Chapter 15: 15. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor! This is No Drill! “Intelligence” Supplied Hawaiian Commanders was Limited

Unlike the top administration and military officials in Washington, the armed forces in Hawaii did not have a “Purple” machine or access to MAGIC. The Hawaiian commanders did not even know of their existence. They knew Washington had information not available to them and had to rely on Washington to be kept informed. When they asked for information so as to be able to make informed decisions in the field, they were usually assured that they were being sent what they needed to know. As a matter of fact, it was Washington policy not to forward diplomatic intercepts to the forces in the field so as to safeguard MAGIC. The large department staffs in Washington were considered better qualified to evaluate the bits and pieces of data in relation to the political situation than were the smaller staffs in the field, and the field commanders were “assured” that they “would get what [they] needed at the time [they] needed it.”^[1]

The commanders in Hawaii received some advice by way of telegraphic reports from Washington and the Philippines. But otherwise, the information available to them was what they gleaned from “intercepting all Japanese naval traffic, and of attacking all the Japanese naval systems contained in that traffic with the exception of one system, which was being worked on in Washington, and in Cavite.” They had “a radio intelligence unit whose duties were to obtain all information available from the Japanese naval traffic by means other than cryptanalysis,” and they had a “mid-Pacific direction-finding unit.”^[2] They also received reports from observers, analyzed directional radio beams, and decoded and translated Japanese messages transmitted in PA-K2 and certain lower classified, nondiplomatic codes.^[3]

It was obvious to the Hawaiian commanders from the cables they received from Washington, as well as from accounts appearing in the Hawaiian press concerning the Japanese-U.S. conversations, that relations between the two countries were tense. On November 27, General Short was advised that “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes.” Short was asked “to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as . . . necessary but . . . not . . . to alarm civil population.”^[4] To minimize the damage that might be done by local Japanese who were antagonistic to the United States, Short alerted for sabotage and so advised Washington.^[5]

Hawaiian Commanders Warned of Japanese Threat to Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, Borneo

On November 27, fleet Commander-in-Chief Kimmel in Hawaii was sent a “war warning” advising that Japanese troops were apparently preparing “an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo.” The same cable also went to fleet Commander-in-Chief Hart in Manila. Both commanders were told to implement WPL-46, the U.S. war plan then in effect, which provided for preparing to take offensive action.^[6] Then on November 28, Short was advised that “all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities . . . to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage.” He took this as Washington approval of his earlier sabotage alert.^[7]

With all clues pointing to a war with Japan erupting in southeast Asia, Short and Kimmel expected their primary concerns would be to defend the mid-Pacific U.S. outposts—Guam, Wake, and Midway—and to carry out WPL-46 by attacking the Japanese-held Marshall Islands. They continued drilling their men and preparing for war. Kimmel was directed from Washington to reinforce Wake and Midway with men and planes. So on November 28 and December 5, he sent out from Hawaii two task forces, under heavy security and in a state of combat readiness,^[8] with reinforcements for Wake and Midway.^[9]

War in the west Pacific appeared imminent indeed to readers of page one of the Sunday, November 30, Honolulu Advertiser. A banner headline read, KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE. The story that followed quoted a former State Department adviser warning the Japanese ambassador that the United States was ready to fight if Japan did not mend her aggressive ways in Asia. Another story on the paper’s front page suggested that it might be the Japanese encirclement of the Philippines that would spark the war. Still another story, datelined Singapore, reported that a Japanese strike was expected there and that in the interest of preparedness all troops had been called back to barracks.

But then the situation seemed to ease. Nomura and Kurusu in Washington asked the U.S. government to continue their conversations. U.S. officials in Washington who were reading MAGIC knew this was merely a ruse to permit Japan to stall for time; they had read Tokyo’s November 29 instructions to the two Japanese ambassadors to “please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.”^[10] But the Hawaiian commanders did not know this. The lengthy meeting of Secretary of State Hull with the two Japanese envoys on Monday, December 1, was reported in the Hawaiian press, giving the impression that the crisis was over, at least for the time being. An Associated Press story in The Honolulu Star-Bulletin datelined Tokyo, December 5, reinforced this impression:

A Japanese government spokesman expressed the belief today that the United States and Japan will “continue with sincerity to find a common formula for a peaceful solution in the Pacific”.^[11]

A December 6 story was headlined NEW PEACE EFFORT URGED IN TOKYO—JOINT COMMISSION TO IRON OUT DEADLOCK WITH U.S. PROPOSED. In Hawaii it looked as if the immediate crisis had passed, even though another December 6 story struck a more ominous note: JAP PRESS ASKS FOR WAR.^[12]

On the basis of radio intelligence, Commander Joseph John Rochefort, officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, noted two significant factors. The Japanese, who usually changed their radio call signs no more often than once every six months, introduced new call signs on December 1, just one month after their last previous change.^[13] Rochefort considered it ominous also when he realized he had lost track of the Japanese aircraft carriers.^[14] It was considered possible that they “were still located in home waters”^[15] communicating with radio waves too weak to be picked up in Hawaii. However, Rochefort thought that they might be “moving eastward.”^[16] As a matter of fact, he had located practically the entire Japanese fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor “in a negative sense.” He had lost them; he didn’t know where they were.^[17]

Rochefort called the loss of contact with the Japanese carriers to the attention of Commander Edwin Thomas Layton, fleet intelligence officer and combat intelligence officer. Layton “showed the location, to the best of [his] knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet”^[18] on his “Communication Intelligence Summary.” He shared this report with Kimmel on December 2, at his usual 8:15 a.m. briefing.^[19]

Layton: Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. . . . We haven’t seen the carriers except Cardiv 3 [Carrier Division 3] and sometimes Cardiv 4. . . . I felt apprehensive. . . . I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully 15 and possibly 25 days.

Kimmel: What, you do not know where the carriers are? . . . Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?

Layton: [If they were,] I hoped they would be sighted before now.^[20]

Dawn on Sunday at Pearl Harbor

It was clearly recognized in Hawaii that the way to assure against a surprise air attack was to conduct long-range air-patrol reconnaissance. But Hawaii had nowhere nearly enough planes, trained pilots, fuel, or spare parts. As Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander, Patrol Wing Two at Pearl Harbor, later testified:

[T]o be reasonably sure that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would have required an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 25-mile radius of visibility, this would have required a daily 16½ hour flight of 50 PBY-5 planes. This, in turn, would have necessitated a force of not less than 150 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well-trained personnel. We had 81 patrol planes in the whole Hawaiian area, including Midway.^[21]

Because of the shortage, the Hawaiian patrols were “operating on a shoestring.”^[22]

“The Fleet operating areas were searched daily,” and as planes were available rotational sweeps were conducted of those sectors thought to be most dangerous. The planes accompanying the task forces sent out from Hawaii to Wake and Midway were also scouting morning and afternoon over 60° sectors to 300 miles on either bow.^[23] On the morning of December 7 three patrol planes were in the air over the fleet operating areas at Pearl Harbor and four other planes were aloft, carrying out exercises with submarines. This was in addition to the three task forces at sea that “were conducting a regular wartime search by aircraft and destroyers, as required by fleet orders.”^[24]

During the early morning hours of December 7, the USS Ward, captained by Lieutenant William Woodward Outerbridge, was steaming back and forth at low speed patrolling the sea lanes converging on Pearl Harbor.^[25] Outerbridge’s orders were that “any submarine operating in the restricted area—not operating in the submarine areas and not escorted—should be attacked.”^[26]

Two minutes before 4:00 a.m. a blinker signal from the minesweeper Condor informed the Ward that it had sighted “a suspicious object” believed to be a submarine “apparently heading for the entrance” of the harbor. “Outerbridge immediately ordered the ship to general quarters. . . . The ship sprang to life.” For nearly an hour she combed a wide area in the dark, conducting a sonar search. Nothing was located. So the men aboard the Ward relaxed.^[27]

But then at 6:37 a.m. Outerbridge was again aroused from his bunk. This time he saw the U.S. target ship Antares towing a raft to Pearl Harbor. Between ship and raft the lieutenant saw “a smaller object which had no right to be there . . . a submarine conning tower . . . unlike any submarine’s silhouette with which he was familiar.” In view of his orders to attack any unauthorized submarine in the area, Outerbridge did not hesitate: “Load all guns and stand by to commence firing.” The first shot was a near miss. “Number 3 gun opened up . . . on the pointer fire, like a squirrel rifle, with a point-blank range of 75 yards. . . . [T]he projectile was seen to strike the conning tower.” And the submarine disappeared from view. The Ward then reported its next move: “We have dropped depth charges on sub operating in defensive area.” Then a few minutes later a follow-up message: WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE AREA.^[28] It was 6:53 a.m. Hawaii time.^[29]

In 1941, the Army was in the process of installing three large fixed radars on high ground in Hawaii, and six mobile radar units. This new radar service was operative daily from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m. only, the hours Short considered “the most dangerous time for an air attack.”^[30] But on Saturday, December 6, the Signal Corps “obtained permission of the control officer to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7.”^[31] However, on that morning Opana radar station actually happened to stay open a little longer. Private Joseph L. Lockard, out of personal interest and a desire for experience, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, who wanted to learn plotting, had volunteered to experiment overtime.

Shortly after 7 a.m., Lockard detected on the radar screen a large flight of aircraft bearing north at a distance of about 136 miles. He was “confused” by what he saw. A few minutes after 7, when it got down to about 132 miles, he called the information center, but no one was around.

[I]t was the largest group [he] had ever seen on the oscilloscope. . . . Then we continued to follow the flight and to plot it, till it got within about 22 miles—20 to 22 miles of the Island, at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area.^[32]

At that time radar was still rather primitive, basically experimental; there was no proper identification system to determine friend from foe, so these planes could not be identified.^[33]

At 7:20 Lockard reached Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler on duty at Aircraft Warning Center and reported his sightings. Tyler discounted the report for several reasons. The planes sighted could be from our own two task forces at sea; they could be from Army’s Hickam Field; or they could be B-17s en route from the west coast to the Philippines and due to arrive about then in Hawaii.^[34] Reassured that his sighting “was not anything of importance,” Lockard and Elliott closed down the radar installation and left for breakfast.^[35]

Air Raid Pearl Harbor STOP This is No Drill

At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, the sun rose at 6:27 a.m.^[36]

At 7:33, Marshall’s last-minute message, announcing the instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s reply at precisely 1:00 p.m. Washington time (7:30 a.m. Honolulu time), had arrived, in code, at Western Union in downtown Honolulu.^[37] It had to be sent for decoding to the Army’s cryptographic center at Fort Shafter, four miles away, before it could be read.

At 7:55 (1:25 p.m. in Washington, D.C.) the first Japanese planes swooped down simultaneously at Hawaii’s Army air base at Hickam Field and at Hawaii’s Navy air base on Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately the first Japanese torpedoes struck their targets in the harbor.^[38]

At 7:58 Vice Admiral Patrick Nelson Lynch Bellinger, commander of Patrol Wing Two at the naval air station on Ford Island, broadcast to all ships in the area, “Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill.” With the emergency, the Naval Base Defense Air Force immediately became functional, and orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 8:05.^[39]

Within minutes of the attack, Kimmel cabled the Navy Department. Official notification of the attack was received in Washington at 1:50 p.m., Washington time, by dispatch as follows:^[40]

AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT [sic] DRILL.

The Attack News Reaches the Navy Department

At about 1:30 p.m., as Navy Secretary Knox, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, and possibly Admiral Turner were coming out of a meeting at the Navy Department, the first news of the attack on Pearl Harbor arrived. The “Air Raid” message, delivered by Commander Fernald from Navy Communications, was handed to Knox.

Knox’s immediate response was, “My God, this can’t be true, this must mean the Philippines.”^[41]

“No, sir,” Stark said, “this is Pearl.”^[42] Stark knew “This is no drill” were agreed-upon code words to indicate an actual outbreak of hostilities.

The Attack News Reaches the White House

On hearing the news, Knox “immediately called on the White House phone and spoke to the president.” It was 1:40 p.m. Knox “simply stated what was in the message . . . [Knox] had no further details and . . . [FDR] would be kept advised.”^[43]

Roosevelt was finishing a late lunch with Harry Hopkins. The president couldn’t believe what he had heard. Nor could Hopkins; he didn’t think Japan would dare to attack Honolulu. “There must be some mistake,” he said.^[44] But there was no mistake.

FDR immediately began telephoning. He called Hull. He called Marshall. He called Stimson. And FDR began receiving phone calls too, from persons all around the world. Winston Churchill was among the callers.

It was Sunday evening in England when Churchill heard the news on a small wireless radio in his dining room at Chequers, the Prime Minister’s residence just outside London. With him at the time were U.S. Ambassador John Winant and Averell Harriman, then a special representative of the president with ambassadorial rank. Churchill immediately placed a call to Roosevelt:

“Mr. President,” he began, “what’s this about Japan?”

“They have attacked us at Pearl Harbour,” FDR replied. “We are all in the same boat now.”

Winant spoke briefly with FDR, and then Churchill got back on the line. “This certainly simplifies things,” he said. “God be with you,” or words to that effect. According to Churchill, Winant and Harriman

took the shock with admirable fortitude. . . . They did not wail or lament that their country was at war. They wasted no words in reproach or sorrow. In fact, one might almost have thought they had been delivered from a long pain.^[45]

The Attack News Reaches the War Department

A very few minutes after the news was picked up out of the air on the west coast, the news reached the War Department in Washington via the Navy. At about 1:30 p.m. a Navy enlisted man, all out of breath, rushed into Marshall’s office. Colonel Deane was there trying to round up men, so as to have the office open on a skeleton basis by 3:00 p.m. that afternoon as Marshall had directed. The Navy messenger was carrying a penciled note, supposedly a message from the Navy radio operator at Honolulu: PEARL HARBOR ATTACKED. THIS IS NO DRILL. Deane immediately telephoned Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message. Marshall directed Deane to contact Hawaii if possible to verify the report. Deane tried to phone, but the operator questioned his authority and refused to put the call through to Pearl Harbor, even though Deane was calling from Marshall’s office. By this time a more official report came in confirming the attack.^[46]

The Attack News Reaches the State Department

In line with the instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura phoned the State Department at about noon to ask for a 1:00 p.m. appointment with Secretary of State Hull. Hull had read the decoded Japanese intercepts that morning—the 14-part reply to our note of November 26, and the “One p.m. Message”—so he knew what to expect. However, the two ambassadors didn’t appear at 1:00. Rather they phoned again a few minutes after 1:00 asking to have their appointment postponed until 1:45. Hull agreed.^[47]

He was still waiting for the ambassadors when the president telephoned from the White House shortly after 1:30. “There’s a report that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor.” FDR’s voice was steady but clipped. In view of his impending appointment with the ambassadors, Hull was especially interested. “Has the report been confirmed?” Not yet, the president said, but it would be checked.^[48]

The ambassadors arrived at the State Department and were in the diplomatic waiting room even as Hull and the president spoke. Hull kept them waiting while he consulted his advisers—Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser, and Joseph W. Ballantine, a foreign service officer, who had participated with Hull in most of his conversations with the Japanese. “The president has an unconfirmed report,” Hull told them, “that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Ambassadors are waiting to see me. . . . They are going to turn us down on our note of November 26,” he said. “Perhaps they want to tell us that war has been declared. I am rather inclined not to see them.”^[49]

Hull thought over the situation and finally decided that “since the president’s report had not been confirmed and there was one chance out of a hundred that it was not true, [he] would receive the envoys.” Hull summoned the ambassadors to his office.^[50]

When Nomura and Kurusu entered, Hull received them “coldly and did not ask them to sit down.” Nomura handed Hull his government’s note. Hull “naturally could give no indication” that he already knew its contents, so he “made a pretense” of glancing through it. When he had finished skimming the pages, he eyed Nomura. “I must say,” Hull said,

that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.^[51]

Nomura’s face was “impassive.” He seemed to be “under great emotional strain.” Hull thought Nomura was about to speak, but Hull stopped him with a motion of his hand and nodded toward the door. “The Ambassadors turned without a word and walked out, their heads down.”^[52]

The Attack News Reaches Secretary of War Stimson

The president telephoned Stimson at his home at just about 2:00 p.m. Stimson was still at lunch. “[I]n a rather excited voice,” the President asked, “Have you heard the news?”

“Well,” Stimson replied, “I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam.”

“Oh, no,” the president responded. “I don’t mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii.”

“Well,” Stimson thought, “that was an excitement indeed!”

His reference to “the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam” was to the British patrol’s sightings of large Japanese forces south of Indochina and moving up into the Gulf. It had appeared that

these forces were going to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three [Stimson, Hull, Knox] all thought that we must fight if the British fought.

That was the reason for their Sunday morning meeting at the State Department and for the position papers they had drafted—“to see whether or not we should all act together. . . . But now,” Stimson confided to his diary, “the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.”^[53] (Italics added)

The Afternoon in Marshall’s Office

Deane had phoned Marshall immediately after receiving the news of the attack. It was about a ten-minute drive from Marshall’s quarters at Fort Myer to his office in the War Department. Although it had taken Marshall a couple of hours to respond to Bratton’s frantic phone call that morning, this time Marshall reached his office within ten^[54] or fifteen^[55] minutes of receiving Deane’s telephone call.

Marshall had many phones in his office, all hung on the side of his desk. He had no sooner arrived than they all began to ring at once. A regular stream of phone calls started coming in. Deane gave Marshall one instrument and then another phone would ring. Roosevelt called on the direct line from the White House, asked Marshall what he knew, but Marshall had to admit that he didn’t know much. At that point another phone on the side of Marshall’s desk rang. Deane answered and when he finished talking, he inadvertently hung the phone on the Roosevelt connection on the side of Marshall’s desk, temporarily closing off the Roosevelt-Marshall conversation. Deane quickly shifted it, but he later recalled that his first act of the war had been to cut off a telephone conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Chief of Staff.^[56]

Marshall sent word of the attack out to all the corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world, particularly in the Philippines.^[57]

Roosevelt asked Marshall to come over to the White House right away and Marshall immediately dashed over.

The first call that came in after Marshall left was from a drunk in St. Louis, who had just heard what those “bastards” had done and offered to come to Washington to help Marshall out. Deane thanked the caller and said he would relay his offer to Marshall. To Deane, this incident illustrated how ill-prepared the Chief of Staff’s office was for the emergency; a call from a plain citizen had gotten through to Marshall’s office without any trouble. Yet Deane had had difficulty trying to call Pearl Harbor on behalf of the Chief of Staff. According to Deane, the War Department personnel that next week were all “at sixes and sevens . . . totally unprepared for what had happened.”^[58]

Stimson’s Afternoon

After hearing the news and finishing his lunch, Stimson returned to his office. He “started matters going in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the defense move.” Armed guards were stationed at the War Department building and also at Stimson’s estate. He offered to provide guards for the White House, but it was decided the FBI should stand guard there.^[59]

Stimson attended FDR’s meeting at the White House. Then at 4:00, he joined McCoy and the chiefs of the armed services, giving them “a little pep-up talk about getting right to work in the emergency.” He spent most of the afternoon in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, Patterson, McCoy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, the provost marshal general. The main topic of their conversation was the form the declaration of war should take. “Grenville Clark had drawn up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one.” They “all thought that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same time with Japan.” But that was “an open question.” However, Stimson thought there was now “no doubt about declaring war on Japan.”^[60]

When Stimson had first heard the news of Japan’s attack, his “first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.” Yet the news that came in from Hawaii during the afternoon was “very bad.” The Japanese seemed

to have sprung a complete surprise upon our fleet and [to] have caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses . . . hit our airfields there and . . . destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before they got off the ground.

It was “staggering,” Stimson wrote, “to see our people there, who [had] been warned long ago and were standing on the alert . . . so caught by surprise.” Nevertheless, his “dominant feeling” continued to be one of relief “in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed.” He felt that “this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.”^[61]

Sunday Afternoon at the White House

Soon after receiving the news of the attack, the White House became a beehive of activity. At 2:28 p.m. FDR had a phone call from Stark telling of the heavy losses suffered by the fleet during the first phase of the attack and reporting “some loss of life.” Stark discussed the next step with FDR, and the president “wanted him to execute the agreed orders to the Army and Navy in event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific.”^[62] At 2:30 Knox ordered all ships and stations to “Execute WPL-46 against Japan.”^[63]

Knox reached the White House almost immediately after Stark finished talking with the president. As Knox later confided, he found the president in the Oval Office, seated, and “as white as a sheet . . . visibly shaken.” The extent of the disaster, news of which was beginning to trickle in, really shook FDR. Knox thought Roosevelt “expected to get hit” by the Japanese, but that “he did not expect to get hurt.” It was not the attack itself, but the amount of the damage that shocked him.^[64]

FDR called in his secretary, Steve Early, and dictated a news release that Early was to give to the press immediately. A half hour later FDR dictated to Early a second press release.^[65]

Roosevelt’s oldest son, James, a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve, was on assignment in Washington at the time, as liaison between Marine Headquarters and the Office of the Coordinator of Information. He was off duty that Sunday afternoon when the White House phoned him at his home in the suburbs; his father wanted him at the White House right away. He “got there as fast as [he] could.” As he entered his father’s office, the first thing FDR said was “Hello, Jimmy. It’s happened.”^[66] As Elliott Roosevelt, James’ next younger brother wrote later, “it was the target, not the attack, that amazed him.”^[67]

Mrs. Roosevelt heard of the attack from an usher as her 30 luncheon guests of the day were leaving. FDR was occupied all that afternoon and evening with meetings, and Eleanor didn’t have a chance to talk with him until later. When she and the president did speak together briefly, it was her opinion that “in spite of his anxiety Franklin was in a way more serene than he had appeared in a long time.” She thought

it was steadying to know finally that the die was cast. One could no longer do anything but face the fact that this country was in a war; from here on, difficult and dangerous as the future looked, it presented a clearer challenge than the long uncertainty of the past.^[68]

FDR had a previously scheduled meeting of his principal advisers for 3:00 p.m., and they soon began arriving: Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark. In anticipation of this meeting, Marshall and Stimson had prepared papers on the status of U.S. military preparedness.

The atmosphere at the conference was “not too tense.” The participants all looked on Hitler as the real enemy. They thought “that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity.” FDR

discussed at length with Marshall the disposition of the troops and particularly the air force. . . . [Marshall] said he had ordered General MacArthur to execute “all the necessary movement required in event of an outbreak of hostilities with Japan.”

Many matters were dealt with at the meeting. Those present agreed that “some type of censorship had to be set up at once.” And the president “ordered the Japanese Embassy and all the consulates in the United States to be protected and ordered all Japanese citizens to be picked up and placed under careful surveillance.” When a move required the president to sign an executive order, he “instructed the person to whom he talked to go ahead and execute the order and he would sign it later.”^[69]

In view of the crisis, the president, at Hopkins’s suggestion, decided to call a special meeting of his entire cabinet for 8:30 that evening. He then asked also to have the congressional leaders come to the White House to confer with the president after the cabinet meeting was over.

CNO Stark Replies to Admiral Hart in Manila

For weeks, especially during the last few days, Washington’s attention had been riveted on the western Pacific and the likelihood of a Japanese landing in Thailand, the Kra peninsula, Singapore, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies. If the Japanese struck any of those areas, the British and Dutch were expected to fight. And if the British and Dutch fought, the United States was committed to helping them militarily. In view of the fact that our commitment was not only secret but also unconstitutional, the administration had been faced with a dilemma. The question had been, as Stimson stated on November 25, “how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”^[70] But if the Japanese attacked us, we would be justified in responding. Thus, the attack at Pearl Harbor had let us off the hook.

The Hart-Phillips cable, asking how Hart should respond to Creighton’s news from Singapore, was a reminder of the U.S. commitment to the British.^[71] The cable had reached Washington during the night of December 6–7, but because of the rash of Japanese intercepts it had not been decoded promptly. It became available only on the morning of December 7, and it was not until after the attack that Stark had a chance to reply. His answer referred to the incoming cable paragraph by paragraph. It was encoded and transmitted December 7, at 11:00 p.m. Washington time.^[72]

Stark agreed with Hart that the Japanese would be able to take the initiative in a war starting at that time, and he agreed also that the most important thing was “to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay barrier.” Stark approved of the defensive strategy suggested by Hart and Phillips, but reminded them of the “possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward,” that the Japanese might strike from the bases they had been constructing on their mid-Pacific mandated islands, the Marianas and the Carolines. As a matter of fact, Stark said,

a Japanese concentration may be established in Halmahera [an island of the Dutch East Indies between the Philippines and New Guinea] or Mindanao [the southernmost island of the Philippines itself] approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL44.

Stark approved of the Hart-Phillips proposals for coordinating U.S. army and navy operations and for U.S.-British cooperation. He said Marshall approved as well. Washington also okayed the idea of permitting the British Battle Fleet to use the naval base in Manila and asked “what additional personnel material and minor forces” were required “for the projected fleet base in Manila or alternatively in Mindanao.”

This reply was sent for action to Hart, for information to the secretary of navy, and to Kimmel. Copies went also to the British Admiralty Delegation and to the U.S. Army’s War Plans Division. Hart was to inform the British and Dutch. The U.S.-British plans for cooperation, conceived months before in London, Washington, and Singapore, when the United States was still officially neutral, were now being put into operation.

A message from the U.S. naval attaché in Australia, Merle-Smith, the transmission of which had been held up 17 hours at the request of the Australian authorities, was also received in Washington on December 7. It reported on the threatening movement of the Japanese in the southeast Pacific. A strike from the Japanese island of Pelau, aimed at Menado, on the northern coast of Celebes, Dutch East Indies, and/or at Ambon, appeared imminent. The Dutch had ordered execution of plan A–2, calling for joint operations by the Australians and the Dutch. And the Dutch Indies forces were mobilizing.^[73]

FDR’s Evening Meetings with Cabinet and Congressional Leaders

As the cabinet officers entered the Oval Office for the 8:30 p.m. meeting, the president was seated at his desk. He nodded to everyone as they came in, but there was

none of the usual cordial, personal greeting. This was one of the few occasions he couldn’t muster a smile. However, he was calm, not agitated. He was concentrated; all of his mind and all of his faculties were on the one task of trying to find out what had really happened.^[74]

The members of the cabinet faced him in a semi-circle. FDR’s secretary, Steve Early, sat at his side.

Knox’s face was drawn and white. Before the meeting started he confided to Stimson that “we had lost seven of the eight battleships in Hawaii.” (As Stimson wrote in his diary, “This, however, proved later to be exaggerated.”)^[75]

FDR opened by saying that “this was the most serious meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861.”^[76] He began in a low voice, looking down at the dispatches before him as he talked. “You all know what’s happened. The attack began at 1:00 [actually 1:25 p.m. Washington time]. We don’t know very much yet.”^[77]

Someone, probably Attorney General Francis Biddle, spoke up. “Mr. President, several of us have just arrived by plane. We don’t know anything except a scare headline, ‘Japs Attack Pearl Harbor.’ Could you tell us?” The president asked Knox to tell the story, which he did, with interpolations by Stimson, Hull, and Roosevelt.^[78]

Dispatches were being brought in every few minutes during the meeting, and FDR enumerated the blows that had befallen us at Hawaii. He “had hastily drawn a draft of a message” he was planning to present to Congress, and “he then read [it] to us slowly.” It was very brief.^[79]

The Cabinet meeting lasted for at least three-quarters of an hour. Then the congressional leaders, who had been waiting below, were called in. Among those who appeared were: Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally, Senator Warren R. Austin, Senator Hiram W. Johnson, Senator Alben Barkley, and Senator Charles L. McNary. And Representatives: Speaker Sam Rayburn, Foreign Affairs Chairman Sol Bloom, Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, Majority Floor Leader John W. McCormack, Minority Floor Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr.^[80]

The president began by giving them

a very frank story of what had happened, including our losses. The effect on the Congressmen was tremendous. They sat in dead silence and even after the recital was over they had very few words [to say]. The president asked if they would invite him to appear before the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going to say to them because events were changing so rapidly.^[81]

The White House meeting didn’t wind up until after 11:00. As the cabinet officers and congressional leaders were filing out, Postmaster General Frank Walker said to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, “I think the Boss really feels more relief than he has had for weeks.”^[82] She agreed.

Mrs. Perkins wrote later,

A great change had come over the president since we had seen him on Friday. Then, he had been tense, worried, trying to be optimistic as usual, but it was evident that he was carrying an awful burden of decision. The Navy on Friday had thought it likely it would be Singapore and the English ports if the Japanese fleet meant business. What should the United States do in that case? I don’t know whether he had decided in his own mind; he never told us; he didn’t need to. But one was conscious that night of December 7, 1941, that in spite of the terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the Navy and its ships, and to his confidence in the American Intelligence Service, and in spite of the horror that war had actually been brought to us, he had, nevertheless, a much calmer air. His terrible moral problem had been resolved by the event.^[83]

Looking Back

A few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, FDR and his confidential adviser Hopkins dined alone together. On that occasion, the president told Hopkins

about several talks with Hull relative to the loopholes in our foreign policy in the Far East in so far as that concerned the circumstances on which the United States would go to war with Japan in event of certain eventualities. All of Hull’s negotiations, while in general terms indicating that we wished to protect our rights in the Far East, would never envisage the tough answer to the problem that would have to be faced if Japan attacked, for instance, either Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. The president felt it was a weakness in our policy that we could not be specific on that point. The president told [Hopkins] that he felt that an attack on the Netherlands East Indies should result in war with Japan and he told [Hopkins] that Hull always ducked that question.^[84]

Hopkins had talked with the president many times over the previous year, and

it always disturbed him [FDR] because he really thought that the tactics of the Japanese would be to avoid a conflict with us; that they would not attack either the Philippines or Hawaii but would move on Thailand, French Indo-China, make further inroads on China itself and possibly attack the Malay Straits. He also thought they would attack Russia at an opportune moment. This would have left the president with the very difficult problem of protecting our interests [in the Far East].

He always realized that Japan would jump on us at an opportune moment and they would merely use the “one by one” technique of Germany. Hence, his great relief at the method that Japan used. In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the blitz-warfare with the Japanese during the first few weeks, it completely solidified the American people and made the war upon Japan inevitable.^[85]

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Judging from reports of a number of the president’s intimate associates who saw him on December 7, after he had learned of the Japanese attack, he was unquestionably more soothed than surprised by the news. He was truly flabbergasted at the actual site of the attack, and he was shaken by the large unexpected losses to his beloved Navy. However, it came as a relief to him that Japan had not bypassed American territory to attack the British or Dutch.

FDR had faced a domestic dilemma. The New Deal had failed to end the depression. Unemployment in 1939 was as high as when he took office in 1933. Only Selective Service and the war orders of France and England had succeeded in eliminating unemployment. Increased employment in the United States had been financed first by French and British gold and then, under lend-lease, by inflation and increased public debt. Without such continued war production, the New Deal, on which FDR’s great popularity rested, would have been revealed as an illusion and the economic catastrophe it really was. Roosevelt continued to improvise new policies and new programs to prevent such a revelation.

To put off the day of reckoning and divert public attention from his domestic failures, he had become more and more involved in foreign affairs. As Japan struggled to protect her Asian markets and sources of supply from ever-increasing communist disruptions, FDR had taken step-by-step actions to support China and to strangle the Japanese economy. He had also joined in “parallel actions” with the British and Dutch to blockade Japan and to prevent her attempts to extend her trade and influence on the Asian mainland.

Because of her straitened economic circumstances, Japan was under pressure to obtain from southeast Asia, by fair means or foul, the oil and other products she needed but which we refused to let her buy. Time and time again, Joseph Grew, our ambassador in Japan, had warned FDR that our embargo was starving Japan economically and that he feared it would eventually lead to war. Yet his warnings went unheeded. Moreover, FDR had given secret assent to naval and military agreements to provide American “armed support” to the British and Dutch if Japan should strike their southeast Asian territories, which seemed likely as Japan drove south for the resources she needed.

Several clues were available in Washington from the reading of MAGIC, which indicated that the Japanese were planning aggressive action against the United States itself. Yet these indications were largely ignored, or at least not recognized by the authorities as serious enough to warrant taking decisive measures, except to plead for more time to prepare for war. As a result, the military commanders in the field remained inadequately alerted to the impending threat.

As the extent of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe trickled in, the enormity of Washington’s negligence began to become apparent. The authorities then tried to conceal their responsibility and to cover their tracks. The tale of the subsequent investigations and the attempted Washington cover-up is dealt with in Part II of this book, “The Fruits of Infamy.”