Liberty and Organization

Well, that is precisely. what Anarchism favors. Individualo ism does not want such organization any longer than is neces .sary. Neither does Anarchism. Mr. Levy's assumption thilt Anarchism ·doe,s not .want such organization. at all arises from histailure to recognize the Anarchistic definition of .govern. ment. Government' has been. tiefined repeatedly in these columns as the stibJ~ction of the non-invasive individual to a will not his own. The subjection of the invasive individual is not goveJ;.nment,but tesistan<;;eto and protection from gov ernme~t. By these definitions government is always an evil; but resistance to it is never an evil ora· poison. Call such resistance an antidote if you will, but remember that ,not·. aU antidotes. are poisonous. The worst that can be said of resistance or protectio~ is, not that it is an evil, but that ·it is a loss· of productive force in a necessary effort to .over come evil. It can be called an evil only in the sense that ne~dful and not· especially healthful labor can be' called .a curse.

GQvernmentis invasion, and the State is the embodiment 44 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY of invasion in an individual, or band of individuals, assum ing to act as representatives or masters of the entire people within a given area. The Anarchists are opposed to all gov... ernment, and especially to the St~te as the worst. governor and chief invader. From Liberty's standpoint, there are not three positions,. but two: one, that of the authoritarian Socialists, favoring governme1tt and the State; the other, that of the Individualists and Anarchists, against government and the State. I may add, in conclusion, that very probably the disposi tion of the Individualist to give greater prominence than does the Anarchist to the necessity of organization for· pro tection is due to the fact that he seems to see less clearly than the Anarchist that the necessity for defence against individ ual invaders is largely and perhaps, in the end, wholly due to the oppressions of the invasive State, and that when the State falls, criminals will begin to disappear.

«Whatever else Anarchism may mean, it means that State coercion of peaceable citizens, into cooperation in restraining the activity of Bill Sikes, is to be condemned and ought to be abolished. Anarchism implies the right of an individual to stand aside and see a man murdered or a woman raped. It implies the right of the would-be passive accomplice of ag gression to escape all coercion. It is true the Anarchist may voluntarily cooperate to check aggression; but also he may not. Qua Anarchist, he is within his right in withholding such cooperation, in leaving others to bear the burden of resistance to aggression, or in leaving the aggressor to triumph unchecked. Individualism, on the other hand, would not only restrain the active invader up to the point necessary to restore freedom to others, but would also coerce the man who would otherwise be a passive witness of, or conniver at"ag gression into cooperation against his more active colleague."

The foregoing paragraph occurs in any ably-written article· by Mr. J. H. Levy in the Personal Rights Journal. The writer's evident intention was to put Anarchism in an unfavorable light by stating its principles, or one of them, in a very offensive way. At the same time it was his intention also to be fair,-that is, not to distort the doctrine of Anarchism, and he has not distorted it. I reprint the paragraph in INDIVIDUAL LIBER.TY 4S editorial type for the purpose of giving it,as an Anarchist~ myentire approval, barring the stigma sought to be conveyed by the words' ((accomplice" and Uconniver/' If a man will but state the truth as I see it, he may state it as baldly as he pleases;•I will accept it still. The Anarchists are not afraid of. their principles. It is far more satisfactory to have one's, position, stated baldly and accurately by an' opponent who understands it than in a .genial:tmilk-and-water, and inaccurate fashion by an ignoramus.

It is agreed, then, that, in Anarchism's view, an individual has a right to stand aside and see a man .murdered. And pray, why, not? ·If it is justifiable to collar, a man who is minding his.own business and force him into a :fight, why may we not also, collar,.him for the" purpose' of forcing him to help us to coerce ,3 parent into educating his child, or to commit any other act of invasion that may seem to us for the general good? I· ca.u see,no ethical distinction here whatever. It is' true that Mr. Levy, ,in the succeeding paragraphs, justifies the collaring a-fthenon-cooperative individual on the ground of necessity. (I note ,here' that this is the same .ground on which' Citizen Most proposes to collar the non-eo-operator in his communistic enterprises· and make him work for love.instead of wages.) But some other, motive than necessity must have been. in Mr. Levy's 'mind, unconsciously, when he wrote the paragraph which I have quoted. Else why does he deny that the non cooperator is ((within his right"? 1 can understand the man .~hQin a crisis justifies no matter what form of compulsion on the ground of sheer necessity, but I cannot understand the mean who denies the right of the individual thus coerced to ,resist such .' compulsion and insist on pursuing his own inde pendent course. It is precisely this denial, however, that Mr.

Levy makes; otherwise his phrase ((within his right" is mea.ningless. , .But however this may be, let us look at the plea of neces sity. .Mr..Levy claims that the cdercion of the peaceful non cooperator is necessary. Necessary to wh~t? Necessary, answers Mr. Le~y, Hin ,order that freedom may be at the maximum." Supposing for the moment that this ,is true, another inquiry suggests itself: Is the absolute maximum of freedom an end to be attained at any cost? I regard liberty as the .chief essential to man's happiness~ and therefore as the 4'6 INDIVIDU AL LIBER TY most important thing in the world, and I certainly want as much of it as I can get. But I cannot see that it concerns roe much whether the aggregate amount of liberty enjoyed by all individuals added together is at its maximum or a little below it, if I, as one individual, am to have little or none of this ag gregate. If, however, I am to have as much liberty as others, and if others are to have as much as I, then, feeling secure in what we have, it will behoove us all undoubtedly to try to :attain the maximum of liberty compatible with this condition of equality. Which brings. us back to the familiar law of equalliberty,-the greatest amount of individual liberty com patible with the equality of liberty. But this maximum of liberty is a very different thing from that which is to be at tained, according to the hypothesis, only by violating equality of liberty. For, certainly, to coerce the peaceful non-co-oper ;ator is to violate equality of liberty. If my neighbor believes in cooperation and I. do not, and if he has liberty to choose to cooperate while I have no liberty to choose not to co-oper ate, then there is no equality of liberty between us.. Mr.

Levy's position is analogous to that of a man who should propose to despoil certain individuals of peacefully and hon estly acquired wealth on the ground that such spoliation is necessary in order that wealth may be at the'maximum. Of course Mr. Levy would answer to this that the hypothesis is absurd, and that the maximum could not be so attained; but .he clearly would have to admit, if pressed, that, even if it could,' the end is not important enough to justify such means. To be logical he must make the same admission regarding his owiJ. proposition. But after all, is the hypothesis any more absurd in the one case than in the other? I think· not. It seems to me just as impossible to attain the maximum of liberty by depriving people of their liberty as to attain the maximum of wealth by depriving people of their wealth. In fact, it seems to me that in both cases the means is· absolutely destructive of the end.

Mr. Levy wishes to restri~t the functions of .government; now, the compulsory cooperation that he advocates is the chief obstacle in the way of such restriction. To be sure, government restricted by the removal of this obstacle would no longer be government, as Mr. Levy is uquick-witted enough to see" (to return the compliment which he pays the IN DI V I D U ALL I B E R T Y 47 Anarchists). But what of that? It would still be a power for preventing those invasive acts which the people are practi cally agreed,in wanting to prevent. If. it should attempt to go heyond this, it would be !promptlycheckedby a diminution of the supplies.'· The power to cut off,the supplies is the most e1fective weapon against tyranny. To say, as Mr. Levy does,. thatCCtaxation •must be coextensive with government" is not the proper way to put it. It is government (or, rather, the State).,that must and will be coextensive with. taxation. When compulsory taxation is, abolished, there, -will·be no State, and the defensive institution-that will succeed it will be, steadily deterred from becoming an invasive institution through fear that the voluntary contributions will falloff. This constant motive tor a voluntary defensive institution to keep itself trimmed down to the popular demand is itself the best possible safeguard .against the bugbear of multitudinous rival, political agencies which seems to haunt Mr. Levy. He says that the voluntary taxationists are victims of an illusion. The' charg~ might' be made against himself with much' more reason.