Why Risk an Interregnum?

December 1, 1952

From 1886 to 1947, an outgoing President could have eliminated the dangerous four-month interregnum before the inauguration of his successor simply by his own act of resigning (together with the Vice President) after appointing the President-elect as Secretary of State. Though this possible course was closed by the Presidential succession act in 1947, it could be reopened by a mere amendment to that act. Such an amendment could be drafted and passed by Congress in less than a week. Yet rather than consider this simple step, many people who began by expressing concern over the risks of the eleven-week interlude before the inauguration of General Eisenhower are now trying to persuade themselves that the risks have been eliminated and the problem solved by a meeting of 70 minutes and a vague joint statement that amounts to little more than a gesture.

The truth is that an interregnum of eleven weeks between the election and inauguration of a new President is as needless, and potentially as dangerous, as the previous interregnum of four months. If it had not been for the interregnum of 1860–61, the disaster of the Civil War might have been averted. Without the interregnum of 1932–33, the banking panic of 1933 could certainly have been averted.

“Again and again,” wrote President Wilson to Secretary Lansing in 1916, “the question has arisen in my mind, what would it be my duty to do were Mr. Hughes to be elected? Four months would elapse before he could take charge of the affairs of the government, and during those four months I would be without such moral backing from the nation as would be necessary to steady and control our relations with other governments. I would be known to be the rejected, not the accredited, spokesman of the country; and yet the accredited spokesman would be without legal authority to speak for the nation. Such a situation would be fraught with the gravest dangers.”

It would be his duty, he went on, “to relieve the country of the perils of such a situation at once,” and if he could gain the consent of the persons involved, he would “then join the Vice President in resigning and thus open to Mr. Hughes the immediate succession to the Presidency.” He concluded: “The whole country has long perceived, without knowing how to remedy, the extreme disadvantage of having to live for four months after an election under a party whose guidance has been rejected at the polls. Here is the remedy. . . .”

Today a change in the law would be needed to adopt this remedy. But advantage could be taken of this, as I suggested here two weeks ago, for Congress to provide specifically that the salary of any President who resigned for this purpose would be continued until Jan. 20, just as if he had remained in office. Certainly no economic penalty should be placed on such a voluntary surrender of office.

Congress could also use this opportunity to deal with the problem of the change-over of Cabinet members. It could authorize the incoming President to appoint for terms of a few months as many Secretaries-General as there were existing members of the Cabinet. Each of these could be assigned to work with his predecessor or chosen successor, as the case might be. No Secretary-General would be granted specific powers, but he would have the standing and salary of a Cabinet member and whatever secretarial help he needed.

None of the legislation here proposed would impose any compulsion on anyone. It would merely permit an outgoing President to resign and turn over his office on any date before the following Jan. 20 that was agreeable to his elected successor. It would give flexibility instead of dangerous rigidity to the period of changeover. Even if Mr. Truman, because of the delay involved by legislation, was not now able to transfer office to Mr. Eisenhower until a few weeks before next Jan. 20, he could still establish a fine precedent and remove a grave risk for the future.