1. Social Science and the Problem of Value

1 Social Science and the Problenl of Value w. H. WERKMEISTER The purpose of this paper is to consider social science and the problem of value within the over-all framework of "scientism and the study of man." By "scientism" I mean here a boundary transgression or a misuse of otherwise legitimate procedures and attitudes of science. To put the problem into clearer perspective, it may be well to consider briefly what is meant here by science and the "enter prise of science." To a large extent, of course, this is a matter of method. But that the material success and the prestige of modern natural science have aggravated the problem-if they have not actually created it-goes without saying. I t may be well for our purposes to distinguish two interrelated aims of science: description and explanation. By description is meant a simple enumerative account of the observable features and qualities of things and events, whereas explanation is an attempt to account for the facts and to show why they are what they are. Ultimately all scientific explanation involves some law or laws in terms of which the explanation is accomplished.

This enterprise of science, however, depends on and involves a number of discernible aspects, mostly of a methodological nature. Thus, the first step in any scientific enterprise must be 1 2 Scientism and Values the collection and description of facts, the precise statement of what is the case. Observation and measurement are here indispen sable. But it is at this level, too, that experimentation plays its part. The purposes for which experiments may be devised are mul tiple. They may be simply a part of the procedure of determining the case; but they may also be designed as tests for hypotheses or for the verification or disproof of laws. That experimentation implies its own set of assumptions of a logical and ontological nature may be remarked only in passing. Facts ascertained by observation and/or by experimentation become the basis for inductive generalizations and, ultimately, for the construction of explanatory hypotheses. Such hypotheses~ although they are essentially imaginative constructions of logical schema from which laws descriptive of the observed facts can be derived by logical transformations-must be logically possible (i.e., they must be self-consistent) and must have predictive significance. .

Now, the history of science is quite clear on one point: facts were discovered, isolated, and described in various fields of in vestigation; and explanatory hypotheses were developed corre spondingly. Thus, there was the field of classical mechanics and the field of electrodynamics, and there was also the quite separate field of chemistry. Each field was developed independently, and in each field explanatory hypotheses made possible the derivation of specific laws descriptive of the observed facts. That all the facts were, in essence, the results of measurements and were statable in purely quantitative terms was but a result of certain assumptions underlying the enterprise in all fields of investigation. But when facts were discovered which legitimately belonged to more than one field of investigation~to classical mechanics, for example, as well as to electrodynamics-it was found neces sary to construct a theory (Einstein's theory of relativity) whose definitions and postulates made possible the logical derivation of laws in both fields. And, similarly, new definitions and assump tions, entailing the law of quantum mechanical resonance, led to the integration of the whole realm of physics and the realm of Social Science and the Problem of Value 3 chemistry as well. There emerged, in other words, the ideal of an integrated and closed system of science encompassing all of physical existence. This actual achievement in the natural sciences of an all-encompassing integrative theory had its unmistakable effects in other areas of knowledge as well. The dream was, born that some day-and in the not too distant future,--the same methods and procedures so successfully applied in the natural sciences would, via the biological and behavioral "sciences,"

encompass the whole of reality and would make everything-man included-amenable to scientific interpretation and understand ing. From the point of view of the integration of all knowledge this was unquestionably an ideal worth striving for. This ideal of an integrated science, however, was keyed to two crucial assumptions. One of these assumptions, formulated by Galileo and actually employed in the natural sciences, was that only quantities or facts reducible to quantities could be admitted as real in science. The other-perhaps only a corollary of. the first-was that only material objects and their interactions could be regarded as legitimate objects of science. The ideal of an in tegrated universal science would therefore inevitably entail a naturalistic reductionism and the elimination of all value concepts from the realm of science. Values, however, are part and parcel of human existence-of an existence, that is, which is essentially purposive activity and a matter of manifold valuations. In view of the value-permeated character of human existence, a special problem arises for all who advocate a total unity and integration of science. It is this: Can man and his deliberate and purposive actions be subordinated to a value-free conception of reality, and can the human world be integrated with physical nature into an all-comprehensive scientific view of the world? To put it in still other terms: Can the reality of man, permeated with values as it is, be fully understood in terms of value-free concepts and theories? The problem would not arise, however, were it not for a number of influential persons in the field of the social sciences who ardently believe that it can be done and who work toward the realization of this goal. Still, the' problem of value looms 4 Scientism and Jlalues large in the human world and cannot be brushed aside easily.

If only the advocates of the reduction of social studies to the level of a natural science could get around the problem of values, they would have clear sailing. The problem of values, therefore, oc cupies a key position in this quest for an all-encompassing science. An examination of the learned journals in the various fields of the social sciences soon reveals, however, that it is not always clear just what is meant by "the problem of value," or whether any particular author regards it as one problem or as many. There is evidence, on the contrary, that different authors mean different things when, overtly or by implication, they are con cerned with values; that their perspectives differ; and that their aims are at variance. I submit that "the problem of value" occurs in the social sciences in at least three basic forms; that these three forms must be strictly separated if we are to solve "the" problem at all; and that each form, in its own way, is ultimately related to an all inclusive value theory, the broad outlines of which I hope to indicate in a moment. And I submit, more specifically, that in dealing with "the problem of value" in the present context we must speak of (a) the value of the social sciences, (b) values in the social sciences, and (c) values for the social sciences.

I (a) The question of the value of the social sciences constitutes no particular problem. Knowledge obtained in any field of inquiry is of value to us-including the knowledge obtained in the social sciences; and it is of value to us in a twofold sense. It is of value (i) because knowledge of any kind satisfies man's innate curiosity; and it is of value (ii) because knowledge and understanding are of crucial importance as the basis for rational decisions and rea sonable actions. As to (i), little need be said here. We must re.alize, however, that man's innate curiosity-his desire· to know-is the driving force behind much of our basic research. The personal satisfacSocialScienceand the Problem of Value 5 tions derived or derivable from the enterprise known as science are, for many of us, sufficient to ascribe value to a science. Let us not underestimate the significance of this side of our work.

As far as (ii) is concerned, the value of the social sciences. tran scends, of course, all merely subjective valuations. We have to deal here with the pragmatic and empirically demonstrable value of the social sciences-with their value in the service of man's aspirations, intentions, and hopes, including his aspiration to understand himself and to control his environment. It is note worthy, however, that this pragmatic value of science-of the social sciences as well as of the physical and the biological sciences-is but the value of a means to an end, and that scientific knowledge, being a means only, is neither the end pursued nor a substitute for the decisions and actions which determine the end. Value relations of quite a different nature enter the picture here. It is true, of course, that any knowledge we have or can obtain concerning the facts relevant to a decision is of value. A rational and reasonable decision is. impossible without such knowledge.

But the knowledge upon which the decision is based concerns not only the actualities prevailing at the time of the decision; it con cerns all foreseeable consequences of the decision as well. And the key to decision-making is not the knowledge provided by the sciences; it is the value commitments of a civilized humanity. These commitments, and not the sciences, determine ultimately what our ends and goals shall be. The various sciences may deter mine the appropriateness of the means of attaining a desired end; they may enable us to estimate the probability of achieving that end and to determine the cost of achieving it in terms of a pre dictable loss of other values; and in this sense they may materially contribute to our selection and revision of the ends to be pursued. Nevertheless, science as science~and this includes the social sciences-does not define the ideals or value norms that consti tute the over-all framework of valuations within which we make our decisions concerning ends and goals in relation to which the facts of science are themselves appraised in regard to their instru mental value.

6 Scientism and Values II (b) The problem of values in science also occurs in a twofold sense. It occurs (i) in so far as valuations and value commitments are part of the facts which the social scientist studies.; and it occurs (ii) as a question concerning the explanatory categories needed in the social sciences. The concern of the social scientist with values. in sense (i) is again obvious. After all, human beings are end-pursuing creatures. The ends pursued are evaluated, individually and socially, and these evaluations~their origins, changes, and manifold interrela sciences~does not define the ideals or value norms that consti social scientist studies and interprets. As subject matter of the social sciences, values constitute no particular problem~although it is true, of course, that even in this sense the problem of values in science does not exist for the physicist· or the chemist.

The second case (ii) in which the problem of values in the social sciences arises requires more extended discussion; for it is crucial to the very nature of science as science. I shall deal with it in some detail in the latter part of this paper. For the present it suffices to say that, in the social sciences, values. may function as explanatory categories~as universals, that is, in terms of which social phenomena must be understood; and that the structuraliza tion and interrelation of value categories provides the only rationale for an understanding of the structuralization of a society or a culture. III (c) The third basic form of our problem is the problem of values for the social sciences. It arises because the investigator himself makes, and must make, certain value commitments both as a person and as a scientist. His commitments as a person reflect in general the value pattern of his own "community" and of the social group and the institutions of which he is a member.

As a scientist, however, he is committed also to the specific value Social Science and the Problem of Value 7 fram,ework within which alone scientists operate. And it is this framework in particular that I have in mind when I speak of values for science. However, not all valuations contained in that framework are of equal importance for science. By and large, we may speak of two groups of valuations, each having its own particular significance for science. There are (i) the over-all value commitments and valuations of any given culture or period in history with respect to science in general; and there are (ii) specific value commit ments which an· investigator must make if he is to be classed as a scientist at all. As far as (i) is concerned, the record of history speaks for itself. The over-all valuations and value commitments,--the "value cli mate"-in contemporary America are much more favorable to the sciences than were the value commitments of medieval Europe; and the post-Sputnik emphasis upon science in the, United States indicates a still further shift in the over-all value framework within which science exists and has its being. A reappraisal of science is taking fplace in our own culture. What effect this will have upon science itself and upon the humanities' only the future can tell. Even so, the value pattern of our American culture also sets limits to scientific enterprise-e.g., by delimiting the extent to which social experiments may be attempted. In addition, how ever, every scientist makes personal value commitments which also have a bearing upon his work. His own valuations determine not only his choice of a field of research, but the specific problems with which he is concerned and the manner in which he pursues them. It would be a mistake to overlook these facts when we speak of values for science. Nevertheless, values and valuations of this type do not affect the character or nature of science itself.

They are therefore only loosely connected with our problem. The specific value commitments and valuations referred to under (ii) are of a different nature and are of crucial importance for science. Moreover, they are inescapable; for the moment we accept scientific rather than nonscientific procedures of investiga tion, we must also accept that complexus of valuations summed up in the term "standards of research.'"

8 Scientism and Values Exactitude and punctilious, care in the compilation of data, in., tegrity and intellectual honesty, sound reasoning, imagination to see alternative possibilities of interpretation, courage to follow an argument to its logical conclusion, and a willingness to abandon cherished ideas in the light of new evidence-these are but some of the qualifications and valuations indispensable to the enterprise of science. Their significance for science is obvious. There is one value commitm.ent, however, which, though as sumed in all scientific enterprise, ~s of particular importance for the social scientist. This is the commitment to objectivity in the evaluation and interpretation of facts. The problem is related to, but not identical with, Max Weber's thesis of "ethical neutrality" as a prerequisite for the social scien tist. What Max Weber demanded was essentially that the social scientist refrain from passing moral judgment on the facts he studies. The various Kinsey reports would in this sense measure up to Max Weber's demand; and, in an obvious sense, the require ment of "ethical neutrality" is fundamental and must be fulfilled.

In this same obvious sense, however, the requirement of "ethical neutrality" is not identical with the demand for objectivity which I have in mind. Under certain conditions the two demands may even be in conflict with each other. In a superficial sense the demand for objectivity means that, as a scientist, one is to be guided only by facts and by logically sound inferences from these facts. Actually, however, the problem cuts deeper and cannot be dealt with so simply; for the so-called facts do not always exist well defined and in pristine purity. Even in the physical sciences a certain degree of abstrac'tion from con text, of isolation, is required if individual facts are to be obtained. In the social sciences this process of delimiting the "facts," of isolating them from overarching contexts, is even more important, and also more difficult. In ,all of. the sciences the selection and the demarcation of facts are determined by the basic assumptions which define the problem to be investigated and delimit its scope, and by valuations which guide the investigator at every step in· the course of his investigation. Because of the· relative sim plicity and the completely ·value-free character of his subject Social Science and the Problem of Value 9 matter, the physical scientist here has an advantage which the social scientist does not have; for the latter is himself an integral part of the culture in which he lives, and shares in a large measure the value commitments prevalent in his society; and the normative ideas of his own culture (conceptions of human rights, of private enterprise, and the like) and his own value orientations (be they conservative or liberal, static, dynamic, or ,anything else) may affect his research from its inception to its conclusion, in cluding his delimitation, collection, and interpretation of "facts."

.i\nd, as a rule, the investigator himself may not even be aware of the influence which these valuations and value commitments have upon his work. The problem of objectivity, therefore, is one of the most difficult which the social scientist has to face. I have dealt with it in another context and shall not discuss it further at this time. l IV Because we appreciate the v~lue of science, we are inescapably committed to values for science. But only as explanatory categories are values of crucial significance in science. And to this problem of values in science I shall now return. In order to see our problem in its full significance and proper perspective, let us remind ourselves for a moment of the fund a men tal change in concept formation and the ideal of explanation which ,vas essential to the emergence and development of science during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the Middle Ages and for centuries thereafter, every explanation of natural events was given in teleological and value loaded terms. Every object and event was assumed to have a pur pose, a value-determined place in the world. Man might not un derstand in any given case what the purpose or value of some particular thing was, but a purpose and value it had-if its pur pose was only to "glorify God." In the Aristotelian scheme of explanations, which included "material," "formal," "efficient,"

and "final" causes, only an understanding of the "final" cause of the purpose, that is, for the sake of which a thing exists or a 10 Scientism and Values· change takes place...;..-canprovide a full explanation of the facts. But this is merely' another way of saying that in the Aristotelian scheme of things" which prevailed prior to the development of modern science, value terms were indispensable as explanatory categories. To understand things and events meant to understand them in terms of the values, which they embody or which they tend to realize. Even the' Copernican view of the universe was still charged with value; for did not Copernicus argue that it was better to have the stars at rest rather than the earth since they are nobler and more divine? It was Galileo who first enunciated the principle which became basic for the physical sciences-the principle, namely, that in science nothing is to be 'admitted as real which is not itself a quantity:or is not reducible to a quantity~ Here for the first time the ideal of a science was envisioned in which value terms 'and teleological conceptions were no longer acceptable as explanatory categories. And from the time of Newton on, all interpretations of the mechanistic processes in nature were given in terms of "efficient" causation only. "Formal" and "final" causes had no longer a legitimate place in science as such.

We need not trace here the history, of the gradual acceptance of this new idea in the physical sciences. Nor need we discuss the problems confronting the biologist in his efforts to free his own science from value concepts and teleological cfltegories of ex planation. Our concern is with the ,social scientist; and for him the problem of value terms as explanatory categories is a complex and difficult one. It is unavoidable, too;' it arises in the social realm irrespective of any commitment or noncommitment to Aristotelian-presuppositions, simply because, consciously or un consciously, human beings, pursue' 'ends which they value, and their valuations and value commitments determine their behavior. If the social scientist does not take, this fact into account, then human behavior, in '80 far as it is purposive, remains inexplicable, much of our social action' remains unaccounted for, and the social sciences cannot advance beyond the elementary stage of mere de scription.

It maybe-argued, of course, that'even in the area of the social Social Science and the Problem of Value 11 studies the employment of value terms as. explanatory categories should be avoided; that unless this is done, social studies cannot attain the status of a science. Even' so advanced a· social science as mathematical economics, however, is based upon value assump tions, namely, that all goods to be exchanged involve some factor of production; that, if no effort were required to produce the goods, the buyer would not be 'willing ·to pay for them; and .that every producer of goods seeks, to maximize his profits and that he acts rationally toward that end. The corollary principles of mar ginal utility to the consumer and of marginal return to the producer but emphasize the reference to valuations and value commitments inherent in economic theory. Mathematical eco nomics, therefore, does not show. that it is possible to avoid value terms as explanatory categories in the social sciences, but only that social studies can be scientific despite the fact that all explanations are ultimately given in value terms, and that this can be achieved by including value terms in the basic assumptions which are foundational to the whole science.

The point I am driving at-:-and I shall elaborate my argu ment later on---"-may be made in another way. Man is by nature gregarious, valuing positively whatever satisfies his, affiliative needs. The whole structure of social living is therefore-.,..and from the very beginning~value-orien.ted; audit is stratified incon formity with value conceptions. Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Cul~ lure provides but one of the many proofs of this 'fact. The social group as a whole functions asa "community" only when its members have at least some basic value commitment ·in common and when, collectively and individually, they are intent on realiz ing or maintaining those values. It is in this sense that we can speak of a "community" of scholars, although the individuals who are members of this "community" live thousands of miles apart and speak different languages. And it is· in this sense also that we may witness the complete disintegration of a "com munity" even though all members are next-door neighbors within a city block.

When the collective behavior in a group, a tribe, or a nation (functioning as a community) becomes clearly defined, stand12 Scientism and Values ardized, and patterned, then "institutions" emerge as the socially recognized or acknowledged embodiments of cooperative efforts on behalf of approved but less comprehensive values. So under stood, social organization is but the outward manifestation of more specific hierarchical or coordinate value commitments. Changes in these value commitments-either in the values them selves or in the character of the commitments-will inevitably result in modifications of the institutions involved and, thus., of the structural pattern of the whole social group or the "com munity." It is obvious, I believe, that the social scientist may well be concerned with the emergence, the function, and the develop ment of institutions, with their mutual interrelations and their relations to the individual, and with their change, persistence, cultural lag, disorganization, and reorganization. But it is equally obvious, it seems to me, that no matter what aspect or p.hase of the social institutions is under study, the social scientist cannot avoid using value terms in his explanation of the facts; for it is a socially approved complexus o~ values which, in the first place, constitutes the very core around which an institution develops; and it is a modification of that complexus of values or of its approval which entails the structural changes in the institution itself. Thus, whether he wants to or not, the social scientist cannot escape the problem of value in science in its profoundest and epistemologically most significant meaning.

One word of caution, however, is now in order. The value terms which the social scientist employs as explanatory categories should not be expressions of his own valuations, predilections, or biases, but should be the basic value commitments inherent in the phenomena to be explained and should be obtained through a most scrupulous examination and analysis of the facts them selves. That is to say, the value premises of social theory should state what has been or is being valued within the social group under investigation, not what should be valued in the opinion of the investigator. Value terms, if they are to be useful at all as explanatory categories, must be indigenous to the subject matter itself.

SocialScienceand the Problem of Value v 13 In the preceding sections reference has been m,Cide again and again to "valuations," "values," and "value commitments." It is now necessary to clarify this terminology and to explain precisely what is meant. Let it be understood from the beginning that no reference to a Platonic re.alm of value essences is here intended. Nor shall I hold that "values" in themselves are entities which factually exist in the world of things. My position is now-as it always has been, and with respect. to the world of things no less than with respect to "values"-that the only basis we have for asserting anything (be it true or false) is our own first-person experience-the ex perience to which I can refer as my experience and which, when you analyze your own experience, you identify as yours. It is the experience which is simply there~ in all its self-revelatory factuality, when we discuss or analyze anything. That this. experience is bipolar, including a subject-pole and an object-pole which, in their conjunction, constitute "my" (or "your") "awareness" of "something," is but an analytic truth. Interpretation of the sub ject-pole leads to our conception of the "empirical subject," the "self," the "person"; and analysis and interpretation of the object pole leads to our conception of "things," "events," "other per sons," and, ultimately, the "world" as the sum total of all there is.

It must be noted, however, that from the very first all first-per son experience has a "felt" quality about it which also requires analysis, and in which are rooted our "felt-value" experiences and our "valuations." In its most primitive form this "value" quality is recognized as a felt pleasantness or a felt unpleasantness of the experience or of the "something" which is being experienced. But such is the complexity of human experience that, at a more clearly defined level of reaction to a "world" around us, the gratification of ap petites, the assuagement of affiliative needs, the satisfactions of the mind, and the sense of harmony and self-fulfillment (which is 14 Scientismand Values happiness) are also "felt" as "values"; whereas, in general, the negative in each case is "felt" as a "disvalue." We are here con fronted with a "hierarchical order" of felt qualities which, despite many infractions and temporal inversions, tends toward an equi librating harmony ·and constitutes the, experiential basis of all our valuations and value ascriptions-'-our "engagement" as a per son in the experience itself providing in each case the criterion of the "ordeT ofrank"6~ the' values.

Moreover,. such is the "felt" .quality of our experience that it encompasses at once the object, event, or situation which occasions ,the "felt" experience. And this fact is the basis. upon which we ascribe "value" to the objects, events, and situations themselves. "Values," therefore, do not· exist in the world around us. But things and events have value because, as warranted by the "felt" quality of our experierrce,we ascribe value to them. Beyond the' objects, 'events, and situations which immediately occasion a "felt value" experience; 'weascribe "value" also to all things, events, and activities' which, being causally related to the former, contribute indirectly to the experience; and to those objects, events, and situations which we anticipate as occasioning a "felt value" experience. That realization may faU ,short of an·ticipation and that a present experience may have to be judged within the perspective of future events and "felt values" signifi cantly implies that value experience is not atomistic and that the context ·of this experience' itself provides an empirical basis for revaluing any particular value ascription.

It is not ·necessary to discuss in detail the many and complex problems which' here confront the philosopher and which have made progress in value theory so difficult. It is sufficient to point out that the approach here. suggested---starting with the intrinsic "value" of certain "felt" qualities of experience and leading to the ascribed "values." of objects, ,events,and situations, and an 'interpretation of their "order of rank" ~avoids the cuI de sac of emotivism and subjectivism no less than.that of Platonic realism. At every step in our. analysis we can find. empirical warranty for our assertions, and from .the most ephem.eral "valuations" we can Social Science and the Problem of Value 15 advance to the most stable, from instantaneous "felt" responses to "valuations" in the long run and on objective grounds. Value theory itself is now not only meaningful, but empirically testable. VI In referring to the complexity of "felt values," I spoke of a "hierarchy" and an "order of rank" of these values. Although I indicated at the time that in .actual experiential situations there might occur infractions and inversions of such an· order, it is now necessary to augment my earlier references in still another way.

The key to what I have to say lies in the fact that "felt value" experiences cluster around certain "core v.alues"which are asso ciatedwith distinct facets of human existence. Aside from the primitive level of simple sensory pleasures-such as, the agreeable ness of the taste of a cherry, the pleasing quality of an azure sky there are "felt values" which cluster around: the basic gratification of an appetite, and the cluster of "values" varies with the ap petite involved in any particular situation (e.g., hunger or sex). There is a cluster of "values" ·,associated with. the "felt value" quality of well-being; and, surely, this cluster of values, except for certain marginal cases, differs essentially from those centering around an appetite. There is, furthermore, the whole scale of "felt values" associated with the assuagement of affiliative needs; and there are yet different clusters of "felt values" associated with intellectual satisfactions and aesthetic enjoyments, with the joys of creation and the experienced sense of self-fulfillment or hap piness. And there are the infinitely manifold and variegated value ascriptions-of means and of ends-which reflect our "felt values"

in a world of facts. My thesis is that these clusters of "felt values" and of ascriptive valuations are relatively stable in basic orientation; that many of them-even in their interrelations~constitute the value basis for social institutions; and that, therefore, the "core values" of the various clusters, .and their 'augmentations and modifications, con.. stitute' explanatory categories indispensable to the social scientist.

16 Scientism and Values One additional point must be considered, however, before we return to the problem of value as an explanatory category in the social sciences. There are two levels of value clusters which are of particular significance for us. One is the cluster of felt and ascribed values associated with man's affiliative needs; the other is the cluster of felt and ascribed values associated with the sense of fulfillment. The former encompasses the whole range of values pertaining to "communal" relations of individuals in actual societies. The latter consists of the ideal projections of self and community "images," constituting patterns of culture which in clude most, if not all, of the other value clusters. That the tran sition between the two levels is fluid is obvious. Nevertheless, only the latter is the projection, of some ideal of a "cultured humanity," infusing the rest of man's valuations with their ulti mate significance and with their relative importance. The degree of harmony (or disharmony) between the actualities of .any given society, on the one hand, and the' valuations inherent in its ideal projections, on the other, is in itself of greatest significance for an understanding of that society. The United Nations, in ideal conception and actual functioning, is but one obvious illustration of what I me.an.

VII To some students of human behavior, in all its complexity, the institution is the real isolate of culture. And if this is so, then the valuations and value ascriptions embodied in institutions are the key to a real understanding of man's communal living and to the cultural pattern which dominates it. A "community" or "society," so I have said earlier, is possible only because, explicitly or implicitly, its members accept certain value commitments as binding for them. Mere spatial togetherness is not sufficient. Persistent value commitments are foundational to, and more or less clearly defined in, all institutions; and in and through its institutions a society is structuralized-the structure reflecting a "hierarchy" of valuations. That there are "overlap pings" of institutions merely confirms the fact that things and Social Science and the Problem of Value 17 events may be valued from different perspectives. In so far as individuals are members of the same institution, there exists among them a "hierarchy" of tasks and functions, reflecting the complexities of the conditions under which the major value com mitment is to be realized; and in so far as individuals are mem hers of different institutions, conflicts in institutional obligations become value conflicts for them. A stable society, therefore, is one in which the value commitments embodied in its institutions reflect all basic valuations of its members and are harmoniously adjusted-a society, in brief, which provides for the highest self fulfillment. And it is in this sense, too, that throughout history institutions hav€ helped mold men by stabilizing their highest valuations and making them socially effective.

It goes without saying, of course, that institutions, once estab lished as means t~ certain ends, may, in time, be perverted into ends in themselves. Such a shift, however, reflects but a shift in valuation and must be understood as such. But institutions may also be modified, expanded, or shifted to a place of new im portance in any given society because members of that society have caught a new vision and have made new value commitments. The relation of the individual to any particular institution, there fore, is always one of mutual interaction: the institution em bodying valuations of the past; the individual reflecting those valuations in the mirror of his own experience and his own in sights. The dialectic of this interaction is, thus, the dialectic of two sources or perspectives of valuation. Individuals are to a large extent cre.atures of the valuations embodied in the institu tions of their society; but, in turn, these institutions and, in fact, the whole of society reflect the effective valuations of individuals.

In brief, the logical structure of a society contains .as founda tional a set of interrelated valuations. Commitment to these valuations is basic to the unity and the institutional pattern of that society. Changes in individual valuations effect changes in that pattern, and changes in the institutions, being dependent on values, affect, in turn, the value commitments of individuals. And in this context·I see no possibility of escaping values and value references as explanatory categories.

18 Scientism and Values VIII I said a moment ago that in and through its institutions a society is structuralized. I now want to enlarge on that statement. Since each institution is the embodiment of a complexus of valuations centering around some basic value, the structuraliza tion of any given society as a whole is ultimately a matter of the distribution of value emphases-that is, it is a question of what is the dominant valuation and what are its stratifications. And here the social scientist faces the problem of discerning in the society which he studies, not his own valuations, but the valuations and value commitments indigenous to that society itself. The problem has no e.asy solution; but unless it is solved, not only "in principle" for societies in general, but for every particular society under in vestigation, the investigator's work remains incomplete with respect to that society. It is evident, however, that, even so, a "value schematism," valid for any society, may also be of sig nificance-in the sense, namely, that it provides a "model" by comparison with which (as an ideal case) actual societies or insti tutions within a society may be better understood, even if only in their deviations from the "model." And any investigation de signed to disclose the valuations and value commitments within a given society is therefore a contribution to sociological knowl edge. It is at this point, incidentally, that interest in value as an explanatory category in the social sciences is intimately inter woven with value as factual subject matter for the social sciences.

It is clear, however, that reference to value in the latter sense is but auxiliary to value as an explanatory category. It is true, of course, that many of our basic valuations are subconscious commitments which we make because they are part and parcel of the society into which we were born and in which we attained maturity. Nevertheless, as in our individual lives, so in our social existence, there comes a time-at least for some of us-when we demand a rational justification for our value commitments and our distribution of value emphases. And it is at such times-at times, that is, when we come to a clearer unSocial Science and the Problem of Value 19 d~rstanding of our own value commitments-that we also ap.. proach society and its institutions with a new understanding; that we see most clearly that institutions are but socially approved means for the realization of socially approved key values or "ends."

And we realize also that the devotion of men to the institutions they serve is in direct proportion to their own commitments to the values embodied in the various institutions which, together, stratify their society. A basic change in these commitments-be it a shift in emphasis or the projection of new goalsr-inevitably entails a change in that devotion. The whole range of institutional changes is thus clearly dependent upon changes. in valuations which, individually conceived, are, in time, socially approved where "appro~al" means a value commitment. And it is this very fact that makes value terms indispensable as explanatory categories in the social sciences. IX I now return briefly and in conclusion to the matter of boundary transgressions and abuses of legitimate science and to distortions of, and interferences with, the whole scientific enter prise, which I regard as the very essence of scientism and to which I referred in the opening paragraph of my paper.

Corresponding to the three aspects of the value problem-the value of science, value in science, and value for science-I dis tinguish three areas in which scientism may be encountered. It lies in the nature of things, however, that the abuses and distortions encountered in one area may overlap other areas as well, or may even entail scientism in all areas together. Where matters are fluid, as they are in this case, it can be only a distortion of facts if we insist upon too rigid separation. Nevertheless, the distinc tions I have in mind will clarify the picture and may well be useful in erasing some of its worst features. At least we shall then know that the term "scientism" is itself a somewhat ambiguous, abstraction. That exact and dependable knowledge in any area of investiga tion has immense value-..;in itself (as providing a better under ..

20 Scientism and Values standing of the world we live in) and in its practical aspects (as providing a basis for policy decision)-need not be stressed again. This legitimate value of science is distorted, however, when Science-with the capital "S"-is enthroned as an Authority in whose presence we are expected to genuflect and whose mere mention in connection with a product or a cause is meant to persuade us of the latter's excellence. This type of distortion of the value of science culminates quite logically in the conception of a "technocracy" as the ideal of societal living. Scientismand scientism of a radical and profoundly sig nificant type-arises with the problem of values in science. As I have repeatedly stressed in this paper, it is in the nature of science to be concerned ultimately with the quantitative and material aspects of reality only. Physics and chemistry legitimately restrict themselves to this sphere. That there are aspects even of human society which are amenable to quantitative analysis need not be denied. Scientism here me.ans that only value-free concepts are to be employed in the interpretation of the human situation, and that man himself is to be reduced-via a behavioristic psychology-to a purely physicochemical complexus of inter related processes amenable to a complete explanation in terms of the value-free concepts and categories of the natural sciences. In other words, scientism here emerges as a reductionistic naturalism which denies in principle that there are irreducible values or that values, if they do exist, have any significance whatever. The pic ture of man which here emerges, and which is inherent in the scientistic boundary transgressions that would extend the value free concepts of the natural sciences to encompass the whole of knowledge, is frightening indeed in. its distortions of man. But it becomes even more so if now it is combined-as quite naturally it is-with the projection. of a technocracy as the ideal of a human society.

The third type of scientism, arises in connection with the prob lem of values, for science-in connection, that is, with the value framework within which science itself operates. As I pointed out earlier, this framework involves, on the one hand, that complexus of values and valuations usually referred to as "standards of reSocial Science and the Problem of Value 21 search." But it involves, on the other hand, also personal and societal biases and ideological prejudices. Scientis,m here m,eans the intrusion of ideological biases and personal prejudices, usually in a more or less subtle way-into the enterprise of science itself. The problem here is most acute as a quest for objectivity. Even if we grant-as I think we mugt-that ultimate or absolute objectivity is beyond human reach, still the effort must at least be made to state clearly our presuppositions and indicate our basic valuations, and not to let prejudice and ideological concern distort our findings as scientists or as philo,sophers, as the case may be.

NOTE 1. "Theory Construction and the Problem of Objectivity," in Symposium on Sociological Theory, Llewellyn Gross, editor '(Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959).