The Salaries of Congress

March 7, 1955

It was a disturbing symptom when the House and Senate, by big majorities, rushed through fat increases in their own pay, effective immediately, raising Congressional compensation from $15,000 a year to $23,750.

There may be good arguments for an increase in Congressional salaries. But that is beside the present point, which is whether congressmen ought to raise their own salaries during their own unexpired terms.

The history of Congressional pay is instructive. In 1789 the compensation of senators and representatives was fixed at $6 for each day’s attendance; in 1815 at $1,500 a year; in 1817 at $8 a day; in 1855 at $3,000 a year; in 1865 at $5,000; in 1873 at $7,500 (reduced to $5,000 again in 1874); in 1907 at $7,500; in 1925 at $10,000; and in 1946 at $12,500 plus $2,500 for expenses. The increase of March 3, 1873 (also retroactive, as in this year’s House bill, to the beginning of the Congressional term), was denounced by the country as a “salary grab”; and on Jan. 20, 1874, it was repealed.

For congressmen to raise their own salaries during their own terms is not contrary to the letter of the Constitution, but clearly contrary to its spirit. Two explicit provisions are relevant. One is Article I, Section 6: “No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any [Federal] office . . . which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time.” The purpose of this is plain. The Constitution provides, again (Article II, Section 1): “The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected.” The purpose of this should also be plain on its face. Any doubt is removed by the contemporary explanation of Alexander Hamilton in “The Federalist” (No. 73) that it was inserted precisely that Congress should not be able to “tempt” the President “to surrender his judgment to their inclinations. . . . They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice.” But the Founding Fathers could not foresee everything; and so they neglected to limit the power of congressmen to change their own compensation. But surely the same considerations that led to the constitutional provisions just cited would indicate that the President ought not to curry Congressional favor by asking Congress to raise its own salaries. They would also suggest that Congress, when it does see fit to raise Congressional salaries, should make the increase apply, not to congressmen already in office, but only to those to be elected in future. Is this too much restraint to ask? Are congressmen’s necessities too great for them to get along on their recent salaries for the next two years? How many of those who voted to increase their own pay explicitly notified the voters during the election of their intention to do so?

This brings us to an even more serious aspect of the self-salary-raise. Congress for the last quarter-century (and the present Congress has not yet shown itself to be any exception) has tolerated, encouraged, and helped to create constant deficit financing and continuous inflation. It has acted on the assumption that almost any problem, domestic or international, can be solved at the expense of the American taxpayer.

When it is suggested that the exorbitant personal or corporate income-tax rates might be slightly reduced, Congress, with a shrug of the shoulder, has expressed perfunctory sorrow that it cannot be done now. But now it pleads that the inflation it has itself encouraged and helped to create has raised its own cost of living to a point where it must raise its own salaries for relief. If congressmen can continue to inflict inflation on the rest of us, and escape the consequences for themselves by raising their own pay, what hope can the country have for a cut in spending, a cut in taxing, or a halt to inflation? If more congressmen had seen the subject in this light, fewer might have voted to raise their own pay.