Reasons for Apathy

October 29, 1956

The public-opinion polls, various other political checkups, and the elections in Alaska, coming on top of those in Maine, all seem to forecast (1) that the total vote will be substantially less, at least in proportion to the number of eligible voters, than in 1952; (2) that Mr. Eisenhower will win, but by a narrower popular and electoral margin than last time; and (3) that the

Democrats will control Congress by an even more decisive margin than they do today.

This outlook could of course be changed between now and Election Day by some major blunder on either side or some other unexpected event. I present it not as my own, but as a composite forecast. My chief purpose here is to discuss the consequences of such an outcome.

These consequences would depend heavily not only on the election result itself, but on the dominant interpretation of that result. If it is the same interpretation as the one that has prevailed among New Dealers and among those advisers who seem until now to have most influenced Mr. Eisenhower, then it will be concluded that the Republicans were denied the control of Congress because they refused sufficiently to divest themselves of their traditional “ultraconservative,” “right wing,” or “reactionary” opinions, and that Mr. Eisenhower had been re-elected because he had moved sufficiently to the left to get into the middle of the road.

UNLEARNED LESSON

It is as likely as not that this will in fact be the prevailing interpretation. The Republicans have so far failed to learn the lesson of the Dewey defeat of 1948 or their Congressional defeat in 1954. The first part of this lesson is that you cannot win with a me-too policy. You cannot defeat the original New Dealers with Johnny-come-lately New Dealers. New Deal addicts prefer the stuff straight, not diluted with soda water. Mr. Eisenhower seems likely to survive by his sheer personal popularity. But his charm and amiability are personal and nontransferable, and most Republicans will probably find themselves under a heavy handicap.

The second part of the lesson is that wherever a Republican Administration does have the courage to substitute a more conservative policy for a New Deal policy, it must explain and defend its course at least as vigorously and tirelessly as its opponents attack it. And it must do this as it goes along. It cannot afford to leave the defense to a few speeches just before election.

It is possible, of course, that the Republicans who survive this time will see at last that their only hope is to rebuild a coherent conservative philosophy and record to stand on in the next election.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

But if the election result is the one that seems at the moment most probable—Mr. Eisenhower with a Democratic Congress—the immediate outlook for a conservative or responsible economic and monetary policy is not bright. It should hardly be necessary to point out again at this late date that the bulk of Mr. Eisenhower’s foreign and domestic policies are essentially continuations and extensions of New Deal policies. We need merely take, as typical examples, farm subsidies, the compulsory minimum wage law, social security, and inflation. The Republican Administration, like the Democrats, believes in farm price supports—only not quite as high. It believes, like the Democrats, in a Federal minimum wage—only not quite as high. It believes, like the Democrats, in expanding social-security benefits—only not quite as recklessly. It believes, like the Democrats, in inflation—only not quite as much. Almost nowhere is there any difference in principle, only in degree.

It is this situation that now causes so much soul-searching among conservative Republicans, and so much apathy on the part of the great body of voters. Whichever of the two major party candidates they vote for, the subsequent policy will probably be more governmental control over our lives, more intervention, spending, and inflation. But even differences of degree are important, and in the matter of inflation, very important. That is why most conservatives will end by voting for Mr. Eisenhower, but with less enthusiasm than four years ago.