16. “Do-Don’t” Warnings

Chapter Sixteen

“DO-DON’T” WARNINGS

WASHINGTON, IN blaming Kimmel and Short for the disaster of December 7, contended that they had been adequately warned of the imminence of war. The first warning which was supposed to have guided the field commanders was a letter from Knox to Stimson on January 24, 1941, in which the Secretary of the Navy said, “If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.”¹

Although the Roberts report cited this letter against Kimmel and Short, the commission failed to state that in the ten months which intervened before the attack, neither Knox nor anyone else in Washington indicated in any warning dispatched to Hawaii that there was any likelihood of an attack upon Oahu. After the attack, the Army Board noted, none of the principal figures admitted the least suspicion that Pearl Harbor should have been the objective. The board said:

The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu is startling. When the Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after December 7, Adm. Pye* testified his first remark was: “No one in Washington expected an attack—even Kelly Turner.”†²

On October 16, 1941, the first of the so-called war warnings was dispatched to Adm. Kimmel by Adm. Ingersoll. It read:

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed, it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye cabinet remains, the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. In either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities, you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.³

The conflict in this message is apparent. Hawaii was notified that if Japan embarked upon hostilities, a war with Russia was probable. This was qualified by mention of the “possibility” of an attack upon the United States and Britain. The Hawaiian commanders were to take “due precautions” and to make “preparatory deployments,” but not to “disclose strategic intention” or engage in “provocative actions.”

Adm. Ingersoll said that these instructions were sent both to Adm. Kimmel and to Adm. Hart, and that the order to execute a “preparatory deployment” applied to the Asiatic fleet rather than to Kimmel’s Pacific fleet. He said:

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action or disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines than to any particular deployment of the Pacific fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation.⁴

Ingersoll, who released the order, was here in conflict with Adm. Turner, who asserted that Kimmel, under the order to execute a preparatory deployment, should have “taken his fleet to sea.”⁵

Senator Ferguson pointed out the confusion arising from sending messages to two or more outposts, with certain instructions intended for one outpost and not for another.

On October 20 Short was sent the following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation: “Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.”⁶ Therefore, the Hawaiian commanders were told that Japan was still relying upon efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement with the United States, and that belligerent action was not foreseen.

On November 24 Adm. Kimmel received the following message from Adm. Stark, concurred in by Gen. Marshall:

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon government and movements of their naval and military force, indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility. The chief of staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform senior Army officers in respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.⁷

The effect of this message was to persuade Kimmel and Short that if Japan moved, it would not be toward Hawaii, but against the Philippines or Guam. They were restricted to a course of action which would maintain secrecy “in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.”

On the next day, November 25, Adm. Stark confused the directions in this message and diluted its effectiveness by sending a letter to Adm. Kimmel concluding,

I won’t go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I’ll be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that’s the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be “anything.”⁸

On November 27 Stark sent Kimmel a “war warning” which the Pacific fleet commander showed to Short. It read:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.* The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed.⁹

Whereas the message of November 24 indicated a possible attack on Guam, Washington now had decided that any Japanese movement would be directly south. Guam, and, by inference, Oahu, were to be on guard only against sabotage. While the message was termed a “war warning,” it did not place in effect Navy War Plan 46, but directed only that a defensive deployment be executed in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned to the Pacific fleet under that plan. These tasks were entirely offensive, involving raids against the Japanese mandated islands. It was indicated that later directions would be received if it became necessary to carry out this plan.

On November 27 a message was dispatched to Short under the signature of Gen. Marshall which, the Army Board said, was so ambiguous and contained so many conflicting instructions that it could only be characterized as a “Do-or-Don’t” message. It read:

No. 472. Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.¹⁰

This message, although bearing Marshall’s signature, had in fact been drafted by Secretary Stimson and Gen. Gerow with some assistance from Col. Charles W. Bundy of the general staff.¹¹ Marshall was in North Carolina observing Army maneuvers on November 27.¹² During the drafting of this dispatch, Stimson also consulted Secretary Knox, Adm. Stark, and Gen. William Bryden, deputy chief of staff.¹³ From Stimson’s own statements, it is apparent that the message was drafted primarily to guide Gen. MacArthur in the Philippines.

Describing his conference with Knox, Stark, and Gerow, the Secretary stated:

The main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasialert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was. We were sending the messages to four people; not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska.¹⁴

Stimson himself drafted the first sentence of the dispatch. As originally written, the first sentence read, “Negotiations with Japan have been terminated.” This was softened after Stimson consulted Secretary Hull by telephone.¹⁵ As revised, it read, “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.” The next sentence, “Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment,” was put in by Gerow or Bundy.¹⁶

The sentence, “If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act,” was thus phrased because, Gerow explained, “the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act.”¹⁷ Gen. Marshall added, “It was included on specific instructions from the President.”¹⁸ Roosevelt apparently was very mindful of his pledge not to send Americans into foreign wars “unless we are attacked.”¹⁹

The next sentence, “This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense,” was inserted by Gerow or Bundy.²⁰ In directing Short to engage in reconnaissance, Stimson and the general staff were manifesting ignorance that distance reconnaissance was a Navy duty in Hawaii and that Short had only six planes capable of distance flights.²¹

The Army Board report remarks that the drafting of the message was “the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor.” The report adds,

It is equally obvious that the November 27 message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counter-proposals of the 26th of November to Japan. No other picture of the situation was given to Short except in this message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short’s mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment of the responsibility of others.

The three principal major generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, chief of staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred.

It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy departments transmitted to Short only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary.

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941.²²

Analyzing the dispatch, the Army Board said that the first two sentences, that negotiations “appear to be terminated,” with only a bare possibility that they would be resumed, and that Japan’s action was “unpredictable, but hostile action possible,” were inadequate and misleading. “The War Department was convinced then that war would come,” the board states.²³ The statement that Japanese action was “unpredictable” did not square with the Navy warning, which Kimmel had shown to Short, that an attack, if it came, would be in the Kra Peninsula or elsewhere in the Far East.²⁴ In any event, Hawaii was not warned of attack.

In addition, Short was told that Japan must commit the first overt act and that he must not alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. He was told that these instructions were not to restrict his defense, but they could have no other effect.

The Army Board dismisses this “war warning” with the sharp comment:

Had a full war message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line. Responsibility lay both in Washington and in Hawaii.²⁵

Gen. Short commented:

The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act.²⁶ That this opinion was in accordance with the views of Gen. Marshall is shown by the following quotation from his testimony:

“So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the governmental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific fleet.”²⁷

No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since the alert message of June 18, 1940. An examination of the various military intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 shows that in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack upon Hawaii. There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. “Hostile action at any moment” meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action.²⁸

The only additional information received by Short after message No. 472 of November 27 was contained in three messages on November 27 and 28 concerning possible danger from sabotage and subversive activities. The first of these, from Gen. Miles of G-2 to Short’s intelligence section, read: “Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and chief of staff only.”²⁹

As a warning in any real sense, this message failed. It was highly conditional: hostilities “may” ensue, subversive activities “may” be expected. Hostilities or inimical activities may be “expected” at any time. Further, the message indicated that if there were hostilities in Hawaii they would take the form of subversive activities.

Short replied as follows to the radiogram of November 27 bearing Marshall’s signature: “Reurad (re your radio) four seven two 27th: Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.”³⁰

The commander of the Hawaiian department received no reply from Washington, either approving the measures he had taken or directing him to institute a higher degree of alert. He interpreted this silence as approval of the measures he had taken. His report was initialed or rubber stamped by Gen. Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Gen. Gerow. If they were dissatisfied with his action, all they needed to do was give him an order. They did nothing.³¹

Gen. Short attributed the lack of reaction in Washington to the fact that “all who read the message believed the action was correct.”³² He cited Gen. Marshall’s testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in support of this thesis. Marshall testified:

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.³³

On November 28 Short received the following message, relating entirely to sabotage and subversive activities, from the adjutant general:

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. This does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not, repeat not, affect your responsibility under existing instructions.³⁴

Because of the emphasis that was again placed on protection against sabotage and subversive activities, Short was fortified in his conviction that he had instituted the kind of alert which Washington wanted. He thought the adjutant general’s dispatch had been prepared after consideration had been given to his message reporting that he had alerted his command to prevent sabotage.

During his examination before the congressional committee, Short was asked by Representative Keefe, “Now, when you received that telegram of the 28th, after Washington had received your message in which you stated you were alerted against sabotage, did that tend to influence you in your thinking that the alert which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washington wanted?”

“It did,” said Short. “I thought it was an answer to my radiogram and [the adjutant general] wanted to emphasize the question of legality.”³⁵

Accordingly, to reassure the War Department as to the legality of his actions, Short explained in his reply to the adjutant general November 29 that his measures against subversive activities and sabotage were countenanced by the organic act of Hawaii and by an ordnance of the city and county of Honolulu.³⁶ He received no reply from the War Department and considered Washington’s failure to comment as implying further tacit agreement that the measures he had taken were all that were intended or desired by the War Department. Short reported:

When the War Department was informed that the Hawaiian department was alerted against sabotage, it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, subsurface, ground, or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This action on the part of the War Department definitely indicated to me that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War Department had nine more days in which to express its disapproval. The action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17’s from Hamilton Field, California, on the night of December 6 to Honolulu confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was not probable.³⁷

Hawaii, Short explained, was a focal point in transporting troops, B-17’s, and air crews to the Philippines. The planes were always sent to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out to “the more dangerous area of the Philippines, we were to arm them.”

None of the planes which left Hamilton Field December 6 was equipped with ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer, and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning the machine guns even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. Short said:

It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished to send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already had information of a pending Japanese attack. The only inference that can be drawn is that while the War Department had information of a pending attack, Gen. [H. H.] Arnold, the chief of air corps, who ordered these planes to Honolulu, and who I understand was present at Hamilton Field at the time of their departure, did not know of the critical situation in the relations between the United States and Japan.³⁸

Confirmation of my view that the War Department’s silence and failure to reply to my report of November 27 constituted reasonable grounds for my belief that my action was exactly what the War Department desired is contained in Gen. Marshall’s testimony before this joint committee on December 11, 1945.

Short then cited the following colloquy:

Senator Ferguson: “Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered to take ’such measures as he deems necessary and to report such measures to you,’ is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of this difference?”

Gen. Marshall: “I would assume so.”³⁹

On November 28 Gen. Arnold sent Gen. Martin, chief of the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, still another message relating entirely to sabotage and subversive activities, similar in tone to the dispatch of the same day from the adjutant general to Short. Again the Hawaiian command was cautioned to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm and confine protective measures to those essential to security, and that illegal measures were not authorized. Martin was instructed to report his action under these orders by December 5.⁴⁰

On December 4 Short and his air general sent a detailed report to Arnold of measures taken by them against sabotage and subversive activities. They underlined the prevailing condition of alert in Hawaii by stating, “This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage.”⁴¹ The Hawaiian department received no reply disagreeing in any way with the action reported.⁴²

The Martin-Short report, the final message from Hawaii to Washington, was dispatched only three days before the attack. Although Washington then had an abundance of information pointing to war almost at once, it was still talking as if the principal and only danger to Hawaii was from sabotage and subversive activities, and it was accepting without comment reports from the Hawaiian command which showed a complete misapprehension as to the gravity of the situation which Washington knew to exist.

In their message of December 4, for example, Martin and Short were suggesting to Washington that their troops could be kept from threatened disaffection by educational talks on the status of the soldier as a citizen, the ideals of the founders of the Republic, and the dangers of Fascism. The report stated:

Entire subject of protection recently received and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention. . . .Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system, civilian and military, now in progress. . . . Secrecy discipline given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi-official agencies.

With reference to counter-propaganda, the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks. Need is felt for a War Department publication suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel, dealing with status of soldier as citizen, ideals and doctrine influencing founders of American government, structure of government, place of military establishment in structure, national objectives, both domestic and international, together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form.⁴³

This, be it remembered, was the same day that Washington knew from the intercepted “east wind rain” message that war had already been decreed against the United States without a formal declaration. No message was sent to Short or Martin to correct their misapprehensions founded on ignorance of the facts known in Washington.

Meanwhile, on November 27, the day on which he received the “war warning,” Adm. Kimmel received two other dispatches from Adm. Stark which convinced him that Washington had no expectation of an attack upon Hawaii. One of these proposed that Kimmel load twenty-five army pursuit planes on each of his two aircraft carriers and send them to Wake and Midway islands. The other proposed the reinforcement of Marine defense battalions on Wake and Midway with Army troops. Two days later Gen. Short received a dispatch from the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take over the defense of these two islands from the Marines. Thus the dispatches sent from the War and Navy departments were in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project.⁴⁴

Kimmel told the congressional committee that it was not feasible to exchange Army troops for Marines on the outlying bases. The Army had no artillery or anti-aircraft weapons to equip any troops which might relieve or reinforce the Marines, and if the Marines had withdrawn, leaving their equipment and arms for the Army, Kimmel had no means of re-equipping or re-arming them. In addition, the Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense battalion, so that the Army garrisons would have required a new table of organization.

Not only would the defense of Midway and Wake have been disrupted during the period the garrisons were being changed, but at Wake there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships under way in an open seaway, and at times bad weather had delayed unloadings at the island for as long as twenty-eight days. It was not unusual for a ship to require a week to unload. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible.

“I believe,” said Kimmel, “that responsible authorities in Washington would not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circumstances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying bases was imminent.” Accordingly, he recommended to Stark that the Marine garrisons remain until Army troops had been adequately equipped and trained to replace them.

The admiral also said that Washington’s proposal to replace Marine planes on Wake and Midway with Army pursuit planes was impracticable.* Gen. Martin stated that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than 15 miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be frozen there, while their 15-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness in island defense.

The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send to Wake and Midway from Oahu on November 27, the same day that Kimmel was being given the so-called war warning applicable to Hawaii, constituted approximately 50 per cent of the Army’s pursuit strength on Oahu. Kimmel stated:

The very fact that the War and Navy departments proposed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable. In brief, on November 27, the Navy Department suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity the carriers of the fleet which constituted the fleet’s main striking defense against an air attack. On Nov. 27, the War and Navy departments suggested that we send from the island of Oahu 50 per cent of the Army’s resources in pursuit planes. These proposals came to us on the very same day of the so-called “war warning.” In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that the “war warning” was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.⁴⁶

Short, under orders November 29 from the War Department, was instructed to put into effect a plan whereby the Army garrison in Hawaii would be depleted. The plan would have required him to garrison Christmas and Canton islands, and later to take over the outlying islands—Palmyra, Johnston, and Samoa. The troops he was supposed to send to these islands would be replaced by fresh troops from the mainland.⁴⁷ This testimony showed that Washington was not looking for any attack on Hawaii after sending Short the warning of November 27; otherwise it would not have directed him to reduce his garrison.

On November 29 Adm. Stark sent a message to Kimmel which was in substance a quotation of the Army “war warning” of November 27 to Short. In addition, it conveyed the following direction:

WPL 52 is not applicable to the Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.⁴⁸

Kimmel explained:

WPL 52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic fleet had shooting orders. It was charged with the task of destroying German and Italian naval, land, and air forces encountered in the area of the Western Atlantic. The Southeast Pacific subarea covered approximately 700 miles of the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of South America. Here the Southeast Pacific naval force had similar shooting orders and a similar task.

In the dispatch of November 29, the chief of naval operations informed me that WPL 52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not have shooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act.⁴⁹

On November 30 the Navy Department sent Kimmel, for information, a dispatch addressed to Adm. Hart, stating that there were indications that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus. Hart was ordered to scout for information but to avoid the appearance of attacking.⁵⁰ On December 1 Kimmel received for information another Navy Department dispatch addressed to Hart, describing a proposed Japanese intrigue designed to draw British forces over the border of Thailand in order to give Thailand a pretext for calling upon Japan for aid. This would have facilitated the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally and have given Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula in order to carry out further operations.⁵¹

“In short,” Kimmel said, “all indications of the movements of Japanese military and naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in the dispatch of Nov. 27—that the Japanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in Southeast Asia.”⁵²

On December 1 the fortnightly Navy intelligence summary issued by Stark, under the heading “The Japanese Naval Situation,” informed Kimmel, “Major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.”⁵³ This estimate could not have been more disastrously wrong.

Three more messages were sent by the Navy Department to Kimmel in the days preceding the attack. The first, on December 3, stated that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London had been ordered to destroy “most of their codes and ciphers”—not all—a point noted by Kimmel and his staff at the time. “This information,” Kimmel said, “seemed to fit in with the information we had received about a Japanese movement in Southeast Asia.”⁵⁵

Kimmel told the congressional committee that he did not know that warnings had been given to Japan as early as July, 1941, that Japanese moves against British and Dutch possessions in the Southwest Pacific would compel the United States to “take steps” to protect its rights. Consequently, he testified, when definite reports were received late in November that the Japanese were concentrating forces for their southward move, he was not aware that such action was in violation of specific warnings from the American government.

The only thing he knew, he said, was that his war plans called for raids against the Marshall Islands to draw the Japanese away from the Malay barrier, but only in the event of war between Japan and an association of the United States and Great Britain.⁵⁶

Two other dispatches were received by Kimmel on December 4 and 6. Of these the Army Board remarks,

This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the messages of December 4 or December 6. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts report, which reads as follows:

“The message of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency [this was sent to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific fleet for information only]; and the message of December 6, directing that in view of the tense existing situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.”⁵⁷

The dispatch of December 4 was apparently that drafted by Capt. Safford to be sent to Guam following receipt of the “winds” signal.

Gen. Short denied that he ever saw the three messages of December 3, 4, and 6.⁵⁸ The Roberts report commented,

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids. On the contrary, they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state of war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air attack was not considered.⁵⁹

The Army Board remarked,

“There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation.”⁶⁰

The final message from Washington to Hawaii was drafted by Gen. Marshall at 11:58 A.M. December 7, one hour and twenty-seven minutes before the Japanese attack began on Oahu, and was dispatched to Gen. Short at 12:18 P.M., Washington time (6:48 A.M., Honolulu time), one hour and seven minutes before the first bombs and torpedoes were launched by the Japanese. The message read:

Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.⁶¹

This message did not carry a “priority” classification and was not marked “urgent.” Early in the morning the Army radio in Hawaii had had difficulty in maintaining communication with the War Department in Washington. Because the War Department message center was dubious about getting through to Hawaii on its own set, it was decided to send this vital message by RCA commercial radio.

Marshall had on his desk a scrambler telephone—which renders conversations a hash of meaningless sounds, which are unscrambled at the receiving end—with which he could have reached Gen. Short in a matter of minutes. The chief of staff later explained that he hesitated to use this device because it was known that German agents had tapped scrambler telephone conversations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and because they had also tapped communications from William Bullitt when he was serving as ambassador to France.⁶² Marshall said that “there was a possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department” if the Japanese had tapped any warning he telephoned Short.⁶³ Since the Japanese intended to embarrass the whole nation with their attack upon Pearl Harbor, the explanation is curious.⁶⁴

The chief of staff also had at his disposal the powerful Navy Department and FBI radio transmitters over which his message, if marked for priority handling, could have been sent to Hawaii in a very short period. Adm. Stark, who was with him when the last minute warning was drafted, offered Marshall the use of the Navy radio.⁶⁵ Marshall, however, did not choose to use either the Navy or FBI sets.

His message was brought to the code room of the War Department signal office by Col. Bratton. Col. French, in charge of the traffic operations branch, had it typed for clarity.* It was then encoded.⁶⁶ The message was received by RCA in Honolulu at 7:33 A.M., twenty-two minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor. When the Jap assault began, a bicycle messenger boy was carrying it through the streets of Honolulu. It was not actually delivered to the Army signal office at Fort Shafter until 11:45 A.M., two hours after the last Jap plane had retired. Because it was not marked “priority,” other messages which were so marked were decoded first at the signal office. The message was finally placed in the hands of the decoding officer at 2:40 P.M. It was decoded and delivered to Col. Dunlop, adjutant general of the Hawaiian department, at 2:58 P.M. Dunlop turned it over at 3:00 P.M. to Gen. Short’s aide, Capt. Trueman, who delivered it to Short. The warning thus was in Short’s hands eight hours and twelve minutes after being filed for transmission and seven hours and five minutes after the attack had begun.⁶⁷

These were the messages which Washington called “war warnings” and which the leaders of government and of the Army and Navy high command said should have put the Hawaiian commanders on guard against a surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor. All of them sent previous to December 7 were termed by the Army Board “Do-Don’t” messages, which told the commanders in Hawaii to prepare for defense but to do nothing in preparing that might precipitate trouble with the large Japanese population or excite the public. The commanders were to prepare to take the offensive, but also to take the first punch: “The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.” They were warned by Washington against sabotage and subversive activities, but were held responsible when a disaster resulted from an air attack which no one in Washington had foreseen. They were told that hostilities would begin in Southeast Asia, but were blamed when the Japs crossed up the brain trust in Washington by attacking Hawaii.

The message of December 7 might have served to convey some sense of danger if it had not been so horribly bungled in transmission, but it was scarcely less ambiguous than its predecessors. Although Marshall stated that he did not know the significance of the 1:00 P.M. deadline and other Jap actions, he nevertheless instructed the Hawaiian commanders to “be on alert accordingly.” In accordance with what? He did not suggest against what they were to be on the alert.

The minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (Conclusion 13, pp. 38-40) appraises all of these warnings as follows:

The messages sent to Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel by high authorities in Washington during November were couched in such conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting the particular actions to be taken—orders that were beyond all reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.

We content ourselves with presenting the following facts in respect to the conflicting, imprecise, and insufficient character of these messages.

It should be here observed that Washington had taken unto itself such a minute direction of affairs as regards outposts that the usual discretion of outpost commanders was narrowly limited.

First of all, it is to be noted that the four reports by the Army and Navy boards created to investigate Pearl Harbor found the warning messages insufficient to put the Hawaiian commanders on a full war alert; and the President’s commission on Pearl Harbor, while finding the commanders guilty of dereliction of duty, itself places neglect on the part of the War Department, in respect to such orders, as among the contributory causes of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, thus qualifying its own conclusions.

The President’s commission, though limited by his instructions to a search for derelictions of duty and errors of judgment on the part of the Army and Navy personnel, made a point of declaring that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy had fulfilled their obligations with regard to matters bearing on the situation at Pearl Harbor and that the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations had fulfilled their command responsibilities in issuing warning messages to the two commanders.

But the commission includes among the grounds for charging Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel with dereliction of duty their failure “to consult and confer” with each other “respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings.” Thus the commission in effect concedes that the war warning messages were couched in language so imprecise that the commanders would have to consult and confer in order to discover what the messages meant.

Having made this statement, the commission goes on to lay some of the blame for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe on the War Department and the Navy Department (that is, upon Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and/or Gen. Marshall and Adm. Stark, whom the commission had earlier in its report exculpated). The commission declared that among the—

“causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were: Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far East and on antisabotage measures. Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the antisabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian department.”

Had the commission been in a mind to do so, it might have added: Failure of the War and Navy Departments to mention in these messages the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, it is to be noted that the commission also places among the “contributory causes” the “nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of Dec. 7, 1941.” As a matter of fact the “nonreceipt” of this warning message was due to inexcusable delays of high authorities in Washington.

Hence, it appears that the President’s commission, by direct statements and by implication, admits definitely that the war-warning messages to Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel were imprecise, indefinite, and constituted no sufficient warning for an all-out alert, particularly the messages to Gen. Short, whose primary duty it was to defend Pearl Harbor and protect the fleet while in the harbor.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, after a careful examination and comparison of the war-warning messages, concluded that the messages of Nov. 27 were “conflicting” and that the statements in the message to Gen. Short were “inadequate” and “misleading.” The Army Board also criticized the War Department for failure to send “specific directives” to outpost commanders.

Despite its conclusion that Gen. Short had displayed lack of judgment, the Army Board laid against him no charge of dereliction of duty and made no recommendations in that respect. The Navy Court of Inquiry likewise criticized the war-warning messages for lack of directives as to actions at Pearl Harbor and concluded that “no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.” It recommended no further proceedings be had in the matter.

In the testimony and other evidence presented to this committee there is no proof that warrants traversing the judgment reached by the President’s commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or the Navy Pearl Harbor Court to the effect that the war-warning messages were not in fact clear and unmistakable directives for an all-out alert against a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Again (Conclusion 18, p. 59), the minority report states:

Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for a Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military administration requires taking note of the fact that they were designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington—all of whom were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed forces of the United States.

This conclusion is self-evident, especially in view of all that goes before, and needs no comment.

* Vice-Adm. William S. Pye on December 7, 1941, was commander, battle force (Task Force 1), of the Pacific fleet. Upon the relief of Adm. Kimmel as commander-in-chief of the fleet on December 17, 1941, he was temporarily placed in command of the fleet. On December 31, 1941, he was succeeded by Adm. Chester W. Nimitz.

† Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, chief of Navy war plans at the time of Pearl Harbor, was reckoned among the Navy’s most bellicose and suspicious officers in regard to Japan.

* “The use of the term ‘war warning’ in constant reference to this message of Nov. 27 to Adm. Kimmel creates a wrong impression. The entire message is of the utmost importance and should be read as a whole rather than adopt two words from it which when taken alone create the wrong impression.” (Min., pp. 41-42.)

* Adm. W. W. Smith testified: “He [Adm. Kimmel] had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and Gen. Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off the outlying islands, and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39’s or P-40’s on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to be taken off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this with Gen. Short and his staff, the commanding general of the Army Air Force (Gen. Martin) and Adm. Pye were present, and also Adm. Wilson Brown, the war plans officer, the operations officers and I believe Adm. Bloch. Adm. Kimmel said, ‘What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?’ And Gen. Martin replied, ‘We do not allow them to go more than 15 miles off shore.’ That was a shock to all of us and Adm. Kimmel’s reply was, ‘Then, they will be no damn good to me.’ The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand.”⁴⁵

* Col. French testified (Maj., p. 225, APH Top Secret, pp. 189-205) that he had not considered using the telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center; that it was unsuitable for a classified message; and that, in any event, “if they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals themselves, chief of staff, or whoever was the individual concerned.” In other words, the decision as to whether to use the telephone was up to Gen. Marshall as the originator of the message and operating chief of the Army.