Chapter 18: 18. The Cover-up Begins The First Week After the Attack in Washington

After the attack, the efforts of U.S. citizens immediately turned in three directions: (1) to avenge the “dastardly act;” (2) to investigate the damage done by the Japanese; and (3) to understand the reasons for the attack. Among top Washington officials, civil and military, there was a fourth concern, namely to prevent public knowledge of any acts of commission or omission on their part that might have contributed to the tragedy and to conceal any implication of their possible complicity or responsibility for having provoked the attack.

The members of Congress were anxious to learn as much as possible about the Pearl Harbor disaster, and they promptly set the wheels in motion to conduct various investigations. Senator David L. Walsh of Massachusetts and Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairmen respectively of the Senate and House naval affairs committees, met with Admiral Stark on December 8. They asked him just how much damage had actually been done to the ships at Pearl Harbor.^[1] Stark answered by giving exact details: Four ships sunk—the Arizona, California, West Virginia, and Olgala—two ships capsized—the Oklahoma and the Utah—and 12 other ships damaged, some heavily.^[2]

Walsh immediately called a meeting of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia and several others advised Walsh to go directly to the president. “[A]sk him to tell the truth to the American people.” Walsh “agreed that the truth should be told, but,” as a former member of the America First Committee who had opposed Roosevelt’s foreign policy, he “was hesitant at first to be the one to go to the president with such a request. After further urging, however, he agreed to do so.”^[3] When Walsh asked FDR to tell the American people the truth about Pearl Harbor, the president “flew into a rage.” He demanded Walsh divulge the source of his information. Walsh acknowledged that “it came directly from the Navy and Admiral Stark.” Roosevelt responded, “Stark should never have given out the facts about Pearl Harbor,” not even to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Then referring to the battleships sunk, Roosevelt said, “Why in hell should we admit that they’re sunk? They’re resting in only a couple of feet of water; we’ll raise ‘em!”^[4]

On December 10, Walsh publicly acknowledged that President Roosevelt must be the judge of information about war operations to be given to the American public. “For that reason, the committee will make no effort to question naval officials on the extent of ship losses at Pearl Harbor.” He was satisfied, he said, that the president had told all he could. “The president, as Commander in Chief,” Walsh continued, “is in the position of having to determine the line of demarcation between giving as much information as possible to the American public and of refraining from giving information that will be comforting to the enemy.”^[5]

On December 10, Harry S. Truman, then chairman of the Senate Defense Investigating Committee, announced that his committee “believes that it should not investigate military and naval strategy or tactics” and that therefore “no attempt will be made to inquire into the circumstances of the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor Sunday.”^[6]

Squelching Rumors and Keeping Wartime Secrets

MAGIC had always been a closely guarded secret, of course, and now it was most imperative, for the sake of the war effort, to keep the Japanese from knowing that their “Purple” code had been broken. As the enormity of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe became apparent, the top Washington officials realized more strongly than ever that they would have to keep the public from learning how much had been known about Japanese affairs in Washington before the attack. Otherwise, they would be asked to explain why, when they had had so much information, the Army and Navy in Hawaii had had so little, and why our military forces in Hawaii had been so poorly prepared. To preserve their own reputations, therefore, Washington officials who had been privy to MAGIC had to maintain its secrecy.

A meeting to discuss Pearl Harbor was held shortly after the attack in the office of the director of Naval Communications, presided over either by Admiral Noyes, director of ONI, or Captain Redman, assistant director of Naval Communications. A “whispering campaign” against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the 14th Naval District, Hawaii, “was then getting in full swing.”^[7] Noyes told his subordinates

there were altogether too many rumors running around the Navy Department and people running to the newspapers . . . getting in the newspapers and on the radio . . . saying all manner of things against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which were not true, that we had to put a stop to . . . these rumors ourselves, if we knew anything let it die with us . . . and not originate any rumors ourselves.^[8]

The section heads were given “standing orders not to talk, not to spread the gossip against Kimmel and Bloch, to keep anything we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to testify officially.” They were told to “pass that word on to [their] subordinates.”^[9] They should

tell all [their] people not to talk, there was too much loose talk going around, that there would undoubtedly be an investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would be called before that investigation and permitted to say all they had to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out anything to destroy it immediately.^[10]

Anyone who had kept “any notes or anything in writing” should destroy them immediately. If these papers weren’t destroyed, there was a chance “somebody might see them and start something” the note-taker hadn’t intended.^[11]

“We were in an emergency situation and there was panic running through the Navy Department at that particular time.”^[12] The order to destroy the papers came down from the office of Chief of Naval Operations Stark. According to Captain Safford, in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications, it “seemed a perfectly logical and reasonable order”^[13] and he carried it out, passing “that word on to [his] immediate subordinates.”^[14] The order applied only to unofficial notes or personal records; the section heads “were not given any instructions to destroy files or any official records.”^[15]

Concerning security in the Army, General Marshall warned his staff officers shortly after the attack that it was mandatory that knowledge of the MAGIC intercepts never be made public. Marshall told them that they would have to go to their graves with this secret.^[16]

With respect to Navy security, Stark testified that “anybody who was let in on that [MAGIC] had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he lived.” He said, for instance, that his aide during the Pearl Harbor investigations, “Lieutenant Commander Richmond . . . pretty near signed his death warrant, . . . if he were to give anything out about it.”^[17]

Short and Kimmel Relieved of Their Commands

Action on the relief of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was prompt. Upon Knox’s return from Hawaii, he conferred with Stimson. Stimson talked with Marshall. “[A]s a result a decision was reached for the relief of both Kimmel and Short.^[18]

There was no hint in Knox’s report of any misconduct on Kimmel’s part, no charges were made; no trial was held. Stark was not consulted beforehand. “[A]fter coming from the White House,” Knox directed that Kimmel be relieved. Knox had no discussion with Stark as to the reasons. But Stark said,

A commander in chief would not be removed without the president’s permission. . . . I imagine that had been discussed with the president because the future of those two officers [Kimmel and Short] at that time was on a high level.^[19]

Kimmel’s dismissal letter, dated December 16, was from the Secretary of the Navy and bore the initials of Stark and Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of Personnel.^[20]

Secretary of War Stimson discussed Short’s situation with Marshall. Short was then promptly relieved of his command “on the direction of the Secretary of War.” His dismissal letter, also dated December 16, was signed by General Marshall.^[21]

Although relieved of their duties in mid-December, both Kimmel and Short were still in the service awaiting further assignments. They remained in Hawaii.

Kimmel and Short had devoted their lives to preparing themselves to defend the United States. Their efforts and their accomplishments over the years had earned them respect and advancement to positions in the military hierarchy. Kimmel and Short had been given no indication that their actions had not been completely honest and honorable. Yet at the very moment when trained and experienced men were in greatest demand they were abruptly relieved of their commands—without any charges having been made, without a hearing, without having had a chance to face their accusers, and without an opportunity to defend themselves.

Pressure for an Investigation

Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a thorough investigation of the leadership at Hawaii. He said,

the statement of the Secretary of the Navy that neither the Army nor the Navy were on the alert at Hawaii . . . is astounding. It is almost unbelievable. . . . The naval commander and Army general should be vigorously investigated.

Theirs is a responsibility and it ought to be determined whether either or both are inefficient or criminally negligent. They must be one or the other. I have always been a big Navy man. . . . I am pained and grieved at its seeming failure of its high duty.^[22]

At his press conference following his own investigation, Knox had avoided potentially damaging statements. Still questions would undoubtedly be asked as to why the military forces at Pearl Harbor had not been better provided with planes and antiaircraft artillery. Why had they not been more adequately supplied with intelligence? And why had the Navy been based in such a vulnerable position far from our shores? It was becoming obvious that if the administration was to retain its good name, an official investigation would have to be arranged to answer such questions.

Less than 24 hours before the Japanese attack, the Navy Department had announced that the U.S. fleet was second to none. Yet now many of its ships had been sunk or set ablaze and were resting in the mud at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. More than 2,500 officers and enlisted men were dead and 650 more were wounded.^[23] Why had seasoned Army and Navy officers, who had spent lifetimes preparing to defend the nation, been taken so completely by surprise? Why had they been caught with their defenses down? Why had they been so ill-prepared? The people were entitled to answers.

Any tragedy, especially one of this magnitude, leads to recriminations and doubts. Many of the individuals involved, directly or indirectly, with the Pearl Harbor disaster must have had second thoughts about whether things might have turned out differently if only they had followed another path. Certainly the Pearl Harbor commanders themselves must have wished they could turn back the clock and have a second chance. Admiral Kimmel, for one, confessed after the attack that he wished he “had taken the other course” when offered the promotion to commander-in-chief.^[24]

Undoubtedly some Washington officials must have also had doubts about whether they had followed the correct path. Suppose they had tried to ameliorate Japanese-U.S. relations instead of aggravating them? Also, given what they knew in Washington about the likelihood of Japanese aggression, could they have done a better job of alerting and provisioning the field commands for defending themselves?

At President Roosevelt’s direction, “with the security of the nation at stake,” most of Secretary Knox’s findings on his trip to Hawaii had been withheld from the public. Of course, we cannot know whom Knox really considered responsible, but one admiral, William H. Standley, commented that he thought Knox was “very sensitive of the failure of the Navy Department and of himself properly to alert the Commander-in-Chief in Pearl Harbor.” Knox appeared “conscious of his share in the blame for the surprise at Pearl Harbor.”^[25]

The Japanese “One p.m. Message,” which had sparked Marshall’s last minute December 7 dispatch, had been intercepted early in the morning of December 7. But apparently it wasn’t decoded and ready for delivery until about 9:00 a.m. Army courier Colonel Bratton said he had it “about 9:00 or shortly before.” He had then tried desperately to reach Army Chief of Staff Marshall. Captain McCollum testified that Navy courier Kramer had brought it to him just before 9:30 a.m. and that he, McCollum, had then handed it to Chief of Naval Operations Stark. Stark had apparently phoned FDR, but taken no further action. According to some reports, Marshall was with Stark in his office sometime that morning. Still nothing was done. Apparently no special action was taken on the “One p.m. Message” until after 11:25 a.m., when Marshall arrived in his office and Bratton was finally able to deliver it to him personally. Marshall did not read it until after reading the other Japanese messages that awaited him. Only then did Marshall draft his message advising the field commanders of the 1:00 p.m. delivery time for the Japanese reply to the U.S. note of November 26. By the time these warning messages had been encoded and sent to Manila, Pearl Harbor, etc., it was 11:58 a.m.

After the attack Marshall must have felt uneasy. He began that very afternoon to check on the disposition of his last-minute message to his field commanders; he asked for an “immediate report on the delivery of that message.” Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. French of the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps wired a follow-up “service message” trying to track down when that message to Pearl Harbor had been delivered and to whom. It had gone to San Francisco by Western Union, which had “a tube running across the street to the R.C.A.” From there it had gone via RCA’s powerful transmitter to Hawaii. According to French, that was “the quickest means” at his disposal at the time. French told Western Union that he wanted “to know whose hands that message got into.” This inquiry “went on late until the night, and 2:00 in the morning we hadn’t as yet received the reply.” French also “talked to the signal officer over there [in Hawaii] . . . on the wire and told him it was imperative that [French] inform General Marshall as to who received that message.”^[26]

To track Marshall’s message, Washington wired officials in Hawaii on December 9 asking them to

advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine [Marshall’s message]. . . . December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff officer received.

Hawaii’s reply on December 9, signed by General Short, stated that the message was delivered to Honolulu, downtown, via RCA at 7:33 a.m. of the 7th, received, still in code, at the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at about 11:45 a.m. It had then still to be deciphered, and it didn’t reach the adjutant general until 2:58 p.m. in the afternoon.^[27]

Many other principals concerned with the nation’s defenses may also have had doubts and questions concerning the responsibility for the disaster. Some of them undoubtedly looked on the prospects of a formal investigation with mixed emotions.