II R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi and the European Parliamentary Union

i?. N. (Jouaenhove~Ka/ergi ana the European Parliamentary Union The Author. An important role in the creation and development of a European Movement after World War I was played by Count CoudenhoveKalergi whose book PanEurope was first published in Vienna, in 1923. The son of an Austrian diplomat and a Japanese mother, the author became a citizen of the new republic of Czechoslovakia by reason of the "Peace of Paris." He had written on philosophical and other political subjects, but he attained world-wide fame and reputation only when he, with much effort and skill, began to muster public support for his plan of European union. Coudenhove was a socialist, nationalist, ardent Catholic, humanitarian, and a keen advocate of European unification.1 His Pan-European movement gained considerable public support from numerous prominent European statesmen and intellectual leaders. After World War II, in 1947, Count CoudenhoveKalergi initiated a private organization, the "European Parliamentary Union," to facilitate contacts among the adherents of his Pan-European idea and to influence key individuals. This organization exercises great influence through its members in presentday political circles. The national legislatures of Western Europe contain numerous adherents of the "European Parliamentary Union." The French Parliament, for example, has more than two hundred and fifty deputies and senators who are members of the French section of the movement.2 1 "My sympathies," says Coudenhove while speaking on his political outlook, "were definitely with Austrian Socialism, thanks to its broadminded social policies." See his Crusade for Europe, Putnam's Sons, New York, 1943, p. 86.

2 John Goormaghtigh, European Integration, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1953, p. 69. 64 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 65 Objectives of Unification. The main objective of his plan for European federal union is to maintain peace and European independence with respect to the growing world powers of America and Soviet Russia. A federation, according to Coudenhove, would prevent every European state from being at the mercy, politically and economically, of the world powers. It would give Europe the strength to repel any military invasion and to meet any economic competition.3 A united Europe also, "thanks to its intermediate position between England and Amercia on the one side, and between Russia and East Asia on the other, and thanks also to the tradition and native gifts of its inhabitants, would be both able and fitted to be the cultural center of the world for a long time to come." 4 The Scope of Union. All the free nations of continental Europe, including Iceland, and their colonies are to be the members of the Pan-European federation. England should be excluded from PanEurope because she "would always sacrifice the interests of Europe to English imperial interests."5 A union with England, according to Coudenhove, is possible after the British World Empire has disintegrated.

PanEurope and Economic Competition. "The basis of PanEurope is economic," says Coudenhove.6 "The economic model for PanEurope is provided by the United States of America." A United States of Europe would also constitute a world power which could easily be defended from the economic competition of the other world powers. Europe must repel the economic competition of the other powers to safeguard its political and economic independence. And this end can be accomplished, according to Coudenhove, by "unifying its organization and rationally opening its African colonial empire, which is very nearly equal to Asiatic Russia in its extent." Under these circumstances, "Europe could itself produce all the raw materials and foodstuffs it requires, and thus also become independent in a material way." 7 PanEurope and America. CoudenhoveKalergi fears the competition of American producers and businessmen. He believes European economic independence is endangered by their competition.

Therefore, in order to safeguard continental independence from America, Europe must unite. Coudenhove shows us the way. He 3 R. N. CoudenhoveKalergi, PanEurope, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1926, p. 34. 4 Ibid., p. 34. 5 Ibid., p. 40. e Ibid., p. 102. 7 Ibid., p. 34.

66 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION calls for abolition of the interEuropean customs barriers and for European autarky. Only a Europe, thus united and autark, "could in the future maintain its economic independence with respect to the United States of America and avoid bankruptcy and economic servitude/'8 The interEuropean custom barriers which now throttle industry, commerce, and transportation and split Europe into economic fragments, must be abolished gradually, and the economic national regions must be fused into one "Pan-European" region "which alone would be successfully able to keep pace with American industry/'9 The InterEuropean Competitive Struggle. Not only is American economic competition the object of Coudenhove's serious concern, but he is also worried about the present "competitive struggle" among the European nations. The economic consequences of the "Peace Treaties of Paris," in 1919, and all their harmful effects on postwar economic conditions in Europe are explained by Coudenhove in the existence of interEuropean economic competition. On page 128, he states: "Once economic cooperation in Europe has taken the place of the present competitive struggle, all economic presuppositions of the Peace Treaties will be automatically changed and will press forward for amicable settlement."

The Advantages of Unification. The advantages of acceptance and realization of his "PanEurope" idea are listed in summary by Coudenhove as the following: 1. security from an interEuropean war; 2. neutralization of Europe in world conflicts; 3. protection against Russia; 4. possibility of disarmament; 5. ability to compete with the American and British industries and avoid bankruptcy and economic servitude; 6. national minorities are insured against persecution, oppression, and denationalization; 7. nations which "did not receive fair treatment at the time the extraEuropean world was divided up, such as Germans, Poles, Czechs, Scandinavians, and Balkan peoples, would find in the great African colonial empires a field for the release of their economic energies."10 Such release of the economic energies of the European nations would also serve his objective of making Europe autark and economically independent. Africa would be converted "into the future 8 Ibid., p. 179.

9 Ibid., pp. 127, 128. 10 Ibid., p. 179.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 67 granary and source of raw materials for Europe," and thus free Europe from imports from other continents. But two main tasks would have to be accomplished: First, the Sahara Desert would have to be transformed partially into agricultural land; and second, the sleeping-sickness, which renders cattle-breeding and colonization impossible in the most fertile districts, would have to be extirpated from Central Africa.11 These tasks, according to Coudenhove, would have to be accomplished by the combined forces of Europe. Agrarian Reforms and Social Reforms. Speaking about the intermediate consequences of the abolition of interEuropean tariff barriers, Coudenhove points out two means for their alleviation. "In Europe," says Coudenhove, "a sufficient amount of land is still available for allotment; agrarian reforms could in most countries provide sufficient land to absorb the workers thrown out of employment by the abolition of customs frontiers and of the national industries." 12 Thus, "through the progressive abolition of the interEuropean tariff walls, proceeding hand-in-hand with the accomplishment of social reforms, especially land reforms, neither the nations nor the workers would suffer injury; no one, indeed, would suffer, save that group of industrialists who are unequal to a free competitive struggle in large interEuropean industry." 13 A Consolidation of Industries. The dangers that threaten the economic development and realization of PanEurope from the "outgrowths of the trust system" may be overcome by socialist controls which, according to Coudenhove, can be carried out in Europe more easily than in America, since socialism in Europe has a greater power. "In order to effectually combat that most dangerous and powerful enemy of Pan-Europeanism, there is a necessity for consolidation of all those industries which have no foreign competition to fear, and which would gain new markets only as a result of interEuropean free trade." These industries are European agriculture and the European monopolist industries which are equal to any conceivable competition. It is imperative to separate these Pan-European monopolist industries from those industries that require tariff protection and consolidate them into the service of the PanEurope idea. In that way, according to Coudenhove, the capitalist resistance to the "United States of Europe" might be broken by capitalism itself.14 11 Ibid., p. 180.

12 Ibid., p. 189. is Ibid., p. 189. 14 Ibid., p. 190.

68 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION Stages of Unification. Coudenhove envisages the following stages of Pan-European development: 1. a Pan-European Conference should be called; 2. compulsory treaties of arbitration and of security pacts among all the democratic states of Europe should be concluded, and a compulsory Court of Arbitration should be set up; 3. a Pan-European customs union should be formed and Europe be federated into a coherent economic sphere—possibly, a monetary union should also be created; 4. a Constitution of the "United States of Europe" which would make provisions for two Pan-European chambers of legislature should be designed and accepted; a "House of Peoples" should represent the peoples of Europe, and the "House of States" should represent the European national governments.15 A PanEurope thus created would be a unit consisting of member states that would enjoy a maximum amount of freedom.

Bourgeois Parties Reprimanded. In discussing the support of his PanEurope idea by the European parties, Coudenhove praises the socialist parties for their keen political perception on the question of European federation and finds harsh words of criticism for the attitude of the bourgeois parties. "The leaders of European socialism/* says Coudenhove, "more clearly recognize the necessity of Pan-European unity than do the leaders of the middle class." 16 He adds, "The attitude of the European bourgeois parties toward the question of federation is less clear; nevertheless, it will be decisive as regards their own fate. History once more gives them an opportunity to perform a great creative act. If they fail to pass this test, allowing petty interests to triumph over world-historical necessities, they will be proving the bankruptcy of their class and their inability to guide the destinies of Europe in the future. Strong arms will take up their heritage and complete the task which proved too great for them." 17 His Socialist Support. Coudenhove contrasts the hesitating attitude of the bourgeois parties regarding his PanEurope idea with the positive reaction of the far-sighted socialist leaders. He quotes Georg Ledebour, a German Socialist leader and a member of the Reichstag, as a representative of fullhearted Pan-European support. "Capital, like Proletariat," says Ledebour, "instinctively presses forward toward an economic world system. But the monopis ibid., p. 175.

is Ibid., p. 183. IT Ibid., p. 185.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 69 olistic urge to exploit which characterizes Capital drives the capitalists of a country to resort, in the first place, always to the annexation or at least the economic subordination of the countries adjoining their own state once the need has shown itself by economically and politically fusing their own productive regions with those of that neighboring country. But such a capitalist propensity toward an extension of power invariably threatens to grow into a 'national' war, with drawn sword in hand." 18 Coudenhove then proceeds to quote from Ledebour's discussion of the French occupation of the Ruhr district in Germany, in 1923, as an example of such capitalistic propensity. He quotes: "to find an escape from that fateful conflict is the most pressing task of the French and German proletariats. Having recognized the need (already apparent within the capitalistic framework) of an amalgamation of the French and German economic spheres, we must draw the inevitable conclusion, which is: the unification of Europe as a coherent economic system. Even as it is now, that need would be realized without difficulty once socialism came to the helm. Socialism, which will regulate the entire world economy, must immediately free mankind from the bonds of exploitation, no less than from the interstate customs barriers which impede it. But even now, while we contend for power within our own capitalist state organism, we are justified in addressing to the capitalistically organized states of Europe the demand for economic federation. For such a federation is in no way incompatible with the capitalist economic system. On the contrary, already a general need in that direction is making itself felt across the narrow national boundaries." 19 His Followers versus "Anti-Europeans'' In conclusion, Coudenhove makes a fundamental distinction between his fellowmen. He distinguishes between adherents of his scheme of unification in a Pan-European federation and "Anti-Europeans." "A clear distinction must be made," says Coudenhove, "between Pan-Europeans and Anti-Europeans." A "decisive struggle will arise between the Anti-Europeans and the Pan-Europeans for the fate of Europe."20 CRITICISM It is as easy to agree on the ultimate goal of Coudenhove's plan and movement for the integration of Europe as it is with all similar is Ibid., p. 183.

19 Georg Ledebour, European Union, in "The Class War," 1923, as quoted by R. N. CoudenhoveKalergi, PanEurope, pp. 183-84. 20 PanEurope, pp. 191, 192, 193.

70 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION plans for unification. The objectives are desirable and the advantages of their eventual realization are entirely praiseworthy. Who would object to a plan designed to bring about security from an interEuropean war or protection from a military attack by Soviet Russia? Who does not wish the national minorities in Europe to be insured against persecution, oppression, and denationalization, or the burden of armament to be decreased? However, as shall be proved in the following, the PanEurope plan by CoudenhoveKalergi does not and, by its very nature, cannot bring about the effects its author claims for it. A PanEurope as envisaged by Coudenhove is unrealizable and cannot be brought about without force, the very avoidance of which is its objective. The second fundamental objection against Coudenhove's PanEurope idea and the European Parliamentary Union movement is the fact that his plan is a scheme for the attainment of wholesale socialism in Europe. A socialist Europe, however, will bring about interEuropean wars and invite Russia to an immediate attack. A socialist Europe cannot be a Europe of peaceful nations. Nor will it be able to compete economically with the other powers of the world, especially America. It will be of necessity a continent of poverty and starvation, of constant wars and unfree individuals who depend on omnipotent government officials and continuous aid and contributions from the free nations of the world.

European Autarky Leads to Chaos and Poverty. "The basis of PanEurope is economic," says Coudenhove. The interEuropean customs barriers are the main obstacles to European unification. They split Europe into economic fragments and throttle industry, commerce, and transportation. Customs barriers therefore should be abolished gradually and the economic national regions should be fused into one Pan-European region. The exfra-European customs barriers, however, are to be maintained. Europe is to become independent in a material way; it is to produce all the raw materials and foodstuffs it requires. For only a Europe united and autark can "maintain its economic independence with respect to the United States of America" and avoid bankruptcy and economic servitude. Coudenhove does not enter into a detailed discussion of the extraEuropean customs barriers, but we may infer from his objective of European autarky and economic independence that the European customs barriers towards the rest of the world are to be sufficiently high in order to bring about autarky. The raising of a European THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 71 customs wall must necessarily be uniform to avoid an inflow of goods at the boundary with the lowest custom obstacle. A tariff, for instance, which endeavors to prohibit the importation of American automobiles but leaves the custom duties of one European country at a lower level is no longer prohibitive, but merely makes the latter country a road of importation for the whole of Europe.

A uniform European tariff must be sufficiently high to be protective. Its minimum level must be identical with the highest presentday national tariff, or it would no longer be protective for the national economy having the highest tariff. This, in fact, is another aspect of Coudenhove's plan of unification. To illustrate, let us look at the following example. We may assume that country A, which will be a member state of the United States of Europe, presently has a tariff on the importation of American typewriters that is absolutely protective. Behind this wall of tariff the domestic industry is enabled to produce typewriters of its own. Let us furthermore assume that the other European member states have lower customs barriers or none at all. A European tariff that is identical with the tariff of member state A would continue to protect the typewriter industry of A; a lower European tariff would be less protective and would increase American competition with the industry of A. To the other member states with presentday lower typewriter tariffs, the European customs necessarily would raise their trade barriers to the protective level of A, which would render the importation of American typewriters impossible. People in these countries would now solely depend on European production, especially on the production of the industry in A. Until the European tariff was established they preferred American typewriters to their domestic typewriters and those of A, for they had not raised their customs to the level of A, but had allowed American typewriters to be imported.

The European tariff would mean an unexpected boon for the protected European industries. In our foregoing example, the typewriter industry of A, which was inferior to its American competition, now would have to fill the demand for typewriters from all over Europe. And new and additional industries would have to be developed to replace the American industries which used to produce for the European market. In conclusion, we may state the following inferences: 1. A European tariff must be uniform. 2. It must be as high as the highest national tariff.

72 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION These requirements of a European tariff of necessity have the following effects: 1. Those industries which presently are most protected from extraEuropean competition are favored; they will obtain those European markets for their products which previously were supplied by extraEuropean industries now cut off by the European tariff. 2. People who formerly imported goods from other continents and who preferred those goods to European goods because they were better or cheaper now depend solely on European production, and especially on the production in those European states which had the highest national tariff. But still two other concomitant effects of a European tariff as envisaged by CoudenhoveKalergi must be mentioned; 1. The European customs barriers that cut off American export industries from their European markets inevitably bring about depression and unemployment in American export industries. Without the European market they are overextended and have to contract.

The depression will be most severe in the industries that depend greatly on European orders. These extraEuropean effects, however, may be disregarded by the European statesmen as being outside their field of interest. 2. The depression in the American industries which formerly earned European media of exchange and European credit balances with which European goods were purchased and imported, automatically spreads to the European export industries which now cease to receive American orders. Where foreign exchange cannot be earned, it cannot be spent. The European export industries will suffer from the same unemployment of capital and labor as the American industries will suffer by being cut off from European markets. Since the European export industries were only located in those countries where low tariffs had permitted an intercontinental exchange of goods, the depression in export industries must of necessity hit these countries.

With regard to the effects of a uniform protective tariff of Europe upon its different member states, we may now make the following statements. 1. The European tariff does not directly affect those countries whose tariffs were as high and protective as the European tariff. 2. The European tariff most severely affects the countries which had imported from and exported to other continents. It brings about unemployment in their export industries and, furthermore, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 73 forces their population against their choice and will to depend solely on inferior European production, especially on the production in those European states with the highest national tariffs. The standard of living of the people in member states, adversely effected by the raising of European trade barriers, is lowered by the very advantage which the importation of goods from other continents had given them. European countries which have had the largest foreign trade per capita of population have always had the highest standard of living. Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries enjoy a relatively high standard of living on account of their foreign trade and international division of labor and production. How low their standard of living would drop in case of interEuropean autarky, can only be imagined.

Public Opinion Against the Effects of European Autarky. Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, we now may raise the fundamental question of the unification of Europe as designed by CoudenhoveKalergi. It is the following: "Will the people of those countries that enjoy the advantages of trading with other continents and correspondingly high standards of living voluntarily yield and submit to a lowering of their living conditions because of and for the sake of the unification of Europe?' This question must be answered in the negative. There cannot be any doubt that scarcely anyone, however European-minded he may be, will vote for a united Europe if it involves a lowering of his living conditions, or even heavy losses and unemployment, as in the case of those export industries that formerly worked for outerEuropean markets. All may be convinced that Europe should unite, but they undoubtedly would vote against a scheme of unification that would bring about a deterioration of their living conditions. No statesman or politician could support a plan that would obviously lower living conditions and reduce wages.

Public Opinion Polls Are Misleading. After World War II, various public opinion polls and tests were taken in Holland, Belgium, France, and Germany. People from all walks of life were asked whether they would support a "United States of Europe" which would bring about peace, but which would involve a certain limitation of national sovereignty. Such a question, however, is superficial and misleading. It is like a public opinion poll on people's preference between war or peace, sin or righteousness. It cannot be surprising, then, that often eighty or ninety per cent or more of those questioned voted in the affirmative. A more truthful and elucidating question for public opinion polls and tests would have 74 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION been: "Are you willing and prepared to suffer heavy losses, unemployment, and a lowering of your living conditions for the sake of economic readjustment necessitated by a unification of Europe?"

One hundred per cent of those questioned would have answered in the negative. Abolition of the InterEuropean Tariffs Unrealizable Under Contemporary Ideological Conditions. The reader who may not yet be convinced that a PanEurope as envisaged by CoudenhoveKalergi is unrealizable may also consider the following argumentation on the effects of the abolition of interEuropean trade barriers on national economies. We maintain that, under presentday ideological conditions, people in Europe are not ready to bear the short-run consequences of such abolition, however favorable the long-run effects may appear to be. Under the pressure of public opinion modern government is firmly committed to a policy of interventionism, and especially protectionism with regard to competition by foreigners. As soon as a particular domestic industry encounters difficulties because of sinking prices or rising costs, or lack of sales at a certain price, or on account of the appearance of new and competing products which the consumers prefer, groups of producers with the support of the respective labor unions ask for government measures of protection.

The alleged reasons usually stated by the advocates of government protection differ widely; they are very old, some are even handed down to us from the time of early mercantilism. They were refuted and exploded innumerable times, but they are repeated again and again. The reason for such illogical tenaciousness of life is the fact that protective measures temporarily improve some people's position. By imposing a duty on the importation of a good, the competitive position of domestic producers is strengthened. The total supply of goods offered on the market is restricted, which ultimately results in higher prices for consumers. But the advantage reaped by the groups enjoying special government protection lasts only for a limited time. Domestic newcomers are immediately attracted by special government protection and the gain derived from it. New and additional competition then tends to eliminate the protection gain until the previous state of affairs is resumed. And so new and additional measures of protection will be necessary if the protected industry is to enjoy its original advantage.

The restrictive measures and the privileges of certain groups of producers bring about a structure of production that, because of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 75 each protective measure, grows apart from that of the free market economy. Additional factors of production remain employed in an industry that had shown symptoms of maladjustment and overinvestment. Thus the structure of production as brought about by government measures will differ from that of an unhampered economy as long as the restrictive measures are not removed. A duty that was imposed one hundred years ago and never repealed shows its lasting effects in the structure of production. However brief the special gain from government protection may have been, the effects on the structure of production are permanent. If restrictive measures are repealed, a new disarrangement of market data results. Although the effects are immediately beneficial to all consumers, they are detrimental in the short run to the special groups previously enjoying protection and privileges.

Many European industries have been protected and privileged by their governments for many decades. There is probably no European industry which has not enjoyed some protection in its past. And the pressure groups interested in the preservation of protection and privileges are numerous and powerful. They are well organized and possess many means of pressure which they can exert on their governments. And these groups would suffer most from the repeal of government protection under the unification plan. The crucial question which now arises is: Are these protected groups of producers and their respective labor organizations prepared and willing to suffer temporarily from the abolition of interEuropean trade barriers for which they have vigorously fought? This is seriously doubted. Special Groups Reject a Tariff Union. It appears inconceivable, for instance, that the German farm group, which constitutes the mightiest pressure group next to labor in German political life, would yield to an abolition of import restrictions on agricultural goods. Long before World War I, when the great Western nations in general conducted free trade policies, German agriculture and some industries enjoyed high protection from growing North and South American competition. German nationalism was determined to make Germany economically self-sufficient as far as possible, in order to free her from the necessity of importing agricultural and other vital goods in times of war and emergency. The great scarcity of foodstuffs during World War I proved to the German nationalists the insufficiency of their preparedness with regard to agricultural autarky. Therefore, in the years between the two world wars, the German government took recourse to even stricter anti-impor76 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION tation laws. In 1938, one year before the outbreak of World War II, more than ninety per cent of all agricultural goods consumed by this great industrial nation was produced by its own fanners.

Germany was almost autark, and the war could begin. An abolition of agricultural import restrictions would inevitably bring about heavy losses and severe unemployment for German farmers. Thousands of farms, often with ten or fewer acres of land, with high costs of production and medieval methods of cultivation, would become unprofitable. Thousands of farmers would have to sell their land which has often been in the possession of one family for hundreds of years. Their anger and indignation, together with their support by German nationalists, would force any government endeavoring to abolish agricultural protection out of office. Other European nations encounter the same economic stumbling blocks to European union. Belgium, another highly industrialized nation, has maintained an important agricultural production by way of import restrictions. The effects of a policy of European free trade would be similar to those outlined for Germany. Holland, mainly an agricultural country, on the other hand, has become more and more industrialized as a result of her protective policies. It is unreasonable to assume that Holland is prepared to sacrifice her artificially protected heavy industry which, because of its lack of raw materials and high costs of production, could not endure Belgian and German competition. Large segments of the Dutch heavy industry would undoubtedly be abandoned and thousands of workers would be unemployed. Similar problems would arise in all other European countries. Industries that enjoyed protection and favors in the past would suffer temporarily from a return to an unhampered market economy.

Labor Unions Oppose Unification. A very serious opposition to European union and interEuropean free trade would also come from the most powerful of all presentday pressure groups—labor. The workers in the countries with more favorable conditions of production and more capital invested per capita of population would denounce as "dumping" the free importation of goods from European countries with less favorable conditions and correspondingly lower wage rates. They would feel injured by their competition and oppose such an "unfair" policy. Labor, like all other pressure groups, enjoys special government favors because it possesses and exerts the power to influence policies in its favor. Now, could a national labor group or any other pressure group be assured that the supranational European state would continue to favor and protect THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 77 them from other European states? Would they not run the risk of losing their power to influence government policies in their favor?

Would it not be likely that the German farm group, farmers as well as agricultural labor unions, for instance, which have striven so successfully for high protection and high prices for agricultural goods, may be a minority in the Pan-European Parliament and be outvoted by an immense majority wanting low prices for foodstuffs? The whole structure of presentday national protection would collapse in the event of a supranational unification of Europe. But under contemporary conditions of ideology and policy it is the first and main function of national government to protect its pressure groups and do favors for its constituents. There is no room for a supranational European authority that cannot assume this function of national government. And it is the very feature of unification that the supranational European state could not do so. Complete Abolition of National Sovereignty Required. The unification of Europe as designed by CoudenhoveKalergi can only be unitary. All sovereignty can only be vested in the supranational authority. Yet this statement is contrary to the assertion of Coudenhove that "the member states would enjoy a maximum of freedom within the federation."21 It is irrelevant in this respect whether a PanEurope as envisaged by Coudenhove may be classified as "federation" from the viewpoint of constitutional law. The real matter of concern is where the political center of gravity, the authority to government intervention, lies. The existence of interEuropean free trade and of extraEuropean trade barriers necessarily shifts the political authority to the central government which would induce the formation of pressure groups on a supranational level. The struggle for privileges and government intervention would even grow worse since national coalitions of groups would be added to the presentday coalitions of national parties and "classes."

As has been indicated, where there is struggle for privileges and government intervention, where there is interventionism or socialism, there can he only one central government—one planning authority. Complete abolition of the sovereignty of national governments is a prerequisite for European unification as envisaged by Coudenhove. But are the European nations willing and prepared to take such a significant step? The Destruction of Agriculture. CoudenhoveKalergi outlines a means which is to lessen the harmful intermediary consequences which the abolition of interEuropean trade barriers would bring 21 Ibid., p. 175.

78 DOCTRINES AND PLANS OF UNIFICATION about. 'In Europe," says Coudenhove, "a sufficient amount of land is still available for allotment; agrarian reforms could in most countries provide sufficient land to absorb the workers thrown out of employment by the abolition of customs frontiers and of the national industries." 22 As was demonstrated in the foregoing, agriculture in countries like Germany and Belgium would suffer severely if tariff protection were abolished. Thousands of farms with high costs of production would become unprofitable. Consequently they would be bought up and incorporated into larger land holdings with lower costs of production or would ultimately be more intensively cultivated as gardens, land for greenhouses, etc. If Coudenhove were to nationalize the large land holdings in order to distribute them among idle workers, he would counteract the effects of his own policy. At first he would bring about a tendency towards larger units of farming by making thousands of farms unremunerative.

Then he would embark upon the destruction of larger units and partition them into smaller units with high costs of production. At the end, there would be few producing farm units left. Does Coudenhove really believe that all these consequences would be willingly borne by the nations of Europe for the sake of unification? Property Rights Disregarded. It evidently does not occur to Coudenhove that the land which he would like to distribute to the unemployed is now the property of someone. Coudenhove fails to explain what will happen if the owner should refuse to sell his estate. Should he be forcibly removed from his property or be imprisoned for failing to sell as ordered by some authority? Nor does Coudenhove enter into a discussion as to whether the unemployed are to purchase this land, or whether they are to receive it from the European government as compensation for the loss of employment.

Furthermore, he does not discuss the important problem of farm equipment. But these are minor technical questions about which Coudenhove does not bother. The Individual's Freedom of Choice of Job Disregarded. Let us assume, however, for the sake of further illustration, that sufficient land is still available for nationalization and redistribution. It is inconceivable that millions of jobless of all walks of life should be willing to begin the life of a farmer for the sake of European unification. Thousands of workers of the Dutch heavy industry, for instance, engineers, foremen, accountants, clerks, directors, and secretaries, are to take up farming according to the plan of Coudenhove. What, however, are their alternatives if they do not choose 22 Ibid., p. 189.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY UNION 79 to be farmers? Coudenhove refuses to answer. There is no question that all these people would rather vote against the realization of the plans of Coudenhove than to be subject to such planning. Agrarian Reform Unrealistic. It is no less unrealistic to assume that the workers thrown out of employment by European unification will migrate from one country to another to begin life on a farm. The jobless Dane, Dutch, or German does not voluntarily choose to settle on a farm in France or Spain, or the Frenchman in Denmark or Germany.23 It is also unrealistic to believe that the French government, for example, would nationalize large landholdings and expropriate its French owners so that Dutch, Belgians, Italians, and Germans could settle and take over. Coudenhove s Program a Socialist Program. His plan of unification is unrealistic and fantastic. It is simply the result of daydreaming and worthless with respect to understanding the problem of European unification. CoudenhoveKalergi's plan of PanEurope and the support which it finds in presentday Europe demonstrate the superficiality of presentday political and economic thought. We do not find anywhere in his treatise the slightest trace of economic reasoning; yet, "the foundation of a United Europe is economic,"