explorer, 2

Fair-trade laws, 75

Federal Communications Commission, 28, 71–73, 79n

Federal Trade Commission (FTC), xv, xvi, 1, 17, 28, 55–57, 71–73, 88–90

Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), 69

Fisher, Franklin M., 15n

Ford, Henry, 61

General Foods Corp., 55–57

General Mills, Inc., 55–57

Getty Oil, 25

Goldschmid, Harvey, xivn, 16n, 58n

Greenwood, John E., 15n

Greer, Douglas F., 58n

GTE Sylvania, Inc., 75–76

Gulf Oil Company, 25

Hand, Learned, 62

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act (1976), 25n

Hatch, Orrin, 1n

Hausman, Jerry A., 92n

Hayek, F.A., 34n

Hazlett, Thomas, 23n

Herfindahl Index of market concentration, 83, 85–86

High, Jack, xiin

Horizontal agreements

See Merger, horizontal; Price fixing

Illegal per se principle, xvi, 90–97

Import quotas, 23

Industrial organization (IO), xii–xiv

Industrial policy, xiii, 25–26

Intel, vii, xvi

International Business Machines Corp. (IBM),14–15

Internet access, 2

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),93

Joint-venture arrangements, 17

Justice, United States Department of, xv–xvi, 93

Kellogg Company, 55–57

Kirzner, Israel, 53n, 88n

Klein, Joel, xvi

Koller, Ronald H., 67n

Langenfeld, James, 76n

Lavoie, Don, 29n

Leverage, 7

Levy, Robert A., 10n

Liebeler, Wesley J., 73n, 102n

Liebowitz, S.J., 6n

Littlechild, S.D., 44n

Local Government Antitrust Act (1984), 46n

Lopatka, John E., 4

MacAvoy, Paul W., 29n

Malmgren, H.B., 91n

Mancke, Richard B., 15n

Mann, H. Michael, xivn, 16n, 58n

Mansfield, Edwin, 36n

Margolis, S.E., 6n

Marvel, Howard P., 37n, 75n

Mason, Lowell B., 101n

McCafferty, Stephen, 75n

McChesney, Fred S., ixn

McGee, John S., 66n

McGowan, John J., 15n

McKie, James W., 15n

McNulty, Paul J., 34n

Mergers

competitive process and, xii

cost-benefit information re, 82–83, 102–04

federal guidelines for, 17

horizontal, 17, 81–97

interfirm benefits, determination of, 34–35

laws re, 81–82

market-share and -power concerns, 81–82,85–86

output restrictions and, 81–82, 86–87,94–95

property rights and, 99–102

public perception of, 21–22

Reagan administration position re, xvi

relevant-market concerns, 83–85

vertical, 77–79

Metzenbaum, Howard, 1n

Microsoft, xvi, 1–12, 24

Miller, James, 20n

Misallocation of resources, 32

Mises, Ludwig von, 34n

Monopolies

as barriers to entry, 2

cartels, 37

costs under,32,37–39

empirical studies re, 43–44

interfirm agreements, 17

legal, 2, 45–46

market supply restrictions through, 31–33

misallocation of resources and, 32–36

monopolizing distinct from, 62

price discrimination and, 69–73

production increases through, 52

profitability and, 37–39

Standard Oil case, 40–43

technical inefficiency under, 31–39

traditional definition of, 31–32

Monopoly price

theory of, 32

Monopoly theory

criticism of, 22, 35–39

errors of, 36–39

see also Barriers to entry

Mueller, Dennis, 43n

Mueller, Willard F., 54n

Navigator, 6–7

Nelson, Phillip, 58n

Netscape Communications Corp., 6–7

Netter, Jeffrey, 37n

Network effects, 4–6

Niskanen, William A., 89n

Noll, Roger G., 28n

Non-signer clauses, 76

Novell Corp., 4

O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr., 104n

Office Depot, 25, 89–90

Office Max, 90

Oracle Corp., 4

Ordover, Janusz A., xvin, 24n

Output restrictions, 31–33

Overstreet, Thomas R., 76n

Owen, Bruce M., 27, 28n

Page, William H., 4n

Parker doctrine, 46n

Path dependence

theory of, 5–6

Pautler, Paul A., 86n

Peckham, Rufus W., 95

Peltzman, Sam, 23n

Petroleum-refining industry, 40–43

Phillips, Almarin, 97n

Pilon, Roger, 99n

Pitofsky, Robert, 76n

Plan-coordination theory of market efficiency, 104–05

Poole, Robert W., Jr., 29n

Popper, Andrew, 92n

Posner, Richard A., 74n

Predatory practices

consumer support for, 65

examples of, 67

inefficiency of, 66–67

nonprice practices, 64

price cutting, 65–66

Price discrimination

Borden Company case, 71–73

competitive process, role in, 70–71

definition of, 69

good faith discriminations, 70–71

laws re, 69–71

monopolies and, 36

property rights and, 100–01

Price fixing

in cast-iron pipe industry, 95–97

efficiency through, 91–92, 96–97

illegal per se approach to, xvi, 90–97

loose price coordination, 94

output restrictions and, 94–95

property rights and, 99–101

in trucking industry, 93

Product differentiation, 51–57

advertising and, 57–60

consumer support for, 52–54

efficient resource use and, 53–55

price and production coordination for, 54–55

Ready-to-eat cereal industry case, 55–57

waste through, 54

Property rights, 100–01

Protectionism, 18, 73

Public interest theory of antitrust policy, xi, 21–23

Quaker Oats Company, 55–57

QWERTY keyboard controversy, 5–6

Ready-to-eat (RTE) cereal industry, 55–57

Reagan administration, xvi

Reed-Bulwinkle Act (1948),92

Relevant markets, 3, 83–86

Rents, 23

Repeal of antitrust laws

argument for, vii–viii, 17–30

opponents of, vii–viii

plan-coordination theory and, 104

Resale price-maintenance agreements, 76–77

Restrictive practices, 104

Rill, James F., xvi

Rizzo, Mario J., 104n

Robinson, Anthony, 37n

Robinson, Joan, 58n

Robinson, Kenneth, 29n

Robinson-Patman Act (1936), 18, 19, 69, 71, 73n

Robson, John E., 20n

Rogowsky, Robert A., 83n

Rothbard, Murray N.

theory of monopoly, 47–50

Rule-of-reason principle, 81–90

establishment of, 81–82

as pseudoscience, 82

social-benefits focus, 87–88

social-costs focus, 81–83

Scherer, F.M, xiiin

Seneca, Joseph J., 37n

Sherman, John, 23n

Sherman Act (1890), 3, 14, 23n, 40

Shoe industry, 78

Shooshan, Harry M., 27n

Shughart, William F., II, ixn, 24n, 31n, 90n

Schumpeter, Joseph, 4

Singer, Eugene M., 44n

Smith, Adam, v, 19, 100, 105–06

Smith, Fred L., Jr., ixn

Sporkin, Stanley, 2

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 39n,40–43

Staples, vii, xvi, 25, 88–90

Steiger, Janet, xvi

Stigler, George J., 23n, 37n

Stone, Gerald W., 54n

Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4

Supreme Court, United States, xv, 42

Taft, William Howard, 96

Taggard, Herbert F.,71n

Telecommunications industry, 26–29

Texaco, 25

Thorelli, Hans, xin

Tobacco industry, 67

Tollison, Robert D., 23n, 24n

Toys “R” Us, vii

Trucking industry, 92–93

Turner, Donald, 65n

Tying agreements, 69, 73–76

definition of, 73–74

economic rationale for, xiii, 74–75

laws re, 17

professional opinions re, 74

property rights and, 75

Vertical agreements

See Mergers, vertical; Resale price-maintenance agreements; Tying agreements

Weinstock, David S., 83n

Western Electric Company, 27–28

Weston, J. Fred, xivn, 16n, 58n

White, Edward D., 42

Wholesale Grocers Association, United States, 71n

Williamson, Oliver E., 65n

Wilson, Thomas A., 59n

Windows operating system, 2, 8–9

Wu, S.Y., 90n

Zerbe, Richard O., 83n