Chapter 2: 2. Foreign Relations in an Election Year U.S.-British Cooperation

On May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill became prime minister of England. He wrote Roosevelt on May 15: “Although I have changed my office, I am sure you would not wish me to discontinue our intimate, private correspondence.”^[1] The two men continued to enjoy the close relationship begun shortly after Britain and France went to the defense of Poland against Hitler in September 1939. Also about this time, Roosevelt established the first “hot line” telephone in the White House,^[2] enabling him, president of an officially neutral nation, to communicate privately with Churchill, head of government of a nation at war. The hot line left no paper trail, no printed record, of their conversations.

Churchill’s May 15 letter pleaded to the United States for help:

I trust you realise, Mr. President that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. . . . All I ask now is that you should proclaim nonbelligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces.

Churchill listed Britain’s “immediate needs”:

[F]irst of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers. . . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft. . . . Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . . Fourthly . . . to purchase steel in the United States.

Churchill continued: “We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same.” Churchill’s fifth “need” was to have a U.S. squadron visit Irish ports, where there had been reports of Germans dropped by parachutes.

Then Churchill added: “Sixthly, I am looking to you to keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore [in Southeast Asia] in any way convenient.”^[3]

Roosevelt assured Churchill the next day that he was “most happy to continue our private correspondence. . . . I am, of course, giving every possible consideration to the suggestions made in your message.” Then he took Churchill’s several requests up one by one.

With respect to the destroyers, FDR was “not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.” As for the aircraft, he wrote “[w]e are now doing everything within our power to make it possible for the Allied Governments to obtain the latest types of aircraft in the United States.” Concerning anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition, “the most favorable consideration will be given to the request.” And with respect to steel, he understood “satisfactory arrangements have been made” for its purchase. FDR was also willing to consider a visit of a U.S. squadron to Irish ports.

To the request that the United States keep Japan quiet, FDR responded, “As you know, the American fleet is now concentrated at Hawaii, where it will remain at least for the time being.”^[4]

Churchill’s letter was dated May 15, British time. Given the ten-hour difference between London and Hawaii, some 15 to 20 hours could have lapsed by the time, “late on the 15th of May,” when Admiral Richardson, commander of the fleet in Hawaii, received the OPNAV (Chief of Naval Operations) cable advising him that the fleet was to remain in Hawaiian waters “for some time”^[5] (see pp. 27–28). In view of the timing, it is not inconceivable that the OPNAV cable was prompted, at least in part, by Churchill’s urging.

The European Situation Worsens as France Falls

William C. Bullitt, whom FDR had sent to the U.S.S.R. in 1933 as the first United States ambassador to that country, left Moscow in 1936 to become U.S. ambassador to France.

By the spring of 1940, Britain’s troops were being hard-pressed on the continent by the Nazi military forces. In May they were retreating to Dunkirk on the English Channel. From there they were evacuated to England, thanks to their heroic and dramatic rescue by a hastily mobilized British fleet of 850 ships, large and small, military and private (tugs, yachts, fishing smacks, launches). Thus, more than 200,000 British, French, and Belgian troops eluded the encircling Germans (May 26–June 4).

By June, the German Blitzkrieg was bearing down on Paris. Reynaud described France’s desperate plight to Roosevelt on June 10: “For 6 days and 6 nights our divisions have been fighting without one hour of rest. . . . Today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris.”^[6]

Bullitt wrote Roosevelt (May 31, 1940) on behalf of French Foreign Minister Paul Reynaud that the French were

most grateful for the presence of your fleet in the Pacific. Without firing a shot, it is keeping the war from spreading to the French and British Empires in the Far East. We hope it will stay there.

Reynaud requested that the U.S. Atlantic Fleet be sent to the Mediterranean. By keeping the enemy at bay there, “Your [Atlantic] fleet,” he said, “can play exactly the same role in the Mediterranean” as the U.S. Fleet is now playing in the Pacific. “Incidentally,” FDR wrote Reynaud in longhand, “further strong steps were taken yesterday by me in regard to the Mediterranean threat.”^[7]

Roosevelt again, on June 13, appeared to hold out hope to Reynaud: “[T]his Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still more are being redoubled.”^[8]

When Churchill saw a copy of this secret message, he wired Roosevelt that he considered it “absolutely vital that this message should be published tomorrow, June 14, in order that it may play the decisive part in turning the course of world history.”^[9] Then Roosevelt must have realized that he had exceeded his authority in giving such an assurance to a belligerent nation. He wired Ambassador Kennedy in London:

My message to Reynaud not to be published in any circumstances. . . . It was in no sense intended to commit and does not commit this Government to the slightest military activities in support of the Allies. . . . There is of course no authority except in Congress to make any commitment of this nature.^[10]

German troops entered Paris on June 14, 1940. On June 17 the French sued for peace. France and Germany signed an armistice five days later. France had fallen.

FDR Moves toward a Third Term as President

Since February 1940, FDR had been hinting to various friends and confidants that he might run for a third term, thus breaking with the precedent set by George Washington and followed by all succeeding U.S. presidents. He made no public announcement, but he had apparently settled the matter in his own mind by June.

Because of the international situation, the fall of France, and his unannounced intentions, FDR considered it important to have a united country. He decided to replace the two cabinet officers who had obstructed some of his foreign-policy initiatives and make his cabinet bipartisan. Roosevelt maneuvered the resignations of Secretary of War Woodring and Navy Secretary Charles Edison,^[11] who had opposed FDR’s proposal to transfer to England some army planes and 50 destroyers^[12] and offered their posts to two Republicans—Alfred M. Landon and Frank Knox, the 1936 Republican candidates for president and vice president. Landon turned down the offer, but Mr. Knox accepted, agreeing to serve as secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt then looked for another prominent Republican who shared his views on foreign policy. He turned to Henry L. Stimson. As Hoover’s Secretary of State in the 1920s, Stimson had long wanted the United States to take a firm stand against Japan’s operations on the Asian mainland. His position, recently set forth in a talk to some of his fellow alumni at the Yale University commencement, was that the United States should reject so-called “neutrality” and take a stronger stand against Japan and Germany. The next day, June 18, he expressed similar ideas in a radio talk and his remarks were reported the following morning on page one of The New York Times. FDR phoned him that very day offering him the post of secretary of war.^[13] When Stimson asked if the president had seen the story in the Times,FDR said he hadand, according to Stimson’s diary, he agreed with it. Thus reassured, Stimson accepted the position. He was sworn in as Secretary of War on July 10, 1940.

These two new cabinet officers soon began to influence U.S. foreign policy; some Navy officials even dated our commitment to war from about July 1, 1940, when Roosevelt dropped Edison and Woodring and replaced them with two men more willing to follow Roosevelt’s lead.

Stimson, the new secretary of war, began almost immediately to push for compulsory military training. His efforts were soon crowned with success. The Selective Service Act of 1940 was passed, and the president signed it into law on September 16.^[14]

British Secret Agent in the U.S.

By the summer of 1940 England’s plight was desperate. Germany controlled most of Europe; her planes were being readied for nightly bombings of Britain’s cities; her U-boats were preparing to attack British shipping in the Atlantic on a massive scale.

In June the British sent to New York Sir William Stephenson who opened offices in New York in Radio City. Ostensibly a public-relations man, Stephenson was actually a British agent known as “Intrepid,” a secret envoy of Churchill’s and chief of British Security Coordination. Intrepid’s express purpose was to get the United States into the war. FDR reportedly told Stephenson on one occasion, apparently he wasn’t kidding, “I’m your biggest undercover agent.”^[15]

Stephenson met with Roosevelt in Washington. Secret arrangements were made for U.S.-British cooperation and for sharing of confidential information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In retrospect, the foreign-policy decisions made in Washington from that time on seem to have been aimed relentlessly at taking the United States down the road to war on the side of England and against Germany and Japan.

U.S. Encourages British Military Purchases

Britain’s and France’s “cash and carry” purchases permitted under the 1939 Neutrality Act were a stimulus to U.S. producers of arms and other military supplies. Those huge sales had relieved much of the mass unemployment that had plagued this country since the Depression and that FDR’s New Deal had failed to solve. But with the fall of France, only the British were still in a position to buy, and they were fast running out of cash. Roosevelt feared that if their purchases came to an end, mass unemployment would return. He was looking for ways to keep workers employed when the British could no longer pay cash.

On July 3 Lord Lothian, British ambassador to the United States, presented to the State Department a formal statement on the status of his country’s finances. Britain was overcommitted. The United Kingdom would pay as long as she could, but

in all frankness . . . it will be utterly impossible for them [His Majesty’s Government] to continue to do this for any indefinite period. . . . This was not a request for credit. The United States Ambassador in London had warned that such a request would be unwise.

Rather, it reflected British concern with their need to enter into long-term contracts so as to feel confident of their sources of supply. The British were reassured by Washington officials. “Lord Lothian was told informally ten days later ‘not to worry too much’ on the score of dollars.”^[16]

According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, the president personally charged him “with the responsibility of seeing that everything be done for them [the British] so that they could not quit” fighting.^[17] Morgenthau asked the British for a detailed explanation of their finances. In mid-July a representative of the British treasury, Sir Frederick Phillips, was sent to Washington to report. The British were then placing orders for aircraft, and Morgenthau thought “[t]he scope of British purchasing plans . . . would probably leave England short of gold within six months.”^[18]

On July 24, Morgenthau gave Arthur Purvis, head of the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission, bold advice.

You’ve talked about how the British would like 3,000 planes a month; say to [William S.] Knudsen [chairman of the Council of National Defense], you’re ready to order them. . . . Don’t worry about the authorization. . . . [Y]ou’ll get it all right. . . . You’ve got to bluff; stick to the 3,000 planes and put it up to Knudsen as though it were an offer you had been thinking about for weeks. . . . Tell Knudsen you want 3,000 planes and I’ll back you up.

As he recalled later, “The tactic worked.”^[19]

On July 25, when reporters asked Morgenthau whether the British were able to pay for the planes they were ordering, he replied he was not worried about a lack of funds: “they have plenty of money—plenty.” To the British embassy this implied

ultimate financial assistance by the United States; no promise of any kind, however, had been given. . . . The [British] war chest was emptying faster than the Treasury had expected. . . . It was clear that only the United States Government was left; without its aid purchasing from the United States must cease.^[20]

Yet according to Morgenthau, the “present temper of the country [was] absolutely opposed” to making loans, or anything like that, to the British.

Phillips, the British Treasury officer sent to Washington to discuss the liquidation of England’s dollar assets, told Morgenthau the British planned to sell gold and securities to meet their deficit. That “would have two healthy effects,” Morgenthau said. “It would help to finance the purchase of necessary war materials, and it would demonstrate to the American public that England was doing everything possible in her own behalf.” And the demonstration, that Britain was doing everything she could, “might in time bring American opinion to support a loan or gift.”^[21]

1940 was an election year in the United States. The British realized that “no aid could be given before the November presidential election.”^[22] Moreover, the British recognized that any commitments made should not become public knowledge. Nevertheless, the financial talks with Phillips in July were not too discouraging. They ended with an invitation for him “to come again in the autumn—after the election.”^[23]

Because the British were running out of dollars so fast, and because exposure of London’s plight might threaten negotiations with the United States, British treasury officials tried their best to follow U.S. advice. If the British were to expect financial assistance from the United States and if the critical U.S. legislation was to go through as speedily as possible after the election, the American people had to be persuaded that the British were doing their best to help themselves, that they were in fact liquidating all their assets and gold. “Throughout the summer [1940] the American Administration had been by no means backward in telling the British how they could get by until massive aid was forthcoming.”^[24] Spokesmen for the United States offered many creative and ingenious suggestions as to how the British might economize, scrape together as much gold as possible, liquidate assets in the United States, and even how they might borrow by offering the British-owned railroads in Argentina as collateral.

Secret U.S.-British Staff Conversations

At the suggestion of the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, on August 6 FDR sent to London for staff conversations three U.S. military officers, representatives of the Navy, Army, and Air Force—Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley; Chief of the Army’s War Plans Division, Major General George V. Strong; and Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, Major General Delos C. Emmons. They sailed on what was supposed to have been a secret mission. But the news leaked out.

One outcome of their conference was an agreement in principle on “methods by which the sources of information at the disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of the British Government.”^[25] By agreeing to share our information with the British, we were taking one more step away from neutrality. The British were anxious that such an “exchange of information should be placed upon a regular basis.” Lord Lothian later “revived the proposal.”^[26]

Trade Treaty with Japan Ended

As the United States’s commercial treaty with Japan had expired on January 26, 1940, Roosevelt was able, on July 5, 1941, to prohibit the export, without a license, of aircraft engines and strategic materials to Japan. Then on July 31, he embargoed aviation gas. From that time on, U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorated, as artful diplomacy alternated with concerted acts of harassment.

The international situation, both in Europe and in the Far East, was becoming increasingly ominous during the summer of 1940. Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, warned FDR that an oil embargo might cause Japan to institute sanctions against the United States, and that sanctions could lead to war. In spite of his warning, however, we banned the export of aviation gasoline to Japan. Japan resented this move. To compensate for the loss, she began to build planes that could operate on ordinary gasoline.

Japanese Diplomatic Code Broken

In August the U.S. Army and Navy communications experts succeeded in breaking the top Japanese diplomatic code. Japanese messages at that time were encoded on an extremely intricate kind of typewriter, actually two typewriters connected by wires, with complex coding wheels and switches. When a message was typed on one machine, the words were printed out mechanically on the other in code. Every few days the arrangement of coding wheels and switches was altered so as to change the cipher. To break this code it was necessary to build a machine that could do what the Japanese machine could do and that would give the same results as the Japanese machine would give whenever it was adjusted. And this task had to be accomplished without having any clues as to the nature of the encoding typewriter or of when and how the switches and coding wheels were altered to change the cipher. It was thanks to a suggestion by Navy communications expert Captain L.F. Safford that one of his subordinates in the Army Signal Corps, who had been struggling with the problem for some time, was finally able to solve the puzzle.^[27]

After the Japanese diplomatic code was deciphered, the U.S. government was able to read all of Japan’s diplomatic messages to and from Tokyo and her representatives in all the capitals of the world. We referred to Japan’s diplomatic code as “Purple” and to the information derived from reading it as “MAGIC.”

Destroyers-for-Bases Deal

The first of Churchill’s several requests in his May 15, 1940, letter was for “the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers.” FDR had replied that he was “not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.” However, he talked with Chief of Naval Operations Stark about the possibility of making such a transfer.

Stark was a serious, well-rounded naval officer. His manner was genial and courteous, not at all gruff or rough. He had graduated from Annapolis in 1903 and had risen up through the ranks. He and Roosevelt had known each other since 1913, when FDR was assistant secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson. Stark had then been in command of a destroyer on which FDR used to travel in Maine waters when visiting his family’s summer home on Campobello, a small Canadian island just across the border from Maine. The two men had become good friends.

Roosevelt liked Stark personally and trusted him as a loyal aide. In 1939, FDR appointed him Chief of Naval Operations. FDR wrote Stark at that time that it would be

grand to have you here as C.N.O. . . . [Y]ou and I talk the same language. My only objection is that if we get into a war you will be a desk Admiral—but I cannot have you in two places at once!^[28]

Stark took over as CNO on August 1, 1939.^[29]

When the question of releasing U.S. destroyers to the British came up, Stark was opposed. A law prohibited the Navy from disposing of anything that the Chief of Naval Operations could not declare “unnecessary” for the defense of the country and Stark believed those destroyers were necessary; they were then being used by the Atlantic Patrol.^[30] In spite of his geniality, Stark was no doormat that FDR could walk over at will. At times he spoke up frankly, and he must have on this occasion. FDR was apparently reluctant also but nevertheless he decided to acquiesce to Churchill’s request and let Britain have the destroyers. He told Stark to make the arrangements.

Stark was depressed by FDR’s orders. That evening, as Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, was leaving his office for home, he just happened to stick his head in Stark’s office to say good night. He noticed that Stark appeared downcast and went in to cheer him up. Stark unburdened himself to Moreell. The president had just asked him to give some of the United States’s over-age destroyers to England. Stark felt that, in ordering him to arrange the transfer, FDR was asking him to do something illegal, thus placing him in a hopeless position.^[31]

The final deal agreed upon exchanged 50 U.S. destroyers for 99-year leases on bases on the Grand Banks (Newfoundland), Bermuda, the Bahamas, in the Caribbean (Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua), and in British Guiana.^[32] Stark reasoned and then “certified that the exchange . . . would strengthen the total defense of the United States, and that by this standard these destroyers were not essential to our defense. We needed the destroyers; we needed the bases more.”^[33]

The “destroyers for bases” executive agreement was announced on September 3 by Roosevelt. This deal, he said, had been worked out

in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in defence of the Western Hemisphere . . . in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana.^[34]

The first contingent of eight U.S. destroyers, renovated and outfitted, was turned over to the British in Halifax on September 9. Little or no publicity accompanied the exchange. The men who took these ships to Nova Scotia were told that “under no circumstances were the American destroyermen to permit themselves to be photographed in the company of British personnel.” The destroyers were soon plying the North Atlantic as escorts to British convoys. The last installment of ten destroyers was handed over on November 26.^[35]

On November 1 the Atlantic Squadron of the “unneutral” U.S. Neutrality Patrol became known as the “Patrol Force” of the newly reorganized Atlantic Fleet.

Retaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor

The U.S. Fleet, which had left the west coast on April 2, 1940, for maneuvers, had been ordered in May to stay in Hawaii. The commander-in-chief, Admiral Richardson, had objected strenuously, but to no avail. The fleet remained in Hawaii. In July Richardson went to Washington to present to his superiors in person the reasons why he believed the Fleet should not be retained at Pearl Harbor. He also sought answers to several questions—why the fleet was being retained there, how long it was expected to stay there, and what efforts were being made to adequately man the fleet.

Richardson explained the lack of security at Pearl Harbor. He described the congestion and the difficulty of operating ships in and out of its narrow entrance. He cited the inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation, and housing. He pointed out also that the prolonged and indefinite stay away from the mainland during peacetime was bad for the morale of the men. But perhaps even more important than all these reasons was the fact that the fleet at Pearl Harbor was not in a state of preparedness. If we went to war, it would have to return to the west coast to be outfitted, and that could involve a net loss of time.^[36]

Richardson met and talked with the president, secretaries of state (Hull) and Navy (Knox), Chief of Naval Operations (Stark), Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Chester W. Nimitz), the Army Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall), state department officials, and several members of Congress. His arguments as to why the fleet should not be kept in Hawaii seemed to fall on deaf ears; he didn’t receive what he considered satisfactory answers to his questions. He testified later that one of Stimson’s anti-Japanese appointees in the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, appeared to be “exercising a greater influence over the disposition of the Fleet than I was.”^[37]

Richardson was called back to Washington a second time in October, at the request of the new Secretary of the Navy, Knox. When they met, the talk turned to the possibility of war in the Pacific. The British were planning to reopen the Burma Road shortly so as to be able to supply the Chinese forces from the south. Roosevelt was concerned about Japan’s possible reaction. “In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the president, was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines” west of Hawaii across the Pacific. Richardson asked Knox “whether the president was considering a declaration of war. The Secretary stated that the president hadn’t said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.” Richardson was “amazed” at this proposal; he said “the fleet was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action.”^[38]

Richardson also visited the president. With FDR he went over the personnel situation, pointing out the need for more enlisted men. Roosevelt believed that “men in mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made adequate sailor men, if their services were suddenly required.” Richardson explained to FDR that “a seasick garage mechanic would be of little use at sea, and that it took time for most young men to get their sea legs.”^[39]

Richardson then took up the question of returning the Fleet, except for a Hawaiian detachment, to the Pacific coast for training and outfitting. “The president stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.” Admiral Richardson doubted it would have that effect, for the Japanese military government knew full well that the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii was undermanned and unprepared for war. However, the president insisted: “Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.”^[40]

Richardson

asked the president if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula [the southeast Asian peninsula at the southern tip of which Singapore is located], or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.^[41]

“The discussion [with the president] waxed hot and heavy.” In Richardson’s words,

[I] could not help but detect that re-election political considerations, rather than long-range military considerations, were the controlling factor in the president’s thinking. It was less than a month before the 1940 Presidential Election, and the president was reluctant to make any commitment to increase the number of men in the Navy, which, due to the location of naval ships in foreign waters, would seem to run counter to his third-term campaign statements. . . .

Finally, when it became fully apparent that he had no intention of accepting my recommendations [to permit the Fleet to return to the west coast], I [Richardson] said to him very deliberately: “Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the senior officers in the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific.”

The president, with a look of pained surprise on his face, said: “Joe, you just don’t understand that this is an election year and there are certain things that can’t be done, no matter what, until the election is over and won.”^[42]

Financing of British Arms Purchases Assured

The president was also seriously concerned at this time with how the British were to finance their arms purchases. The British treasury was fast being depleted. There was a “growing sense of urgency in London.”^[43] It was difficult for them to know how to proceed. “Earlier in the year the president had shown an interest in regard to British assets in Latin America, including the Argentine Railways. . . . He came back to it again in mid-October in a talk with the British Ambassador. He thought that by this means the financial crisis might be postponed for a month or two.”^[44]

On October 14 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador, asked Roosevelt and Morgenthau when British treasury representative Phillips might return to continue discussions about Britain’s financial resources. Lothian was told it would have to wait until after the election.^[45] Shortly thereafter he returned to England for a visit.

The impasse [with respect to Britain’s financial crisis] was disguised by the desires and explorations, of both sides, to find some way out of the maze. The Ambassador on his return from London nine weeks later, reported that the [U.S.] Administration was “still discussing ingenious ways of giving us assistance.”^[46]

The British encountered continued vacillation in their dealings with the United States.

Time after time the British side was told to go ahead with orders, only to find the way blocked by insuperable difficulties. On 20th October Purvis [Britain’s purchasing agent in Washington] reported that in week-end talks with Secretary Morgenthau at the latter’s home he had received “a complete green light” for the immediate ordering of 9,000 aircraft. . . . In the next few days Purvis and [Sir Walter] Layton were told to go ahead with their orders on the assumption that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would pay for the capital cost. An agreement to this effect was worked out with the War Department. The admonitions to go ahead continued at intervals through December.^[47]

FDR Winds Up His Election Campaign

As the election campaign continued, Roosevelt spoke to the people more than once about his determination to keep the United States out of the war. For example, in Chicago on September 11:

I hate war, now more than ever. I have one supreme determination—to do all that I can to keep war away from these shores for all time. I stand, with my party, and outside of my party as president of all the people, on the [Democratic Party] platform, the wording that was adopted in Chicago less than two months ago. It said:

We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack.^[48]

While Roosevelt and his administration were reassuring the British off and on of U.S. assistance in their war against Germany, he was reassuring the American voters of our continued neutrality. On October 23, he spoke in Philadelphia:^[49]

To Republicans and Democrats, to every man, woman and child in the nation I say this: Your president and your Secretary of State are following the road to peace.

We are arming ourselves not for any foreign war.

We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or intervention in foreign disputes. I repeat again that I stand on the Platform of our Party. . . .

It is for peace that I have labored: and it is for peace that I shall labor all the days of my life.

Then on October 30, FDR made a similar pledge to the voters in Boston:^[50]

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war from our shores.

The purpose of our defense is defense.

Roosevelt wound up his campaign with talks on Saturday evening, November 2, in Buffalo, New York, and on Sunday, November 3, in Cleveland, Ohio. In Buffalo, he pledged, “Your president says this country is not going to war.”^[51] And in his final address of the campaign, on November 3, in Cleveland, he said:^[52]

The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war. . . . And through it all [my past record] there have been two thoughts uppermost in my mind—to preserve peace in our land; and to make the forces of democracy work for the benefit of the common people of America.

Taking the side of one of two combatants in a conflict always incurs risk. For months, FDR and his close associates had been secretly encouraging the British to expect continued and increased U.S. support in their struggle against Germany. At the same time, they had been reassuring the American people they were doing everything that could be done to keep the United States neutral and at peace.

These contradictory pronouncements were certainly intentional. Some time later Ambassador Bullitt, a long-time intimate and adviser of Roosevelt’s, as much as admitted that this equivocation had been deliberate. Roosevelt’s “White House advisers,” Bullitt wrote “persuaded him that if he told the truth he would lose the 1940 election. The president knew that war was coming to the American people. . . . This was a low-water mark in presidential morality,” Bullitt said, “but the president won the election.”^[53]