On Economic Right; D. Kelley

and volumes of theory, have shown that he does not fit the role, his self-image has hardly changed. And most persistent of all, per haps, is his incongruous claim that he is defending man's rights. The basis of that claim is the theory of "economic rights," which is founded in society's alleged duty to provide all its members with certain "necessities." These claims of the individual against society, however, cannot be called "rights." Consider, for example, the follow ingassertion of an economic right: Everyone. has the right to educa tion. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.! Such statements are little more than obfuscation; if left unques tioned, they wouJd destroy the meaning of "right," and attach the libertarian connotations of the word to statist programs of com pulsion. Let us see why. It has often been observed that rights are closely connected with duties, that your rights impose obligations on me and the protec tion of your rights requires re strictions on my freedom to act.

This is true so far; the possession of rights would be meaningless if no one were obliged to observe them. But what sort of obligation is involved? In the answer to this question lies the difference be tween natural rights and the libMr. Kelley is majoring in philosophy as a 1 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, student at Brown University. Article 26, sec. 1. 541 542 THE FREEMAN September erals' "economic rights."2 A man's natural rights entail only a nega tive obligation for other men - the obligation not to use force against him. "Economic rights," on the other hand, impose positive obli gations, which in fact violate nat ural rights. Natural Rights and Responsibilities One of the sources for the theory of natural rights is John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Govern'ment. Man in the state of nature - that is, man by his own nature - possesses rights to life, liberty, and property. These are all expressions of man's freedom from other men. But what about duties; what does man owe to other men? Only the recognition of their rights.

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. 3 2 In fact, there is one eco'nomic right: the natural right to acquire and dispose of property through free trade. I shall use the phrase "economic right," how ever, to refer to things like welfare, housing, and education, assuming for the sake of argument that they are rights. 3 Second Treatise, sec. 6. This is the negative obligation not to use force against other men; there is no positive obligation that is natural, as rights are. Thomas Jefferson held a similar theory. The rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" establish man's independence from other men; they do not, however, entail any positive duties of men toward one another. "From the point of vievl of the community, 'rights' have a negative implica tion. . . . His 'natural rights' theory of government left all men naturally free from duties to their neighbors."o!

It is not difficult to show why these rights do not imply positive duties. Natural rights are all rights to actions. The right to life is not the right to have one's life assured; it is, rather, the right to livee It is the right to take the ac tions one considers necessary to secure his life and happiness. The right to life does not, however, guarantee the success of any ac tions - only the freedom to act. The other natural rights apply to specific areas of freedom. The right to property is the right to own, to use and control, the things one has earned, but it applies only after one has earned them. Whether or not one will earn them 4 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1948), p. 195-6.

1969 ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS 543 is another matter - not a question of rights. Rights protect actions, but they cannot guarantee the suc cess of those actions; they protect men from each other, but not from reality and the fact that only by certain actions can they achieve their purposes. Human Relations and Economic Rights One of the areas in which rights protect man's freedom of action is that of hunlan relations. A right to action is a right to act on one's judgment, including his judgment of other men. One is thus free to choose with whom he will associ ate. Other people, however, also have rights and the freedom to choose, which one is obliged to re spect. In any association of men, therefore, the free consent of all involved is a moral prerequisite. A duty asserts a moral relation between two or more men. Accord ing to the libertarian argument, therefore, obligations other than to abstain from the use of force can only be incurred by some pre vious, freely chosen act, such as signing a contract. Any obliga tion not incurred in this way would be an infringement on my moral freedom to act as I. choose, and thus an infringement on my natural rights.

An examination of "economic rights" will show that they do imply positive obligations which are incompatible with liberty. A man has the right, according to the U.N. Declaration, to a job (Art. 23), leisure (Art. 24), an adequate standard of living, food, clothing, shelter, and security (Art. 25), and education (Art. 26). All of these are, in one form or another, rights to things, to economic goods. The difference here between natural and "economic rights" is evident. Natural rights are rights to these things if one earns them, if one obtains them in mutually voluntary trade with others. "Eco nomic rights," however, attach no such condition to the right; a per son has a "right" to have these goods, regardless of how they are to be obtained. Thus, while natural rights guarantee men the freedom to act, though not guaranteeing the success of their actions, "eco nomic rights" guarantee men things produced by the successful actions of others.

The value of economic goods is largely a reflection of the fact that human labor is required for their production. A "right" to aneco nomic good, then, includes a "right" to the human labor in volved, that labor which was suc cessful in producing the good. These "rights" obviously impose positive obligations on at least some men; if someone else has a right to something that I produce; 544 THE FREEMAN September then I am obliged to produce it for him. Natural rights only require that men abstain from certain kinds of action, but say nothing further about how they should act. "Eco nomic rights," on the other hand, require positive actions from men beca use they specify the goals and beneficiaries for which they should act. They specify certain products which must be produced, and the methods by which these products are to be distributed. If people have a right to food, clothing, and wealth enough for leisure, these things must be produced; if every one has a right to them, they must be distributed so that everyone has them. To require that certain things be produced is to require that men produce them, that is, that men act in certain ways, for certain goals. To· require that goods be distributed in any way other than by the prior voluntary agreement of the producers is to require that some men act for other men, not as a gift, not out of benevolence, but as a legally en forceable duty.

Imposing on Others No theory that imposes upon men unchosen duties - which are in no way incurred by their exer cise of natural rights - can claim to protect political freedom. If the government tries to protect economic rights, it necessarily vio lates natural ones. Is there, however, another "di mension of freedom," economic freedom? The concept of "free dom" can only be applied where the potential "oppressor" is not completely determined in hi~ (or its) actions; that is, one can only be free from men. "Economic freedom," however, as liberals use the term, means exemption from certain economic laws. To be free from these, one would have to be free from their conditions. One condition is the nature of reality. Man has certain needs that must be satisfied by recourse to the ex ternal world. But if he acts to gain things from nature, he is subject to her laws: "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."

IVlan must discover what will sat isfy his needs, how to obtain it, and then act to gain it. Nothing guarantees success at any of these steps, and poverty or disease or ignorance is the penalty imposed on the unsuccessful. Noone can be free from this; one cannot legis late a change in reality. One can only substitute the work of some one else for his own, and in doing so, he is not free from the require ments of reality; he has only found a new way of meeting them. The other condition against which "economic. rights" protect is the exercise of free choice by 1969 ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS 545 other men. Thus, in a free society, if a man wants a job, the employer must be willing to hire him; if he wants to buy a product, the pro ducer must be willing to sell it to him. To be free from this condi tion, one must be free from indi vidual choice, which means: free from freedom, which is meaning less. The obligations which "eco nomic rights" impose restrict one's moral and political freedom with out in any way producing a coun terbalancing increase in freedom.

Those "rights" have additional antiliberal implications. An obli gation to observe the "economic rights" of other people easily be comes a· duty to the state, for it is only through the state's programs that such "rights" can be ob served. It is only the state, more over, which can decide what "economic rights" there are, and who has them, for those "rights" de pend on what the economy can afford, and, as a result, are con stantly changing. Since "economic rights" infringe upon political freedom, to recognize them is to recognize. the right of the state to decide how much freedom it is go ing to allow, and how much it will destroy, whether that decision is made by a dictator, or by pressure groups, or by majority vote. The doctrine of "economic rights" thus provides an excuse for statists to destroy the consti tutional system of freedom which is based on natural, inalienable rights. That doctrine is therefore a moral and intellectual fraud the state-conferred benefits to which it refers cannot be called rights. ~ IDEAS ON LIBERTY Economics in One Lesson THE LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES of some economic policies may become evident in a few months. Others may not become evident for several years. Still others may not become evident for decades. But in every case those long-run consequences are contained in the policy as surely as the hen was in the egg, the flower in the seed.

From this aspect, therefore, the whole of economics can be reduced to a single lesson, and that lesson can be reduced to a single sentence. The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy,. it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups. HENRY HAZLITT EDUCATION IN AMERICA GEORGE CHARLES ROCHE III 12. Philosophyof Growth IN THIS EXAMINATION of educa tion in America, we find substan tial gaps between the ideal we envision and the reality we face. Closing those gaps by construct ing a comprehensive educational "system" seems unrealistic, not only because it is difficult to focus any system upon the individual, but also because society rejects any such attempt. We must re member, however, that the process of education is epitomized by ceaseless questioning, even when the answers seem difficult or dis tant. In the best sense of educaDr. Roche is Director of Seminars for the Foundation for Economic Education. He has taught history and philosophy in college and maintains a special interest in American edu cation.