Chapter 25: 25. Administration Directed Supplementary Investigations: Clarke, Clausen, Hewitt

Each of the three supplementary investigations was unique. The first of these three supplementary investigations, the Clarke Investigation, was launched at the request of Army Chief of Staff Marshall, while the APHB was still under way, to help him prepare for his next appearance before that board.^[1] The second investigation, the Clausen Investigation, was instigated by Secretary of War Stimson to look into “unexplored leads” in the Pearl Harbor situation from the Army’s point of view.^[2] The third investigation, the Hewitt Inquiry, dealt primarily with the Navy’s situation and was ordered by Navy Secretary Forrestal who had found the NCI investigation had not exhausted all possible evidence.^[3] Implicit, if not explicit, in the directives setting up the Clausen and Hewitt investigations was a desire to uncover information that might contradict, discredit, or at least cast doubts on the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, which the administration had found unacceptable.

The Clarke Inquiry (September 14–20, 1944)

After the APHB learned of the Japanese intercepts, Marshall was again called to answer questions. In preparation for that appearance, Marshall asked Colonel Carter W. Clarke to explore the “manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.”^[4] Marshall hadn’t been able to recall the extremely important Japanese reply to the U.S. November 26 “ultimatum” prior to the morning of December 7. Yet several witnesses had reported that the first 13 parts (of that 14-part reply) had been received and delivered to top Washington officials the evening of December 6. Marshall was also interested in reviewing the events of the morning of December 7 and his response to the radiogram advising the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their government’s reply to Secretary of State Hull on December 7 at precisely 1:00 p.m., Washington time. Clarke interviewed eleven witnesses who had been involved with the receipt and distribution of the intercepts.

Marshall had Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Army intelligence (G-2), recalled from the European theater where he was then serving. Bratton had been responsible for the pre-Pearl Harbor distribution of intercepts to Army personnel. Bratton described the procedure for distributing various Japanese intercepts to the top military and civilian officials in Washington, including President Roosevelt, Marshall, and the secretaries of state, war, and navy.

Bratton was also asked about the November 27 war warning to Short and about what intelligence had been sent to Hawaii. Bratton believed that Japan’s 14-part reply “started coming into the Navy on the 6th,” and his recollection was that he “transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State that night.”^[5] When testifying, Bratton referred to a memorandum he had prepared shortly after December 7.^[6] He described his efforts to locate Marshall that morning, Marshall’s arrival in his office at 11:25 a.m., the discussion then of the significance of the “One p.m. Message,” Marshall’s decision to notify Short, his consultation with CNO Stark, and the transmission of the last-minute warning.^[7]

Clarke then questioned Colonel Edward F. French, Army Communications Service, who had actually transmitted Marshall’s last minute December 7 message to the field commanders. Its transmission was delayed, French said, as Marshall’s penciled draft was “rather difficult to read” and it had to be typed, “verified and authenticated” before being encoded. “[O]ur channel at Honolulu was out, due to atmospheric conditions.” To “avoid the risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army facilities through San Francisco,” French decided “the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service.” So the message to Hawaii was “handled directly to San Francisco via the Western Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA office in San Francisco.”^[8]

Major General Gerow, assistant chief of staff, war plans division, presented Clarke with a memorandum he had prepared December 15, 1941 concerning the “One p.m. Message”: “On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a.m., E.S.T., General Marshall called me to his office.” Bratton was there and was directed to take Marshall’s “penciled draft” to the message center and “have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means” to the Philippines, Panama Canal, Hawaii and the West Coast command.^[9]

Gerow told Clarke that G-2 (Army Intelligence), not his war plans division, was to advise Hawaiian G-2 with respect to sabotage. Therefore, any reference to subversive activities and sabotage had been “stricken out” of the November 27 “war warning.” Gerow had considered that message “a definite warning to be on the alert,” not only against sabotage, but also “against a possible enemy offensive.” Gerow admitted Short’s response left no room for misunderstanding; he had definitely “taken all the necessary precautions against sabotage”^[10]—and sabotage only.

General Miles, acting assistant chief of staff, G-2, also testified for Clarke. Miles was thoroughly familiar with the MAGIC intercepts, but his memory was “very hazy” about whether the “Winds Message” had been implemented; he did “not remember seeing any document on it, any written statement on it.”^[11]According to Miles, Bratton, chief of the Far Eastern section during this period, selected the important Ultra information for Marshall.^[12] Miles had known “we were watching for” the Japanese reply to the November 26 U.S. ultimatum “very eagerly.”^[13] He learned during the evening of December 6 that it was in, and he had the whole 14-part reply when he got to the office the next morning. Signs that war was coming had been apparent everywhere and the War Department, Miles said, had even made plans for putting censorship into operation and was training censors.^[14]

In addition to questioning the witnesses separately, Clarke held a roundtable discussion with Miles, Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner (chief, intelligence branch, military intelligence division), Colonel John T. Bissell (chief of the counter intelligence group of military intelligence), and Bratton—“to iron out any little differences” that may have appeared in their testimony.^[15] For instance, Bissell and Kroner had said that the Ultra secret intelligence derived from MAGIC had not been made available to them prior to Pearl Harbor but Bratton said it had been—through memoranda concerning subversive activities. Bratton reported that MAGIC was regularly distributed to the top administration and military officials.^[16]

These four men, all concerned with some aspect of pre-war military intelligence, discussed their pre-attack view of the Japanese threat. Although Kroner hadn’t seen MAGIC himself, he knew Bratton and Miles were handling it and insisting it be kept secret.^[17] When news of the attack came on December 7, Kroner had actually been reading Miles’s November 29 estimate of the Far Eastern situation, so he remembered “distinctly” that that estimate did “not include in the lines of action open to Japan, an attack on Pearl Harbor.”^[18]

According to Miles,

the bulk of our information, all of it including Magic, indicated the major probability of a Japanese move to the south, Indo China, Siam, Thailand, perhaps the Dutch West [sic] (East?) Indies, perhaps Malaya. . . . We did not exclude war with the United States since we specifically mentioned the Philippines as being part of the Japanese southern push and in a war with the United States of course there was a possibility, particularly with the Japanese that a surprise attack might be made anywhere, certainly including Hawaii which had been armed and prepared for such an attack for twenty years.^[19]

Bratton believed

that initially . . . any attack against an American installation in the middle or eastern Pacific would be in the nature of a diversion and having as its objective the immobilizing of any force that we might call in to help the Dutch and British in west and southwest Pacific, but . . . their primary initial objective was the destruction of Great Britain’s power in southeast Asia.^[20]

Clarke questioned witnesses about the elusive “Winds Execute.” Cryptanalyst Friedman had had no direct knowledge of a “Winds Execute” himself, he had “only learned of it comparatively recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and Capt. Safford of the Navy.”^[21] But he had known monitoring stations had been alerted to watch for a “Winds Code” implementation. Further, he said, a “diligent search,” if not “a completely exhaustive search,” had failed to find “a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army station actually intercepted a Winds Execute message.”^[22]

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, chief of the Army Communications Service at the time of the attack, told the inquiry he heard from Admiral Noyes that “the message is in,” meaning that the “Winds Execute” had been received, and it said “war would be declared between Japan and Great Britain.” He didn’t say with the United States also, but he couldn’t verify that for he didn’t know the word in the Japanese text.^[23] War was expected in the Netherlands East Indies too; by December 5 “the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2 [for U.S. naval participation] . . . . a part of the joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of war.”^[24]

Clarke presented his findings to Marshall on September 20, 1944. When Marshall returned to the APHB (September 29 and October 2), his memory was refreshed.

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The Clausen Investigation (November 23, 1944–September 12, 1945)

The APHB report concluded that Marshall, Gerow, and Short had failed in the performance of their duties. Both FDR and Stimson had been shocked; they much preferred the Roberts Commission findings that Kimmel and Short were responsible for the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Thus, Stimson directed Major Clausen, an attorney who had served as assistant recorder for the APHB to look into “unexplored leads” in the Pearl Harbor situation.^[25] The investigation was to be limited “strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.”^[26] Clausen’s assignment was classified an “emergency war mission;”^[27] he had an unlimited expense account, permission to travel in and out of the war theaters; persons interrogated by Clausen were to answer his inquiries “fully;” all papers, secret or top secret, were to be “furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.”^[28] His investigation appears to have been aimed primarily at exploring the procedure for distributing MAGIC, in order to discover who was responsible for delivering to Marshall the crucial December 6–7 intercepts, and if they had not been promptly delivered, why not. Clausen’s questions also indicated concern with the information provided, or not provided, to Short.

For almost ten months, November 23, 1944, to September 12, 1945, Clausen “traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy and civilian personnel,” 52 of whom presented their recollections of pre-Pearl Harbor events in sworn affidavits.^[29] From time to time, Clausen reported to Stimson’s special assistant. Major Clausen was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel by March 24, 1945.^[30]

One of Clausen’s first interviewees was Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenbury, Bratton’s assistant. Dusenbury said he and Bratton “alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts . . . daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts . . . sorted to about twenty-five for distribution.” Dusenbury recalled that the 13 parts of the Japanese reply “started coming in on the night of 6 December 1941.” He and Bratton were both on duty. Dusenbury said Bratton “remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon, he left and went home at about 9 p.m.” Dusenbury stayed and waited for the remainder.

The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. . . . None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night. . . . I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.^[31]

Dusenbury’s affidavit contradicted Bratton’s previous testimony before both the APHB and the Clarke investigation. Bratton had told Clarke that he had transmitted to the secretary of state a copy of the first 13 parts the night they were received.^[32] Two weeks later, he had told the APHB that he had also delivered the 13 parts “to the office of the Chief of Staff [Marshall], [and] the A.C. of S., G-2 [Miles].”^[33] Then a few days later, he had told the APHB that he recalled that Marshall, Miles, and Gerow “got their copies the evening of the 6th.” It was his practice, Bratton said “to deliver to them their copies [of the Japanese intercepts] before I went to the State Department.”^[34]

In March, Clausen secured the affidavit of Brigadier General Charles K. Gailey, a major and Gerow’s executive officer on December 6. The affidavit signed by Gailey, but unquestionably drafted by Clausen, stated that it was Gailey’s “customary practice” to deliver to Gerow “as soon as practicable” the deciphered and translated Japanese intercepts received from Bratton or Dusenbury. Gailey did “not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source” on the evening of December 6. Gailey was certain that if Gerow hadn’t received any intercepts” that evening, they hadn’t been delivered to him, “as, if they had been, I would have given them to him [Gerow].”^[35]

Clausen then flew to the Pacific theater, Guam and Honolulu. He was in the Philippines on V-E Day, and from there he flew to Germany, France, Italy, and England.

In June, at Mainz, Germany, Clausen tackled Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Marshall’s staff secretary in December 1941 and had risen rapidly in the ranks. By then, he was a lieutenant general and Eisenhower’s chief of staff. On December 6–7, 1941, Bedell Smith and his assistants were supposed to maintain a 24-hour watch outside Marshall’s office, know where Marshall was at all times and see that important messages reached him promptly. Clausen summarized, for Bedell Smith, Bratton’s testimony before the APHB. Bedell Smith then gave Clausen an affidavit setting forth, not his recollections of the pre-attack situation, but rather his “usual practice” for handling the pouches of sensitive material intended for Marshall. When

instructed that the contents should reach him at once . . . the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. . . . Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay.^[36]

Bedell Smith had no recollection of having received, or known of, an urgent delivery on the evening of December 6. “To the best of my recollection,” he swore, “I left the office at the usual time on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7:00 p.m., turning over to the Night Duty Officer.” Bedell Smith was

quite certain that I was not at the office after 10:00 p.m. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope . . . to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.^[37]

In his role as secretary to the chief of staff, Bedell Smith had several assistant secretaries. One of them must have been on duty that night. But Clausen interviewed only one, John R. Deane, who had not been on duty that night.^[38]

Gerow had been chief of army war plans in 1941. When Clausen secured Gerow’s affidavit, at Cannes, France, Gerow was both positive and direct. During November and December 1941 he had received and reviewed the MAGIC intercepts in their raw, unevaluated form, and had always returned them promptly to G-2. He recalled seeing the requests from Tokyo for reports on ship movements at Pearl Harbor, but as “these related especially to Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information.” However, Gerow did not consider Pearl Harbor to be Japan’s only interest; he recalled similar inquiries made of Japanese consuls at Manila and Seattle.

Gerow did not remember conversations with either Bratton on December 4 or Sadtler on December 5 concerning alarming Japanese intercepts, at which time Gerow had replied that “sufficient” warnings had already been sent to the overseas commanders. In his opinion, however,

the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short. . . . General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu.

Concerning the MAGIC messages, Gerow again warned that “it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence.”^[39] He did not recall seeing the 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our ultimatum before the morning of December 7.

In July in Paris, Clausen interviewed Bratton. He showed Bratton ten affidavits he had collected bearing on the “Winds Code” message and delivery of the 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our ultimatum—the five already mentioned (Dusenbury, Gailey, Bedell Smith, Gerow, and Deane) and five others by Army officers who said they couldn’t recall details of pre-attack events. These affidavits did not really differ from Bratton’s APHB testimony, for most of the officers didn’t answer Clausen’s questions directly. Only Dusenbury’s affidavit actually conflicted with Bratton’s previous statements, and when Dusenbury erred, Bratton pointed that out.

Clausen usually typed the affidavits, sometimes retyping them when an interviewee requested changes. At the Joint Congressional Committee Bratton recalled: “[I] dictated what I thought I should say,” making corrections as we went along.

Finally we got it all in shape in pencil. Then he [Clausen] put a piece of paper into the typewriter and typed the affidavit. Bratton made some further suggestions and corrections; only after Bratton was satisfied that the affidavit represented his “best recollection” did he sign it.^[40]

The Japanese reply to our ultimatum, Bratton said in his affidavit, started coming in from the Navy the evening of December 6. He and Dusenbury were on duty together. Bratton’s account differed from Dusenbury’s. After receipt of the 13th part, Bratton determined from SIS that the 14th part was not likely to come in that night. Bratton and Dusenbury then assembled the 13 parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. Bratton

directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff [Marshall] to his home at Fort Myer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about 10:00 p.m.

Bratton said in his affidavit that the only set he delivered that evening was to the secretary of state, between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. to the State Department night duty officer. The sets for Miles, Gerow, and Stimson, Bratton said, “were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part.” Bratton concluded his affidavit:

Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my statements here . . . should be modified and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now represents my best recollections of the matters and events set forth . . . after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects.^[41]

Early August found Clausen back in the United States

In the affidavit Colonel Sadtler, a signal corps officer at the time of the attack, signed for Clausen in August in Washington, D.C., he discussed “a possible ‘Winds Code’ execute message” that Noyes had given him on December 5, 1941. Sadtler was already “alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which Admiral Noyes had just given me.” After conferring with Miles and Bratton, he had gone to his office and “personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders.”^[42] According to Sadtler’s recollection, it read substantially as follows:

C.G.-P.I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall.

Sadtler hadn’t shown his draft warning to anyone in 1941, and he had “made no copy at the time.” However, he testified he had talked with Gerow and Bedell Smith after drafting it. However, in June 1945, neither Gerow nor Bedell Smith remembered such a conversation with Sadtler^[43] and after reading the Gerow and Bedell Smith affidavits Sadtler believed they were correct in saying that he had not talked with them about it in December 1941. Moreover, Gerow didn’t believe that Sadtler, “purely a Signal Corps officer,” should be “concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of ‘Magic.’ ”^[44]

Sadtler also denied he had ever “urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders.” He denied that he had made “further efforts to obtain the [“Winds”] execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.” And he denied Friedman’s statement to Clarke that he, Sadtler, “had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster.”^[45]

Clausen was in Washington on V-J day, his investigation almost over. But he went to Boston to interview Major General Miles, brigadier general and chief of army intelligence in 1941. Miles said that on the instructions of Marshall, transmitted through General Osmun and Colonel Clarke of G-2, he had said nothing to the APHB about the top-secret MAGIC sources. He had known about the 13 parts of the Japanese reply on the evening of December 6 because he had been dining that evening at Admiral Wilkinson’s home. Admiral Beardall, FDR’s aide, who was there also, had brought it to Wilkinson’s attention, and Wilkinson had shown it to Miles. Miles had been under the impression that before December 7 the Navy in Hawaii had been intercepting, decrypting, decoding, and translating Japanese diplomatic and consular messages.^[46]

Back in Washington, Clausen met with Marshall. In his affidavit Marshall said that when he first appeared before the APHB on August 7, 1944, he had “informed” the voting members in a one-hour closed session of “the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called ‘Magic’.” In that brief meeting, Marshall said, he did not explain the nature of the information gleaned from these sources except to say that “neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source.” According to Marshall, it was “not until it developed that the ‘Magic’ papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry” that Army officers concerned with MAGIC had been “authorized to go into all the details regarding ‘Magic’.”^[47]

Marshall stated that it had been his “understanding” that

in the period preceding 7 December 1941 . . . the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department [Short] was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.

In this Marshall was mistaken.^[48] Marshall told Clausen that he had advised Short by correspondence (February 7 and March 5, 1941) of the

risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine. . . . At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan.^[49]

Marshall did not say whether he had sent Short any advice or warning later than February or March 1941 concerning the impending crisis. However, Marshall did say that Short’s assistant G-2 officer, Colonel George W. Bicknell, had seen a Navy wire sent to Pearl Harbor on or about December 3, 1941, concerning instructions to the Japanese diplomatic representatives in the southwest Pacific, Washington, and London to burn their codes and ciphers.^[50]

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Clausen’s investigation had set out to look into “unexplored leads,” primarily for Marshall’s benefit, about MAGIC and especially about the Japanese response to the U.S. “ultimatum.” He tried to discover to whom it had been delivered on December 6–7. Clausen had also inquired after the “Winds Code” and its implementation, the “Winds Code Execute.” And he had asked what information had been furnished General Short in Hawaii concerning the impending crisis. Although many questions remained unanswered, the Clausen affidavits did offer two possible excuses for Marshall’s failure to notify Short of the developing December 6–7 crisis:

1. Bratton and Dusenbury had been remiss in not delivering the important 13-part Japanese dispatch to Marshall on the evening of December 6.

2. Washington officials, including Marshall and Miles, believed that the Japanese messages were being intercepted and decrypted in Hawaii.

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The Hewitt Inquiry (May 14 to July 11, 1945)

Upon the completion of the Navy Court of Inquiry’s report, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal found

errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. . . . [and] has decided that the [NCI] investigation . . . should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.^[51]

Therefore, Forrestal on May 2, 1945,

appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S. Navy, as investigating officer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and to obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order to fully develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.^[52]

After reviewing the findings of the previous investigations, Hewitt decided his task was to explore further what information was available in Washington and at Pearl Harbor before the attack; to ask specifically about intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages, especially the “Winds Code,” to find out whether or not Japanese submarines had been operating in and around Pearl Harbor prior to December 7; and also to determine Kimmel’s understanding of various plans for the defense of the fleet.^[53] With these goals in mind, Hewitt took testimony from 39 witnesses over 26 days, from May 14 to July 11.^[54]

As the Hewitt Inquiry opened, Captain Arthur H. McCollum, who in December 1941 had been the Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, reviewed the intelligence then available concerning the Far East. Hawaii was dependent on data derived from direction finders, radio intelligence of fleet activities confirmed later by newspaper accounts, and information from Washington. Before the war started on December 7, they were not permitted by U.S. law to tap telephones or intercept messages to or from the Japanese consul in Honolulu. Hawaii did not have a “Purple” machine, which would have given them access to Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in other codes that could not be decoded in Hawaii were mailed to Washington for decrypting. After the imposition of the U.S. embargoes on Japanese trade and the outbreak of war in Europe, few Japanese merchant vessels ploughed the seas, few Japanese ships crossed the Pacific to ports in the Americas, and U.S. ships no longer traversed the north Pacific. Thus we had lost the means of keeping track of the few Japanese ships that were still sailing, as well as the “eyes” of observer agents at various ports in Asia.^[55]

Given his position at the time of the attack, Captain McCollum was able to keep abreast of developments in U.S.-Japanese relations. When McCollum appeared before the Hewitt inquiry on May 15 he brought with him “an analysis of the situation as it looked to me at that time” which he had submitted on December 1, 1941, to Admiral Wilkinson, director of naval intelligence. He and Wilkinson had then met with Stark and “urged that a dispatch of warning be sent to the fleet.” Stark assured them that “such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th of November which definitely included the term, ‘This is a war warning’. “Subsequent to this,” McCollum said, “the situation further deteriorated.” He and Wilkinson “did send dispatches out to our naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers.” This was “[s]ome time after the 1st [of December], possibly around the 4th.”^[56]

Regarding the “Winds Code,” there was no doubt that the Japanese government set up a scheme of weather words with hidden meanings. Yet, mystery and confusion surrounded practically every other aspect of the matter. According to McCollum,

[I]n one instance it [the weather code] meant war with Russia; in the next instance it meant war with England, and another one . . . it meant war with the United States. Those were the three possibilities.

But a literal translation of the Japanese did not actually say “war.” McCollum went on. “Instead of war, the term used was, ‘In case relations are in danger,’. . . . There is the verbatim translation; in Japanese this says, ‘In case there is danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations’.”^[57]

When Hewitt questioned Captain Safford about the “Winds Code” message, Safford insisted, as he had in earlier hearings, that a “Winds Execute” had been received before the attack, that it mentioned the United States, that it meant war, that he and Kramer had looked at it together, that it had been delivered to Director of Naval Communications Admiral Noyes, that later he, Safford, could find no reference to the “Winds Code” Execute in the files, and that he had been unable to locate any copies of it at all.^[58] Safford couldn’t understand what could have happened to them. When Kramer testified before the NCI in Hawaii during the summer of 1944, he had not hesitated to say that the “Winds Execute” had been received and that it referred to the United States as well as to Great Britain. But a year later, before the Hewitt inquiry, he was “less positive of that now.” Kramer did “recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Safford’s office and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him.” A brief conversation ensued and then Safford had taken the message, Kramer assumed, to Noyes. And that was the last Kramer saw of it. He did not recall the precise wording of that message. He had “a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week [December 1–7, 1941] of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic.” His recollection was no longer clear; he was “under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.”^[59]

If a “Winds Execute” was received, as Safford claimed, he was under the impression that it had been turned over to the Roberts Commission.^[60] But “within the past month” Kramer had told Safford

that a copy of the “winds” message and other papers relative to the break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the Roberts Commission but were given to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while he was Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Knox who had flown to Hawaii.^[61]

This is likely because, according to Forrestal’s schedule of appointments, he saw both Kramer and McCollum on December 10, 1941.^[62]

Many argue that the reason no copies of a “Winds Execute” have been found in the files is because Tokyo did not send one. It may also be, as Kramer informed Safford on another occasion, that

no written copy was furnished the Army and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders not to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message himself.^[63]

Safford told Hewitt that he had heard through Friedman, cryptanalyst, that “written copies of the ‘winds’ message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.”^[64]

William F. Friedman, Chief Cryptanalyst, had been responsible, with his team in the Army cryptoanalytic bureau,^[65] for having deciphered after 18–20 months of hard concentration, the purple (diplomatic) code in August 1940. Friedman testified before Hewitt on June 22, 1945:

Captain Safford indicated that . . . there had been a “winds” execute message; that no copies of it were to be found in the Navy files, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to the effect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was intercepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and was promptly forwarded into Washington. . . .[H]e [Safford] indicated that it not only had the affirmative for break in relations between Japan and the United States, but it also had a negative for a break in relations between Japan and Russia.^[66]

Friedman then said he had had a conversation about a year and a half ago with Colonel Sadtler who had

indicated that the “winds” code execute message had come in some time on the 4th or 5th of December . . . that he hadn’t himself seen a copy, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to bedestroyed by General Marshall. (Italics added)

Friedman said he had “regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and nothing more than that; highly inconceivable. . . . I probably just passed that [story] out [to Safford] as one of those crazy things that get started.” Friedman said he shouldn’t have done it; he “certainly had no idea that he [Safford] would repeat it.”^[67]

As a result of this June 22, 1945, testimony by Friedman, the Clarke investigation was later re-opened to investigate the charges.

Hewitt was interested also in the delivery of the “One p.m. Message.” The 14th part of the Japanese reply was coming in when McCollum arrived at his office early Sunday morning, December 7. While he and Wilkinson were discussing the situation with Stark, about 8:30 to 9:00, the dispatch directing the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their reply to Hull at precisely 1 p.m. was brought in. Stark immediately called the White House.

At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands. . . . [W]e didn’t know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii.^[68]

Kramer told Hewitt a similar story. While the folders for the recipients of MAGIC intercepts were being made up that morning, he recalled “drawing a navigator’s time circle to see if this 1:00 p.m. Washington time tied up at all with the developments in the Malay area, which we had been following in considerable detail the previous week.” He was

impressed with the fact that 1:00 p.m. here was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where we knew the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Bharu with the connivance of the Thaiian Chief of Staff. That further tied up with the movement of a large Japanese convoy down the coast of China the previous three or four days.

When delivering the folder for Knox, who was then at a meeting in the State Department, Kramer also pointed out the time at various points in the Pacific when it was 1:00 p.m. in Washington. He may have mentioned the time difference to eight or ten others, including McCollum, Bratton, several people in the State Department, possibly Wilkinson, Stark, and, he thought, Safford.^[69]

All those questioned by Hewitt who had been stationed in Hawaii at the time of the attack were well aware that Japan was on the verge of going to war with someone somewhere. Captain Rochefort, who had been in charge of communication intelligence in Hawaii, noted that “[o]n December 1 all service radio calls were changed, and that this indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.”^[70] According to Rochefort, “it was generally agreed that there was a definite offensive movement” in the works. “The only error made was in the direction.”^[71] All attention had been turned toward the far west, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Captain Layton, who had been fleet intelligence officer for Pacific Fleet, at the time of the attack, also testified before Hewitt that the Japanese Navy had changed all calls only one month after the previous change—six months had been the usual period. To Layton, “service calls lasting only one month indicated progressive steps in preparing for active operations on a large scale.”^[72] When he learned during the first week of December that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers, he said, “That fits the picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying their codes.”^[73] Layton said there had been several reports of unidentified submarine soundings in Hawaiian waters.^[74]

McCollum testified that “we had suspected for some time that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation.”^[75] Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, who had been war plans officer for CincPac at the time of the attack, told Hewitt he considered it “highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas.”^[76] He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor “possible but not probable and that the fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defense of itself against a surprise attack, but that it should also carry on other fundamental duties.”^[77] Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger, commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, acknowledged that there had been “sound contacts,” indicating the possible presence of submarines, but most such reports were unconfirmed: “[N]o submarine was ever seen.”^[78] Nevertheless, the threat of a submarine raid was widely acknowledged as real, much more real than the likelihood of an attack by air.

Many other witnesses conceded that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable. Kimmel’s chief of staff, Admiral William W. Smith, testified: “We were particularly guarding against their submarine raids in the area. . . . We believed that that was Japan’s first attack to be made upon us and we made every effort to guard against it.”^[79] Smith knew of “no one in this area who really believed there would be a hostile air attack on the Hawaiian Islands.”^[80]

Hewitt’s inquiry revealed that the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan, submitted April 9, 1941, by a group headed by Bellinger, anticipated a possible air attack by planes

launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. . . . A single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

This plan of operations pointed out that such an attack at dawn offered “a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise . . . and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start.”^[81] This scenario was followed almost precisely on December 7. The sighting and sinking, shortly before dawn, of a Japanese submarine by the destroyer Ward, was followed very shortly after dawn by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by planes launched from carriers about 200 miles away.

It was acknowledged that “The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by an enemy.”^[82] The Navy was assigned the responsibility for long-range reconnaissance. However, there were nowhere near enough planes or crews on Oahu to conduct long-range reconnaissance for any length of time while training and preparing for offensive action in accordance with the war plan, Rainbow Five. In his testimony, Bellinger estimated that he could have conducted

360 degree reconnaissance with the available Navy planes . . . perhaps four or five days . . . 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis . . . until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is . . . based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.^[83]

Moreover, according to McMorris’s testimony,

had the maximum search been instituted from Midway and Pearl Harbor on the 27th of November warning, the situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December would have been in a highly critical situation.^[84]

If all-out reconnaissance was to be carried out in anticipation of an attack, it was imperative not to start so soon that the planes and crews would be exhausted when the emergency arose. As Hewitt pointed out, when the “war warning” was received “on 27 November they had no idea that the attack was coming [1½ weeks later] on the 7th. They had no way to time it. They had to make plans for patrol indefinitely.”^[85]

Hewitt Inquiry Conclusions

Hewitt’s investigation was completed on July 12. The 134-page report reviewed the previous investigations, discussed war and defense plans, Japanese espionage, naval intelligence, reconnaissance, and the December 7 attack itself.

The NCI report had absolved Kimmel of responsibility for the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The Hewitt report credited Kimmel with being “energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war,”^[86] and it recognized the difficulties he had faced in trying to juggle his limited resources to maintain reconnaissance, training, anti-aircraft defenses, patrols against submarines, and morale. However, the report revived some of the criticism levied against Kimmel by the Roberts Commission. It held that he did have “sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious,” and yet he had “not disseminated [this information] to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable.”^[87]

The Hewitt report followed the lead of the NCI report in attributing some of the blame for the disaster to Stark:

[T]he Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to [Kimmel] important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the “1:00 p.m.” message and its possible import, were unfortunate. . . . Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. . . .

A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet.^[88]

Regarding the existence of a “Winds Execute,” the report held unequivocally that “no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.”^[89]

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With the Hewitt Inquiry report finished, Forrestal submitted it for analysis and recommendations to the Department’s judge advocate general and Admiral King, commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. On August 10, Judge Advocate General T.L. Gatch wrote that now that this report is in

the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed. . . . It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific. . . . I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been over emphasized: for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

Gatch did not recommend court martialing any officer, although he held that “the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist.” However, no courts martial should be held “prior to the end of hostilities with Japan;” not only would it be “highly impractical” but it would also “be detrimental to the war effort.”^[90]

In his August 13 endorsement of the Hewitt report, King held that

the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service. . . . Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.^[91]

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Clarke Investigation, Part II (July 13–17, 1945)

The Clarke investigation was reopened in July 1945 at Marshall’s request.^[92] Its primary purpose was to investigate Friedman’s statements before the Hewitt inquiry [May 14-July 11, 1945] about the destruction, under Marshall’s orders, of Pearl Harbor records, especially of a Winds Code execute, if one had actually been received.^[93] According to Army courier Colonel Bratton at the APHB^[94] and Chief of G-2, Military Intelligence, Major General Sherman Miles^[95] file copies of all the Japanese intercepts were supposed to have been held in tight security in both Army and Navy files. Yet no Winds Code execute could be found. So Clarke wanted to clear up that mystery.

William F. Friedman, Chief Cryptanalyst, told Clarke that he had had conversations with Captain Safford who said “there had been such a Winds execute message and that he believed that a copy of it was still in somebody’s safe in the Navy Department but that all of his attempts to locate a copy of the Winds execute message in the official files of OP-20-G had been fruitless.”^[96] Months later, somebody higher up in the War Department—perhaps General Bissell—“directed that a search be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless.”^[97] Yet Safford was “quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the Army, if not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to some body in G-2.” Safford could not explain this “mysterious disappearance . . . of all copies of the Winds execute message,” especially as copies of all the Japanese intercepts were supposed to have been held in tight security in both Army and Navy permanent files. This “mysterious disappearance” was naturally also

of extreme interest to me, and some time after my first or possibly second, conversation with Capt. Safford, I learned of the return to Washington for duty of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends. . . . Shortly after he came back he came over to my office one day—and I don’t know whether he had specifically in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor—he may have—but at any rate in the course of our reminiscences about those days, he told me some very startling things. . . . I asked him about the Winds execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he certainly was positive about this recollection of the fact that such a Winds execute message had been intercepted by a Navy source, because he told me that he was called over to either Gen. Miles’ office or Col. Bratton’s office . . . I recall now that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning and my recollection is that it was on December 4—might have been the 5th—1941, saying—and this stands very bright in my memory —“It’s in,” meaning that the Winds execute message had been transmitted and had been intercepted and that it meant a break in relations between . . . Japan and England, and that he had then gone over to either Gen. Miles’ office or to Col. Bratton’s office—or Adm. Noyes had telephoned the same message or the purport of the Winds execute message to Gen. Miles or to Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned or presented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute message had come in and that something should be done right away. . . . Col. Bratton, the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sadtler to tell him what the Japanese word was that had been included in the Winds execute message. . . . Sadtler said that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information from the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn’t give the Japanese word. . . . [W]hen he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was nothing they could do. . . . [H]e being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might break out at almost any hour without any declaration on the part of the Japanese. And he felt that somebody high up in the War Department ought to send a message out to Gen. Short warning him . . . the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand: “Break in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within the next 24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there will be no repetition of Port Arthur.” . . . Well he tried to interest some of the people in the higher echelons. . . . He tried somebody in G-2; he tried somebody in Operations Division, the Secretary of the General Staff—I can’t enumerate them all now—but at any rate he said that he got turned down all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. . . .

Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, “What do you suppose happened to the Winds execute message which we believe so firmly was intercepted?” Well he said he was told that they were ordered destroyed. And that sort of took me aback, and I said, “By whom?” And he said, “By Gen. Marshall.”. . . . [M]y disbelief of the story was discredited by him apparently, because he still remained very firm in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, both in the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to be destroyed. . . . I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowledge. He was passing on second-hand information.^[98]

Friedman: Col. Sadtler didn’t impose any secrecy upon what he was telling me. Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion. . . . I certainly wouldn’t have said anything to Capt. Safford about it if he imposed some sort of secrecy upon what he was telling me, and of course you understand that, not giving any credence to it myself, I didn’t feel that Safford would believe any of it. But to my astonishment, Safford seemed to think there might be something to it, at least he thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can’t be found.^[99]

Colonel E.W. Gibson, aide to Clarke Inquiry: Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: “Then if I remember correctly I asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message [the Winds Code execute], and his answer was, if I remember correctly that he hadn’t himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall.”

Col. Sadtler: I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because as far as I know, that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed. . . .

Gibson: At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

Sadtler: Yes. Sometime during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J.T.B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed. Sadtler said that he might possibly have told that to Friedman in one of their conversations.^[100]

Sadtler went on to tell about the warning message he had written:

After leaving Gen. Miles’ office where Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information about the execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and thought that something ought to be done. The message was typed up and I went to see Gen. Gerow and talked this over for a few moments with him and suggested that he notify them. Gerow’s reply to the effect was that they had been adequately notified, as I recall it. I then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col. Bedell Smith, and told him what had been done and suggested he send a message. His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further.^[101]

Sadtler: I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it [a Winds Code Execute] destroyed or that anyone told me that Marshall ordered it destroyed. . . . Some time during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J.T.B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.^[102]

Clarke and Gibson questioned Spalding personally about Friedman’s testimony about Sadtler having said that Spalding said certain messages had been destroyed under orders from Marshall and Bissell,^[103]

Spalding: I did not tell him that in substance, answering specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But at no time was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation. . . . I wish it to appear in my testimony that it is my full belief that the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, are not involved in any way whatsoever with the testimony which I am about to give, and it is my belief that neither one knew anything of it. . . .We [Spalding and Bissell, when at Ft. Bragg in the summer of 1943] talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing to him my failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy could fail to discover that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. . . . I remember shooting off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for whom I didn’t have a very high regard professionally . . . and Bissell said that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary to destroy them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to the War Department and that he [Bissell] on his own responsibility destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most desirable that the president, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about. I had a feeling that Bissell destroyed them without even Gen. Raymond Lee, the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence. . . . Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would call vital records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the War Department. Bissell was the only man who ever told me anything that I remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn’t want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line I know.^[104]

Clarke and Gibson questioned Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith: At any time during your service in the War Department in 1941 until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were any of the records of G-2 destroyed?

Smith: Categorically, no. . . . I am very certain that no permanent records after January 1941, perhaps, were removed or destroyed.

Gibson: At anytime did you ever receive any order from anyone after Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to destroy or have any records destroyed?

Smith: I did not. . . .

Gibson: As far as you know, are the records of G-2 that pertain to Pearl Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete?

Smith: To the best of knowledge they are.

Gibson: Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comment made that if certain records in G-2 became known or were made public that it would be very damning to the Secretary of War or Chief of Staff?

Smith: No I had never heard any such comment.

Gibson: Did Col. Bissell to your knowledge, ever, destroy any records in G-2 in the Department?

Smith: He did not during my tenure of office; and I believe that if he had I would have known about it from my subordinates.

Gibson: Did Col. Bissell ever tell you that he had destroyed some records dealing with Pearl Harbor?

Smith: He did not. . . .

Clarke: Do you know whether or not the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. Bissell, had at his disposal all of the information and intelligence which was available to the Intelligence Group?

Smith: I have a vague recollection that some point was brought up either shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward that some sources of Counter Intelligence data were in existence but not being exploited to the maximum. I think I can state as a certainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not receive the pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have a vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contacts with the Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents in this country.^[105]

Brigadier Colonel John T. Bissell, named by Sadtler and Spalding as having destroyed documents, was then questioned:^[106]

Gibson: Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things you told him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?

Bissell: No I did not. . . .

Gibson: To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed?

Bissell: Not as far as I know.

Gibson: And once a message was okayed and sent it was kept?

Bissell: It went to the file immediately.

Gibson: And no files were ever destroyed.

Bissell: Not as far as I know. . . .

Gibson: Did you tell Gen. Spaulding [sic] at any time, in substance that you had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department?

Bissell: I did not.

Gibson: Did you ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?

Bissell: No.^[107]

Clarke questioned not only Friedman but also the four army officers supposedly implicated—Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Brigadier General Isaac Spalding, Major General Ralph C. Smith, and Brigadier General John T. Bissell. Each in turn denied having actually seen a possible Winds Code Execute.

Clarke Investigation Part II – Summary

Friedman was told by Sadtler that he remembered hearing that a Winds Code execute had been received on December 4 or 5 and that it had been destroyed on GCM’s orders.^[108] Sadtler told Friedman he had heard this from Spalding.^[109]

Sadtler later contradicated this testimony. He said he had never seen a Winds Code execute himself.^[110] He later made “an absolute flat denial of that . . . because as far as I know that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that General Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that General Marshall ordered it destroyed.”^[111]

Sadtler said he was told by Spalding in August 1943 that J. T. B. Bissell said everything pertaining to PH was destroyed.^[112]Spalding then added “[A]t no time was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation or discussion.”^[113]

Spalding was told by Bissell that he deemed it necessary to destroy files in G-2, implying that he had done this “on his own responsibility.”^[114] Spalding said further “I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn’t want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line I know.”^[115]

Bissell later testified that as far as he knew no messages pertaining to Pearl Harbor had been destroyed; once a message was okayed and sent, “It went into the file immediately. . . . And no files were ever destroyed.”^[116]

Clarke’s Report

After quoting Friedman’s statement before the Hewitt Inquiry, Clarke stated:

I find that Mr. Friedman . . . was told by Col. Sadtler at some time in 1943 that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding told Col. Sadtler that Brig. Gen. J.T.B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

I find that Col. Sadtler was told by Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding sometime in August 1943 that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bisssell had told Gen. Spalding that certain messages, pertaining to Pearl Harbor had been received and were in the files of G-2 on 7 December 1941 and that Bissell had deemed it most necessary to destroy them.

Clarke’s Conclusions

I find that Spalding was not told by Bissell that certain messages had been received, were in G-2’s files and that Bissell deemed it necessary to destroy them.

I find that Sadtler did not tell Friedman that Spalding had told Sadtler that certain messages implementing the Winds Code message were destroyed as a result of an order of Marshall.

In the end, Clarke concluded:

I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2 [Military Intelligence, Army], and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2.

He so reported to Chief of Staff Marshall.^[117]

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Stimson Issues “Official Report . . .” —(August 29, 1945)

As we have seen, Stimson refrained from releasing the APHB report when it was completed in October 1944. However, upon conclusion of Clausen’s investigation Stimson promptly issued an “Official Report . . . Regarding the Pearl Harbor Disaster,” dated August 29, 1945.^[118] Clausen’s affidavits did not really deal with the APHB charges, but Stimson used them and other documents Clausen had assembled to overturn its findings, especially with respect to Marshall, and to reconfirm the findings of the Roberts Commission. In this report, Stimson defended Marshall and Gerow for having adequately alerted Short to the impending crisis, defended Hull, and placed the primary blame once more on Short.

Stimson found that insofar as the Army was concerned, Short bore “[t]he primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor” and that he “was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing.” Stimson did

not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him.

His failure “adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded . . . contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster. . . .”

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment . . . [due to] General Short’s confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. . . .

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. . . . To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet.^[119]

As to the APHB’s conclusions concerning Washington officials, Stimson wrote,

Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. . . . The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.

I find . . . that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation. . . . Furthermore, . . . I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.^[120]

With regard to the charges against the war plans division, Stimson believed it

made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. . . . [A] more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short’s message [reporting his sabotage alert] be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

However, Stimson made excuses for the division.

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. . . . Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division.^[121]

Stimson was especially anxious to overturn the APHB’s “wicked” (FDR’s term) criticism of Marshall:

In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. . . . The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.^[122]

Testimony as to the delivery of MAGIC to Marshall on the evening of December 6, had been contradictory. Bratton, then with War Department’s G-2, had told the APHB that he had personally delivered that evening the 13 parts of the Japanese reply not only to Hull’s duty officer, but also to Miles and Marshall’s secretary.^[123] However, in his affidavit for Clausen he “corrected” his previous testimony and said he had told Dusenbury to deliver Marshall’s set to his home at Fort Myer, and further that the only message he, Bratton, had delivered that night was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State.^[124] Stimson ignores these contradictions and simply accepts the statement in Bratton’s affidavit. In his “Official Report” Stimson wrote: “There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information [the Japanese reply] until the morning of December 7.”^[125]

The APHB had suggested also that if Hull had followed a different procedure with the Japanese envoys, he “might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action.” This, Stimson said, “amounts at best only to a conjecture.” He considered the board’s comment in this respect “uncalled for.”^[126]

To the apparent satisfaction of the administration, the three supplemental investigations had shifted the major responsibility for the Japanese attack away from top Washington officials—Marshall, Gerow, and Hull—and back once more to Kimmel and Short, with some blame left over for Stark. The administration considered the matter closed.