The Pearl Harbor Investigations

7 THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS by PERCY L. GREAVES, JR. The most disgraceful feature of the whole tragic affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. The incomplete and one-sided Roberts report, the circumstances oi the retirements of Kimmel and Short, the attempts of the War and Navy Departments to deny access to the intercepted messages by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Board of Investigation, the appointment of secret one-man boards to continue investigations, and finally, the inability of the Joint Congressional Committee to secure access to pertinent files, constitute a blot on our national history. —ADMIRAL HARRY E. YARNELL, former Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, and former Commandant, Pearl Harbor Naval Base. I drafted the Pearl Harbor report. Two Republicans signed that report. I have no apologies to make concerning it, and no one as yet has come forth with a single fact to challenge one statement of mine in the report. If you have any such fact or facts, I would be glad to receive them.

No man ever more conscientiously or objectively plowed through a 10,000,000-word record than did I in drafting that report. What facts were not dug out and presented? —EDWARD P. MORGAN to Senator Andrew F. Schoeppel, Congressional Record, January 15, 1952.

Percy L. Greaves, Jr., was born in Brooklyn, New York, on August 24, 1906. He received the degree of B.S., magna cum Jaude, from the Syracuse University School of Business Administration in 1929 and later carried on graduate study in economics at Columbia and New York Universities. He served as financial editor and research economist of the United States News from 1934 to 1936. He resigned to accept an executive position in Paris. From here he travelled widely in Europe, especially in France, England, and Germany, observing economic conditions and diplomatic relations. He returned to the United States in 1938 to direct research and survey activities for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Following this assignment, Mr. Greaves did extensive research work in the political field, particularly in regard to problems of the Executive Department of the Federal government and foreign affairs.

During the second World War he followed closely the diplomatic aspects of the era and the revelations which began to make their appearance, even during the great conflict, When the Joint Congressional Committee was created to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor, Mr. Greaves was engaged as chief research expert for the Republican minority members. His alertness and industry in that post apparently annoyed Senator (later VicePresident) Alben W. Barkley, chairman of the committee, for Barkley remarked one day: "He [Greaves] has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan [Homer Ferguson] during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses." At any rate, no person knows more than Mr. Greaves about the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack, of the socalled investigations of that tragic event, and of the failure of these investigations to bring forth, honestly and clearly, all of the facts connected therewith.

I. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS The investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack have been many and varied. The complete facts will never be known. Most of the socalled investigations have been attempts to suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. From the beginning to the end, facts and files have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which benefit the administration under investigation. Those seeking the truth are told that other facts or documents cannot be revealed because they are intermingled in personal diaries, pertain to our relations with foreign countries, or are sworn to contain no information of value. Nevertheless, many revealing facts have been brought forth and buried in a voluminous public record. Some of the most astounding are unknown to the general public and to many historians. Most of them are hidden away in the forty-five volumes of the Congressional investigation of 1945-46. The full story of the administration's attempt to cover up the facts would run into many volumes so only the high lights can be covered in this short review.

In order to understand the why and how of the whitewash, it is necessary to know a few of the basic facts. Under our form of government the President and the Secretary of State are responsible for the safe conduct of our foreign relations. In 1941 the Secretaries of War and Navy were responsible under the laws of Congress for the maintenance and supervision of our Army and Navy. The Chief of Staff was responsible for Army operations and the Chief of Naval Operations for Navy operations. Together, within the laws and appropriations of Congress, these six persons had primary responsibility for the defense of the United States and all of its possessions. The Pacific Fleet was subject to orders of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington but, when it was in Pearl Harbor, the Army was charged with its protection. The Hawaiian Army 409 410 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE commander took orders directly from only the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, or the President of the United States.

In August, 1940, sixteen months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army Signal Corps had broken the top Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE. We were thus able to decipher and read all diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and Japanese officials all over the world, including Washington. Copies of the most important of these and other intercepted messages were circulated to all key administration officials in Washington, including the President. These messages, known as MAGIC, revealed much important data to the recipients. Washington sent duplicate code machines to London, Singapore, and Cavite, Philippine Islands, to keep the British and our Far East forces informed. Hawaii did not get one. Therefore, Washington had a far greater than normal responsibility and opportunity to make certain that Hawaii was properly warned and alerted. Early in 1941 administration officials reached a secret agreement with British and Dutch officials which committed us to go to war against Japan if Japanese forces crossed a certain line. Crossing this line would have indicated an attack on the possessions of one, two, or all three of the signing powers. This meant that we were pledged to go to war if British or Dutch Far East possessions were attacked.

Since this agreement had not been submitted to, much less approved by, Congress, it was unconstitutional. The administration was, therefore, extremely anxious to conceal this fact from the American public. Accordingly, every effort was made to prevent its disclosure during the investigations. For these reasons, it is perhaps only human that Washington officials have desired to conceal what they did or did not do with the information at hand.

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 4II II. THE KNOX REPORT The first investigation was the shortest, as well as one of the most important. It was made by the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. He flew out to Pearl Harbor immediately after the attack and made his report to the President about a week later. The administration never intended that this report be made public. However, it was located in the files of the Navy Department, through the diligence of Senator Homer Ferguson, long after the original date the administration had set for the closing of the Congressional investigation. It had never been seen by the Chief of Naval Operations and the committee's counsel had failed to bring it to the committee's attention. It contains at least two interesting statements which the administration was anxious to withhold from publication. This report revealed that: Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday. . . . Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack wras attempted, it would be made in the Far East.1 Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this 412 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.2 The significance of this report is that it revealed that Washington had vital information that was not passed on to the Pearl Harbor commanders and that Pearl Harbor was not adequately supplied with defense materiel because our available supply had been furnished to foreign powers. This report did not contain a single word of criticism of those in command at Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, U.S.A., and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, U.S.N. Yet, with only this report as av basis, they were removed from command shortly afterward. It might also be noted that the Congressional Investigating Committee Counsel did not consider this report "of interest generally."3 It was given to Senator Ferguson only in answer to his request, and was not distributed to other members of the Investigating Committee or to the press.

III. THE ROBERTS COMMISSION The next investigation was conducted in secret for the purpose of preparing a report which could be made public. This report could contain no inkling that Washington had had any informaTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 413 tion which was not available to those at Pearl Harbor. If the true circumstances had become known, the administration would have lost public confidence. The group making this report is known as the Roberts Commission and it was created by Executive Order on December 18, 1941. President Roosevelt asked Secretaries Knox and Stimson for their "suggestions as to the investigating board."4 In making his suggestions, Stimson conferred with his Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and they united in making their suggestions to the President. They proposed that it should have a civilian head, and recommended Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. Originally a Philadelphia lawyer and nominally a Republican, the Justice had been an active supporter of President Roosevelt's prewar foreign policy of aid to the Allies. Likewise recommended by Messrs. Stimson and Marshall was Major General Frank R. McCoy and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney. The latter had just returned from Europe where he had been negotiating with the British and Russians and was, therefore, well informed as to our agreements with these foreign powers. During the "session of the Commission" he was promoted to major general.5 On the Navy's side, the appointees were Admiral J. M. Reeves and Admiral W. H. Standley. The latter is described by Robert E.

Sherwood in Roosevelt and Hopkins as "An old friend of Roosevelt's, Standley had been one of the President's most rugged supporters in the long battle for aid for the Allies before Pearl Harbor."6 Two weeks after the completion of this report, Admiral Standley became the President's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These friends of the administration started by taking testimony from the Washington principals entirely off the record. No transcripts were kept, although they heard General Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark, Navy Chief of War Plans Admiral Turner, Army Chief of War Plans General Gerow, as well as the heads of the Military and Naval Intelligence Services. Justice Roberts spent a day with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Apparently these conversations were all of a friendly, confidential nature. The Commission accepted without question all the information volunteered by these Washington authorities. It then 414 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE proceeded to Pearl Harbor, where it lecoided testimony taken under oath from those at the scene of the disaster. The Commission was not well informed about the code breaking or "Magic"

information, known in Washington but not in Pearl Harbor. They raised little or no question concerning the responsibilities and duties of those in Washington. In fact, there is every indication that the Commission felt that the commanders at Pearl Harbor were better informed than they actually were. One of the most important things involved in the Pearl Harbor situation was the Winds Code message. This involved a code which Japan had set up to notify her representatives around the world when they would start the war. The implementing message would also indicate in three weather words which nations Japan would attack. Later testimony revealed that such information had been received in Washington indicating that war was going to be levied against the United States as well as other countries. Later, during the Congressional investigation, Justice Roberts was asked if the Winds implementing message had come before his commission. The Justice testified: "I have no recollection of any such thing. And I think you will search the testimony in vain for any reference to it."7 A few minutes later, Senator Ferguson, in questioning the Justice, quoted from the Justice's own words in the transcript of the Roberts Commission. Chairman Roberts was then questioning General Short's Intelligence Officer, Colonel Fielder: CHAIRMAN ROBERTS: It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.8 THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS The Justice denied that this had reference to the Winds Code message, although he admitted it was very likely that it could describe that message.

In questioning another Intelligence officer, Colonel Bicknell, at Hawaii, Justice Roberts, as chairman, stated: I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor and that, having broken that down, one of the military establishments in Washington caught over the radio, the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands. COLONEL BICKNELL: I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.9 Another conflicting situation concerning the Roberts investigation, as reported by Justice Roberts to the Congressional Committee, is that they had asked the higher command of the Army and Navy to produce every document that could have a bearing on the situation at Pearl Harbor. He testified that he was furnished an outline "of the whole transaction" by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Again, with Senator Brewster questioning: It is my understanding that you were given more or less information about the magic, but all reference to that was very properly eliminated from both your investigation and your report? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Certainly ... we knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code; yes, indeed. ... All that about the magic, and all that, was given us in confidence at the War Department when we were taking the statements and not put on the typewritten record.10 416 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE A few minutes later, Senator Ferguson asked him if he got the "Magic." MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: NO; we were never shown one of the magic messages. SENATOR FERGUSON: Not one? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Not one. SENATOR FERGUSON: Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: NO, sir. SENATOR FERGUSON: SO that when you made this report, you never had any information out of the magic messages?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: NO, sir. SENATOR FERGUSON: Did you know there were such messages? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to. SENATOR FERGUSON: All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions: 'The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof." How, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy told us that every time Hull gave them a THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 417 warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in. SENATOR FERGUSON: NOW, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President and the Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you know that they were all being furnished the magic? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it. SENATOR FERGUSON: Well, then, Justice, if your Commission was not furnished all the data that we had here in Washington how could you make a finding on whether or not they were on their toes out in Hawaii and knew all the facts?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS : We had the messages that were sent to them. SENATOR FERGUSON: Well, did you know that there was more information that could have been sent to them? MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS : I suppose there never was a situation where there was not more information that could be sent to somebody.11 As might be expected, the Roberts Commission Report condemned the actions of the Pearl Harbor commanders, claiming among other things that: It was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them . . . demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities invested in them and inherent in their positions . . . each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the attack.12 Those in Washington got off scot free with one exception: "Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating 418 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE to the antisabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department/'13 This last statement mentioned no names, although the responsibility was definitely that of General Marshall. This report, made public on January 25, 1942, held that the Washington officials had sufficiently alerted the commanders at Pearl Harbor and that these commanders had failed to take the necessary steps to protect the fleet. No indication was given of the confidential information in the hands of Washington and mentioned in the report of Secretary Knox.

Although there is no record of the secret conversations Justice Roberts held with top Washington officials, he told the Congressional Committee that all information gathered by his commission had been given to the public. It was later revealed in a letter, which the administration tried to keep secret, that during the 1944 presidential campaign, General Marshall had written to candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey: The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.14 Senator Ferguson had questioned the General very closely on this point, ending up with: We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public. GENERAL MARSHALL: That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON: And you had that information in September of 1944, because you wrote the letter at that time? GENERAL MARSHALL: Oh, yes; sir.15 Nevertheless, Justice Roberts maintained that nothing had been withheld, even though his report mentioned 1,887 Pages and the Congressional Committee was furnished only 1,862 pages. A close examination of all the testimony and papers made THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS public by this commission indicates that its purpose was to judge those in command at Pearl Harbor. The Commission seemed to feel it had no responsibility to investigate those in Washington. Their personal friends or superiors could do no wrong. So it was a pure and simple whitewash of those in Washington. IV. THE HART INQUIRY About two years after the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Kimmel, still subject to possible court-martial, became worried lest some of the important testimony be forgotten or lost. He asked the Navy Department if it could not make a record of the testimony. An inquiry was ordered on February 12, 1944, to take testimony and depositions from members of the naval forces who had knowledge of facts pertinent to the surprise attack. Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Retired, was chosen for this task. At the time of the attack he was Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the person to whom all the "war warning" messages were originally sent.

The precept for this inquiry left to the Admiral's discretion the persons whom he should interview and the questions which he should ask. He, of course, had no authority to question anybody from the White House, the State or War Departments. He concluded four months of taking testimony on June 15, 1944. He made no report as he had not been asked to make one. Before the Congressional Committee, Hart admitted that he had not done a complete job. He had made no attempt to question Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, Captain Arthur McCollum, or Commander A. D. Kramer, all of whom were key Navy witnesses. In a later inquiry,16 Admiral Hart became the counsel for Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the attack. Hart was also one of the witnesses who had said that he had seen the Winds Execute message. Later, he changed his statement, 420 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE saying that what he had seen was a report about the Winds message and not the original.

While appearing before the Congressional Committee he was questioned at length concerning his knowledge of the situation in the southwest Pacific, his deployment of the Asiatic Fleet, and certain preattack messages sent to Washington relating to our agreements with the British. Embarrassed, at one time during his testimony, he stated: "I would like to do anything to get me out of this seat but I will continue."17 Although he could hardly be considered an impartial person to head such an inquiry, he did obtain some very valuable testimony which later investigations tried to destroy. Perhaps the most important testimony taken by the Hart Inquiry was that of Captain L. F. Safford, in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications in Washington. This officer testified that in his official duties he had seen messages which gave definite information concerning the Japanese objectives as early as the spring of 1941. He said in part: In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless, diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the deadline for negotiations then being conducted between Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. . . . On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operation of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that largeTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 421 scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally at 10:15 a.m.

(Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service,- War Department, that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time), that date. 1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S.I.S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy.18 Other valuable information was obtained from Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who, at the time of the attack, was Chief War Plans Officer in Washington. He testified that the WPL-46 (Basic War Plan 46, also known as Rainbow No. 5), mentioned in the "war warning" message to Admiral Kimmel, . . . had its basis in an international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force. The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that plan were held PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world, in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy and by the President. The Navy issued their form of that War Plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection that the Army form of it was issued about August.

It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war, for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.19 This admiral also testified that Admiral Kimmel's part in the plan was not defensive and that "it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it."20 He further testified, in reference to whether the plan could be put into partial execution, that a careful study of this plan shows that "its mechanism does not permit such a step to be taken . . . that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases."21 This admiral also confirmed information that Washington knew that an attack was to be made on the United States. He testified: "The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United States.

Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching war, then warlike actions may occur any place/'22 This had reference to a dispatch of December 3, sent to Admiral Hart as Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel for information. It stated that we knew that Tokyo had ordered the destruction of its top-secret code machines in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila; that the Batavia machine had already been returned to Tokyo; and that a day earlier Washington also was directed to destroy its machine. The British THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 423 had reported that London had already heard that the Japanese had destroyed their machine there. V. CONGRESS TAKES A HAND About this time, Senator Homer Ferguson, a close follower of these events, became concerned lest the public might never get the true story. So he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 133. This was approved on June 13, 1944. It provided for a further extension of all statutes affecting the prosecution of those connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and further directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding it. As a result, each Secretary appointed an investigating group which immediately went to work. What happened after the intervention of Congress into the situation will be described in the remainder of this chapter.

VI. ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD (APHB) Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson appointed three Army officers to the Army Pearl Harbor Board in July, 1944. They started off by reviewing the record and exhibits of the Roberts Commission. They went on to gather fortyone volumes of testimony and seventy exhibits. A total of 151 witnesses appeared before them. The Board found that 'There was a distinct lack of a war mind in the United States. . . . Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war."23 Since then public opinion has never been allowed 424 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE to develop by itself. The administration has seen to it that public opinion was favorable before it announced any new plans to the nation. The APHB went into the problem much more factually than either the Roberts Commission or the Hart Inquiry. It placed on the record damaging information obtained from the State Department concerning the November 26 ultimatum sent to Japan over the objections of Army and Navy officials and in contravention of an agreement previously reached at the White House. It revealed Marshall's awareness of the danger back in the early months of 1941, and many of the things he did to hide his responsibility for the fact that the Army was not prepared to defend the fleet on the morning of December 7, 1941.

The testimony taken also revealed that the messages sent to Short were written and designed primarily for MacArthur in the Philippines, with copies going to Short. There was also testimony that Secretary of War Stimson had himself weakened the socalled warning message. We also learn from APHB testimony, for the first time, that it was a Colonel Walter Bedell Smith who, as Secretary to the Chief of Staff, was responsible for getting important messages to General Marshall. The final secret APHB Report placed the blame on Secretary Cordell Hull, General Marshall, and General Leonard T. Gerow, as well as on General Short. In addition to this secret report, made public after V-J Day, and the testimony pertaining thereto, the Board had learned of the existence of "Magic" several months after it had started taking testimony. It also learned of the attempt made by General Marshall to suppress this information. Nevertheless, the APHB was not deterred and obtained considerable top-secret information concerning the Winds messages and other vital material. The Board pointed out that none of the vital information known by the War Department in Washington was passed on to General Short at Pearl Harbor. The top-secret report said, in part: The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction of this information . . .

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 425 the difference between altering those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.24 They found that Colonel Walter Bedell Smith did not get to General Marshall, on the night of December 6, an intercepted Japanese message which might have caused him to send further information or warning to General Short. The APHB top-secret report concluded with this paragraph: Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.25 This is, perhaps, a slight exaggeration as Washington did not know, or at least no evidence has been adduced that Washington knew, precisely, that the attack would fall on Pearl Harbor although they had good reason to expect that it might.

The nation and our historians are greatly indebted to Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, the executive officer of the Board. It was largely due to his diligence that much of this information was obtained and he is to be thanked for compiling the final report which gives as true and unbiased account as has yet appeared. It was not complete, as it could not go into phases involving the White House and certain other diplomatic matters, but its conclusions are logical. For that very reason it did not satisfy the powers that be. Secretary Stimson, who had appointed the board, felt called upon to make a statement in his own defense and continue further investigations under his personal direction.

426 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE VII. THE NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY (NCI) In accordance with the joint resolution passed by Congress, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal appointed three retired admirals to conduct an inquiry "into all circumstances connected with the attack made by the Japanese Armed Forces on Pearl Harbor."26 This inquiry ran concurrently with the APHB, covering about the same dates—in this case from July 24, 1944, to October 19, 1944. Secretary Forrestal ruled that Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum could not appear before the Court "without interruption to or interference with the war effort."27 Inasmuch as the admiral had been Director of Naval Intelligence and the captain had been Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941, these key men could have furnished valuable information. The APHB had questioned Ambassador Grew, but the NCI was the first to inquire of Washington State Department officials. The NCI examined Stanley K. Hornbeck and Maxwell M. Hamilton, both of whom had been concerned with Far Eastern affairs in the State Department. The inquiry was directed at finding out whether they passed on information to the Navy Department that it should have known and transmitted to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.

NCI was not able to get any satisfaction from these gentlemen and undoubtedly did not feel that it was within the Court's province to call Under Secretary Welles or Secretary Hull. The questioning was conducted with little evidence of bias, although the NCI did not feel that it had the right to make inquiry into Washington's higher levels. The Court members, being well informed on naval affairs, saw that the evidence indicated little reason for placing any blame on Admiral Kimmel. They knew that his assignment under the War Plan was principally an offensive THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 427 assignment and that he was carrying out the duties assigned to him when the attack occurred. They found that: ... the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to their defense. . . . The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent— how imminent, he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas as the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on.

Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information . . . all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available.28 However, there were some attempts to defend the Navy's actions. One part of the report says: 'The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable."29 Another section, partly whitewashing the Navy, was: Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted lengtn of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable.30 The Court found that Admiral Kimmel "had no knowledge of the existence"31 of the ultimatum that was sent to the Japanese on 428 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE November 26, a copy of which was furnished the Navy Department. He also lacked other pertinent information available in Washington.

The Court also stated: In view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.32 The NCI had a full copy of War Plan 46 and knew the exact instructions that were given to Admiral Kimmel in the socalled "war warning" message. The Roberts Report, like other administration propaganda, had tried to mislead the public into thinking the instructions were to prepare for defending the Fleet, whereas, in fact, they were to prepare for an attack on the Japanese mandated islands. The Court of Inquiry found . . . that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-inChief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 429 Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service. The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.33 Like the APHB, the NCI took top-secret testimony and issued a separate top-secret report concerning "Magic," its decoding and circulation among the high command and the White House in Washington. From time to time the Navy's Judge Advocate objected to putting this material in the record. In most cases it was put in over his objection or after he had withdrawn his objection. The top-secret material established beyond any question the fact that the Winds Code and Execute messages were received. This was acknowledged in testimony taken from several admirals and from most of the personnel involved. The only key person who did not recall it was Admiral Noyes, who, at the time of Pearl Harbor, was the rear admiral in charge of the Navy's Communications Division in Washington. Several hundred important dispatches were shown Admiral Noyes. He could not, or would not, say which ones he had previously seen, refusing to identify any except those which bore his initials. He refused to rely on his memory, explaining that, by the time of his testimony, over three years had elapsed since these dispatches would have officially come to his attention.

The NCI record also included many important messages indicating the seriousness of the situation and revealing to Washington the fact that Japan was preparing for some action against Great Britain and the United States. On the whole the NCI reports were good and sufficient, so far as the Navy was concerned.

4 30 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE VIII. THE CLARKE INQUIRIES During the summer of 1944 General Marshall learned that the existence of "Magic" had come to the attention of the APHB and NCI. He then ordered his Deputy Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, Colonel Carter W. Clarke, to conduct a top-secret inquiry. The interrogations were held September 14, 15, and 16, 1944. They were directed primarily at the handling of "Magic" in the War Department. Testimony revealed that the United States had been reading some Japanese codes as early as 1936. It also revealed that Colonel Bratton, who testified before the APHB that he had delivered the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message to Colonel Walter Bedell Smith on the night of December 6, 1941, for delivery to General Marshall, had "a memorandum which I made at the time for the record."34 Bratton also testified that top War Department officials "knew that some such message was coming"35 as the message announcing it had been delivered to them by him at 3:00 P.M., December 6.

Another witness, General Marshall's Intelligence Officer, Major General Sherman Miles, testified concerning the delivery of the first thirteen parts of the fourteenpart Japanese reply. "I first knew that it was in that evening and of course we were watching for it very eagerly. We knew that that meant some very definite decision regarding the conference. It was being translated all night. I knew the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th but that did not give away the whole business."36 Another bit of testimony, damaging to the administration's attempt to keep secret the prewar AngloDutch-American agreement, was that of Lieutenant Robert O'Dell, our assistant military attache at Melbourne at the time of the attack. He testified concerning a December 6, 1941, message from his superior to the War DepartTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 431 ment via Hawaii. This message indicated that the Dutch were putting the Joint War Plan into effect and that this was to happen only in case of war. This message had been held up for seventeen hours by the Australian officials, and was not received in Washington until after the attack, but the information was that an attack was expected by the Dutch within sixty hours as early as December 3, our time. Before the cable was sent, the Netherlands Command reported that Japanese planes had reached Kopang. The plan that the Dutch were putting into effect called for United States participation, "in a naval manner."37 Upon completion of the testimony, Colonel Clarke prepared a memorandum for Marshall's Assistant Chief of Staff, Major General Clayton Bissell. This was a seven-page memo which indicated the Army had been informed on December 5; that Admiral Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, had received the Japanese message using the Winds Code; and that it . . . meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken; that on 5 December 1941 Col. [Otis K.] Sadtler [Chief of Army Communication Service, Army Signal Corps, War Department, Washington, D.C.] so informed Gen.

Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and Gen. Bedell Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler information.38 The memo also indicated that those gathered in General Marshall's office on the morning of December 7 were primarily concerned with the Philippines, and not with Hawaii. When Colonel Bratton left with the fateful last-minute message, he was instructed: 'That if there was any question of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines."39 General Bissell, in preparing a covering memo for General Marshall, dated September 20, 1944, summarized the findings in four paragraphs, two of which said that the Army and Navy Departments had been receiving and distributing "Magic." The third stated: "Prior to Pearl Harbor, neither the F.C.C. nor the Army 432 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Signal Corps intercepted an implementing message/'40 meaning the Winds Execute message. No mention at all was made of the fact that most of Washington's top Army officials knew of its receipt by the Navy.

The fourth paragraph dealt with the fourteenpart message from Tokyo and said that it was delivered in the War Department before 9 A.M. on December 7, 1941, and "as soon as possible thereafter [actually it was 11:20] Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War Department and at the time Gen. Marshall decided to send a further warning to the commanders in the Pacific areas."41 The Clarke Investigation was reopened on July 13, 1945, upon the oral directive of General Marshall, as a result of the fact that the NCI had taken testimony indicating that General Marshall might have ordered the destruction of the Winds Execute message. Testimony then taken revealed that the top Japanese diplomatic code, known as "Purple," had been solved in August, 1940, after twenty months' work, and that it was given to the British in January, 1941, along with all the technical cooperation necessary to read any Japanese message. Other testimony revealed that General Marshall was not satisfied with the work of the Army Signal Corps during the first half of December, 1941.

Brigadier General Isaac Spalding, who was purported to have said that General Marshall had ordered the destruction of certain messages, told Colonel Clarke that: "I wouldn't want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line, I know."42 Needless to say, both were his superiors. However, Spalding did testify that Colonel John T. Bissell had told him in 1943 that: Certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary to destroy them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most desirable that the PresiTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 433 dent, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about.43 Colonel Bissell, who, since Pearl Harbor, had been raised to a brigadier generalship, was brought before the committee and furnished all previous testimony. Asked if he had ever made such a statement, he answered, "No, I did not."44 And so a memorandum was prepared for the Chief of Staff on August 13, 1945, which said: "I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2 and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2/'45 And that whitewash was complete.

IX. THE CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION The APHB Report had pointed directly at General Marshall and indirectly at Secretaries Hull and Stimson. The administration could not allow these charges to stand. The report was reviewed officially on November 25, 1944, by the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Myron C. Cramer. In a fifty-page report, he said, among other things: It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified. ... To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report.46 On December 1,1944, Secretary Stimson said in a statement that General Short had shown "errors of judgment of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This was done on January 11, 1942."47 Stimson said nothing about General Marshall 434 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE at that time, but added: "I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained/'48 In a letter dated November 23, 1944, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Stimson wrote: In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation.49 This investigation was primarily a matter of finding a scapegoat for the failures of General Marshall and Secretary Stimson. And so, promoted to a lieutenant colonelcy, Henry C. Clausen, formerly of the APHB staff, started off on what was probably the greatest whitewash junket in American history. Clausen later reported that: "In the course of this investigation, I traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel."50 Statements of fifty of the ninety-two interviewed were included with his report. But there was no word as to what he learned from the other forty-two. Before starting out, he received further instruction on "unexplored leads" from General Cramer. A few of the twenty-three leads dealt with very minor details, while most of them were aimed against the Hawaiian Command. Only one or two were concerned with the top brass in Washington. Clausen was free to interview whomever he pleased, but his findings or leads were limited to those relating to Army personnel.

It is interesting to note that these instructions asked him to find out "Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 435 Captain Safford knew about the AngloDutch-U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a 'War with Britain' message would necessarily have involved the United States in war/'51 Most administration apologists still deny that such an agreement ever was in effect. One of the first affidavits prepared by Colonel Clausen was signed by a Colonel Dusenbury. It stated that no part of the final Japanese message was delivered to top Army brass before December 7, 1941, because "the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep."52 This contradicted previous testimony and denied the admitted fact that at least one set had been delivered by Colonel Bratton on December 6 to the State Department.

On June 15, 1945, Clausen obtained an affidavit from Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith. General Smith was the Colonel to whom Colonel Bratton said he delivered the message on December 6. Bedell Smith had since risen to Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower. General Smith said that to the best of his recollection he had left his office on December 6, 1941, at 7:00 P.M. and that he was quite certain he . . . was not at his office after 10:00 P.M. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope. . . . Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay.53 The next affidavit was signed by General Leonard T. Gerow. It said: General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully 436 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him.54 This contradicted the fact that General Short had wired back to Washington exactly what he had done, alerted his command for sabotage. According to General Marshall's own printed rules and regulations it was his, Marshall's, responsibility, as General Short's only Army superior, to notify Short if Short's reported action was unsatisfactory.

General Gerow denied receiving the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message on December 6, because, if he had received them, he said, "I would immediately have warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me."55 The next affidavit was obtained from Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, who furnished the names of three who might verify the reception of the Winds Execute message. These three were later interviewed but only one was questioned on this subject. Apparently Clausen had little interest in verifying receipt of the Winds Execute message. On July 27, 1945, Clausen obtained Colonel Bratton's affidavit in Paris, France. Colonel Bratton was then serving under General Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's successor as Commander in Chief in Europe. In his affidavit, Colonel Bratton, after being shown the other affidavits, changed his former testimony to state that, on December 6, he had given thirteen parts of the fatal message to Colonel Dusenbury for delivery to General Marshall, inasmuch as Colonel Dusenbury lived at Fort Myer where General Marshall had his home. In closing his affidavit, he said: "Any prior statements or testimony of mine, which may be contrary to my statements here ... should be modified and considered changed."56 His earlier testimony had been almost a year nearer the event and was given when he had before him a memo written right after the attack.

The affidavit of Major General Miles, signed in Boston, was revealing. It stated that in his earlier testimony before the APHB: THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 437 I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic," or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed.57 General Marshall confirmed in his affidavit that he had ordered these facts withheld. In effect, he had ordered his subordinates to commit perjury in their sworn testimony.

In an interim report, Clausen stated that Colonel Bratton's memory "was more refreshed" and that other affidavits "tend to support the revised testimony of Colonel Bratton."58 The new affidavits to which he referred were made by men who were not on duty or who could not remember what happened. Apparently Clausen thought that they supported revised evidence. Clausen asked that his witnesses be required to destroy their copies of affidavits they had signed for him. In one report, Clausen wrote: "General MacArthur, who received information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after reviewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war."59 However, Clausen neglected to mention that the Philippines were reading the intercepts from Japan while Hawaii was not, and that MacArthur had much more information than did General Short.

Concerning Short's defense that he had been ordered not to alarm the public, Clausen reported that affidavits from two persons "confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the experience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940."60 Apparently Clausen thought that previously announced peacetime 438 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE maneuvers were similar to sudden alert maneuvers when tension was mounting and headlines said that war might break at any time. The exhibits of this investigation included a cable picked up from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Manila, dated December 3, 1941. It said: "Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U.S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."61 Upon the completion of Clausen's junkets, Secretary Stimson issued his official report on the Pearl Harbor disaster. He said "the primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of" Pearl Harbor "rested upon" General Short.62 His report neglected to mention that Short was not supplied reconnaissance planes and other vital materiel that Knox, Stimson, and Marshall knew were needed at Pearl Harbor when they diverted such supplies "before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."63 Stimson placed whatever blame might lie in Washington on a beribboned pro-administration sycophant, General Leonard T.

Gerow. This was part of the whitewash, as Gerow officially had borne no responsibility. Gerow had been in charge of the War Plans Division. It did not become an operating division until after war began. He had had no authority in his own name to issue any instructions whatsoever to General Short. The only man in the Army who could have given such orders was General Marshall. Stimson found that there was "no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information [the Japanese message] until the morning of December 7 . . . the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State."64 As to General Marshall, Stimson found that "criticism is entirely unjustified. ... It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff."65 He completely ignored the fact that Marshall, and Marshall alone, had the responsibility of supervising General Short. Stimson concluded that "on the contrary, throughout this matter I believe THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 439 that he [Marshall] acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency."66 And so Marshall and top administration officials overruled the APHB and declared themselves guiltless.

X. THE HEWITT INQUIRY Although the NCI had recommended that no further proceedings be held, the administration was not satisfied with the results of this inquiry; so the Navy, like the War Department, ordered an additional inquiry. On May 2, 1945, the Secretary found "that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence/'67 And so Admiral H. Kent Hewitt was detailed to make a study of all previous Navy investigations and then to conduct such further investigations as may appear to be necessary. Complete files on previous Navy investigations were turned over to John F. Sonnett, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher. The Sonnett-Baecher team held the administration viewpoint and played much the same role that Colonel Clausen did for the Army. Their first task was to prepare a lengthy two-volume "Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations." Then they determined that there were certain things that should be further investigated. Practically all of these pointed to whitewashing the administration while blaming those in authority at Pearl Harbor. They also sought to negate the well-substantiated testimony that a Winds Execute message had been received.

Testimony taken revealed, among many other things, that Admiral Stark had called the White House before nine o'clock (Washington time) Sunday morning, December 7, when he had in his possession the message indicating that diplomatic relations 44O PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE would probably be broken by Japan at 1:00 P.M. (Washington time). Captain Kramer, who had previously testified that he had received the Winds Execute message, went over his thinking and stated: I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message was the one we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.68 Admiral Hewitt asked Kramer if this message was in "a collection of intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor" that Kramer had assembled and discussed with Mr. Forrestal "during the latter part of December 1941 ,"69 Kramer could not recall, but this indicated the early interest the administration had in gathering all such messages.

Kramer gave this testimony on May 22, 1945. The group went on to other testimony, but it was still not satisfied with Kramer's testimony. He was called back again toward the end of this investigation, on July 6, 1945, at which time he stated that he had "a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a 'winds' message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special setup that he had for that type of message/'70 Mr. Sonnett did the questioning on this second occasion and tried to get Kramer to say there was "no translator on duty in the Navy Department during such times as you could not be present/'71 Kramer answered that there was, in effect, a translator on duty in the Navy Department as he had indicated. It is interesting to note the quibble about the absence of certain minor personnel when the top command, knowing an important THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 441 message was coming in, was nowhere in evidence that week end.

The Hewitt investigators ignored previous testimony from admirals who knew that the Winds Execute message was in and contented themselves with sending for underlings who could say they hadn't seen it. Instead of calling Admiral Noyes, Admiral Hewitt stated for the record: There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received. Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record.72 Earlier evidence clearly indicated that the message disappeared after it reached Admiral Noyes. Noyes could not discuss it on the phone the day it was received because he had to hurry to Admiral Stark's office, presumably with this message. The previous failures of Admiral Noyes to recall, and his refusal to identify, any prePearl Harbor documents without his initials was considered sufficient, and he was not questioned; whereas Kramer, who remembered it clearly, was called twice in attempts to "refresh" his memory.

So, those whose testimony was satisfactory to the administration were not called back, while those whose testimony was unsatisfactory were twice grilled in an attempt to shake them. Admiral Hewitt made 101 findings. His first one was that: "The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan."73 The second one was that: 442 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE "The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet. . . ."74 This verified the fact that our war plans were based on a secret joint agreement with foreign powers and that the socalled "warning" message to Admiral Kimmel to prepare to carry out the Navy War Plan was, in fact, an order to prepare for offensive rather than defensive operations. Admiral Hewitt did find that Admiral Stark failed to transmit to Kimmel, on December 7, the "highly significant information [received] several hours before the attack" although he could have reached him immediately with a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army.75 Hewitt also found that three officers, who had previously been said to have seen and read the Winds message, testified that they had never seen such a message.

His eighty-third finding was that: "The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere."76 The ninety-eighth finding was to the effect that on December 7, 1941, the battleships were in Pearl Harbor "as a result of adherence to Fleet schedules."77 Admiral Hewitt came to twenty-nine conclusions, including: No message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States. . . . The Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him (Kimmel) important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. . . . Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious. . . .

Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack.78 THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 443 His final conclusion was that "Unity of Command" should be established. The Secretary of the Navy then found that both Admirals Kimmel and Stark "failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties/' Orders were also issued that these gentlemen should never hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of "superior judgment."79 And so, the blame for Pearl Harbor continued to lie in part on Admiral Kimmel, and the blame for all the Navy laxities in Washington was placed on Admiral Stark—although there is good reason to believe that his actions, or lack of actions, were undoubtedly the result of orders from above.

XL THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION Congress was still not satisfied with the information which had been made public. Much of it was confusing. The reports of top administration officials were in conflict with those of the APHB and the NCI. Rumors of various sorts became widespread. Finally, after V-J Day, John T. Flynn published his revealing pamphlet, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. It disclosed for the first time that our Washington officials had read all the diplomatic messages going in and out of Tokyo for months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, and that—for them—the attack was no surprise at all. Senator Ferguson introduced a resolution in the Senate providing for a full investigation, while Representative Forest Harness introduced another in the House. The House Naval Affairs Committee backed an investigation and the administration was finally forced to come forth with its own resolution. This was presented by Senator, later VicePresident, Alben Barkley. A Joint Congressional 444 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Committee was appointed, composed of five Senators and five Representatives, three of each being Democrats and two Republicans. This gave the administration under investigation a majority vote of six to four.

The majority members picked for committee counsel a nominal Republican, William D. Mitchell, who had served with Secretary Stimson in the Hoover cabinet. He was a gentleman of the old school who believed that all officers of the United States Army and Navy were gentlemen who never lied. His sympathies were definitely with the administration as he could not, apparently, conceive that anyone could commit such crimes of concealment as were evident to the more discerning. For chief assistant counsel, the majority selected Gerhard A. Gesell, a young retired New Dealer who was then a $35,oooa-year partner in Dean Acheson's law firm. Acheson, himself, was then Under Secretary of State and, as such, censored all information supplied by the State Department. The Navy liaison was Lieutenant Baecher, who had helped pilot the Hewitt attempts to discount the NCI findings. The minority was not officially allowed any assistance (but the author of this review was employed by Senator Brewster, personally, to assist him as the ranking Republican Senator and the other minority members in their efforts to ferret out the facts).

The first difficulty the committee faced was the fact that, before it was appointed, President Truman had issued an order ... to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of— Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States Government.80 It was obvious to all that such an order would effectively prevent any real investigation. So, President Truman was persuaded to modify it on October 23, 1945, to permit public testimony on the subject before the entire committee. This still prohibited Army and Navy officers from talking with the committee members inTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 445 dividually and furnishing any possible leads. It also gave the War and Navy Departments power to determine what they would release or keep secret. A majority vote of the committee could likewise foreclose any testimony it did not care to hear.

The President was requested to modify his order further. He then permitted employees of the government to volunteer information to the "committee or its counsel, to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry." This still did not satisfy the minority, and the President was forced to amend the order still further to permit prospective witnesses "to disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee" any information they had. He qualified this, however, by adding: "This does not include any files or written material/'81 Individual committee members were thereby stopped from receiving any files or written information from any employee or ex-employee of the Federal government. The full committee determined by majority vote what was or was not material to the investigation without members of the committee ever seeing rejected material. So the stage was carefully set for whitewashing.

On November 1, 1945, the members of the committee were handed a tentative order of proof covering committee procedure. This provided for a Navy and an Army officer to present a story of the actual attack, summarizing all available data, and then for the committee to hear about forty-eight witnesses whose names had been selected by Counsel Mitchell. It was his expectation that all testimony could be taken in a month of open hearings and, allowing two weeks for writing the report, the entire matter would be closed by the end of the year. A committee staff, friendly to the administration, decided what papers and evidence were to be presented before the committee. Minority members were not satisfied with this situation and asked for a great deal of material which they desired to analyze for their own use. As there were only one or two typed copies available of the previous investigations and the committee staff generally required one of them, this presented serious difficulties. Another one thousand pages of unindexed exhibits were also furnished com446 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE mittee members in the forty-eight hours preceding the opening day. Minority members sought postponement of the hearings so they could first digest this vital background material. The majority would not permit a delay, and so the hearings opened on schedule, November 15, although no one was adequately prepared.

The tactic of constantly deluging committee members with more material than they could possibly read was continued throughout the investigation. The exhibits alone, when finally printed eleven months later, totaled thirty-four volumes, several of which ran well over eight hundred pages. Other material placed in the record without exhibit numbers and occasionally without even enough copies to go around ran the total number of volumes up to forty-five. To this day, many important facts have never been adequately presented to the public and remain buried in the ten-million-word record. Exhibit No. 1 contained 253 pages of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages sent during the period from July 1,1941, to December 7, 1941—all selected by a member of the committee staff. Senator Brewster immediately requested in writing that he be provided with all of the intercepts instead of the staff-selected ones and that he be permitted to see those going back to January 1, 1941. No attention was paid to this request and no committee member was ever permitted to look at the complete file. It seemed evident that some vital messages were missing.

Senator Brewster also tried to get a copy of former Ambassador Grew's diary on which his book, Ten Years in Japan, had been based. The counsel wrote Mr. Grew and received in reply a letter saying: As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private work headed "Daily Personal Notes" containing my own personal records and prepared for my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day developments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketchbook in which the main lines of my eventual official reports to the Secretary of State were traced, and it contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 447 down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, corrected or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only the official reports should therefore govern. Private matters of interest only to my family and myself, are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore frank comments on individuals, comments which can only be regarded as of a strictly personal and private character and which I am honor bound not to reveal.

It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book, "Ten Years in Japan." To make assurance doubly sure, however, I have carefully examined these daily personal notes covering the months immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment or material, other than that already published, which would, in my opinion, be helpful to any phase of the Committee's investigation, it is my belief that all of the main facts on this subject, so far as my own observations and reports from Tokyo are concerned, have been published in the four volumes mentioned.82 And so, on the opinion of this gentleman, himself, the committee was prevented from finding out what his true thoughts were concerning the development of our diplomatic relations with Japan before the attack. Minority members had been informed by Grew's assistant, Eugene H. Dooman, that the ambassador had vigorously opposed the policies of Secretary Hull which led to the breach in relations and the attack.

The first Navy Department witness, Admiral Inglis, in charge of Naval Intelligence, told the committee he thought that Congress and the American people were largely to blame for Pearl Harbor. This bias colored his presentation, although the facts were that Congress, the representatives of the people, had always given the Army and the Navy more funds than the administration had requested in the years preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. It was the administration, and not the people or the Congress, who had the facts.

448 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Early in the investigation two Democratic members of the committee tried to intimidate persons suggesting leads to members of the committee by asking that the committee be publicly furnished with the name of any individual who furnished any committee member any leads or information. Upon insistence of the minority that they would keep their sources confidential, the Chair ruled that it had "no desire to regulate the attitude of any member on that subject/'83 The desire of the minority committee members to get facts not proffered by the witnesses or the questioning of the committee counsel upset the carefully planned schedule of the majority. And so new tactics were evolved. President Truman ordered General Marshall to the Far East to assist in the program that ultimately led to the communization of China. The committee counsel then decided to call Marshall out of sequence so that he could be hurried out of the country. But, before presenting Marshall, the counsel called General Gerow, the 1941 Chief of War Plans, and had him assume responsibilities which had belonged solely to Marshall. This also reduced the time available for Marshall's testimony, inasmuch as Truman wanted to get him off to China that week.

Marshall had been involved in almost every step leading to the Pearl Harbor attack from the ordering of the fleet to Hawaii up to the very moment it was struck. He was responsible for its protection while in Pearl Harbor and for providing the fleet with the materiel needed for its defense. He was also consulted on most diplomatic maneuvers and received copies of all Japanese messages. In addition he was in charge of many of our prewar conversations and agreements with the British and Dutch and could have vetoed the sending to foreign powers of materiel needed at Pearl Harbor. He was also responsible for asking Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the 1944 Republican presidential candidate, not to mention facts relating to Pearl Harbor which were damaging to President Roosevelt, then running for his fourth term. General Marshall's appearance was very dramatic. An atmosphere of urgency for speed was created. He first appeared on Thursday morning, December 6. The committee counsel and majority memTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 449 bers questioned him through Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning minority members were permitted to question him. Senator Brewster was absent because of the sudden death of his father.

Representative Gearhart questioned the General for a short time. Then Senator Ferguson began. In the meantime the committee chairman, Senator Barkley, stated on the record that he had hoped to conclude with the General that day. Marshall had told the vice-chairman, Representative Cooper, that "his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China."84 It later developed that Marshall had not even seen the President for instructions since accepting his appointment over the telephone. Senator Ferguson questioned him all through Saturday and the following Monday and Tuesday, and still further during the second round of questioning on Thursday. There was an attempt made to deride and discredit Ferguson's pointed questioning. Some majority members claimed the questions were not pertinent. Senator Lucas spent the week end with the President. Following this, Marshall was ordered to the White House. Lucas took this opportunity to launch an attack on the author of this chapter for his assistance to the minority members.

Despite all these attempts to head him off, Senator Ferguson was hitting home. On his first day alone, he forced Marshall to admit, among other things, the following damaging facts: 1. That General Gerow was in charge of war plans. He had no authority over General Short. In fact, Gerow had nothing to do with operations until we were actually engaged in war; 2. That under Army Regulations, Gerow had no responsibility for sending or not sending a proper alert to Short; 3. That Marshall, as Chief of Staff, was the only Army officer with authority over Short and, therefore, Marshall was the only person responsible for not properly alerting Short; 4. That there was no responsible Army officer on duty Saturday evening, December 6, or Sunday morning, De450 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE cember 7, who could take action before Marshall's belated arrival at 11:20 Sunday morning and, therefore, it could not be said that Washington was on a full alert, even though they knew the situation was critical; 5. That Marshall had appointed as head of Army Intelligence a man he knew was short of the required qualifications; 6. That although the head of Army Intelligence "should have had access to all intelligence" he did not have such access and, therefore, his confidential bulletins were not the best information available; 7. That lack of manpower in deciphering Japanese codes was not due to lack of Congressional appropriations; 8. That Marshall knew Great Britain was informed of what we read in the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor, and that "we have been trying to keep that quiet as much as we could"; 9. That Marshall knew no reason why Admiral Kimmel had been cut off from the group receiving information obtained from reading Japanese codes; 10. That Marshall denied knowledge that the Japanese once knew we were reading their codes. (A later witness revealed that Washington had such knowledge and this message was circulated to Marshall in the regular distribution of other intercepts.) 11. That before the Roberts Report "was made public there were certain things withdrawn and the complete Roberts Report went to the President before portions were withdrawn."

12. That the United States initiated the AngloDutch-American Agreements; 13. That Marshall had approved these agreements, as had the Secretaries of War and Navy, and that the agreements went into general effect before the attack; 14. That officers of the United States were furnished to China for combat duty against Japan before December 7, 1941.85 THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 451 All this and more was brought out solely by Senator Ferguson's questioning after the committee counsel and the majority members of the committee were fully satisfied that they had placed in the record all of the significant information that Marshall could furnish. If the record had been closed before Senator Ferguson's questioning, Gerow would have been left the Washington scapegoat, responsible for the failure to alert Short properly, whereas Marshall and Stimson bore this responsibility. The fact that Senator Ferguson was dominating the investigation, and bringing forth so much vital material that the general counsel had not covered, angered the general counsel.

The general counsel was further infuriated when, on December 18, Senator Brewster asked Admiral Wilkinson: Did you have any reason to suspect, during the period between October and December 7, 1941, when you were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs suspected that we were breaking any of their codes? ADMIRAL WILKINSON: Yes. I do not know specifically in that period, but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October, I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indications that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes. SENATOR BREWSTER: Have you located the messages which contained these references to the German warning? ADMIRAL WILKINSON: I think I can find one, sir. SENATOR BREWSTER: I would like to ask counsel whether they have located those.

MR. GESELL: NO; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to. SENATOR BREWSTER: What steps have you taken? SENATOR FERGUSON: Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. GeselFs memory? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my letter states definitely that there were no 452 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE such codes—I mean no such messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell? MR. GESELL: NO; I do not. SENATOR BREWSTER: Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was all to the contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell? MR. MITCHELL: Yes. That is based on a report from the Department of whom we made inquiry.86 The next day Mr. Mitchell opened the hearing by saying: Yesterday, I made the mistake, without checking up on the fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy in not producing what we asked for.

I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find I never did ask for that material, and that this answer that I made was based on my own impression of what they were asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I might be forgiven for that. THE VICE CHAIRMAN: I am sure we all recognize that. MR. MITCHELL: At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quite sure referred to what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor. . . . SENATOR FERGUSON: That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that. MR. MITCHELL: There is no misunderstanding about that. At that time, this was in the singular, and I was thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I wrote THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 453 and told him I did not know of any evidence of that kind.

I should have asked the Departments for it, but I am glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it. . . .87 A number of intercepted messages were then placed in the record revealing that the Japanese had been warned by Berlin that we were reading their codes in early 1941. Marshall and several other top officers had previously testified to the contrary. This apparently was close to the last straw for the general counsel. He was a pitiful sight. Mrs. Mitchell approached Mrs. Brewster on the side asking if the minority senators might be a little easier on him because of his health. It was quite apparent that it was a shock to him that Army officers had testified that these messages had not existed, whereas they did. He resigned a short while later, as did his assistant counsel. The new general counsel was Seth Richardson, who more recently served the administration as chairman of the Loyalty Review Board and also as chairman of the Subversive Activities Control Board. The new associate general counsel, replacing Mr.

Gesell, was none other than Samuel H. Kaufman, who was later rewarded with a Federal judgeship. He presided at the spectacular first trial of Alger Hiss. Before leaving, Mr. Mitchell prepared a "Revised Order of Proof and List of Witnesses, and Explanatory Memoranda" for the use of the new counsel and committee members. This document, prepared prior to Kimmel's testimony, contained a section critical of him. Another section dealt with the White House papers of President Roosevelt. Mr. Mitchell had: . . . requested Miss Tully to extract from the files for the year 1941 all papers relating to Japan, the imminence of war in the Pacific, or general Far Eastern developments. . . . Counsel has not had nor requested physical access to the files, but has relied upon Miss Tully's extraction of documents coming under the broad headings noted above . . . not all of the Roosevelt files have been read, but, of course, those 454 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE considered likely to contain material relevant to the inquiry have been read.88 Another long section was devoted to his (Mitchell's) belief that the Winds Execute message was never received. All in all, it was a judgment of the evidence before it was all in.

For a while things ran a little more smoothly. During the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Brewster brought out the fact that the committee had only been told of the defensive duties ("f," "g," and "h") of the Pacific Fleet and subsequently he obtained the omitted offensive tasks specified in WPL-46: a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers89 in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area. d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 1550 East. e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

SENATOR BREWSTER: NOW, those are rather large orders, are they not? ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Yes, sir; and in that connection I might say that prior to the commencement of these hearings we found out what they were submitting to counsel and my counsel went to Mr. Mitchell and pointed out to him that these defensive measures divorced from the others did not give a true picture of my responsibilities, of the problems that faced me; that it was necessary to have these additional things THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 455 brought to the attention of the committee. After that and when it was distributed to the committee my counsel again went to Mr. Gesell and informed him that we felt this was not a full presentation of the picture which was necessary to be drawn if they were to find out what my responsibilities were in the premises, and beyond that we went no further. SENATOR BREWSTER: DO you know what reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you regarding that matter?

ADMIRAL KIMMEL: What, sir? SENATOR BREWSTER: What reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you, regarding that request? ADMIRAL KIMMEL: I do not know as he made any reply, but he did not do anything about it. MR. MURPHY: Will the Senator yield? SENATOR BREWSTER: Well, I am quite interested because I raised this very question early in the hearing as it impressed me that we would be utterly unable to form a balanced judgment on whether or not you had made a wise decision unless we knew what your responsibilities were and if your primary responsibilities were to carry out aggressive warfare all over the Pacific Ocean, out as far as the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and all that, I assume that must be taken into account. I was unable to secure recognition of that by the counsel at the time and I am very much interested to know that you apparently had presented a similar and what seems to me a well-warranted request and I think that it will be in order to find out, if possible, why it was that this information was not made available to us initially by whoever was responsible.

MR. MURPHY: Will the Senator yield? SENATOR BREWSTER: Yes. ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Well, I don't know anything about it. SENATOR BREWSTER: NO; I know you do not. MR. MURPHY: Mr. Mitchell made a statement to the committee that the reason it was not was he thought the committee was primarily concerned with defense obligations made 456 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE as to Pearl Harbor. Then he was pressed by the committee and he and Mr. Gesell then made available to the committee the complete war plans of the Pacific and the complete plans covering the entire situation and we have that. SENATOR FERGUSON: Were you through? MR. MURPHY: Yes. SENATOR FERGUSON: Then do I understand counsel had this entire matter before them and only furnished us this deleted version, or did they have to go back to the Navy and get the entire matter? And I would like to know whether they requested the entire record at first.

MR. MURPHY: I am sure I cannot answer that. I can only say that Mr. Mitchell said at first all they wanted to present was the defense of Hawaii.90 Although this voluminous WPL-46 had been shown to the committee, only one copy was available. It was a bulky thing that no one had time to read and the former counsel had kept it out of the record. The new counsel let it go in. It contained the first public inkling of what Admiral Kimmel had been ordered to do in the socalled "war warning" message, first mentioned in the Roberts Report. Unfortunately, no copies were given or shown to the press until the entire proceedings were printed many months later. The high light of the hearings was probably the testimony of Commander Lester R. Schulz. He had never appeared in any of the previous investigations and was not scheduled to appear at this one. His appearance resulted from Senator Ferguson's request for the names of all those who were on duty at the War, Navy, and State Departments, as well as the White House, during the important days preceding the attack. Many of the records were lost, but one was located by the sheer persistence of the Senator, showing that Commander Schulz, then a Navy lieutenant, was on duty during the late afternoon and evening of December 6, 1941. This witness was flown in from somewhere in the Pacific and came directly into the committee room before the Navy liaison man, Baecher, had time to talk with him or suggest anything in the way of testimony.

Schulz testified that he gave a locked pouch to President RooseTHE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 457 velt at 9:00 P.M. on December 6. The President opened the pouch and read the message. Then, in Schulz's presence, he turned toward Harry Hopkins and said, in substance, "This means war/' Mr. Hopkins agreed and expressed his opinion, according to Schulz, that: ... it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record." The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.91 He also revealed that the President tried to get in touch with Admiral Stark at his home. When told Stark was at the theater, the President decided not to risk alarming the public by calling him out of his box, and so the President let the matter rest.

Such valuable information was obtained only as a result of the minority's perseverance and in the face of the majority's efforts to direct testimony along other lines. Schulz was such a clean-cut youngster that no one dared to challenge his word. It was accepted without question by the stunned and silent majority. Another glum period for the majority came during the appearance of Colonel Bratton, who had been persuaded by Colonel Clausen to change his earlier testimony. MR. KAUFMAN: And do we have it now that no delivery was made to any of those persons other than to the Secretary of State and excepting General Miles who had already seen it at Admiral Wilkinson's house? COLONEL BRATTON: This is the point at which my memory begins to go bad on me. I cannot state positively whether there was any delivery made that night or not at this time. I testified before the Grunert Board (APHB) that I had made delivery to the Secretary of the General Staff, to the night duty officer, or to General Gerow and to General Miles.

458 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE That was my normal procedure. I tried to make simultaneous delivery to all of these people. Since making that statement before the Grunert Board— I withdraw that statement. At the time when I made the statement to the Grunert Board I had not remembered, or I did not remember, that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. Now, since making this statement to the Grunert Board I have been shown a number of affidavits by various officers, General Smith, Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, General Gerow, and others, to the effect that they did not receive the 13 parts of this message from me or from anybody else Saturday night. Now, I know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty and integrity of any one of them, and if they say that I did not deliver these pouches to them that night, then my memory must have been at fault.92 Apparently not wanting to contradict his superiors—those who should have acted before the attack—he was persuaded to alter his original testimony, based on notes made at the time, and to say that his once-clear memory was at fault.

As time wore on it became evident that a thorough investigation was not to be permitted. Secretary Hull's statement was read to the committee and he appeared a few times for one hour at a time for questioning by Mr. Mitchell and by five majority members. When Marshall was brought in out of sequence, Hull was shunted aside so that no member of the minority was ever able to cross-examine the man who was officially responsible for the disastrous negotiations leading to the attack. The minority was permitted to submit some written questions to Hull, but the answers were largely evasive and there was no chance to cross-examine him. Among the other key witnesses who were never brought before the committee were the State Department's Far East advisors, Stanley Hornbeck and Maxwell Hamilton. Stanley Hornbeck had been suddenly sent to Europe as ambassador to Holland. He is the gentleman who, Admiral Richardson testified, had more to say about THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 459 the Pacific Fleet than the Navy itself. He was apparently very confident that Japan would be a pushover and took a very aggressive stand in the negotiations.

Another State Department witness never called was Ambassador Grew's former assistant, Eugene Dooman. Dooman had indicated privately that Hull had threatened Ambassador Grew on his return to this country if Grew did not immediately destroy all copies of certain papers. Secretary Stimson had a heart attack the day it was announced that he would be summoned as a witness. He did not recover until after the hearings had been closed. Written questions were submitted to him and he answered only those he chose. He submitted part of his diary, largely those parts which had previously been revealed in the APHB proceedings made available to this committee. He claimed that all other sections of his diary would reveal nothing further about Pearl Harbor. These brief quotes indicate that, during the last week in November, President Roosevelt had told the cabinet we could expect an attack as early as the following Monday. A November 25, 1941, entry, discussing a White House meeting, stated: 'The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."93 The hearings ended when the majority shut off all further investigation and testimony over the objections of the minority. No opportunity was granted to obtain testimony from almost two score of important witnesses including Bedell Smith, James Forrestal, top Far East State Department officials, and the Judge Advocates of the Army and Navy who had instigated the Clausen and Hewitt "investigations." Smith, as Marshall's top secretary, was especially vital as it was his duty to see that the key messages of late December 6, and early December 7, were delivered to the General promptly. Another important witness would have been the orderly assigned to General Marshall on the evening of December 6. He could certainly have told the committee whether or not Marshall was at home up to ten o'clock when the orderly normally went off duty.

The committee had no opportunity to question the code experts 460 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE as to the truth of Marshall's statement to Dewey that the Japanese were using the same codes in 1944 as in 1941. Several witnesses had indicated that this was not so. It was a rather technical subject but experts should have been examined to determine if Marshall had been attempting to keep this issue from embarrassing his chief during the 1944 presidential campaign. Time was not allowed to go into many situations thoroughly, particularly the attempts of many in this country and Japan to obtain a peaceful settlement of our differences. The information on the record seems to indicate that those in high power in this country rejected all peaceful solutions and refused to co-operate with peace groups in Japan. The failure of these peace groups to obtain a hearing put the Japanese war party in power and made "Pearl Harbor" inevitable.

The new counsel, Seth Richardson, began to worry about the report shortly after coming on the job the second week in January. On February 21, 1946, he submitted a confidential memorandum to the members of the committee which indicated quite clearly that he still lacked an understanding of the case. He expressed his opinion on a number of issues. He felt that the duty of the Pacific Fleet was "purely defensive." He also agreed that "the President was supported by a majority of his military advisors" in sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor. The facts were the very opposite. Every top Navy man testifying on the subject indicated that the fleet should not have been stationed there. Richardson compared the Philippines with Hawaii, ignoring the fact that the Philippines had "Magic" while Hawaii did not. Perhaps the clearest indication of his confusion was his statement that: "The insistence of General Short that he was entitled to assume approval at Washington of his sabotage alert report seems unconvincing to me." Later in the memorandum Richardson stated that: "General Marshall and General Gerow admitted, specifically, responsibility for neglecting a proper consideration of this report."

After the hearings were closed, four memoranda were prepared and distributed to every member of the committee. One, dwelling on the diplomatic phase, was prepared by John Masten, an assistant counsel for the committee. It was wholly an administration THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 461 interpretation of the material which the administration had permitted the committee to see. This memorandum was printed later as part of the Majority Report.94 It indicated that the majority had been successful in keeping many important parts from the public. The memorandum by the general counsel, Seth Richardson, indicated he had learned some things between February, when his first statement appeared, and June. He placed some blame on Washington for sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor without adequate protection and priority on materiel. He found that the warning messages were primarily intended for Admiral Hart in the Philippines and not Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, and that the Navy at Washington should have required more comprehensive reports from Kimmel as to his action, since they had known for weeks that Pearl Harbor was being mapped and plotted by Japanese agents.

He also assumed that Washington should have acted more promptly in connection with the last-minute messages inasmuch as their importance was confirmed by Commander Schulz's testimony that President Roosevelt thought they meant war. He also blamed the White House obliquely for not insisting on unity of command at Hawaii. On the whole, his recommendations were of the middleof-the-road type. A third memorandum was prepared by the associate general counsel, Samuel H. Kaufman, who had acted as the administration's agent and who later revealed his pro-administration sympathies more flagrantly during the first Hiss trial. In his opinion the messages to Hawaii "adequately and fully reflected the information in Washington." He ignored the Schulz testimony concerning Roosevelt, stating that only Marshall thought the last-minute messages were important and, therefore, there was some excuse for the others not to consider them important. He also thought that Admiral Kimmel had been instructed to take defensive measures. Mr.

Kaufman was very kind to Secretary Hull. He implied, as did the Roberts Report, that Admiral Kimmel had received a December 6 message announcing the destruction of some Japanese code machines, although this message did not arrive until after the attack. He found the Hawaiian commanders "derelict," but did not accept the administration viewpoint that General Gerow was partly to 462 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE blame for not sending a further message to General Short after receipt of Short's sabotage alert message. He agreed with the general counsel that "the failure to reach a timely decision was due to the inability of the two services to agree upon a basis for unified command and the failure of superior authority to impose it." The only superior authority was Franklin D. Roosevelt. The most important memorandum was that prepared by one Edward P. Morgan. It was 308 pages long and was done in the best Morgan manner. He is now better known as the author of the more recent Tydings Committee whitewash of the State Department.

The Morgan Pearl Harbor Report represented the administration's point of view and, after important modifications, became the final Majority Report. It was too biased for even the majority to swallow in toto. Mr. Morgan's boastful and protracted brazenness is well revealed in the quotation from his answer to Senator Schoeppel, printed at the beginning of this chapter. The major changes made in the original Morgan Report follow: Where the Morgan Report had stated: "Indeed, had the keen awareness of Japanese deceit and bestiality voiced by the Secretary of State characterized thinking elsewhere, the disaster of Pearl Harbor as we know it might never have occurred," the Majority Report read: "The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan."95 Where Morgan had suggested: "The disaster was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and materiel losses, of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese," the Majority Report removed the two words, "in Hawaii."96 Mr. Morgan had suggested: "The attack came as an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic surprise to the commanders in Hawaii. Yet they were fully conscious of the danger from air attack."

Here the Majority Report says: "Officers, both in Washington and Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack."

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 463 Mr. Morgan did place some responsibility on the War Plans Division of the War Department in Washington for failure to discharge its responsibility. The Majority Report made this a "direct responsibility."97 Mr. Morgan found that Army and Navy officials in Washington thought that those in Hawaii had been "adequately and properly alerted on the basis of the November 27 warnings. This belief was justified." The Majority Report found that "The Intelligence and War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments failed" in this respect.98 This addition was obtained by the minority House committee members, as well as the final conclusion of the Majority Report that: "Under all of the evidence the War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war/'99 Neither Mr. Morgan nor the Majority Report mentioned the responsibilities of the State Department.

When the committee came to consider the report, Senator Ferguson was ignored completely because, as Senator Lucas said, Ferguson would not agree with anything the majority wrote and would write his own report anyway. For these reasons, minority Senators Brewster and Ferguson did not attend all closed sessions dealing with the Majority Report. Minority Representatives Gearhart and Keefe caused considerable consternation by signing the Majority Report. They felt they had improved the Majority Report by obtaining certain changes in, and additions to, the Morgan Report. It is undoubtedly true that the Majority made extensive concessions in return for these two signatures, but the unfortunate result was to give the whitewash a more or less respectable veneer. There was some gain for the cause of truth in that, if the majority had not sought to lure Gearhart and Keefe, they might have submitted the far more misleading Morgan Report as the official Majority Report.

Representative Gearhart had always been a thorn in the administration's side. He represented the Ninth California District—a district with more registered Democrats than Republicans. Under California's peculiar election system, candidates for political office 464 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE enter the primaries of both major parties. Gearhart, a Republican, had replaced a Democrat in 19347 when he won both the Democratic and Republican nominations. He held them both through 1944. During the early Pearl Harbor hearings he had been a vigilant searcher for the truth. The administration, knowing he represented a strong anti-Japanese West Coast district, tried to embarrass him by charging, flippantly, that he wore a kimono. On March 23, 1946, the House majority leader, Representative John W. McCormack, accused Gearhart and the Republican Senators of being "willing to prove the Japs innocent of the sneak attack if they could prove President Roosevelt guilty."100 These attacks had their effect, and in June (1946) Gearhart lost the Democratic primary. Thus intimidated by "pro-Jap" charges, Gearhart was scared into signing the July 20 Majority Report in order to save his seat in the November elections.

The case of Representative Keefe was different. He had asked many incisive questions and shown a keen interest in the proceedings. His questioning had dispelled the administration's charges that Congress was responsible for our unpreparedness. He produced the figures which showed that, in the eight years preceding Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had cut Army and Navy requests by $2,800,000,000, while Congress had restored $1,300,000,000 of the budget cut. He was relentless in his questioning of Marshall and other administration apologists. He was handicapped, however, by committee rules which permitted every other member prior opportunity to question each witness. Many of the questions he had worked up were exhausted by Senator Ferguson before Keefe's turn. Time after time, Keefe saw the Senator getting credit for uncovering many important points he, himself, had been prepared to reveal. Piqued by this fact, he was determined not to sign a report sponsored by the Senator. Two days before the Majority Report was issued, "he told the House he could not agree with the report as a whole, so he signed it Vith reservations/ The reservations, he added, will be listed in a separate statement filed with the report."101 His twenty-four-page "Additional Views" statement was an intelligent condemnation, not only of Marshall and the administration, but also of the way the Majority Report was slanted, THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 465 saying, "The committee report, I feel, does not with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as soft a light as possible on the Washington scene."102 Lest anyone is still inclined to believe that Keefe was in essential agreement with the Majority Report, it is well to cite the opinion of Charles Austin Beard in his President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (pp. 346-47): ... his [Keefe's] Additional Views constitute an arraignment of the Roosevelt Administration's management of affairs during the months before December 7, 1941, which is, in many ways, sharper in tone than the "Propositions" filed by the two Republican Senators, Mr. Ferguson and Mr.

Brewster. Indeed, in phrasing, Mr. Keefe's statement is even more like an indictment than the essentially historical Conclusions advanced by the minority. . . . The press ignored the content of Keefe's "Additional Views" and heralded his signature on the Majority Report. He was alarmed at this interpretation and asked that his "reservations" be printed as a minority report. The majority refused this request on the basis that it was too late. Senators Brewster and Ferguson found the Majority Report: . . . illogical, and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee . . . permission to search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual members even when accompanied by Committee counsel. Rightly or wrongly it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block the search for the truth. . . . When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes apparent that the record is far from complete.103 466 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE These two senators prepared and signed a minority report which was fully documented. Yet it was not nearly as strong as it might have been because they were overcautious lest they state something which could not be 100 per cent verified from the incomplete record.

XII. THE ADMINISTRATION PAID OFF Subsequent events have revealed that those who testified in the various hearings as to facts that were damaging to the administration and their superiors had few promotions. Those who maintained secrecy, failed to remember, or testified on behalf of the administration, rose very quickly to high places. General Marshall was made a permanent five-star general entitled to a lifetime fifteen-thousand-dollar-a-year pension, and was later moved up to the cabinet. Colonel W. Bedell Smith soon became a three-star general, succeeded General Eisenhower as commander in chief of the American Forces in Europe, and later was appointed our ambassador to Russia. Secretaries Hull and Stimson recovered their health soon after the hearings closed. The committee chairman, Alben Barkley, became our VicePresident. One majority committee member, Senator Lucas, became the Senate majority leader until he was retired by the Illinois voters in 1950.

Another majority member, John W. Murphy, and the associate general counsel, Samuel H. Kaufman, were appointed to lifetime Federal judgeships. On the other hand, virtually no one who tried to spread the alarm during the twenty-four hours preceding the attack, or later to reveal facts damaging to the administration, has ever been promoted or rewarded. While the administration has been anxious to keep certain facts from the public, it has done everything it could to have its own side publicized. Perhaps the worst example of this was the appointment THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 467 of Samuel Eliot Morison as the Navy historian. This "historian" from Harvard, President Roosevelt's alma mater, had all records made available to him, yet he tried to confuse the American public by absolute misstatements in his criticism of the late Dr. Beard, saying: Part II, "Unveiling Realities," affords Beard a marvelous opportunity, by quoting all manner of gossip, slander, Congressional snipings, and the like, to build up in the reader's mind an impression of frightful iniquity on the part of the Administration. For instance, David Lawrence is quoted on pages 289-90 as asking a number of rhetorical questions, such as: "Why were all our battleships in harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, instead of out at sea, and who in Washington gave the orders to keep them there?" But Beard never gives the answer: That they were there by Admiral Kimmel's order, in accordance with normal peacetime routine, after he had received the "war warning" message of November 27.104 As shown in this chapter, the fleet was there in accordance with Washington orders. The "war warning" message ordered Kimmel to prepare for the offensive movements shown in the war plans which were available to Dr. Morison, but which the administration tried to keep from the public. Dr. Morison would have us believe that Kimmel was disobeying wise Washington orders and following "normal peacetime routine," whereas, in fact, he was obeying orders, as Dr. Morison must have known.

History bought and paid for by politicians in power is seldom worth the paper on which it is imprinted. Unfortunately, Dr. Morison 's thirteen volumes will have to be discounted as biased, incomplete, and unreliable. The taxpayers' money has once more gone down the drain. A recent example of the whitewash technique was revealed in the book, The Road to Pearl Harbor, by Herbert Feis. This State Department employee took two years off from his administration duties to write his apologia at the Princeton Institute of Advanced 468 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE Study. Unlike the great historian, Charles Beard, he was permitted "full access to all pertinent records"105 of the State Department, all American official military records, the help of Miss Grace Tully in obtaining access to the collection of papers at the home of President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, "the full private diaries of Stimson, Morgenthau, and Grew; the file of the intercepted 'magic' cables; and equivalent collections of official and private Japanese records."106 For him, Colonel Carter Clarke "was good enough to assemble the whole of the file of intercepted Japanese messages known as magic."107 Despite this, his book fails to mention most of the damaging facts presented in this cursory review.

XIII. OFFICIAL ARMY HISTORY REVEALS PREWAR ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR PLANS An even later whitewash attempt is perhaps the most pitiful. This shameful effort to hide the administration's unconstitutional prewar agreements with Great Britain is contained in a 551-page volume of the official "History of the War Department" entitled Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, by Mark S. Watson (Washington, D.C., 1951). Pages 103 and 104 describe the preparation of Army and Navy Joint War Plans. In conclusion: This grand composite was the basic plan in readiness when war actually came in December 1941, the program having been continuously restudied and amplified in the light of coordination with British plans. On page 125, the author states: On 29 January 1941, with the British Staff on hand, there were initiated the two nations' Staff Conversations, ABC-i THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 469 and ABC-2, which lasted until 27 March, riveted Army and Navy firmly to Rainbow 5, and established an understanding of what British and American elements alike would regard as their respective missions in the event of war.

Then on pages 369 and 370, the reader is cautioned that: The discussion could not avoid some degree of joint planning of U.S.-British strategy, contingent though it would be by advance stipulation, and negative though it would be, for the same reason, in political commitment of the United States to any war agreement whatever. . . . The conferring Staff members were to be of high level, but not the highest in the case of either nation, and this supported the polite assurance that the conference decisions would not be actually binding upon anyone. Constitutionally of course they could not be. Emphasis is added to this caution on page 375: The conversations ended with a detailed report of agreement on basic policies, primary objectives, and the plans for attaining them—all on a contingent basis as scheduled. The agreements were "subject to confirmation by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom,"

and by "the Governments of the United States and . . . United Kingdom." The governmental confirmation, which could come only from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, was not given, either for the ABC report or for the later Joint Rainbow Plan 5 that was based upon the unconfirmed ABC compact. . . . The Staff Conversations served to put into written form the views which already were held and on which there was general agreement. . . . The plot gets more interesting on page 379: 47O PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE The responsibility for strategic direction of the Associated Powers' [see Footnote 89] naval forces in the Far East (except those which were retained by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet for Philippines defense) was without argument assigned to the British. This official document of the Army Department's Historical Division reports on page 384: As to the ABC-i agreement, its final approval at the Cabinet level came some weeks after the end of the conversations.

The report itself was signed only by the delegates, but upon the cover of a copy that was introduced in evidence at the Congressional Pearl Harbor Inquiry in 1946 is a penciled notation, itself unsigned and undated, reading: "Approved by Sec. Navy 28 May 1941. Approved by Sec. War 3 June 1941. Not approved by President." To that extent it was made clear by the Chief of State in the United States (and this was true of Great Britain as well) that the conversations were not those of the highest civil authority. The test specifically mentioned that agreements were subject to confirmation by the military chiefs (which was given) and also by the governments. These last confirmatory signatures were never affixed. The author, having explained to his own satisfaction that the agreements were not agreements, neglects to explain that all priorities and war plans were issued and carried out in accordance with these agreements, regardless of who did, or who did not, sign them. But as the pages pass, the truth rears its embarrassing head.

On page 394 it is stated: On 2 April 1941 . . . General Marshall sent to the commanding general of the Philippines Department, then Maj. Gen. George Grunert, a full copy of ABC-i plus five of its annexes. He informed General Grunert that he had not yet formally approved the report and that its provisions would not become directives until such approval was given.

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 471 This plainly states the "agreements" became directives upon Marshall's signature. An alarming admission is quoted on page 408, from a Joint Board memorandum of September 25, 1941: The major strategic concept, and the principal military operations set forth ... (in ABC-i) are still sound, and should form the general guide for the conduct of a war against the Axis Powers, in which the United States is associated with the British Commonwealth. The sentence following this quotation states: This "Final Action" of Army and Navy, signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, was dispatched to London on 25 September for transmission to the British Chiefs. On page 446, the Army Department quotes from an October 18, 1941, memorandum from Marshall for MacArthur, that one of "the enlarged Army missions now would be": (d) Co-operate with the Associated Powers in defense of the territories of these powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements.

Four pages later the author reports a conference of November 26, 1941, when General Gerow said the Japanese probably would not go into Siberia, but most likely into Thailand, raising a question of American action after the Japanese had passed the agreedupon limit of ioo°E-io°N. A glance at the map shows that passing this "agreedupon limit of ioo°E-io°N" would represent a Japanese by-pass of the Americanheld Philippines to attack either British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, or both. The author thus unconsciously admits the truth of 472 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE the statement that administration officials had agreed that the United States would go to the aid of the other "Associated Powers" in such an eventuality—that we would join Britain in war, even though there were no attack on American territory or ships. A further admission appears on page 476: After the Secretary of War had given formal approval (2 June 1941) to Rainbow War Plan 5, largely based upon the ABC agreements, the Army pushed ahead with its detailed implementation of that plan in all its commands.

It should be noted that the Joint War Plans stated that they were based on these agreements. The socalled "war warning" messages sent to MacArthur, Short, Hart, and Kimmel asked them to take action in accordance with these agreements. To maintain that these agreements were not in force is to make a farce of every major Army and Navy action in the last six months of 1941. The copy of the agreements actually signed by Messrs. Stimson, Knox, Marshall, Stark, et al., was never produced. Could it be that President Roosevelt approved it? That was Admiral Stark's opinion up to the day before he testified in 1946. His prepared statement read in part as follows: 21. . . .we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC i, dated March 27, 1941. 22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC-i, the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Planr known as Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, m4 fey the President."

In reading this aloud to the committee, Admiral Stark interpolated: "You will note that I have crossed out the words 'and by the President/ That is the only change made in this statement."108 Later the Admiral was interrogated on this point: THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 473 SENATOR FERGUSON: I want to know, when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion personally that that had been approved by the President? ADMIRAL STARK: I was. ... I took that out because I had no documentary proof of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it, although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also from the record. ... I told Kimmel and told Tommy—Admiral Hart—that I had read to the President my official letter of April 3 and that the President had approved it and knew I was sending it out.

Therefore, I think it is safe to say that the President certainly approved of it. He approved my sending it out, although he had not officially approved it.109 SENATOR FERGUSON: NOW, on April 4 you said this in your letter: "I spent over 3 hours with him (the President) day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as the result of that conference. I may tell you and Hart and King in the strictest confidence—and I mean by that nobody but you and Hart and King—that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it. ... I am also enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it covering the President's talk with Ghormley " ADMIRAL STARK: Yes; that is Vice Admiral Ghormley SENATOR FERGUSON: "—and me yesterday." Now, what was in that memorandum that was ordered to be burned?

ADMIRAL STARK: I do not specifically recall what was in that memorandum.110 Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, issued and approved all top Navy orders and directives in 1941. He did so with the understanding that Roosevelt had approved these agreements and that they were in full effect. The record seems to substantiate his statements, and not those of the "official" historian.

474 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE The record is full of references to missing papers, forgetful memories, and direct contradictions. Approvals are not approvals. Agreements are not agreements. If you search for the truth, be you great historian or chosen representative of the people in the Congress of the United States, the doors are locked against you. If you are friendly to the administration, you may see any papers you want. Such is the whitewash of those responsible for the death of our boys at Pearl Harbor, for our participation in World War II, and for the resulting world-wide chaotic conditions—conditions which seem to be leading us into World War III. Those who have participated in this great conspiracy against the American people undoubtedly believe that the end justifies the means. They probably all join the Editors of Life, who tell us in their Picture History of World War II that "In retrospect Pearl Harbor seemed clearly the best thing that could have happened to the U.S."111 POSTSCRIPT This chapter was prepared principally from original sources available to the Joint Congressional Committee at the time of the 1945-46 investigation. Later, in checking the documents furnished committee members with those finally published as a "complete"

record, an interesting discrepancy was noticed. It indicates quite clearly the extent to which the administration went to keep the public in the dark, particularly with reference to concealing that we were secretly at war while publicly at peace. The following transcript is given as it appeared in the original Clarke records. The words in brackets were omitted from the printed record made public. GEN. CLARKE: In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and so have you, to the socalled Japanese I THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 475 Purple system. Will you state approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved? MR. FRIEDMAN: TO the best of my recollection, the first complete translation was handed in some time in August [of 19^0], it might have been the early part of August or the middle part of August [1940]. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system [for approximately 20 months]. . . .

GEN. CLARKE: On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the British? MR. FRIEDMAN: I recall that very clearly. A joint U.S. Navy-U.S. Army cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went to London [in January 1941] for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time that the Army furnished a Purple machine and the technical data to the British.112 EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT Mr. Cabell Phillips' attempt to whitewash General Marshall for his delinquency in failing to alert General Short after he knew of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor has been dealt with at the close of the preceding chapter by Mr. Morgenstern. The situation is further illuminated by the following letter which the writer of this chapter sent to the New York Times. It hardly needs to be stated that the Times did not publish the letter.

January 22, 1952 The Editor New York Times Magazine 229 West 43rd Street New York City Dear Sir: On December 2nd you ran an article by Cabell Phillips, 'Ten Years Ago This Friday." This article, in accordance with your established policy, had the normal Pro-AdministraPERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE tion left-wing slant New York Times readers have come to accept as "All The News That's Fit To Print." When some of the errors were called to your attention you made the situation worse by printing a socalled correction along with a defensive reply by Mr. Phillips. Now, in the issue of January 20th, Phillips, in trying to meet his critics, has passed the bounds of even his prejudiced writings. I hope that you have sufficient respect for your readers to correct his amazing misstatements. First, let's dispose of your December 16th correction that Marshall was not among the conferees with President Roosevelt on the night of December 6, 1941. On the record, Marshall pleads he doesn't remember where he was that night.

Off the record, he has told at least one Senator that he could not say where he was because it might injure his superior. In the recent MacArthur hearings, Marshall told the world that he considered loyalty to his Chief superior to loyalty to his country. On the record, he was asked by the Pearl Harbor Congressional Committee's counsel: MR. MITCHELL: YOU are sure you were not at the White House that evening? GENERAL MARSHALL: NO, Sir; not at all. Technically, that would indicate he wasn't sure whether or not he was at the White House. His other official answers are just as evasive so it cannot be said definitely whether or not he was at the White House. As for Mr. Phillips' December 16th reply: "The Army had no direct telephone communication with Pearl Harbor—scrambler or otherwise—in December, 1941. Naval communications were not available to General Marshall on that Sunday." Of course, any phone in the United States could have been connected with Pearl Harbor.

In your January 20th issue, Phillips goes further in contradicting your correspondents. He states that there was no such device as a scrambler phone in existence in December, 1941. He also states that the existence of such an instrument "is THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 477 not conclusively shown by the printed testimony of the Pearl Harbor investigation." Then, referring solely to the whitewash, in the best Morgan manner (Morgan also wrote the Tydings Committee whitewash), he "found no reference in the report to an offer by Admiral Stark of the use of Navy communications facilities." He then says that it is not unreasonable to conjecture that "Marshall did not feel free to ask the use of Navy communications for a message to Army commanders exclusively"—previously he had admitted it was also "to inform the Naval officers." Now, let's look at the record. In Vol. 29, page 2313, we find: GENERAL FRANK: Was the telephone considered as a means?

GENERAL MARSHALL: NO, it was not considered, or it may have been considered but it would not have been used. I am quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first, because all our information at the moment was out at the other theater, out in the other thing. If I had thought I could put telephone calls through at those hours, which meant we had to get the fellow out of bed and do a number of things, and all the time-consuming element on the business, I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, because we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. Vol. 3, page 1109: GENERAL MARSHALL: The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happening.

Vol. 3, page 1432: MR. KEEFE: NOW, as a matter of fact, what sort of telephone service did you have to Hawaii at that time? GENERAL MARSHALL: We had no special lines, but I think 478 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE we had a scrambler. I know I had a scrambler on mine, and I think we had a scrambler on the phone. MR. KEEFE: Did you have to use the ordinary commercial telephone service? GENERAL MARSHALL: I think so, yes. MR. KEEFE: Put in a call and ask to get somebody out there? GENERAL MARSHALL: Well, as far as I recall, that was the situation at that particular time. MR. KEEFE: YOU got a call that morning from somebody out there, and they got you out there right when the bombs were dropping. GENERAL MARSHALL: I think I put in that call. MR. KEEFE: YOU may have put in the call later on that morning? GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, sir. MR. KEEFE: Whom did you call? GENERAL MARSHALL: I called General Short, and I got his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

MR. KEEFE: HOW long did it take you to get it? GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not recall. MR. KEEFE: YOU got it right when the raid was in progress? GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, when the bombs fell. Vol. 3, page 1212: GENERAL MARSHALL: My only recollection regarding the security aspect—and it is difficult for me to state this with any assurance that I am being accurate because I am confused in back sights—was we must be sufficiently secure to prevent some claim of overt act on our part, and, therefore, the telephone was ruled out. Now, I am not at all certain that that did rule out the telephone. That might have been an afterthought after the event; I do not know. On the following page he mentions that the scrambler then in vogue was not as elaborate as the later model which is now felt to be secret. Vol. 3, page 1214: THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 479 SENATOR FERGUSON: YOU had a scramble telephone to Hawaii and the Philippines at that time?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I don't know about the Philippines but I know we had it in to Hawaii. Now, as to the Navy's offer of its radio (Vol. 3, page 1431) : GENERAL MARSHALL: He (Stark) asked me if I wanted to use the Navy radio. I first spoke to him about sending the message. I do not think he spoke in that first telephone conversation about the Navy radio. I think it is probable that that came in the second message, the second conversation 10 minutes later. MR. KEEFE: At any event, in one of the conversations before the message was sent to your message center, you talked to Stark and he wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio. GENERAL MARSHALL: That is correct, sir. MR. KEEFE: And you did not accept it? GENERAL MARSHALL: I did not accept it. I have quoted Marshall because I presume you believe him, although Mr. Phillips could claim that Marshall's word is worthless because of his many misstatements during the investigation.

The sworn affidavit of General Miles, Vol. 35, page 101, states that he (Miles) was ordered to commit perjury by Marshall. Marshall admits this on page 104. If Phillips will not accept Marshall's statements, other testimony can be provided. The Navy Court of Inquiry found: "Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began." The endorsement by James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, said: "An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication."

PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE I hope that the New York Times has enough integrity left to print this communication. Very truly yours, (Signed) Percy L. Greaves, Jr. FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER 7 1. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (39 parts, with exhibits; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), Part V, p. 2338. (The Hearings will hereinafter be designated Pearl Harbor Attack.) 2. Ibid., Part V, p. 2 342. 3. Ibid., Part V, p. 2350. 4. Ibid., Part VII, p. 3260. 5. Adjutant General's file on General McNarney. 6. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 496. 7. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part VII, p. 3272. 8. Ibid., Part VII, p. 3276. 9. Ibid., Part VII, p. 3277. 10. Ibid., Part VII, pp. 3271-72. 11. Ibid., Part VII, pp. 3278-80. 12. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 21. 13. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 21.

14. Ibid., Part III, p. 1129. 15. Ibid., Part III, p. 1205. 16. Navy Court of Inquiry (NCI). 17. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part X, p. 4815. 18. Ibid., Part XXVI, p. 390. 19. Ibid., Part XXVI, p. 264. 20. Ibid., Part XXVI, p. 265. 21. Ibid., Part XXVI, pp. 284, 286. 22. Ibid., Part XXVI, p. 283. 23. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 29. 24. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 221. 25. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 230. 26. Ibid., Part XXXII, p. 5. 27. Ibid., Part XXXII, p. 7. 28. Ibid., Part XXXIX, pp. 307, 309.

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 481 29. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 308. 30. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 311. 31. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 316. 32. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 321. 33. Ibid., Part XXXIX, p. 321. 34. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 19. 35. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 21. 36. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 58. 37. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 63. 38. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 5. 39. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 7. 40. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 1. 41. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 2. (Italics and insert supplied.) 42. Ibid., Part XXXIV, pp. 92-93. 43. Ibid., Part XXXIV, pp. 91-92. 44. Ibid.f Part XXXIV, p. 1 o 1. 45. Ibid., Part XXXIV, p. 76. 46. Ibid., Part XXXIX, pp. 267-64. 47. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 4. 48. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 5. 49. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 5. 50. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 1. 51. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 6. 52. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 26. 53. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 91. 54. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 93. 55. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 93. 56. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 98.

57. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 101. 58. Ibid, Part XXXV, p. 116. 59. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 120. 60. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 120. 61. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 592. 62. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 14. 63. Ibid., Part V, p. 2342. 64. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 17. 65. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 18. 66. Ibid., Part XXXV, p. 19. 67. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 359. 68. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 81. 69. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 83. 70. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 340. 71. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 349. 72. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 93. 73. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 578. 74. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 578. 75. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 581. 76. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 586. 77. Ibid., Part XXXVI, p. 587.

482 PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 78. Ibid., Part XXXVI, pp. 575-76. 79. Ibid., Part XXXIX, pp. 382-83. 80. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, p. 285. 81. Ibid., p. 287. 82. Grew refers to his book and to three State Department voiiimes. 83. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part I, p. 229. 84. Ibid., Part III, p. 1234. 85. Ibid., Part III, pp. 1184-1229 incl. 86. Ibid., Part IV, p. 1815. 87. Ibid., Part IV, pp. 1859-60. 88. "Revised Order of Proof," by Mitchell, Sec. 3, p. 2. 89. "The term 'Associated Powers' means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power." Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XVIII, p. 2909. 90. Ibid., Part VI, pp. 2838-40. 91. Ibid., Part X, p. 4663. 92. Ibid., Part IX, p. 4515. 93. Ibid., Part XI, p. 5433. 94. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, pp. 291-465. 95. Ibid., p. 251. 96. Ibid., p. 251.

97. Ibid., p. 251. 98. Ibid., p. 252. 99. Ibid., p. 252. 100. Congressional Record, March 27, 1946, p. 2680. 101. New York Heiald Tribune, July 19, 1946. 102. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, p. 266-A. 103. Ibid., pp. 493, 497, and 499. 104. The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1948, p. 95. Morison has since been appointed to the rank of admiral. 105. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. vi. 106. Ibid., see on the jacket for the book. 107. Ibid., p. vii. 108. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part V, p. 2102. 109. For other testimony to the effect that the President had approved the Joint Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5—WPL-46—see Admiral Turner's testimony on pp. 421-22, above. 110. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part V, pp. 2391-92. 111. Life (periodical), Picture History of World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950), p. 86. 112. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part XXXIV, pp. 84-85.