Japanese-American Relations 1921-1941

JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941; THE PACIFIC BACK ROAD TO WAR by CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL It is . . . peculiarly to our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with 01 without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. AJJiance with China, in view oi China's absolute military helplessness, means, of course, not an additional strength to us, hut an additional obligation which we assume. —THEODORE ROOSEVELT, to President William Howard Taft, December 22, 1910. America provoked Japan to such an extent that the Japanese were forced to attack Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on history to say that America was forced into war. —CAPTAIN OLIVER LYTTELTON, British Minister of Supplies, June 20, 1944. . . . It is beyond doubt that President Roosevelt wanted to get his country into the war, but for political reasons was most anxious to insure that the first act of hostility came from the other side; for which reason he caused increasing pressure to be put on the Japanese, to a point that no self-respecting nation could endure without resort to arms.

—CAPTAIN RUSSELL GRENFELL, Main Fleet to Singapore, 1952 I. PRESIDENT WILSON CARRIES ON A POLICY OF PRESSURE UPON JAPAN The path to Pearl Harbor was a long and much-travelled one. President Theodore Roosevelt put Japanese feet upon that path in September, 1905, under the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Control of the South Manchuria Railway meant control of the economic life of Manchuria. Then, in order to check Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast and to keep Japan from casting acquisitive eyes in the direction of the Philippines, Roosevelt, in the Root-Takahira Agreement (November 30, 1908), gave her a "free hand in Manchuria."1 The advantages accruing to Japan from her special position in North China were clearly recognized by the American ambassador in Tokyo in 1910: The war with Russia left in the hands of Japan as the chief fruits of her success substantial rights in the Chinese provinces of Manchuria. . . . None of the Powers stood in the way of her peace treaty and all understood that to enjoy the benefits of her acquisition a certain superiority over other nations must be conceded.2 Theodore Roosevelt had been willing to make this concession, but President Taft rejected all thoughts of "appeasement" and tried to preserve the territorial integrity of China by endeavoring to place a strong financial flooring under the province of Manchuria.3 He succeeded merely in destroying the structure of "balanced antagonisms" erected by Roosevelt and abruptly pushed suspicious Japan into the reluctant arms of Russia.4 President Wilson carried on this policy of pressure upon Japan.

His Minister to China, Paul Reinsch, sent to the Department of State a series of dispatches so critical of the Japanese Twenty-One 272 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Demands that they helped to create in the American mind a fixation of Japanese wickedness and thus broadened the path to Pearl Harbor. Under Wilson, a Secretary of State whose fame as a pacifist encircled the globe, sent to Japan (May 11, 1915) a note with a delayed fuse of nonrecognition that exploded into war some twenty-six years later. Then, in order to make Japanese hostility a constant factor in the uneasy Far Eastern equation, Wilson sent General William S. Graves with a small army to Siberia to check expansion in that quarter.5 Thanks to this American intervention, the maritime provinces of Siberia were saved for the avaricious regime of Red Russia. Finally, during the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson led a determined assault upon the Japanese position in Shantung in the face of his acquiescence in the secret treaty that bound Britain to support the Japanese claims to economic domination of that province. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement (November 2, 1917) recorded this acquiescence, and Wilson's later actions at Paris and his subsequent denial of any knowledge of any secret treaties must have convinced Japanese statesmen that he was implementing the maxims of Machiavelli.6 Secretary Lansing had a much clearer view of the realities in Far Eastern politics than did President Wilson. To him there was a definite basis for the Japanese fear of the spread of bolshevism in the Far East and he understood their desire to control the maritime provinces of Siberia as a bastion of defense against the tide of communism: My belief is that they [the Japanese] will send reinforcements to Siberia and attempt to strengthen SeminofFs force [of White Russians]. I cannot see how the Japanese Government can adopt any other policy in view of the very real peril to Japan if the Bolsheviks should gain a foothold in Manchuria and co-operate with the Korean revolutionists.

Certainly in the circumstances we ought not to raise any objection to Japan sending a sufficient force to check the Bolshevik advance, for the spread of Bolshevism in the Far East would be a dreadful menace to civilization.7 JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, I921-I94I 273 In the following year, when the anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States reached high tide, Lansing shrewdly remarked: I have little patience with these people who are forever on the verge of hysterics about the deep and wicked schemes of Japan. They imagine some of the most preposterous things and report them as facts. I would be inclined to think that some of these enemies of Japan were mentally unbalanced but for their sanity on all other subjects. Unfortunately, they are listened to by many Americans whose reason ought to warn them against believing such tales without better evidence.8 This hostile sentiment in the United States toward Japan gave great satisfaction to Lenin, who hoped for eventual war between these enemies of bolshevism. Perhaps the bait of economic concessions in Siberia might serve a useful purpose in this regard! In November, 1920, the New York Times printed a news item to the effect that W. B. Vanderlip had been granted the exclusive use of a large area in Siberia for mining purposes.9 The reason for this concession was explained by Lenin to his intimate associates: "We shall give America a territory for economic use, in a region where we have no naval or military forces. In this way we incite American imperialism against the Japanese bourgeoisie."10 Few Americans had the slightest conception of the devious schemes of Lenin to sow seeds of suspicion between Japan and the United States. Secretary Lansing was well acquainted with the menace of bolshevism in the Far East but was compelled to leave the Wilson cabinet in February, 1920, and his successor did not enjoy a similar knowledge of all the implications of Soviet policy.

274 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE II. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN UNDER THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATIONS OF HARDING, COOLIDGE, AND HOOVER Secretary Hughes maintained the tradition of the Wilson administration. In the field of foreign relations the "normalcy" so dear to the heart of President Harding meant hostility toward Japan. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was primarily called as a means of checking Japanese expansion in China and the Japanese delegation must have winced under the verbal lashing of Secretary Hughes as he read his long recital of Japanese misdeeds. But even Hughes realized that there were limits to this policy of pinpricks and pressure. In 1924, when Congress passed an exclusion law against the immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States, he wrote a letter of protest to Senator Lodge who had been a strong supporter of this legislation. To Hughes it seemed obvious that it was unwise to arouse in the minds of large numbers of Japanese a feeling of bitter resentment against the United States: "I dislike to think what the reaping will be after the sowing of this seed."11 Further seeds of resentment were sown in the fields of finance.

In October, 1927, the South Manchuria Railway Company applied to Morgan and Company for a loan of $40,000,000 to be used for the development of transportation facilities in Manchuria. Inasmuch as this railway was largely controlled by the Japanese government, the loan assumed a political character. Before the application for this loan had been filed, Thomas W. Lamont, of Morgan and Company, made a trip to Manchuria to look into the situation. He found the province was the "only stable region in all China." The Japanese were developing "Manchuria not chiefly in the military sense but in an economic way." Development was working out "in JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 275 the interest of the Chinese" who were pouring into Manchuria to "escape the banditry, looting and despoiling to which they are subjected elsewhere/'12 When the government of Chiang Kaishek entered a vigorous protest against this proposed loan, Ferdinand L. Mayer, the American charge d'affaires in Peking, wrote to Secretary Kellogg some words of sage advice: "From a purely humanitarian viewpoint it would be advantageous for China to have America participate indirectly in Japanese development of Manchuria/' Then with his eyes on the Russian advance he continued: "The Powers cannot ... let China drift on in her present anarchy indefinitely ... if the Russian influence is not curbed/'13 A few days later Mayer made the following significant remark: "... after all what has the socalled especially friendly attitude of the Chinese ever meant to us? It has not furthered our commercial interests . . . nor has it saved us from the horrors and insults of Nanking/'14 Although Ambassador MacVeagh, at Tokyo, expressed the opinion that the Department of State should "use the first opportunity to convince the Japanese of our honest desire to help them when we can legitimately do so,"15 the opposition from China was so strong that Morgan and Company lost all interest in the loan. This action caused some of the seeds of distrust sown by American officials to sprout into small plants of active dislike. It was Henry L.

Stimson who fertilized these seedlings into luxuriant growth. The opportunity for Secretary Stimson to bedevil the situation in the Far East came with the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan on September 18, 1931. This was not a plain case of Japanese aggression. Ever since 1915, successive Chinese governments had strongly contended that the treaties growing out of the Twenty-One Demands were invalid because they had been signed under duress. The Japanese responded by pointing to Versailles. The war lord of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, was deeply in debt to Japanese bankers and, instead of showing some appreciation for financial favors, he courted Chiang Kaishek. Japan could not afford to have Nationalist armies move across Manchuria and leave a trail of destruction like the one that marked their entry into Tsinan and Nanking. But the most important factor that propelled Japan 276 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE into action in 1931 was the fear that Russia was threatening the Japanese life line in Manchuria. Chinese raids in 1929 upon the Russian consulate in Harbin had disclosed vast quantities of propaganda designed to win the populace over to Communism. In the undeclared war of 1929 Communist armed forces had quickly crushed the weak resistance of the Chinese war lord and compelled him to sue for peace. These Communist thrusts could be repelled in the future only by Japanese military strength based upon more strategic frontiers in Manchuria.16 To Japan it appeared that Manchuria was essential to her as a defensive position and as the keystone of her economic structure.

Her statesmen hoped that the Department of State would recognize that North China was just as important to Japan as the Caribbean area was to the United States. The American government had sent military forces to Haiti and the Dominican Republic for the purpose of establishing administrations that would be responsive to American desires. This armed intervention had been so recent and so effective that it led the American charge d'affaires in Peking to close a dispatch to Secretary Kellogg with a very suggestive comment: "We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone —the Caribbean."17 Admiral Toyoda, of Japan, and the American charge d'affaires at Peking had much the same viewpoint. There was a definite identity of interest between Americans and Japanese with reference to checking the expansion of Communism in the Far East. In a letter to Ambassador Forbes, Admiral Toyoda stressed this common interest and then remarked that the Pacific area would eventually witness some of the important clashes between capitalism and Communism. The nature of this future conflict would exclude any idea of compromise: We, or our near posterity, will have to decide between Sino-Russian Communism or the AngloSaxon capitalism.

If China should fall under the rule of Communism, and if Japan keep up her present policy, which she certainly will, the chance is she will be forced to play the role of Iki and JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 277 Tsushima as the advance posts of the AngloSaxon capitalism.18 Secretary Stimson lacked the clear vision of Admiral Toyoda. He read the situation in the Far East with his prejudices rather than with his eyes. The fact that, in 1932, Russia had already consolidated her control over Outer Mongolia and was fast infiltrating the province of Sinkiang appeared of little consequence to him. The rapid rush of the Red tide over vast stretches of North China left him serene, but he moved to instant action when the Brown tide of Japan rolled forward in Manchuria. The story of the Stimson challenge to Japan is too familiar to be repeated here. It should be clearly understood, however, that the Japanese government had not desired a conflict with China in 1931.

China had a large chip on her shoulder and, when it suddenly became dislodged, she loudly accused Japan of aggressive measures. George Sokolsky, who was on the scene in 1931, remarks as follows concerning the outbreak of hostilities: It needs to be recalled here that in 1931 the last efforts were made to reconcile these countries [China and Japan]. Actually, I was an instrument in that attempted reconciliation, going to Japan from China to hold meetings with Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others. I can say that the Japanese attitude was conciliatory; the Chinese, on the whole, antagonistic. . . . Two forces were at work to keep China and Japan quarreling: Soviet Russia and the League of Nations. Soviet Russia had been engaged since 1924 in an active program of stirring hate among the Chinese people against all foreigners except the Russians, but particularly against the British and the Japanese. The League of Nations secretariat was developing in China a field of widespread activity through its agent, Dr. Ludwic Rajchmann, who was spending most of his time in China. Rajchmann was violently anti-Japanese, although Japan was a member of the League of Nations and Rajchmann an employee. Rajchmann is a Pole and is now associated with the United Nations.19 278 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Japan's conciliatory attitude was lost upon Secretary Stimson, who became obsessed with the idea that the Japanese government had become aggressive under the pressure of a military clique in Tokyo. Aggression should be denounced and punished and, in looking around for a convenient club to castigate Japan, he came across the KelloggBriand Peace Pact. It took his fertile brain to find a martial meaning in the pacific phrases of that pact and it was not long before he succeeded in transforming that formula of peace into a clarion call to arms. In the Far East the Japanese government paid little attention to the stop signal flashed by Stimson.

Their Manchurian war machine had gained too much momentum to be halted by an American traffic cop who blew a tin whistle of nonrecognition. A distinguished professor of international law has condemned the Stimson formula as "fatuous,"20 and a famous American diplomat who watched at Geneva while its application drove Japan out of the League of Nations, filed a sharp indictment against it: "For the first time ... I began to question the nonrecognition policy. More and more as I thought it over I became conscious that we had entered a dead-end street/'21 But, on January 9, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the President-elect, entered that dead-end street by accepting the Stimson formula over the spirited protests of two of his closest advisers, Rexford G. Tugwell22 and Raymond Moley.23 It was not long before that dead-end street became a road to war. In distant Tokyo, Ambassador Grew saw definite shadows across the path of Japanese-American relations. To him they seemed to be cast by Japanese statesmen who had no real understanding of moral obligations. He believed that this "callous disregard of the pledged word" could be traced to the fact that in Japanese jurisprudence there was "nothing to correspond to the rules of abstract justice contained in the old Roman law." This critical viewpoint was immediately challenged by Mr. Grew's own Counselor of Embassy, Edwin Neville. To him it was apparent that Japanese policy was the resultant of certain forces in the Far East. One of the most important of these was Chinese disregard of their treaty obligations. To the Japanese Foreign Office the situation in 1931 "apJAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 279 peared worse than ever as the Chinese had used borrowed money to operate railways to the detriment of the Japanese line; their various agreements with the Chinese remained unimplemented.

. . . The Chinese are in no position to bring up any of the Washington settlements. They have defaulted on their obligations thereunder and do not come into court with clean hands."24 But Secretary Stimson never worried about dirt on Chinese hands. He felt outraged, however, when he discovered some Manchurian mud under the fingernails of Japanese statesmen. When Matsuoka, the head of the Japanese delegation at Geneva, whispered to Hugh Wilson that impatience with American policy was reaching a breaking point in Tokyo, Stimson regarded this warning as an idle threat. Japan might choke on the formula of nonrecognition but it would be a paroxysm that would lead to peace rather than to war.25 His supreme confidence that he could handle Japan in his own way led him to look coldly upon a Japanese suggestion that a meeting be arranged "at some point between the continental United States and Japan, such as Honolulu, between some prominent American statesman and a prominent Japanese" for the purpose of seeking some basis for an understanding. Mr. Hornbeck, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, thought such a meeting might do more harm than good, and Stimson finally agreed with this viewpoint.26 History would repeat itself with tragic consequences in 1939 and 1941.

Although Stimson's bedevilment of the Far Eastern situation finally came to an inglorious close in March, 1933, his influence upon Japanese-American relations went so deep and spread so far that, soon after he assumed office, President Roosevelt began to talk of the possibility of conflict with Japan. On March 7, during a cabinet meeting, Postmaster General Farley noted in his diary that the "President discussed possible plans of action in the event of war" with Japan.27 He was already picking out the first notes in a marche militahe. It is significant to note that the Stimson-Roosevelt policy of pressure upon Japan had the support of the German government even after Hitler became chancellor.28 The support of the Italian government was equally significant, especially with reference to the 280 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE question of placing an embargo upon the export of munitions of war to Japan. On January 10, 1933, President Hoover sent a message to Congress29 recommending that legislation be passed empowering the Executive at his discretion, after consultation with such other nations as he might deem necessary, to impose an embargo on the export of arms and munitions of war to any nation or nations which he might designate. A resolution embodying the President's suggestion was unanimously passed by the Senate, but in the House of Representatives no action was taken on a similar resolution.

The dangers in this policy of pressure were indicated by Ambassador Grew in a warning telegram to Secretary Stimson. Japan believed that Manchuria was the "life line" of her empire and she was determined to support the new state of Manchukuo at all costs. Her "long strained exasperation with the former chaotic conditions in Manchuria and the failure of the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations" had convinced most Japanese statesmen that a policy of conciliation was futile. There was "no bluff" in the firm attitude of the Japanese government. The decision had been made to "fight rather than to surrender to moral or other pressure from the West."30 This warning dispatch from Grew gave President Hoover serious concern. He immediately lost all interest in an economic embargo upon Japan. In a letter to Secretary Stimson he remarked that he was "inflexibly opposed to the imposition of any kind of sanctions except purely public opinion. The imposition of any kind of sanction, military or economic, would in the present state of mind of the Japanese people, provoke the spread of the conflagration already in progress and might even involve the United States."31 This firm statement imposed a definite check upon the plans of the belligerent Secretary of State. When the British ambassador inquired on February 24 if the United States would follow a parallel policy with Britain in the Far East with special reference to the imposition of an embargo upon the shipment of munitions of war to Japan, Stimson cautiously replied that Congress had failed to pass legislation to empower such action. Stimson was able, however, to persuade the President to refrain from the publication of JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 281 any statement that would make clear to the world the fact that the American government had no intention to "ever engage in sanctions other than that of public opinion." The President had been hopeful that such a declaration would relax the tension "to some extent." But Stimson had no desire for this tension to relax. Japan would have to bend or break and he regarded with satisfaction the action of the League in chiding Japan in such caustic terms that Matsuoka marched out of the meeting of the Assembly.32 III. ROOSEVELT AND HULL ADOPT THE ANTIJAPANESE POLICY OF STIMSON President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull shared the Stimson rather than the Hoover viewpoint with regard to embargoes upon the shipment of munitions of war to belligerent countries. On March 11, 1933, Secretary Hull informed the British ambassador that the Roosevelt administration was ready to "press for the passage" of legislation that would prohibit the export of munitions of war from the United States to "such country or countries as he [the President] may designate/'33 In the meantime Signor Ruspoli, of the Italian delegation at Geneva, in a conversation with Hugh Wilson, indicated his strong support of the American viewpoint that an embargo "on two parties to the dispute is almost certain to hurt the innocent party more than the guilty one since the aggressor will have taken the precaution to store up stocks of war materials."34 On March 11 Secretary Hull indicated to Wilson that he should convey to Ruspoli the fact that the Department of State "concurred in the view of his Government."35 Apparently there was a spirit of sweet accord between the United States and dictator nations like Germany and Italy.

This same spirit was sadly lacking in the relations between the President and Congress. In accordance with the desires of the 282 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Chief Executive, legislation was introduced into Congress giving the President the power to forbid the shipment of munitions of war to "such country or countries as he may designate." On April 17 this proposed legislation passed the House of Representatives, but in the Senate there was strong opposition to giving such large discretionary powers to the President. Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, informed Secretary Hull that members of his committee were fearful that the imposition by the President of an embargo upon munitions of war to a belligerent country might have "a strong tendency to involve the United States to such an extent that a condition of war might arise."36 These fears led the committee to report (May 30) an amendment that all embargoes upon the shipments of war materials should "apply impartially to all the parties in the dispute/'37 This action was displeasing to the President, who had no interest in legislation that did not give him wide discretionary powers. The drive against Japan had temporarily stalled, but he hoped it would gain new momentum in the next Congress.

Action against Japan, however, would now have to wait upon the next session of Congress. One very effective way to challenge Japan was through the exercise of the recognition power. Since 1917 the Department of State had refused to extend recognition to the Soviet government. Japan was particularly fearful of the Red menace in the Far East. American recognition of the Red regime would seriously embarrass Japan and make her fearful of her position in North China. It would make her increasingly anxious to conciliate America. The first step in this new drive against Japan was the refusal to accept a good-will mission from the Japanese government (October, 1933).38 Secretary Hull next closed his ears to timely warnings from Mr. Neville, in Tokyo, concerning Russian designs in Outer Mongolia.39 Russia was to be courted, not criticized. Ambassador Grew had written in detail about the friction between Japan and Russia concerning Communism: "Japan considers herself as the bulwark against the spread of communism southward and eastward.

Given sufficient provocation, the Japanese could readily be aroused to enter Siberia with the intention of completely destroying a JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 283 regime which it fears and detests."40 The Roosevelt administration did not share this detestation of communism. Indeed, it was ready to recognize the government of Stalin that had recently shocked the world by the mass murder of millions of Kulaks, or well-to-do peasants in Russia. On November 16, 1933, recognition was formally extended to Soviet Russia with all its wide implications of a joint policy against Japan. In Tokyo, Edwin Neville saw the dangers of a Russian victory in the Far East: "In the light of Russian activities in Outer Mongolia and the behavior of Soviet agents in intramural China, it is open to question whether a Russian military victory . . . would be of any value in preserving or restoring the political and administrative integrity of China/'41 Ambassador Grew, without the clear vision of Neville, looked at the situation in the Far East more through administration eyes. He thought the recognition of Russia had been an astute political move. As a result the President had gained an "entirely new and more friendly orientation of Japanese policy toward the United States."42 Mr. Grew refrained from adding any comment to the effect that recognition of the Soviet regime would prove an asset to China. At times his silences were more significant than his words.

In Japan the action of the Roosevelt administration indicated the necessity of adopting a bold, independent policy in the Far East. On April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office proclaimed a Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia. Japanese statesmen were fully acquainted with the farreaching implications of the Olney corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, and they realized that American acquisition of the Panama Canal zone in 1903 had often been justified on the basis of the doctrine. The message of 1823 had been implemented by repeated American interventions in Latin American states and the right to do so was not abandoned until 1936. In 1934 the Japanese government merely extracted an important page from the American book of diplomatic practice and underscored the paragraph that asserted hemispheric supremacy. Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, hurriedly prepared a memorandum of guidance for Secretary Hull. He advised against sending a strong protest to Japan with reference to the recent proclamation of a Monroe Doctrine for the Far. East: 284 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE "I do not think that the United States should 'stick out its neck' and become the spearhead in opposition to Japan."43 Secretary Hull rejected this cautious advice. On April 28 he sent to Ambassador Grew an aide-memoire which bluntly challenged the new position taken by the Japanese Foreign Office.44 It reached Tokyo on the following day. Although it was Sunday and the Emperor's birthday, Grew thought the urgent note sounded by the aide-memoire was so significant that he requested the Foreign Minister to grant him an interview. Hirota graciously acceded to this request and, after reading the verbal broadside of Secretary Hull, he quietly remarked that in the United States there was a "great misunderstanding" of Japanese policy.45 The British government was ready to take Japanese promises and explanations at face value and it stressed the viewpoint that it was untimely to invoke an AngloAmerican parallel policy to meet the situation. The British ambassador informed the Department of State that the Foreign Office "believed that each power should state its own views/'46 This desire of the British government to follow an independent policy in the Far East was fully appreciated by Mr. Hornbeck who summarized the position of the Foreign Office in a long memorandum: "It is of advantage to us to know . . . that Great Britain cannot be counted on to make with us a united front of opposition to Japan and may on the contrary be expected to endeavor to make compromises with Japan both in reference to China and in reference to naval matters. ... In a sense the British may be regarded as being in the act of 'letting us down.' "47 IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS This British refusal to take concerted action with the United States in formulating a policy to fit the Far Eastern situation did JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 285 not deter Secretary Hull from firing repeated blasts at the Japanese position in Manchukuo. He was particularly disturbed by the thought that the Japanese government was slowly closing the Open Door in that region. It was true that monopoly rights had been granted to certain Japanese corporations with reference to the distribution of petroleum products, but this preference had not prevented the volume of American exports to Manchukuo from increasing in a significant manner. In 1932 these exports were only $1,186,000. In 1935 they reached the respectable figure of $4,188,000 and in 1937 they rose rapidly to the impressive total of $16,061,000. The Open Door was really straining at its hinges in order to admit this flood of American products.48 But concessions to America paid such poor diplomatic dividends that, on September 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Grew that his government had decided to "give notice before December 31, 1934, to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty." This action greatly angered Secretary Hull.

When preliminary conversations began in London in October, 1934, relative to the renewal of the Naval Treaty of 1930, he instructed Norman Davis to give no encouragement to the Japanese delegates to expect "any concessions."49 When the British objected to this abrupt tone, Hull finally consented that "conversations should not be broken off right away/' but he insisted that Davis "refrain from doing anything which would diminish the embarrassment of the Japanese/'50 In the face of this feudist spirit there was nothing left for Japan to do but inform the Department of State on December 29, 1934, of its official decision to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922. Disagreement at London with reference to naval limitations led the Japanese government to pay more attention to the situation in Manchuria. In 1935 it sponsored an independence movement that aimed at the autonomy of the five northern provinces of China.

This action brought a prompt protest from Secretary Hull and a lecture from President Roosevelt, who admonished Japan to endeavor to attain her objectives "by an appeal to the finer instincts of world justice."51 While Japan listened to these pious admonitions she noticed 286 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE that Russia had not only absorbed Outer Mongolia but had made Sinkiang a "Soviet colony in all but name."52 The Soviet army in the Far East had increased to an imposing force of more than 300,000 seasoned troops,53 and could count upon an equally large army of Chinese Communists for support in any action against Japan. In order to make this threat to Japan more potent, Moscow then arranged an understanding with Chiang Kaishek. When he was taken prisoner at Sian, in December, 1936, by his puppet Chang Hsueh-liang, Moscow quickly intervened and secured his release. It suited Soviet policy for the time being to save Chiang Kaishek and use his Nationalist armies in a joint crusade against the Japanese. When his usefulness was over he could be shot as a "fascist-militarist."

Under the impact of this growing accord between Chiang Kaishek and the Communist leaders, Japan concluded on November 25, 1936, the wellknown Anti-Comintern Part. Assurances were given to Ambassador Grew that this treaty had no implications that menaced America, and he noted in his diary on New Year's Day, 1937, that there were no current controversies "of prime importance" between Japan and the United States. He also noted that the Japanese Prime Minister, Hirota, was making strenuous efforts to preserve friendly relations with the United States.54 But these relations were always endangered by any friction that might arise between Japan and China, and the Chinese government, in the autumn of 1936, was acting in an unduly provocative manner. On October 30 David Berger wrote to Secretary Hull that he had learned from an official of the Chinese government in Nanking that there was "now a desire to bring about what might be called a Soviet orientation in Chinese foreign affairs."55 There was little doubt that Nationalist China was showing toward Japan an increasingly belligerent attitude. Alarmed by this martial spirit, Anthony Eden called on the Chinese ambassador in London and requested him to "urge his Government not to overplay its hand." In Tokyo the Chinese ambassador talked in such a boastful manner that Grew believed China was "feeling its oats"

and would refuse to listen to any pacific overtures from Japan.56 Undismayed by this unfriendly attitude, Japan sent Kenji Kodama, JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, I92I-I94I 287 the former president of the Yokohama Specie Bank, to China in an attempt to cement closer economic ties between the two countries. Chiang Kaishek assured him that Chinese industrialists would follow the footsteps of Japanese industrial experts "so that China's culture and economy" might rise to the "same plane with Japan for the stability of oriental peace."57 But Chiang did nothing to implement these fair words. Indeed, by April 30, 1937, Grew wrote from Tokyo that China's attitude had "stiffened as a result of Japan's conciliatory gestures/'58 In June, 1937, Mr. Andrews, second secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo, had a conversation with Dr. Mar, who was connected with the Chinese Embassy in the same city. Mar's evident "truculence" toward Japan clearly indicated that China was looking toward some outbreak of violence between Chinese and Japanese troops in North China. This took place on the night of July 7, 1937, when some Japanese troops near the Marco Polo bridge (Peiping) became involved in a sharp fight with some units of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army.59 A new drama that would end on a curtain line announcing Russian domination of the Far East, had opened with an ominous fanfare. The whole world became an interested audience with few of the spectators realizing that the progress of the play pointed toward a Russian conclusion. Chinese, Japanese, and Americans would move across the Far Eastern stage in intricate patterns that finally proclaimed a definite Muscovite motif. The Moscow theater never staged a more effective puppet show.

Communist instigation of this outbreak of war in North China was indicated by the Chinese ambassador in Moscow. During a conversation with the American diplomatic representative he remarked that he had arrived in Moscow in November, 1936, as a "firm supporter of Chinese-Soviet friendship." One of the purposes of his mission had been to "obtain assurances from the Soviet Government that if China pushed Japan so far as to make war inevitable, the Soviet Union would support China with supplies and aimed forces.77 When he questioned Litvinov on this point he had received the answer that the Soviet government preferred to have this matter settled at Nanking. In this regard it 288 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE was significant that, during the spring and summer of 1937, the Russian ambassador at Nanking endeavored to "make the Chinese Government believe that if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it could confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union."60 During a conference between Viscount Ishii and the British ambassador in Rome, December, 1937, Ishii stated as a matter of fact that when Chang Hsueh-liang had taken Chiang Kaishek prisoner, "part of the tetter's release was that he should co-operate with the Communists against Japan. This arrangement had been kept secret, but Chiang . . . had carried out his promise fully."61 It is certainly true that, in the early months of 1937, a more combative spirit was manifest in Chinese official circles. The clash between Chinese and Japanese armed forces on July 7 was followed by a Chinese attack upon Japanese troops at Lanfang and at the Kwang-an Gate of Peking. Other attacks were the prelude to the dispatch of some thirty divisions of Chinese soldiers to North China. To meet this situation and to prepare for the possible intervention of Russia into the conflict, the Japanese government sent large military forces to Manchuria.62 The attitude of Russia toward the outbreak of conflict in North China was of particular interest to the Department of State. On October 14 Secretary Hull had a conversation with the Chinese ambassador and embraced the opportunity to inquire "very confidentially" as to the position of Russia toward "Outer Mongolia and with respect to observing the integrity of China generally."

He received the vague answer that Outer Mongolia still "claimed herself as a part of China." It was apparent to Hull that the ambassador was somewhat complacent about Russian penetration of North China while showing great perturbation about the advance of Japanese armies in the same region.63 When Sumner Welles talked with the Russian charge d'affaires on the Manchurian matter he quickly discovered that the Soviet government was quite dissatisfied with the cautious attitude of the Department of State. Oumansky wished to know if the American government would co-operate with other governments in connection with the possible "imposition of military or economic JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, I921-I94I 289 sanctions" upon Japan. Welles made the chilling reply that the Russian representative seemed to have "completely misunderstood the whole basis of the United States policy ... of taking no sides in the present conflict." Oumansky mumbled that such a policy was a 'Very discouraging one" and hurriedly left the Department of State.64 This neutral attitude was greatly appreciated by the Japanese government and Ambassador Grew expressed to Secretary Hull the hope that there would be "no departure by our Government from its present official attitude and methods." He thought that the Department of State should aim to "avoid unnecessarily sacrificing our present relations" with Japan. There was no use in hampering America's "future interests, and perhaps our own future helpfulness in working for peace by creating among the Japanese people a renewed antagonism against the United States."65 V. THE UNITED STATES MOVES TO WAR AGAINST JAPAN 1. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DELIVERS A QUARANTINE SPEECH DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN Grew's dispatch reached the Department of State on October 5. On this same day President Roosevelt made a famous address in Chicago in which he advocated a quarantine against aggressor nations.66 His words of criticism and warning were directed chiefly against Japan and their baleful effect was all that Grew had feared.

It was really big talk in a high key. He was actually far more worried about party reverses at home than about Japanese movements in Manchuria. An economic recession in the United States had made it clear that the big ballyhoo of New Deal politicians had suddenly turned very sour. The Morgenthau diaries give in29O PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE disputable proof of the deep concern the administration felt with regard to the wide break in the economic structure of the nation.67 Joined with this bad news from the economic front was the hostile reaction in the press over the appointment of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court. In September it was made known that Mr. Black had once hidden his face under the wide hood of a Klansman. In dismay he fled to Europe and President Roosevelt found it convenient to make a hurried trip to the Far West. It was highly expedient for him to make some address that would divert public attention from the widespread effects of economic recession and to cover the flight of the nimble Justice Black. A sharp denunciation of the Japanese advance in North China would draw a big herring across a noisome trail and, if it led to eventual war, there was the bright consolation that the war powers of the President are so indefinable and farreaching that they would insure a long period of dictatorship.

The quarantine speech of October 5 had many macabre overtones designed to frighten the American people. Many parts of the world were experiencing a "reign of terror/' and the "landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice" were being "wiped away." "Innocent peoples and nations" were being "cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy" which was "devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration." If this sad condition of affairs existed in other parts of the world it was vain for anyone to "imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization." This attempt to frighten the American people and thus make them forget conditions at home was only partly successful. It is true that Justice Black was soon a "forgotten man" but business conditions grew so steadily worse that they could not escape notice.

Moreover, a large part of the American press expressed the view that, if conditions abroad were so bad, it would be wise for America to adopt an isolationist attitude and stay away from trouble. There is no doubt that the President was "disappointed by the failure JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 291 of the people to respond to his Chicago speech."68 It was a bit of globaloney with such a strong smell that it took some years for American nostrils to get accustomed to it. It is true, nonetheless, that the President's challenge to Japan marked a tragic turning point in our relations with that country. He had inaugurated a policy of pressure that eventually pushed America down the road to Pearl Harbor. Japan erected the first milestone along this road by the bombing of the Panay on December 12, 1937. A prompt apology and a large indemnity indicated that the Foreign Office was still anxious for peace, but the fact that such an incident had occurred gave support to the President's program of pressure upon Japan.

2. THE PRESIDENT PUSHES A PROGRAM OF PRESSURE UPON JAPAN The first item in this new program aimed at Japan was the sending of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll to London in the latter part of December, 1937, with instructions to "explore with the British what we could do if we both found ourselves involved in war in the Far East with Japan/'69 When asked why he was sent to London in 1937 the Admiral replied that "everybody knew" that "sooner or later, we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves." The only tangible result of these AngloAmerican conversations in London was a "distribution of codes and ciphers."70 It should be remembered, in this regard, that similar secret conversations between British and French officials in 1905 constituted the first link in the chain that bound the British to a policy of war with Germany in 1914.

While Admiral Ingersoll was engaged in conversations in London, the President had a press conference on January 8, 1939, in which he expressed the significant opinion that the time had arrived for "Congress to enact legislation aimed at the equalization of the burdens of possible war so that the whole nation will engage in war if we unfortunately have one."71 Congress did not follow this suggestion. A majority of the members of both houses 292 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE were still thinking of peace, not war. But the martial mood of the President and Secretary of State became apparent on July 1 when the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control sent a letter to "148 persons and Companies manufacturing airplane parts" stating that the "Government of the United States is strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes or aeronautical equipment which would materially aid or encourage" the practice of "bombing civilian populations from the air." The Japanese had been guilty of such a practice and therefore the Department of State' would "with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines" or aircraft accessories to Japan.72 This "moral embargo"

invoked against Japan led to further measures that forged an iron ring around that island empire and pushed it strongly in the direction of war with the United States. In September, 1938, the President was so sure that the United States would soon "get into war" that he sent Harry Hopkins on a tour of airplane factories to see how production could be expedited. When Hopkins returned to Washington he was visited by Brigadier General George C. Marshall, who was later made Chief of Staff through the influence of Hopkins and Pershing. Marshall quickly caught the belligerent mood of the circle close to the President and it was not long before "several millions of dollars of WPA funds were transferred (secretly) to start making machine tools for the manufacture of small arms ammunitions."73 While America was thus secretly preparing for what the President regarded as an inevitable war, the Japanese government was making pacific overtures to the United States. On May 16, 1939, a prominent Japanese made an important approach to Ambassador Grew concerning an improvement in Japanese-American relations.

If the "democratic nations, especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, . . . those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened."74 On the following day the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hachiro Arita, commented upon the dangerous JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 293 activities of the Soviet government and the negotiations then going on in Moscow for an alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet government. He then remarked that "there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to 'strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact' until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some 'gesture of welcome/ " Arita stressed the fact that Japan was "very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe/' but it was impossible to ignore the fact that "Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its [Russia's] policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other." It was possible that the danger of a tripartite pact between Britain, France, and Russia might compel Japan to enter into some arrangement with Germany and Italy. He could assure Mr. Grew, however, that the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy "would contain no military, political or economic clauses/'75 On May 18, 1939, Grew had a long talk with Arita who once more insisted that an alliance between Britain, France, and Russia would probably push Japan into a closer understanding with Germany and Italy. He was equally insistent that Japan, in joining hands with Germany and Italy, had "no other purpose than to combat the destructive activities of the Comintern." If the United States, "not understanding the true position of Japan on this point, should base her future policies on such misunderstanding, it would bring about a deplorable situation not only respecting the relations between the United States and Japan but also in respect of the peace of the world/'76 The next step by the Japanese government was an invitation to the United States to adopt a program whereby the two nations would jointly attempt to find a peaceful solution of the political differences that were leading to war in Europe. In discussing this matter with Prime Minister Hiranuma, Mr. Dooman, the American charge d'affaires in Tokyo, asked the pertinent question whether the head of the Japanese cabinet "believed it likely that the American people would look with favor on American collaboration with 294 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Japan in approaching the difficulties in Europe when Japan herself was considered to be guilty of the same acts of which Germany and Italy stood condemned." Hiranuma replied that ''if the Powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the world's troubles these issues involving American rights in China could be disposed of without difficulty." With reference to the conflict in the Far East he expressed the hope that "the American Government at least realized that Japan had not intended or expected to engage in war with China."77 Secretary Hull's answer, which did not arrive in Tokyo until the end of July, was negative and tart. Japan was advised to use its "influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace." The establishment of world peace was made more difficult by "the continuance of armed conflict" in the Far East. The intimation was clearly given that if Japan was sincere in her desire to help the cause of peace in Europe she should give a better example in

eastern Asia.78 In order further to emphasize the hostile attitude of the United States toward Japan, the Department of State, on July 26, 1939, gave notice to the Japanese government that, after six months, the treaty of February 21, 1911, would expire.79 This action was a severe blow to a Japanese cabinet that was desperately striving to arrive at some understanding with the United States. But Prime Minister Hiranuma disregarded this sharp rebuff and made another attempt to effect more friendly relations between Japan and the United States. On August 26, 1939, the Japanese ambassador (Horinouchi) had a long conversation with Secretary Hull. He gave assurances that his government "had decided to abandon any further negotiations with Germany and Italy relative to closer relations under the anti-Comintern Pact to which they have been parties for some time." After this conciliatory statement, he reiterated his "personal desire to clear up any misunderstanding or differences between our two countries and to restore the friendly JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 295 relations heretofore existing." Mr. Hull's answer was one more example of his usual moral platitudes and the Japanese gestures of good will were in vain.80 While Secretary Hull was prating of peace, President Roosevelt was constantly thinking of war with Japan. Ambassador Grew saw this fact clearly in September, 1939. During the course of a conference with the President he took pains to point out that, if America placed an embargo upon oil exports to Japan, the result might be a Japanese effort to take the Dutch East Indies and thereby control the rich oil resources of Borneo. The President's reply showed that he was already thinking of war. If Japan decided upon such a step, American naval forces could "easily intercept her fleet/'81 But Grew wished to prevent rather than provoke war with Japan.

While the President was talking this belligerent bombast, Grew was confiding to his diary that the Department of State should "offer the Japanese a modus vivendi" and then commence negotiations for a new commercial treaty. In Japan the Shidehara policy of conciliation had once existed: "It can exist again."82 To Grew the Japanese program, with its insistence upon "strategic protection against a future attack by Soviet Russia," did not appear too unreasonable. If America wished to change this program it should not try to do so through the employment of sanctions: "There must be no tone of threat in our attitude."83 It is evident that Grew did not appreciate the fact that the President's dislike of Japan had gone so deep and spread so far that it would lead inevitably to war. In defiance of Grew's advice against sanctions, a White House statement was issued once more invoking a moral embargo upon the shipment to Japan of "airplanes, aeronautical equipment and materials essential to airplane manufacture."84 This statement of December 2 was followed by another one of December 20. This later pronouncement issued from the Department of State and contained the significant formula that "national interest suggests that for the time being there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required 296 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE for the production of high quality aviation gasoline."85 In 1940 there was a series of statements issued by the Administrator of Export Control which indicated a drastic curtailment of exports to Japan.86 If embargoes could produce war the administration was determined to overlook no opportunity to exert pressure upon Japan along that line.

3. BRITAIN AND FRANCE ADOPT A POLICY OF APPEASEMENT TOWARD JAPAN American pressure upon Japan was followed by Japanese pressure upon Britain and France. On March 30, 1940, Japan set up a "new Central Government of China" to be headed by Wang Ching-wei. Secretary Hull immediately announced that the Department of State would continue to recognize the government of Chiang Kaishek "as the Government of China."87 But the British Foreign i Office was more conciliatory. On March 28, Sir Robert Craigie, I the British ambassador in Tokyo, delivered an address in which j he stated that Britain and Japan were "striving for the same objective, namely, a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous, subversive influences."88 This address keynoted British policy. On July 17 the Burma Road was closed j to shipments of war materiel to China.89 France had already acceded to demands for a similar embargo upon supplies going to Chiang Kaishek through Indochina. The Nationalist government in China was being effectively shut off from aid that was essential to her continuance in the war against Japan.

1 4. JAPAN CONCLUDES AN ALLIANCE WITH THE ROME-BERLIN 1 Axis While Japan was exerting pressure upon Britain and France she was making overtures to the Rome-Berlin Axis. An alliance with j these European dictatorships had been long in the making. Its I most important Japanese sponsor was General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Germany. He and Ribbentrop were on j intimate terms. In the summer of 1938 Ribbentrop inquired if JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 192I-I94I ZCfj Japan would be willing to sign a treaty aimed at all the potential enemies of the proposed Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle.90 Tokyo rejected this broad proposal91 and in February, 1939, Prince Ito was sent to Berlin to acquaint Ribbentrop with the decision that Japan wished to limit the proposed treaty to action against Russia alone.92 In order to speed a decision by Japan to enter into an alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis, Heinrich Stahmer hurried to Tokyo and insisted that the prime purpose in effecting the new political alignment was to keep America out of war.93 Stahmer succeeded in silencing all Japanese opposition to the tripartite pact which was signed with great pomp in Berlin on September 27, 1940.94 Article III pointed straight at the United States: "Japan, Germany and Italy . . . undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the SinoJapanese Conflict/'95 There is evidence, however, that Japan extracted from Stahmer a secret oral understanding that she retain for herself the right to decide whether the casus foederis existed in any situation that might arise.96 5. JAPAN.is READY TO SACRIFICE HER POSITION IN CHINA FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES But this tripartite pact of September 27,1940, did not mean that Japan had abandoned all hope of a satisfactory arrangement with the United States. Quite the contrary! In November, 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka asked Bishop James E. Walsh, Superior General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of Maryknoll, New York, and Father J. M. Drought, of the same order, to undertake a special mission to Washington in order to impress upon the President and Secretary Hull the fact that the Japanese government "wished to negotiate a peace agreement: (1) an agreement to nullify their participation in the Axis Pact ... (2) a guarantee to recall all military forces from China and to restore to China its geographical and political integrity." Other conditions bearing upon the relations of Japan and the United States were to be ex298 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE plored and agreed upon "in the conversations that it was hoped would ensue."

Bishop Walsh and Father Drought then had a conference with General Muto, the director of the Central Bureau of Military Affairs, who assured them that "he and his associates in the Japanese Army were in accord with the efforts to reach a peace agreement." Bishop Walsh and Father Drought hurried to Washington where (on January 23, 1941) they placed the whole matter before President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull during a long conference of more than two hours. They were told that the matter would be "taken under advisement/'97 and thus ended an anxious effort on the part of the Japanese government to find a path to peace, even though this path led to a renunciation of Japan's objectives in China and a tremendous loss of face. It seems quite possible that the Far Eastern Military Tribunal brought to trial the wrong persons. It might have been better if the tribunal had held its sessions in Washington.

6. BLUEPRINT FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE WAR ON JAPAN Instead of acting upon the proposals of Bishop Walsh and Father Drought, the President and Secretary Hull initiated Joint Staff conferences in Washington from January to March, 1941. Delegations from Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand surveyed with American representatives the many questions involved in the defense of the Pacific area against Japanese attack. During the session, which resulted in the ABC-i Staff Agreement, the British delegation ardently argued that the defense of Singapore was so essential that the United States should be willing to divide the Pacific Fleet for that purpose. Although this proposal was rejected, the agreement did outline for American task forces some important operations that would be beneficial for Britain in the event both powers were involved in war with. Japan. The ABC-i Staff Agreement was promptly approved by the Secretaries of the Navy and War; the President gave it no explicit JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 299 approval.98 It was soon apparent, however, that American military plans were profoundly affected by it." The changes made in them were far more than mere technical details: they indicated a close community of thought and proposed action between Britain and the United States. A blueprint had been drawn for an AngloAmerican parallel policy. It would be carried out as soon as the President could find a pretext for doing so.

7. JAPAN PRESSES FOR PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES As Hitler moved toward war with Soviet Russia he began to think more and more of Japanese assistance in this projected struggle. In March, 1941, Ribbentrop strongly argued that Japan, in its own interest, should enter the war "as soon as possible/' This intervention would not only destroy England's key position in the Far East but it would also "keep America out of the war."100 On March 26 Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. On the following day Ribbentrop plied him with the usual Nazi line of argument. It would be "very advantageous if Japan should decide as soon as possible to take an active part in the war upon England." Japanese intervention would be "most likely to keep America out of the war." When Matsuoka bluntly inquired about the attitude of Germany toward America after Britain was defeated, Ribbentrop quickly answered that "Germany did not have the slightest interest in a war against the United States."101 Japan also did not have the "slightest interest in a war against the United States." The appointment of Nomura as ambassador to the United States was an indication of this fact. Admiral Nomura had been the Japanese naval attache in Washington during the first World War and had formed a friendly relationship with Franklin D. Roosevelt, then serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His reception at the White House was cordial but the President frankly referred to the fact that relations between Japan and the United States were steadily "deteriorating."102 At the State Department he soon discovered a studied policy of "coolness toward the Japanese."

On March 8 Hull and Nomura had their first conversation on 300 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Japanese-American relations. Subsequently they met more than forty times in vain endeavors to find some firm ground on which to build a new structure of friendship. Hitler viewed these negotiations with frank alarm. As Ribbentrop later remarked: The Fuehrer ... saw the attitude of the United States "short of war" and he was worried . . . about groups in Japan who wanted to come to an arrangement with America. He was afraid that if an arrangement would be made between the United States and Japan, this would mean, so to speak, the back free for America and the expected attack or entry into the war by the United States would come quicker.103 Japan paid little attention to this pressure from Berlin and Nomura carried on his talks with Hull without much thought of the desires of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The Japanese government was willing to give two important pledges: (1) to use only peaceful measures in the southwest Pacific; (2) to go to the support of Germany only in the event that she was the object of aggression.

In return for these pledges Japan wished America (1) to restore normal trade relations between the two countries; (2) to assist Japan to secure access to basic raw materials in the southwest Pacific area; (3) to exert pressure upon Chiang Kaishek so that he would consent to certain peace terms; (4) if Chiang refused to yield to this pressure the American government would withdraw support from his regime; (5) and, finally, to lend friendly diplomatic assistance aimed at the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways "to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East." Secretary Hull countered with a memorandum emphasizing the following points: (1) respect for the territorial integrity and the soverignty of each and all nations; (2) support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; (4) nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.104 The discussion of these bases for a friendly accord was not JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, I92I-I941 3OI helped by occasional verbal pyrotechnics on the part of Matsuoka.

On May 14 he had a conversation with Ambassador Grew during the course of which he sharply criticized the attitude of the United States toward Germany. American attacks upon German submarines might bring into action Article III of the tripartite pact of September 27, 1940.105 This conversation was the subject of comment by Sumner Welles during a conference with the British ambassador. Lord Halifax inquired as to the progress of the Hull-Nomura talks. Was there any chance that they would have a successful outcome? Welles thought that the "chances might not be better than one in ten/' He then handed to Halifax a copy of a letter Matsuoka wrote to Grew immediately after their conversation on May 14. It was written in such a rambling style that Halifax thought it "bore evidences of lunacy." Welles shared this impression but finally came to the conclusion that "it might be due to the fact that Mr. Matsuoka was understood to be drinking extremely heavily at this time and the mental state apparent in the writing of this letter might be momentary rather than permanent/'106 It is apparent that Matsuoka's belligerent state of mind was a result of the pressure from Berlin. Hitler would soon launch his attack upon Russia and he was particularly anxious that America remain neutral. But this Japanese threat failed to restrain Roosevelt. On June 20 an announcement was made in Washington that no more oil would be exported from American eastern ports (including the Gulf of Mexico) except to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere. Two days later, Hitler's armies crossed the Russian frontier and the German offensive began to roll. When the news reached Tokyo, Matsuoka rushed to the Emperor and strongly argued that Japan should support Germany by immediately attacking Russia. He readily admitted that his program implied possible war with the United States.107 Although Konoye wished to apply a brake to the forward tactics of Matsuoka, the Japanese army leaders were restive, and liaison conferences on June 25 and July 2 mapped a new and dangerous program: (1) Japan should not rush into a conflict with the Soviets; (2) the triple alliance should not be abandoned; (3) 302 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Japan should move south into Indochina.108 Knowledge of this decision reached Washington during the first week in July. The Japanese code had been broken and from July to December, 1941, the President and Secretary of State could read the instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura.109 The projected Japanese drive to the south was soon familiar in all its details.

8. ROOSEVELT FREEZES JAPANESE FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES On July 16 the Japanese cabinet resigned. When Konoye was asked to form a new cabinet he dropped Matsuoka and named Admiral Toyoda as the new Foreign Minister. Toyoda was particularly fearful of further American embargoes upon the export of essential commodities to Japan. In the third week in July he sent an ominous instruction to Nomura in Washington: "Should the U.S. . . . take steps at this time which unduly excite Japan (such as ... the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation/'110 The efforts of Nomura to this end were in vain. On July 26 an order was issued freezing Japanese funds in the United States. This meant an end to the export of oil to Japan. When Nomura called at the Department of State to inquire about the situation, Welles received him in his best frigid manner. Nomura expressed the hope that this restriction would not mean any "further deterioration in the relations of our two countries/' but Welles parried this indirect query by remarking upon the extraordinary patience "which the United States had demonstrated in its relations with Japan during recent years." The Japanese ambassador quietly stated that he believed the best thing under the circumstances was to adopt some "compromise solution which would prove acceptable to both sides." Welles crisply replied that there was not the "slightest ground for any compromise solution."111 JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 303 9. THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE PUSHES AMERICA CLOSER TO A BREAK WITH JAPAN Any thought of a compromise solution of Japanese-American difficulties was made more difficult by the decisions of the Atlantic Conference between Churchill and President Roosevelt. On August 9,1941, in the Newfoundland harbor of Argentia, the first conference between these two statesmen was held. It was soon apparent that Britain was deeply disturbed about conditions in the southwest Pacific. According to a British suggestion, America was to state very frankly to Japan that any "further encroachment" in the direction of Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies would compel the United States to take measures that might lead to war.

Welles wished to broaden the scope of American action. He would have the United States play the role of policeman in a very wide area in the Pacific. American forces should be ready to repel any Japanese thrust whether it was directed "against China, against the Soviet Union or against British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area." Churchill and Roosevelt were in hearty agreement with this wider formula, but the President was too cautious to broadcast it to the American public.112 Churchill did not secure at Argentia all the items in his program but he at least secured pledges that relieved many of his fears. In a speech in Parliament, January 27, 1942, he remarked: "The probability, since the Atlantic Conference . . . that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. ... As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone."113 10. ROOSEVELT REFUSES TO MEET PRINCE KONOYE In a statement he handed to the Japanese ambassador on August 17, Roosevelt carried out his pledge to Churchill. It was phrased PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE in language that carried a definite warning against Japanese expansion: If the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy ... of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding ... the safety and security of the United States.114 A new issue now came up with reference to a meeting between Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As early as August 7 the Japanese government had asked for such a meeting. It was now informed (August 17) that if it was ready to "suspend its expansionist activities" the Department of State would "endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views."

In Tokyo Ambassador Grew was deeply impressed with the importance of a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt. In a dispatch to Secretary Hull he thought such a conference would present an opportunity for "the highest statesmanship/'115 In the State Department, however, there was little enthusiasm for a Konoye-Roosevelt conference. In the Division of Far Eastern Affairs a memorandum was prepared which flatly stated: "The holding of the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on the basis of the present status of the discussions between this country and Japan would result in more of disadvantage than of advantage as regards this country's interests and policies."116 Ambassador Grew strongly contested this viewpoint and cogently argued against a firm stand by the Department of State upon an inflexible program of principles in advance of a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. Political differences could be expressed in subtle shades that would not affront sensitive nations that objected to the conventional pattern of black and white. It would be best to go to such a meeting in a spirit that welcomed adjustment of existing difficulties; not in a spirit of challenge.117 But Secretary Hull paid little attention to these admonitions from JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 305 Grew. On October 2 he handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement that vetoed any idea of a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. Before such a conference could be agreed upon there would first have to be a definite meeting of minds upon the agenda.118 Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador in Tokyo, was sharply critical of the Hull attitude: By pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. . . .

It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problem since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner. . . . Both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.119 11. GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL STARK OPPOSE AN ULTIMATUM TO JAPAN When Hull insisted upon a continued "unduly suspicious attitude" toward Japan, the Konoye Ministry resigned (October 16). In the new cabinet General Hideki Tojo assumed the post of Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. The story of the attempts of the Tojo cabinet to find some path to peace is a twice-told tale that does not have to be repeated here.120 It has long been equally obvious that the highest officers in the American Army and Navy were deeply concerned about the rapid drift toward war and wanted to postpone the conflict for at least three months. But Chiang Kaishek began a drive to hasten American intervention. On November 2 the Generalissimo wrote to Roosevelt that a new Japanese offensive against Yunnan might shake the morale of the Chinese Army and the Chinese people "to its foundation." For the first time in "this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible" if the Japanese drive succeeded in taking Kunming.121 But General Marshall and 306 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Admiral Stark resisted this Chinese pressure to push America immediately into the war. On November 5, after a review of the situation in the Far East, they strongly recommended that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan/'122 12. JAPAN IS "MANEUVERED" INTO FIRING THE FIRST SHOT AT PEARL HARBOR The rejection of the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting was a real ultimatum to Japan, and after October 16 tension in Tokyo rapidly mounted. On November 5 instructions were sent to Nomura that November 25 would be the deadline in the negotiations in Washington.123 This deadline was repeated in instructions on November 11.124 From the intercepted Japanese radiograms, Secretary Hull knew all about this deadline. On November 15 Hull handed Nomura another one of his long oral statements. He knew that it could not be accepted by Japan. The bases for an agreement were a challenge. Complete control over "its economic, financial and monetary affairs" should be restored to China, and Japan should abandon any thought of preserving in China a "preferential position."125 Japan realized that this was really a challenge, but a last attempt was made to preserve peace. Saburo Kurusu was sent to Washington to assist Nomura. He had served as consul in Chicago and New York, and his happy marriage to an American girl had given him a personal interest in finding some road to accommodation. But Hull was hell-bent for war. The constant needling by Chiang Kaishek had gotten under his skin and President Roosevelt felt pressure from his administrative assistant, Lauchlin Currie, also a warm admirer of Soviet Russia. At this point Owen Lattimore, American adviser to Chiang Kaishek, sent a strongly worded cablegram against any modus vivendi or truce with Japan: "Any modus vivendi" now arrived at with Japan would be "disastrous to Chinese belief in America."126 For a week Currie had been "terribly anxious" because he feared that "Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river."127 In Chungking, Madame Chiang Kaishek became "unrestrainedly critical" of the JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 307 American government for its failure to "plunge into the war" and thus aid China.128 From London word came from Churchill with reference to the situation in China: 'There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kaishek? Is he not having a very thin diet?129 Under the impact of these cablegrams Hull became hysterical.

During a telephone conversation with Secretary Stimson he remarked that he had just about made up his mind about any thought of a modus vivendi or truce with Japan—he "would kick the whole thing over/'130 This is just what he and President Roosevelt did on the following day, November 26. On that afternoon Hull handed to the Japanese diplomatic representatives a ten-point proposal which amounted to a sharp ultimatum: "The government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina."131 Both Hull and the President knew the Japanese government could not accept such a proposal: it was an invitation to war. It was not long before that invitation was accepted. FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER 5 1. A. W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1938), p. 129. 2. Ambassador O'Brien to Secretary Knox, Tokyo, February 5, 1910.

711.94/138, MS, National Archives. 3. Theodore Roosevelt to President Taft, December 22, 1910, Philander C. Knox Papers, Library of Congress. 4. E. H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), pp. 101-60. 5. Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 141. 6. Griswold, op. cit., pp. 218-20. 7. Lansing, Diary, November 30, 1918, Lansing Papers, Library of Congress. 8. Ibid., July 31, 1919.

308 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 9. New York Times, November 21, 30,1920. 10. David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 165. 11. Secretary Hughes to Senator Lodge, April 17, 1924, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress. 12. T. W. Lamont to R. E. Olds, Under Secretary of State, New York, November 11, 1927. 894.51 So 8/48, MS, Department of State. 13. Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 22, 1927. 894.51 So 8/4, MS, Department of State. 14. Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 25, 1927. 894.51 So 8/8, MS, Department of State. 15. Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, November 21, 1927. 894.51 So 8/2, MS, Department of State. 16. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1921-1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), I, 71; K. K. Kawakami, "Manchurian Background," Pacific Affairs, V (February, 1932), 111-30; Edith E. Ware, Business and Politics in the Far East (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1932), p. 213.

17. Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 22, 1927. 894.51 So 8/4, MS, Department of State. 18. Admiral Tejiro Toyoda to Ambassador Cameron Forbes, Tokyo, March 3, 1932. 793.94/4877, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 19. George Sokolsky, "These Days," Washington Times-Herald, March 14, 1951. 20. Herbert Briggs, "NonRecognition of Title by Conquest," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (May 13-15, 1940), p. 81. 21. Hugh Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1941), pp. 279-81. 22. The Stricken Land; the Story of Puerto Rico (New York: Doubleday, & Company, Inc., 1947), p. 177. 23. After Seven Years (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), pp. 94-95. 24. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, February 24, 1933, with an enclosure to Mr. Neville. 793.94/6031, MS, Department of State. 25. Secretary Stimson to Ambassador Grew, November 21, 1932, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 19311941, Department of State Publication 2016 (2 vols; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), I, 104-5. (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, I or II.) 26. Endorsement of Secretary Stimson upon the Hornbeck memorandum, January 28, 1933. 793.94/6063, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.

27. James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 39. 28. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933, The Far East, III, 162-63, 201. 29. Congressional Record, LXXVI, Part II, 1448. 30. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, February 23, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, The Far East, III, 195-96.

JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 309 31. President Hoover to Secretary Stimson, February 24, 1933, ibid., Ill, 209-10. 32. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, February 24, 1933, ibid., III, 204-5. 33. The Department of State to the British Embassy, March 11, 1933, ibid., Ill, 231-32. 34. Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, March 9, 1933, ibid., I, 36364.. 35. Secretary Hull to Hugh Wilson, March 11, 1933, ibid., Ill, 233. 36. Senator Key Pittman to Secretary Hull, May 10, 1933, ibid., 1, 365-66. 37. Acting Secretary of State Phillips to Hugh Wilson, June 1, 1933, ibid., I, 378. 38. Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, October 6, 1933, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941,1, 125. 39. Memorandum by E. L. Neville, Tokyo, October 6, 1933. 793.94/6495, MS, Department of State. 40. Ambassador Grew to Under Secretary Phillips, Tokyo, October 6, 1933, Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 421-24.

41. Memorandum by E. L. Neville, Tokyo, October 6, 1933. 793.94/6495, MS, Department of State. 42. Diary of Ambassador Grew, November 30, 1933; Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan; a Contemporary Record Drawn from [his] Diaries and Private and Official Papers, 1932-1942 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), p. 108. 43. Memorandum by Stanley K. Hornbeck, April 25, 1934. 793.94/6700, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 44. Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, April 28, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, 231-32. 45. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 133-34. 46. Memorandum of Under Secretary of State William Phillips, April 26, 1934, Foreign Relations, 1934, The Far East, III, 142-43. 47. Memorandum of Stanley K. Hornbeck, ibid., pp. 190-93. 48. Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, I, 155-57; Ralph Townsend, The High Cost of Hate (San Francisco: The Author, 1939), pp. 24-25. 49. Secretary Hull to Norman Davis, November 22, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941,1, 262-63.

50. Secretary Hull to Norman Davis, November 26, 1934, ibid, I, 266-67. 51. President Roosevelt's message to Congress, January 3, 1936, Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 19311941, Department of State Publication 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943)^PP-3°4-752. Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), pp. 231-32. 53. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 108-12. 54. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 192-204. 55. David Berger to Secretary Hull, October 30, 1936. 793.94/8451, MS, Department of State.

310 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 56. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, December 14, 1936. 793.94/8437, MS, Department of State. 57. Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Nanking, March 18, 1937. 793.94/8543, MS, Department of State. 58. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, April 30, 1937. 793-94/ 8632, MS, Department of State. 59. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, June 24, 1937. 793.94/ 8725, MS, Department of State; Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Peiping, July 8, 1937, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, I, 313-14. 60. Mr. Henderson to Secretary Hull, Moscow, December 21, 1937. 793.94/11763, MS, Department of State. 61. Conversation between Lord Perth and Viscount Ishii, December 2, 1937. 793.94/11642, MS, Department of State. 62. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, November 2, 1937. 793.94/ 10946, MS, Department of State. 63. Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Hull and the Chinese ambassador, October 14, 1937. 793.94/10791, MS, Department of State.

64. Conversation between Sumner Welles and Mr. Oumansky, Russian charge" d'affaires, October 2, 1937. 793-9^/lo^3°> MS, Department of State. 65. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, September 15, 1937. 793.94/ 10697, MS, Department of State. 66. Foreign Relations: Japan, 19311941, I, 379-83. 67. 'The Morgenthau Diaries," Collier's, CXX (October 4, 1947), 20; ibid., CXX (October 25, 1947), 85. 68. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 6. 69. Testimony of Admiral R. E. Ingersoll during the Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), IX, 4272-73. (The Hearings will hereinafter be designated Pearl Harbor Attack.) 70. Ibid., pp. 4274-77. 71. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt; edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (13 vols.; New York: Random House, Inc., 1941), VII, 67.

72. Joseph C. Green, Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control, to 148 Persons and Companies Manufacturing Airplane Parts, July 1, 1938, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 201-2. 73. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 100-101. 74. Eugene H. Dooman to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, June 7, 1939, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XX, pp. 4144-64. 75. Ibid., pp. 4148-50. 76. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, May 18, 1939, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 1-5.

JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 311 77. Mr. Dooman to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, May 23, 1939, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XX, p. 4139. 78. The Secretary of State to the Japanese Prime Minister, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 6-8. 79. Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador, July 26, 1939, Peace and War, p. 475. 80. Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Hull and the Japanese ambassador (Horinouchi), August 26, 1939, ibid., pp. 48082. 81. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 41, quoting from the manuscript diary of Ambassador Grew. 82. Ibid., p. 42. 83. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 296-303. 84. Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 202. 85. Jbid., pp. 203-4. 86. Ibid., 807-8. 87. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 88. London Times, March 29, 1940. 89. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940-1941; edited by S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), III, 270-71.

90. Interrogation of General Oshima, February 4, 1946, Record oi Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1946), Exhibit No. 497, pp. 6050-54. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid., pp. 6063-71. 93. Ibid., Exhibits Nos. 549, 550, 553, pp. 6323-93. 94. William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 532-37. 95. Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 165-66. 96. H. L. Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-1941 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), p. 71. 97. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit No. 3441, pp. 32979-85. 9 8. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part V, p. 2 391. 99. Admiral H. R. Stark to the Commanders in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; the Asiatic Fleet; and the Atlantic Fleet, April 3, 1941, ibid., Part XVII, pp. 2462-63. 100. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), P-S 1834, IV, 469-75.

101. Memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, March 28, 1941, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (New York: Didier Publications, 1948), pp. 298-303. 102. Memorandum by Secretary Hull, February 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 387. 103. Testimony of Ribbentrop at Nuremberg, September 10, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement B, pp. 1200-1201.

312 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 104. Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 407. 105. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, May 14, 1941, ibid., pp. 145-48. 106. Memorandum of a conversation between Sumner Welles and Viscount Halifax, May 17, 1941. 711.94/2207, MS, Department of State. 107. "Memoirs of Prince Konoye," Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XX, p. 3993; see also the diary of the Marquis Koichi Kido in International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit No. 635. 108. "Memoirs of Prince Konoye," op. cit, pp. 4018-19. 109. These intercepted decoded messages from Tokyo are given in detail in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XII, pp. 1-316. 110. Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura, July 23, 1941, ibid., pp. 4-5. 111. Memorandum of a conversation between Sumner Welles and Ambassador Nomura, July 28, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 537-39. 112. Memorandum of conversations at Argentia between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins, and Sumner Welles, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part IV, pp. 1784-92.

113. Winston Churchill, The End of the Beginning (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1943), p. 33. 114. Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 556-59. 115. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, 1941, ibid.T p. 565. 116. Memorandum of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, September 23, 1941. 711.94/2344, Stiictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 117. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, September 29, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan; 19311941, II, 645-50. 118. Oral statement handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura, October 2,1941, ibid., pp. 656-61. 119. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XII, p. 51. 120. Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 282-325; Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 496-516; Frederic R. Sanborn, Design for War; a Study of Secret Power Politics, 19371941 (New York: DevinAdair Company, 1951), pp. 377-425.

121. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XV, pp. 1476-78. 122. Ibid., Part XIV, pp. 1061-62. 123. Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura, November 5, 1941, ibid., Part XII, p. 100. 124. Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura, November 11, 1941, ibid., pp. 116-17. 125. Oral statement handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura, November 15, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19311941, II, 73437126. Owen Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XIV, p. 1160. See also Hearings Before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the Administration oi the Internal Security Act (McCarran Committee), United States Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., Part I, pp. 156-57.

JAPANESEAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941 313 127. Hearings, ibid., pp. 157-58. 128. Ambassador Gauss to Secretary Hull, Chungking, December 3, 1941. 711.94/2600, MS, Department of State. 129. PearJ Harbor Attack, Part XIV, p. 1300. 130. Stimson diary, November 26, 1941; Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XI, p. 5434* 131. Oral statement handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, November 26, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan: 19312941,11,766-70.