The Founding of the American Republic 4; C. Carson

This is a prelude to making a case for the study of history to my classes. The point is that it is quite costly to learn by personal experience, while it is much less expensive to learn from the ex perience of others. Actually, however, the case for vicarious historical versus per sonal experience is not as con clusive as I tend to make it. Per sonal experience usually makes a much stronger and lasting im pression than do accounts of the experience of others. Any retell ing of an experience is to a large extent an abstraction which leaves out the warp and woof of life. The difference between vicarious and personal experience is quite often like the difference between travel folders of an area and the actual Dr. Carson is Chairman. Social Science De partment, Okaloosa-Walton College. He is a noted lecturer and author, his latest book en titled Throttling the Railroads. 667 668 THE FREEMAN November vacation experience - a chasm of considerable dimensions. Still, there is much that has to be learned, if it is to be learned at all, from the experiences of others because of the limi ted career of an individual and because some things - e. g., drowning - are likely to be· experienced only once, and all experience ceases.

Political experience - both vi carious and personal - is of .par ticular urgency for those who would erect governments and gov ern. This is so because govern ment is both essential and poten tially man's most dangerous instrument, most dangerous be cause it can muster all other in struments and bring them to bear in the pursuit of whatever end those who govern may have. Gov ernment is that body charged with the monopoly of the use of force in a given jurisdiction. Politics is the arena of contest over who shall employ the force for what ends. Each of us is prey to the notion that if we had power we would exercise it only for the good of those who fell within our jurisdiction. Without experience, we can easily concoct plans whose fulfillment we would achieve if we could get the reins of power. The plans may have all the beauty of any abstraction, but they usu ally ignore the reality of the con...

test of wills by which power is actually gained and exercised, con tests in which the man with a vision imputes evil to those of a different view, seeks power at first for the good he would do, then seeks power because he thinks he is good, and eventually seeks power for itself alone. There is a human tendency for anyone in power to concentrate it in his hands and absolutize it. Constraints Upon Power There is, however, a counter tendency at work in most govern ments at most times. It arises, in the first place, out of the difficulty which any ruler experiences of putting into effect personally his edicts. Authority must be parceled out. Those who exercise it incline to arrogate to themselves that particular authority. Moreover, it is easier to do anything if it is made into a routine. Routines be come customs, and customs as sume the character of law in the course of time. Hence, power is balanced and constrained to some extent and as a rule at most times and in most places. This can be prevented from happening only by relentless terror, a terror of a kind which is unusual.

Political experience is experi ence of the contest of many wills, of routine and custom become law, of devices by which power is con strained, of compromise, of the 1971 THE COLONIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 669 gap between conception •and exe cution because both those who rule and those who are ruled have wills. A. deep reading of history may acquaint one with these proc esses and actualities; personal ex perience will be even more likely to do so. Americans in the colonies had a goodly amount of political experi ence before they broke from Eng land, experience with the uses and abuses of power. They had it in what is probably the best way to gain experience with the use of power; the power at their disposal was limited and constrained. The colonists gained experience within the confines of the English con stitution, in the first place. Their laws were supposed to conform to those of England. To make sure that they did, the system provided that court cases could be appealed to the Privy Council in England.

Restrictive Charters The colonists were restricted in what they could do also by their charters. Most of the colonies had originally been founded as com mercial ventures, though a few were founded as proprietaries which harked back to the feudal system for models, and one - Geor 'gia - was a trust. In any case, they were founded on the basis of charters. These spelled out the territory to be occupied, the financial arrangements, and the rights and privileges of the settlers. Or dinarily, the settlers were per mitted to participate in the mak ing of laws, and such laws as were passed had to be in keeping with and not contrary to English law. It would be correct to say that the colonists were both' restrained and enfranchised by their charters. The colonies were restricted also in that they were a part of the British Empire. In that ca pacity, they fell under the author ity of the government of England (after 1707, the United Kingdom) and were subject to certain of the acts of the Crownin-Parliament.

Before discussing this relation ship, however, it will be useful to note some major changes that had occurred in the English govern ment in the last years of the seventeenth century, the changes associated with the Glorious Rev olution. These changes raised questions about· the extent of par liamentary authority over the col onies under the constitution as it had developed, questions that were not finally pushed to the point of irreconcilable contradiction until the 1770's. At the time when most of the colonies were chartered and founded, England was more or less of an absolute monarchy. Parlia ment was, for the Tudors and the 670 THE FREEMAN November early Stuarts, an auxiliary to them in the exercise of their power. In theory, and usually in practice, Parliament was that body which enabled the monarch to make al terations from time to time in the contract with his subjects whom he ruled by Divine right. Ordinar ily, he could and did rule without consultations with Parliament. If some change were wanted by the monarch - e. g., a new tax meas ure - then he might call a session in order to get the needed legisla tion. If he could get by on es tablished revenues and laws, he had usually foregone the nuisance of having Parliament meet.

The Stuart Kings and Parlia ment were at odds for most of the seventeenth century over their re spective powers. The issues were resolved by the Glorious Revolu tion and its aftermath, resolved in favor of Parliament. As one his torian summarizes the conse quences of this Revolution, it "de molished the doctrine of the divine right of kings. . . . After that momentous victory Parliament slowly and gradually, yet remorse lessly and irresistibly, extended its power in all directions."! An other sums up the changes this way: 1 Curtis P. Nettels, The Roots of Amer ican Civilization (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1963, 2nd ed.), p. 543. William III began his reign with a clear recognition on his part that the royal office had been shorn of exten sive powers. As it has been expressed by a distinguished historian of the constitution: "The king was distinct hT below statute; he was to have no power to suspend statutes or to dis pense with statutes; he could not by his proclamations create any new of fence; he could not keep a standing army in the realm in time of peace without the consent of parliament; parliament had begun to appropriate supplies; the military tenures were gone; he had no powers of purvey ance and preemption; he could not try men by martial law; the judges were no longer to hold office during hj/:) good pleasure .... " We may add: he could make no laws without the consent of the nation's representa tives; he could lay no taxes; he could claim no kingship by divine right .... 2 In short, Parliament had come to occupy much of the ground for merly held by the monarch and would in the course of the eight eenth century gain much more control over affairs. England had a constitutional monarchy.

Parliamentary Powers These changes affected Ameri cans in two most important ways. One of them is that Parliament's powers were neither clear ly de2 George B. Adams, Constitutional His tory of England, Rev. by Robert L. Schuyler (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 366.

1971 THE COLONIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 671 !ineated nor restricted. The Brit ish had spent much energy over the centuries in limiting the king. This was now as well accomplished as it might be without making him impotent. In doing so, how ever, a new power had been loosed - Parliament. It is true that the House of Commons is restrained by having its members stand for election. This was so, however, only for England and then the United Kingdom. The other import of this for Americans was related, for it had to do with what the power of Parliament over colonials would be. The colonists had no repre sentatives in the House of Com mons, nor were there any Ameri can bishops or nobles sitting in the House of Lords. Moreover, nothing comparable to the Glori ous Revolution occurred in the colonies. Parliament proceeded to pass acts affecting the colonies, though there was now doubtful constitutional warrant for such measures. For a long time the is sue was not pushed with vigor by either side; it lay dormant ready to spring to life when differences between the colonists and the mother country rose to the point where constitutional questions would come into focus.

One reason that the issue did not come to the fore was that Parliament exercisjed restraint in legislating for the colonies until the 1760's. Parliamentary acts known as statutes of the· realm usually applied only to England, Wales, and to Scotland after 1707. "Inasmuch as both Parliament and the colonial assemblies exercised the lawmaking power, a rather in definite distinction between in ternal and external legislation was allowed to develop. Parliament generally confined itself to the regulation of the external affairs of the colonies (trade, currency, etc.) and permitted the colonial assemblies to legislate for do mestic concerns."3 This policy is sometimes referred to as one of "salutary neglect." Why it should be so called except by a partisan of British rule and Parliament is not clear; it suggests that the colonies were neglected and that Parliament had the authority to impose its will over the colonies - both doubtful propositions.

If there was "neglect," it was in the neglectful manner of the founding of the colonies, not so much in their later governance. The Stuart kings probably had two prime motives· in authorizing plantations. One was to benefit England commercially; the other was to be rid of troublesome, un desirable, or, in the case of Roman Catholics to whom they were sym pathetic, persecuted elements. The 3 Nettels, Ope cit., p. 546.

672 THE FREEMAN November latitude that many of them were given in matters of religion sug gests that the monarchs did not expect the growth of large, peace ful societies under their dominion. At any rate, a strong case can be made that over the years the British government was less and less "neglectful" and more and more concerned to tie the colonies close to England and make them conform to the British pattern. It is certain that over the years more and more laws were passed, and more and more attention was given to imposing the British will over the colonies. Trend Toward Royal Control One way to see the trend toward greater British control is to look at the types of colonial govern ments and changes in them. There were three types of governments in the colonies: royal or crown, proprietary, and charter. A royal colony was one in which the colony fell directly under the king: the governor was appointed by the monarch; he was an agent of the king, in effect, acted in the place of the king, and he, in turn, ap pointed lesser officers. A proprie tary colony was one in which the proprietor appointed the governor and otherwise had authority rem iniscent of a feudal lord. He, in turn, was a kind of vassal of the king. A charter colony was one operating on the basis of a char ter; in effect, the members of the colony were members of a corpor ation, and the electors among them controlled the government on the basis of the charter.

The trend over the years was for England to extinguish the charters and proprietorships, which the original colonies had been, and to make of them royal colonies. By the middle of the eighteenth century, there were only three proprietary colonies and two charter colonies. The meaning of this is made clearer by this contemporary comment on the power of the people in the charter colonies: "The people in these Colonies chuse their Gover nors, Judges, Assemblymen, Coun sellors, and all the rest of their Officers; and the King and Parlia ment have as much influence there as in the wilds of Tartary."4t This is an exaggeration, but it does indicate that the trend toward royal colonies was a trend toward greater British control. Despite the fact that the colo nies had grown up to considerable degree separate from one another, they had a similar form of gov ernment to one another and to that of England. Each of them had a governor, whose powers 4 Quoted in Clinton Rossiter, The First American Revolution (New York: Har court, Brace and World, 1956), p. 103.

1971 THE COLONIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 673 were modeled on those of the English monarch. The extent to which the English attempted to gain or maintain control of colon ial development is indicated both by the fact that most colonies were made royal colonies and by the extensive powers of the gov ernor. He "was the personal repre sentative of the king and the sym bol of the empire in the colony, 'endowed with vice-regal· powers, analogous though inferior in de gree to those of the monarch.' As such he was the commander-in chief of the military forces in the colony and the chief among the agents of the crown. He had the power to appoint judges in the vice-admiralty court, where there was such a court in his colony, and judges, justices of the peace, and sheriffs in the administration of civil justice. He also had the power to nominate members of the executive council ... , and the power to veto acts passed by the legislature. . . ."5 He could sum mon, adj ourn, and dissolve the legislature, and he could pardon those who had been convicted of offenses. "The governor's powers were thus fourfold, for he was at once a Crown agent and the effec tive head of the executive, the IS Max SavelIe, A History of Colonial America, Rev. by Robert Middlekauf (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win sten, 1964), p. 402.

legislative, and the judicial arms of government."6 A colony ordinarily had one or more councils, but usually there was a single council which served in several capacities. These were men chosen from among natives who were usually men of wealth and position in their communities. In one of their capacities, they were a sort of governor's cabinet, assisting him in governing by ad vice and in other ways. In another capacity, they might serve as a court of appeals. And, they were the nearest thing to an upper house of the legislature that the colonies had. In this capacity, they were analogous to the House of Lords. Many colonials got experi ence in governing by serving on councils. However, most of the colonial political experience was gained by serving in the legislative assem bly. This body was known by dif ferent names from colony to col ony - i. e., House of Delegates, General Court, House of Burgess es, and so forth-but each of the colonies had one. It was the fount of popular government in the col onies, the only body at the level of colony that was chosen by the freeholders. In theory, it was sub ordinate to the governor in royal and proprietary colonies, awaiting on his call, subject to his dis6 Ibid.

674 THE FREEMAN November. missal, even subject to being dis solved in favor of the election of a new one, and its acts subject to his absolute veto. It could almost be said that it existed at the pleas ure of the governor. Colonies Develop Self-Government in Subtle Ways Theory is often one thing, how ever, practice another, and this was certainly so for the colonial assemblies. In their service in as semblies colonials learned. the sub tleties by which power is counter balanced and the maneuvers by which power can be gained. The way they worked, in general, is described by one scholar in this passage: One is impressed with the rather prosaic manner in which the lower houses went about the task of extend ing their authority, with the infre quency of dramatic conflict. They gained much of their power in the course of routine business, quietly and simply extending and consolidat ing their authority by passing laws and establishing practices, the impli cations of which escaped both colo nial executive and imperial authori ties and were not always fully rec ognized even by the lower houses themselves. In this way they grad ually extended their financial author ity to include the powers to audit accounts of all public officers,to share in disbursing public funds, and even tually even to appoint officials concerned in collecting and handling revenues. 7 Some of the devices by which they gained power are interesting and were quite valuable experi ence for colonists. One position from which they gained leverage over governors was that the salary of most of the governors was paid by their respective colonies. This meant that the legislature had to appropriate it. If they would· only appropriate it on an annual basis, the governor would find it expedi ent to call the legislature into session each year. If they made the appropriation of his salary the last item of business before they were ready to adj ourn, he could be, and was, effectively stripped of his powers to prorogue the assembly. "Not content with reducing the governors' legisla tive power, the assemblies ... used their control over the purse to usurp many executive functions, insisting, that certain conditions be met before appropriation bills were sanctioned. Thus the assem blies extended their sway over financial matters by stating in detail how money was to be spent, by appointing provincial treasur ers . . . , by naming collectors of 7 Jack P. Greene, "The Role of the Lower Houses of Assembly in Eight eenth-Century Politics," Essays in Amer ican Colonial History, Paul Goodman, ed.

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win ston, 1967), pp. 431-32.

1971 THE COLONIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 675 the revenues ... , and by setting up committees to supervise the spending of money appropriated."8 Colonists got political experi ence at two other levels than that of colony. One level that did not involve many people directly but was nonetheless important was as agent for a colony to the govern ment in England. An agent was sent from most colonies toward the end of the coloni~l period to England to explain to various gov erning bodies the situation in the particular colony, the attitudes of the inhabitants, .and the effects laws and other English actions might have. Sometimes both a governor and a legislature would send such an -agent. He would have no official standing. in Eng land, but he would be valued for his service both by the mother countries and the colonies and would gain much valuable experi ence. Benj amin Franklin undoubt edly got the most experience as agent, for he represented several colonies at one time; through this experience, he was prepared for the yeoman work he would later perform as diplomat for the United States.

The other level was local gov ernments. Of their importance, Clinton Rossiter says: "In gen eral, the central governments of the colonies exercised even less 8 N ettels, op. cit., p. 563. control over local institutions than did the mother country over the colonies."9 That is, they managed most governmental affairs locally by institutions that were in keep ing with the locale. In New Eng land, town government was the most important level, and the town meeting the device by which the electorate directed affairs. In other parts of the country, county and parish government handled most local affairs. These were the fea tures of local governments Ros siter thought particularly worthy of note: "the broader suffrage for local than for colony-wide elec tions; the multiplicity of unpaid offices and duties, a system under which a much larger percentage of citizens performed some sort of public duty than is the case today .... " In short, a large num ber of colonists had political ex perience while they were under nominal British control.

The British government did not neglect the colonists in the last hundred years or so of the colonial period. They set over most of them an arrangement that should, in theory, have brought them un der the will of those who governed in England. There were governors with comprehensive appointive powers, numerous agents of a variety of boards and committees were sent to America, and Ameri9 Rossiter, op. cit., p. 119.

676 THE FREEMAN November cans were in some ways more clear ly under the dominion of the king than were the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. Short of taking from the Americans their institutions of government, it is not clear how they could have been prevented from developing as they did. Evolving Institutions Nonetheless, the American col onies did evolve away from the British pattern, even as, to a lesser extent, the government in the homeland was evolving away from its older pattern. Americans today do not feel great unfamili arity with colonial institutions and practices as they had developed by 1765. They would, however, if they understood them, find most of the institutions that were originally transplanted unfamiliar and for eign. Many of these institutions were medieval in character when they had been set up. For example, a town was a corporation with definite bounds, with privileges for its inhabitants, with powers to exclude others from them, with monopolistic powers, with an ex clusive and delimited character.

This had so far broken down by the end of the colonial period that men could generally come and go, move in or out, and go about their business without much onerous restriction. In a similar and related manner, there was an attempt to maintain class arrangements and prescrip tions in America. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Gen eral Court of Massachusetts for bade the wearing of certain cloth .. ing to the lower orders. Yet, such efforts were of little avail, and long before the end of the colonial period it was commonly observed that respect for and distinctions among classes were disappearing. When confronted with the Puri tan demands for the abolition of episcopacy, James I declared, "No bishop, no king." His prophecy proved correct for America. Though there were several col onies in which the Anglican Church was established, there was never a bishop in America. The Bishop of London was appointed over the American colonies, and he was represented from time to time in particular colonies by a commissary, a man appointed to perform some of the overseeing functions of the bishop. But there was no clerical hierarchy that amounted to anything in America.

Hence, even in Anglican colonies, the control of church affairs tended to slip out of the hands of the clergy and into that of the vestry. Of course, in several of the colonies, the prevailing de nominations neither had any hier archy nor approved of it as an 1971 THE COLONIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 677 institution. The religious supports for rule by an hierarchical order were missing. In the same manner, there was never any titled nobility in the colonies to speak of. There is a saying that "Dukes don't mi grate," and it is substantially true. For decades on end most Ameri cans never saw a titled noble, and if they did, he was most likely a royal governor. No native Ameri cans were ever raised to such rank, to my knowledge, nor is it likely that they aspired to it. Americans who acquired extensive possessions aspired· to the life of a country· gentleman, so far as we can tell, and would have been aliens in their own country had they been titled.

The effect of this is that Amer;,. ica-ns turned away from the old sources of authority and political power even more than did their counterparts in England. Author ity, for them, did not extend from the top downward; it derived from the place they were accorded by their peers .. Americans looked up to men who had acquired posses sions by their own efforts or that of their immediate forebears and, among these, to those who showed ability at managing their affairs. Birth counted for little; achieve ment counted most. Probably, Americans had more extensive experience in governing in legislatures, in towns, in coun ties, and as councilors than did any people anywhere in the world at that time. True, it was limited experience. They had little experi ence as chief executives or in for eign affairs, and they operated within the limitations of the Brit ish constitution and the empire. Even so, they were probably better prepared for popular government than anyone else, unless it was the English people themselves.

It is possible, however, to over rate experience. There are experi enced thieves and murderers. There are experienced dema gogues, and there are politicians with a vast amount of experience at gaining more and more power by plundering the populace. Ex perience can be useful in attain ing any end, but it does not dis criminate among ends. That is determined by what a people, or some portion of them, value. And values are a resultant of ideas held and cherished. It was not enough for Americans that their experience had turned them away from monarchy, from hierarchies, and from authoritarian govern ment. If their experience was to stand them in good stead, they must be drawn to something con structive to take the place of these things. Americans were, and de velopments in ideas prepared the way for this shift. If) t PAUL L. POIROT WHY GRESHAM omitted the "s" when he drafted his famous law is not clear. What is painfully clear to U. S. citizens caught in the wage-price freeze of 1971, however, is that Gresham's Law remains in force: bad money drives good money into hiding.