Chapter 8: 8. The Countdown Begins U.S.-Japanese Negotiations Broken Off

U.S. “naval officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department that negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated.”^[1] When British Ambassador Lord Halifax heard this, he abruptly returned to Washington from Philadelphia where he had planned to weekend. The British government was “greatly excited” at the news. Halifax called on Undersecretary of State Welles that Friday evening, November 28, to see if it was actually true. As far as Welles knew, the situation was exactly as it had been the night before: the Japanese ambassadors had submitted the U.S. government’s statement to their government: no reply had as yet been received, so that “technically” negotiations had not yet been broken off. However, the U.S. government did not expect the Japanese government to accept its proposals.

Halifax called on Hull the next day to check on the outcome of the conversations FDR and Hull had been having with the Japanese. Hull blamed in part the “hysterical cable messages” sent by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides. Hull wished Churchill had sent a strong cable to Chiang in response to his “loud protest about our negotiations . . . telling him to brace up and fight.” Churchill’s expression of concern at Chiang’s “very thin diet” had resulted in “virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations.” Thus Chiang’s November 25 cables to officials all around the world urging that the United States reject any form of a modus vivendi with the Japanese had persuaded the United States to drop the U.S. proposal for a three-month modus vivendi and to submit in its place a ten point “ultimatum.”The Japanese ambassadors had not been optimistic about their government’s willingness to agree to the United States’ ten points. Although the Japanese government had not as yet replied, Hull said “the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over [and] the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy.” Hull also told Halifax “in great confidence” that he expected some action on the part of the Japanese before long.

[I]t would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation, to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and . . . capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions.^[2]

Tokyo Orders the Japanese Ambassadors Not to Break Off Negotiations But to Try Again

On Sunday, November 30, U.S. Navy decoders and translators intercepted, deciphered, and translated Cable #857 from Tokyo, informing the Japanese ambassadors in Washington to “make one more attempt verbally.” They should point out that “The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position.” Thus,

the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government. . . . [W]hat has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months?

The two ambassadors were told that “in carrying out this instruction” to continue their conversations with the United States, they should “please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.”^[3] In compliance with these instructions, the Japanese ambassadors requested an appointment with Secretary of State Hull.

An Inflammatory Speech in Tokyo by Japan’s Prime Minister Tojo

The Washington, D.C., newspaper headlines on Sunday, November 30, quoted from an inflammatory speech in Tokyo by Japanese Prime Minister Tojo. President Roosevelt was at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia. When Hull telephoned him about Tojo’s belligerent remarks, he took the overnight train back to Washington.

Tojo had criticized the United States and Britain severely: “The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans must be purged with vengeance.” U.S. Ambassador Grew reported by quoting from Japanese press reports:

[M]any countries . . . are indulging in actions hostile to us. . . . The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism . . . is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other. . . . For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.^[4]

Ambassador Nomura in Washington cabled Tokyo that he was concerned Tojo’s speech would “be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans.”^[5] Ambassador Kurusu was fearful that Tojo’s belligerent remarks would jeopardize their efforts to maintain the pretense of continuing to negotiate. He cautioned the Japanese foreign office in Tokyo by TransPacific Radio Telephone to “watch out about these ill-advised statements.”^[6] The Japanese government belittled the reports; it was “flabbergasted.” Yamamoto, chief of the American bureau of the Japanese foreign office, was “nonplused;” he asked, “What speech?”^[7] The Japanese government cabled an explanation.

The Washington embassy’s first secretary, Hidenari Terasaki, called on Joseph W. Ballantine, a State Department official, on December 2, and told Ballantine that he had not come to “vindicate” themselves or to “make any explanation. [He] merely wished to state the facts.”^[8] Relying on his government’s explanation, Terasaki discounted the importance of the speech and also its belligerence. The “so-called speech . . . was originally drafted by members of the office staff of the East Asia Restoration League, a non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be president.” It had been given out to newspaper reporters Saturday evening, November 29,

before the said draft was examined by either the Premier himself or other Government officials, and this unapproved manuscript was printed in the metropolitan newspapers. As a matter of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the 30th. . . . It should further be noted that the reported statement “For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance” is a mistranslation. . . . The correct translation of the statement should be “For the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed.”^[9]

Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors Exchange Strong Words

On December 1 the ambassadors called on Hull as scheduled.

Upon [their] arrival at the State Department, [they] found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators [spectators?] were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.^[10]

The meeting with Hull was long, and their conversation got off to a rough start when he brought up Tojo’s “bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo.” The ambassadors responded with tact: In the United States, they said, you “seem to take a more serious view of the Japanese Prime Minister’s utterances than was warranted.” The ambassadors told Hull that the document he had handed them on November 26, the “ultimatum” with its ten points, “had been communicated to the Japanese government,” which was now studying the case. They expected “within a few days” to receive their government’s “observation thereon.” However, they wished the United States would reconsider its rejection of the proposed Japanese modus vivendi.

Hull then remarked that we had learned of “heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina.” He criticized Japan for moving into Indochina so suddenly “without any advance notice to this Government.” We can’t overlook Japan’s digging herself into Indochina, Hull said. It

create[s] an increasing menace to America and her friends. . . . [W]e will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the Pacific. . . . [W]hen a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia.

Hull accused the Japanese of using methods in China “similar to those which are being adopted by Hitler to subjugate Europe. . . . [W]e cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to seize one-half of the world.” Hull said he believed the Japanese militarists were “moving in a similar direction to seize the other half of the earth. . . . [T]his Government cannot yield to anything of that kind.”

Ambassador Kurusu replied there was

not much difference between Japan’s idea of a co-prosperity sphere and [the U.S. policy of] Pan-Americanism, except that Japanese methods may be more primitive. He denied that it was Japan’s purpose to use force. . . . Japan was motivated by self-defense in the same way as Britain had been motivated by her acts, for example, in Syria.

He pointed out that

Japan needed rice and other materials at a time when she was being shut off by the United States and other countries and she had no alternative but to endeavor to obtain access to these materials. . . . The Ambassador commented that today war is being conducted through the agency of economic weapons, that Japan was being squeezed, and that Japan must expand to obtain raw materials.

Hull pointed out that

we were selling Japan oil until Japan suddenly moved into Indochina; that he could not defend such a situation indefinitely; and that the United States would give Japan all she wanted in the way of materials if Japan’s military leaders would only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.

Hull said

that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japan’s military leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from the Japanese military, only bluster and blood-curdling threats.

He also brought up Japan’s ties to Germany through the Tripartite [Germany-Japan-Italy] Pact. In view of Japan’s commitment to her ally, Germany, he said, Japan could not expect the United States to stop helping her friends, Britain and China.Kurusu

felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides further away than before.

Hull responded

that every time we get started in the direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all the threats that had been made.

The Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are the implications of such terms as “controlling influence”, “new order in east Asia,” and “co-prosperity sphere.”. . . Hitler was using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest.

Kurusu “disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between Japan’s purposes and Hitler’s purposes.”

The Japanese ambassador pointed out that “wars never settle anything and that war in the Pacific would be a tragedy.” But he added that

the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to keep Japan fighting with China and to keep Japan strangled. He said that the Japanese people feel that they are faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or of fighting. . . .

The Ambassadors said that they understood the Secretary’s position in the light of his statements and they would report the matter to the Japanese Government.^[11]

Japanese Troop Movements Portend Early Attack in Far East

By the end of the month, Captain Arthur H. McCollum, officer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Navy Department’s Division of Naval Intelligence in Washington, had become seriously concerned by the massive Japanese military buildup in Indochina and the preparations being made for their reinforcement.^[12] McCollum’s

duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war.^[13]

Because of the mounting evidence of Japanese offensive action, McCollum assembled and evaluated the available data in a memorandum, which he took, on the morning of December 1, to his superior, Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, director of naval intelligence. The memorandum reported that Japanese transports had been moving large numbers of fully equipped veteran troops from Shanghai to Indochina. Others were going by rail:

From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.

(a) South and Central Indo-China 70,000

(b) Northern Indo-China 25,000

The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa.

McCollum also reported extensive Japanese naval activities: ships being equipped and repaired, air and surface patrols being established and ships and planes being moved to the Mandated Island area, merchant vessels being fitted out as antiaircraft ships, naval task groups being reorganized, outlying naval air groups being inspected, and so on. He said the Japanese had under surveillance the U.S. island of Guam, more than 3,000 miles west of Hawaii. Espionage networks were being established throughout southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Japanese residents, especially women and children, had been evacuated from British India, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Australia, and many had been withdrawn from the United States, Canada, and South America.^[14]

Admiral Wilkinson made an appointment at noon on December 1 to go with McCollum to see Chief of Naval Operations Stark. As McCollum later testified, “We knew that the Japanese fleet was ready for action. We knew that it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for action.” Also the Japanese fleet had just changed its call signs and frequency allocations again after only a relatively short interval. This change in radio transmissions, when considered in conjunction with the various other clues, was one further indication that something was afoot.^[15]

Wilkinson, in subsequent testimony, said that “On the evidence available we had concluded…that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula.”^[16] At the meeting with Stark, both Wilkinson and McCollum “urged that a dispatch of warning be sent to the fleet at that time.” Stark assured them that such a dispatch had already been sent—on November 27—and that it had definitely included the phrase, “This is a war warning.”^[17]

The Army’s December 1 View of Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of War

Under date of December 5, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, acting assistant chief of staff, G-2 (Intelligence), prepared a long memorandum for the benefit of Marshall, an “Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942.”^[18] G-2 was responsible for the collection, interpretation, and distribution of information about our enemies or potential enemies. G-2’s duties included codes and ciphers and liaison with other intelligence agencies.^[19] The assistant chief of staff of G-2 was on the list to see MAGIC, and presumably Miles, as acting assistant chief of staff also had access to this information derived from reading the Japanese “Purple” intercepts.^[20]

Miles presented a rather complete analysis of the situation from the Army’s viewpoint. His memorandum^[21] in brief:

This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941, to March 1, 1942.

Miles went on to review the military situation in the Atlantic, Europe, Middle East, and the Pacific.

Germany, “though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives.” She was not “in a position [at this time] to attempt an invasion of the [British] islands,” and if she did attempt it, it “will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942.”

The battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. . . . As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

In the Middle East, “The United States is committed to providing great masses of material . . . and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply.”

In the Pacific, “the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension.” After listing her alternatives, Miles believed her “most probable line of action is the occupation of Thailand. . . . The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan.” He thought the British-Dutch-U.S. “consultative association for the defense of Malaysia” had been “effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest.”

China was “containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions,” an important consideration in view of our objective—the defeat of the Nazis. China would remain in the war and “will continue to contain important Japanese forces.” However,

The effective use of China’s unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it [her manpower] particularly in artillery and aviation. . . . For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. . . . [and] China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country.

The United States is concerned with southeast Asia and Malaysia in two different capacities: (1) “as a possible belligerent” and (2) “as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies.” Although we were “sending a few military airplanes to Thailand . . . this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. . . .”

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia.

Japan was torn between two opposing factions. The government leaders were “aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific” and seek “a peaceful settlement” with the United States. On the other hand, “army hotheads” and “other intransigents” oppose any major concessions. From the point of view of the government leaders, the situation appeared bleak; the conversations between the Japanese ambassadors and the U.S. government in Washington “can now be said definitely to have ended in failure”

Miles said Japan faced a serious problem:

Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deficiencies in these categories. . . .

The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan “on the spot” economically. . . . If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence. . . .

[I]n short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. This is a problem which she must solve within then next few months.

A basic assumption of Miles’s memorandum, in spite of United States’ official neutrality, was that we were “committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany.” He wrote matter-of-factly about “the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participating in the war.” Miles acknowledged that the “Kurusu conference,” the negotiations between the Japanese ambassadors and our State Department, “can now be said definitely to have ended in failure.” Yet he did not appear to view this rupture with particular concern. Nor did he reflect the sense of urgency that pervaded much of Washington at that time—including the members of FDR’s War Council or Cabinet and some of those who were working with the Japanese intercepts, notably McCollum in naval intelligence and Safford in naval communications.

Miles realized that the United States’s “consultative association” with the British and the Netherlands East Indies “for the defense of Malaysia” made us “a possible belligerent” in that area. He knew that the “increasing amount of equipment” we were sending China pitted us directly against Japan. Miles also recognized Japan’s “perilous [economic] plight.” After analyzing all these various factors, he concluded that the intentions of Japan were not predictable. Our economic blockade of Japan and our military forces in the Pacific, Miles wrote,

are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan, we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because . . . it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

Honolulu Press Reports U.S.-Japanese Conversations Continuing

A report of the Japanese ambassadors’ December 1 meeting with Hull appeared in the newspapers, including the Honolulu papers, where it was seen by Kimmel and Short. The two Pearl Harbor commanders had no way of knowing what was going on behind the scenes, except as they were informed by Washington. Short had received Stimson’s November 27 cable, sent out over Marshall’s signature, telling him that “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated . . . with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.” Kimmel “was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest possibilities of their resumption.” Neither Kimmel nor Short had received any further official report of the situation, and then, as Kimmel said, they “were left to read public accounts of further conversations between the State Department and the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had been resumed.”^[22] They could only assume that the report they had received of a break in negotiations had been superseded.

Japan Alerts Berlin of Impending “Clash of Arms” with Anglo-Saxon Nations

On December 1, our Navy cryptographers intercepted, decoded, and translated two November 30 messages from the Japanese government to its ambassador in Germany. These were long cables, sent in “Purple,” asking the ambassador in Berlin to notify Japan’s allies under the Tripartite Alliance (Germany and Italy) of the breakdown in negotiations with the United States.

These cables were sent in three parts. The first part^[23] reported to the ambassador the status of the conversations between Tokyo and Washington. “[I]n spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government,” the negotiations “now stand ruptured—broken. . . . In the face of this our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination.” The ambassador was asked to “immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments.” He should describe the “provocative attitude” of England and the United States and the plan of the British and Americans to move military forces into East Asia. He should say that this makes it inevitable that Japan

counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

In part 3 of this three-part cable,^[24] the ambassador was to reassure the German officials, if questioned about Japan’s attitude toward their common enemy under the Tripartite Pact, the Soviets with whom the Nazis were then engaged in a fierce struggle to reach Moscow, that Japan did

not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

After speaking with the Germans, the ambassador was to have an Italian translation of this cable transmitted to Hitler’s ally, Premier Mussolini, and his Foreign Minister Ciano.

To the Japanese, the breakdown in negotiations with the United States meant war. And they were telling their German and Italian allies that they were planning to move south—that is, in the direction of the Philippines, Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula.

The second November 30 cable from Tokyo to Berlin was in two parts. The negotiations had been started in April under the previous Konoye administration. The “intent” of these negotiations, Tokyo reminded the ambassador, had been to restrain the United States from participating in the war. During the negotiations of the last few days, however, the Japanese had found it

gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. . . . Their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Tokyo told the ambassador that

before the United States brought forth this plan [to reject Japan’s modus vivendi proposal], they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.^[25]

Japan Orders her Embassies Worldwide to Destroy Codes and Code Machines

On December 1, Tokyo sent two short circular cables to its embassies around the world, giving instructions for abandoning the use of code machines and describing how to destroy them.^[26] Four offices—London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila—were told to destroy their code machines and codes; the office in the United States was told specifically to retain its machines and machine codes. When a government orders the destruction of the code machines at its diplomatic offices in certain countries, that is a strong indication that a break in relations with those countries is imminent. The officials who were reading MAGIC intercepts realized the significance of these cables.

FDR Assures British Ambassador Halifax of U.S. Support in Southeast Asia

Because of the sense of growing emergency, Roosevelt had returned suddenly from Warm Springs to Washington. On the afternoon of December 1, he and his close aide Harry Hopkins met for a “long interview” with British Ambassador Lord Halifax at the White House. Both Halifax and FDR had considered sending a joint British-American statement to the Japanese, but rejected the idea as they expected it would only evoke an evasive reply from Japan.^[27] Halifax was concerned about whether the United States would lend support to the British in southeast Asia, as agreed during the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in April. As a signatory to the ADB agreement, the United States was committed to engage in “active military counter-action” in the event of “a direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers.”

The geographical area encompassed by this pact covered large portions of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. The details as to how “active military counteraction” was to be undertaken had not been specifically spelled out. However, the ADB agreement did specify that the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquartered in Hawaii “whenever and wherever they can . . . should assume the offensive against Japanese naval forces and sea communications.” In addition to defending its base in Manila, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was to transfer some of its cruisers with aviation units and destroyers “towards Singapore . . . to operate under [the] strategic direction” of the commander-in-chief, Chin.^[28]

The situation in southeast Asia was becoming increasingly precarious. Large contingents of Japanese troops were moving in that direction. The government of the Netherlands East Indies “had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces.”^[29] Halifax had been instructed by his government to tell the U.S. government that it “expected a Japanese attack on Thailand, and that this attack would include an expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus” (the narrow strip of land belonging to Thailand north of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore). The British “proposed to counter this plan by a rapid move into the Isthmus,” and they “wanted to be sure . . . [of] American support.”^[30]

Roosevelt told Halifax that “[i]n the case of a direct attack” on the British or the Dutch, “we should obviously all be together.” However, he wanted to explore some situations which might not be quite so clear, for instance, if there were not a “direct attack” on the British or Dutch, or if the Japanese moved into Thailand without attacking the Kra Isthmus. When Halifax reported this conversation to his government, he said “he thought the United States would support whatever action we might take in any of these cases.”

FDR also told Halifax that the British “could count on American support if we [the British] carried out our move to defend the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese attack, though this support might not be forthcoming for a few days.” FDR then suggested that the British promise the Thai government that they would respect and guarantee the “full sovereignty and independence” of Thailand if the Thais “resisted Japanese attack or infiltration.” Roosevelt said that the U.S. Constitution did not allow him to give such a guarantee, but he told Halifax that the British “could be sure” that their guarantee to the Thai government would have “full American support.”^[31]

The president’s answer was sufficiently encouraging to enable Halifax to report that in his opinion the United States would support whatever action we might take in any of the contingencies outlined by the president. We could, in any case, count on American support of any operations in the Kra Isthmus.^[32]

Hart (Manila) Directed to Charter Three Small “Men-of-War” to Observe Japanese Convoys

At the direction of the president, the Navy sent a cable about 7:00 p.m. on December 1 to Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of our Asiatic Fleet, based at Manila. Hart was asked to charter three small vessels “as soon as possible and within two days if possible” to form a “defensive information patrol.” These three small ships were to have the minimal requirements to be classified as “U.S. men-of-war.” Each was to be commanded by a U.S. naval officer, although the crew members could be Filipinos. For weapons, they needed only a small gun and one machine gun. Their mission was “to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam.” The three small ships were to be stationed off the coast of French Indochina. “One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau,” all locations in the anticipated path of the Japanese convoys then known to be sailing toward southeast Asia. Hart was also asked to report on the reconnaissance measures—air, surface, and submarine—being performed regularly by both Army and Navy.^[33]

Ambassador Grew Reports Gloom in Tokyo

During the last few days of November, U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan spoke with

a number of prominent Japanese, some of whom have been in direct touch with the Foreign Minister, and most of them appeared to be already familiar with the substance of our Government’s recent ten-point draft proposal. While desirous of continuing the Washington conversations, they all reflect a pessimistic reaction, perceiving the difficulties of bridging over the positions of the two countries and emphasizing what they seem to regard as the unconciliatory “tone” of our proposal.

On the evening of December 1, Grew saw one of his old Japanese friends at the Tokyo Club, looking “gray and worn.” “[T]he cabinet had decided to break off the conversations” with the United States, he told Grew. “[I]n that case,” Grew “feared that everything was over and that [he] would soon be leaving Japan.”^[34] However, the government-controlled Tokyo newspapers that night reported “that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations.”^[35] Grew cabled Washington to that effect. In spite of this apparent good news, Grew’s friend remained “crushed.”^[36]