The Founding of the American Republic 11; C. Carson

The difficulties confronting the Patriots - for so those who fa vored independence have been most Dr. Carson shortly will join the faculty of Hillsdale College in Michigan as Chairman. of the Department of History. He· is a noted lecturer and author, his latest book entitled Throttling the Railroads. 341 342 THE FREEMAN June commonly called - were numerous and resistant to resolution. One such difficulty is frequently. ig nored by revolutionists, though failure to deal effectively with it thwarts the purposes for revolt; for the American colonists it was to see that the revolt against Eng land did not turn into a revolt against all authority. The usual course of revolution is for a break down of authority to follow the re pudiation of the old authority. When this happens, there ensues an often brutal contest for power, accompanied by the disintegration of society, bloodletting, and the de velopment of well-nigh irreconcil able divisions among the people.

Power is usually consolidated once again and order restored by an autocratic rule. The object for the original revolt, however noble, is commonly lost from sight as the yearning for order supersedes the quest for the good society. The deepest source of the disin tegrative impact of revolution no doubt lies in the human condition itself. What man is there who would not like a fresh start, who would not like to be free of his debts, who would not like to be re lieved of the tangle of duties and obligations in which he finds him self, who would not relish the op portunity for starting over. Revo lution appears to offer such an in viting prospect. As he made his way home from the First Conti nental Congress, John Adams en countered a man fired by emotions such as these. The man said: "Oh! Mr. Adams, what great things have you and your colleagues done for us ! We can never be grateful enough to you. There are no courts of justice now in this province, and I hope there never will be an other."l John Adams understood that this was not a laudable opinion, and there were many others who intended to prevent the dissolution that would accompany the domina tion of events by men holding such opinions. The Americans were gen erally successful in avoiding many of the pitfalls of revolution. But, by the refusing to arouse the populace by holding forth visions of beati tude that would follow from their efforts, they also forfeited fanatical zeal in their followers. The Amer ican Patriots had quite limited means for achieving their limited ends.

Divided Opinion in America A more obvious difficulty at the time was posed by the Loyalists those who remained loyal to the king and to England. So long as the colonies retained their connec tion with Britain, most Americans joined in the opposition to British policies during the period of rising discontent. They sometimes dif1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDENCE 343 fered over tactics and as to the correct theoretical position on the constitution. But once the decision for independence was made, some goodly number of people retained their loyalty .to Britain. These threatened to turn the war into a domestic civil war as well as a war against Britain. How many' Loyalists there were was in doubt at the time and has remained so ever since. Those pros ecuting the war in Britain wanted to believe that Americans in gen eral retained their loyalty, espe cially that the sober and substan tial inhabitants did. Hence, they were favorably disposed to exag gerated acounts of their numbers.

Such a view made sense of the idea of subduing the "rebels," for after such a conquest Britain still might rule America if a substan tial portion of the population was loyal. Moreover, British armies were continually being encouraged to come to this or that province on the grounds that Loyalists would turn out to support them in great number. The extent of loyalism has been revived as an important historical question in the twenti eth century by those attempting to make a Marxist or class-struggle interpretation of American ori gins. These historians have resur rected what was once the British view for reasons quite different than those that would have interested King George III. On this class-struggle interpretation, men of wealth and position in America were usually Loyalists, and the thrust for revolt came from the lower classes. This interpretation is not sub stantiated by the facts. A modern historian describes the social sta tus of the Loyalists in this way: "Some came from quasi-aristo cratic families, like the Fenwicks of South Carolina, and others were the humblest folk. They were rich, like Joseph Galloway of Pennsyl vania, and they were poor; they were large landowners, and they were middling and small men of property; they stood behind coun ters, and they possessed hands un wrinkled by trade or toil. . . .

Truth to tell, the Loyalists were of every station and every occu pation.":! He goes on to point out that Anglican clergymen and other officials dependent upon Britain for appointment or livelihood were likely to remain loyal. He also notes that some men of' conspicu ous wealth were among the Loyal ists,3 a point that is offset by the fact that there were prosperous men among the Patriots as well. Textbook lore has it that the population was divided in this fashion: one-third Patriots, one third Loyalists, and one-third neu trals. About the. only thing to com mend this estimate is that it is a 344 THE FREEMAN June . formula easily remembered by un dergraduates for test purposes. Since no census was ever taken to determine the number of Loyalists and Patriots, most evidence of numbers is indirect. The most critical of such evidence indicates that the Patriots generally pre ponderated over the Loyalists. Loy alists were able to achieve military successes only in conjunction with British armies. They could not even hold territory gained by the British. Once the main army moved on, Patriot militia usually swarmed over the Loyalists. The following estimate of Loyalist strength may be very near the mark: "In New England they may have been scarcely a tenth of the population; in the South a quarter or a third; but in the Middle col onies including New York per haps nearly a half."4 There were, then, Loyalists in considerable number in America after the Declaration of Independ ence. They did not, however, suc ceed in turning the conflict into a fullfledged civil war. They were a threat to internal security; they offered encouragement to Britain to continue the war; they hamp ered the mustering of the resour ces of the states ~ and they attempt ed to undermine the war effort. It is not surprising, then, that the Patriots dealt with them fero ciously when they encountered them in battle or that they were subject to persecution when they were discovered.

Wartime Problems The leaders of the revolt had difficulty enough without civil war. They had to lead by way of make shift governments during most of the war. The colonial governments were no more, once independence was declared. Indeed, they had al ready been replaced with provin cial congresses or legislatures be fore that event in most states. They subsisted for some time without formal constitutions, and their exercise of authority smacked of extralegality, to put the best face on it. Though the states were faced with the crisis of prosecut ing a war, they were under the necessity of moving carefully in order to· carry as many people with them as possible. The states were hardly united, and their war effort was plagued by the fact that each state tended to go its own way. The only union government which existed from 1775 into 1781 was that provided by the Second Continental Congress. It had no constitution, nor any authority ex cept that which derived from the states. It was not a government in the usual sense of the word, though it attempted to perform the diplomatic and military func tions of one.

1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDEN CE 345 The most perplexing difficulties, however, were military and finan cial. To confront the most power ful navy in the world, the states had only a few ships that could be called warships; most of the dam age they were able to do against the British was done by privateers which depended upon speed rather than armor. The armies should be called occasional rather than regu lar or standing. True, Congress authorized a Continental Army, made requisitions on the states for men and supplies, appointed gen erals, and undertook the direction of campaigns. There was a Conti nental Army from the time of its formation until the end of the war; but at times - usually in winter - it dwindled to the point that it more nearly resembled a party than an army. When some region was threatened, the army could be fleshed out with numer ous increments of militia. The British did not usually conduct winter campaigns, .so that an oc casional army was nearly enough - for defensive purposes.

The Continental forces, during most of the war, however, were not sufficient to go on the offensive. The army frequently lacked· most of the things which make an army: discipline, effective officers for smaller units, uniforms, blankets, tents, firewood, food, adequate shot and powder, sufficient muskets or rifles and bayonets, and continuity. The initial enlistments were for one year only: only long enough, as Washington observed, for them to absorb some training and come under discipline before their officers had to begin to treat them with great deference in the hope that they would re-enlist. The militia were undependable and un predictable in combat in the open field; they were of greatest use when they outnumbered the enemy. Financing was so ineptly man aged and the consequences were so important both to the conduct of the war and the founding of the Republic that it will receive treat ment in a separate chapter.

Advantages of the Patriots It is appropriate to focus atten tion on the difficulties confronting the Americans in the War for In dependence. It enables us to see highlighted the sacrifices, bravery, and tenacity of those who did per severe to victory. But it is appro priate also to note that the Patri ots had advantages as well as diffi culties. Americans were fighting, usually, on their own soil. They had the potentiality of supplying many of their wants at home. They did not have to conquer Brit ain, only to drive her forces from the states. They had much greater prospects of gaining friends among European nations than did Brit346 THE FREEMAN June ain, for Britain's successes in the Seven Year's War had been at the expense of other major powers. The American Patriots had a cause, too, which much outranked that of their enemy. They were fighting for liberty and independ ence; the best that the British could do was appeal to monarchy, empire, and tradition, and their case for tradition was flawed by the innovations which had pro voked colonial resistance.

Even the method of assembling and maintaining armies was more appropriate than is often appreci ated. It is true, of course, that the army should have been better fed, clothed, shod, munitioned, and housed. A strong case can be made, too, that if Patriot com manders had had larger numbers of seasoned and disciplined troops they might well have won decisive victories long before they did. But it is quite possible that an army composed of men with long-term enlistments in resplendent uni forms, who were extensions of the wills of their officers and who had garnered a series of brilliant vic tories, would have endangered American liberty. Many thought ful Americans feared just the sort of army wanted by any man con fronted with the military tasks before him. Congress was loathe to encourage long enlistments. They feared a standing army, as might be expected of men of Brit ish descent. Americans were con scious not only of British history but of Roman history, and of the threat posed by successful gen erals. America did avoid the shoal of military dictatorship following the revolution, and a plausible rea son why is that there was no army with which anyone inclined to such exploits could be confident of ac complishing them.

Outstanding Leadership The Americans had another ad vantage, too; they had George Washington as commander-in chief. Whether he was a great tactician or not is a question that can be left to military historians. But there should be no doubt that he had that peculiar combination of qualities of a man to whom others turn in difficult situations. He was dignified, tenacious, far sighted, disciplined, correct, and a gentleman. His personal bravery was of the sort that is called fear less among soldiers and sometimes foolhardy for a general. More than once he rallied his troops by exposing himself to enemy bullets. A lesser man than he would have committed and lost several armies, if he could have assembled that many. Washington was sorely tempted to risk his army to rescue and redeem his reputation. Yet he resisted this temptation time and 1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDENCE 347 again, believing that it was more important to keep an army in· the field than hazard the American cause on the chance of gaining personal glory. He said after be ing driven from Long Island: "We should on all occasions avoid a general action, or put anything to the risk, unless compelled by a necessity into which we ought never to be drawn."5 He perse vered, persevered when beset by critics in Congress and the states, by the shortages and inadequacies of his army, by superior armies, by a war of attrition in the later years, and by mutiny of some of his forces. He had not only to di rect his armies against enemy forces that frequently outnum bered his, were better equipped, better disciplined, and better sup ported but also to keep up a con tinual correspondence with Con gress and with state officials to gain support and to get men and supplies. Small wonder that he often longed to return to Mt. Ver non and pursue his own affairs.

Yet he persevered for more than eight years, from 1775 to 1783. There were, of course, other generals and officers whose leader ship and ability contributed to the American cause. Among them would be listed: Benedict Arnold (until his betrayal), Henry Knox, Anthony Wayne, Nathanael Greene, and Daniel Morgan. The Continental Army benefited much, too, from foreign volunteers, not ably, Lafayette, De Kalb, and Von Steuben. And there were private soldiers, whose names do not adorn the pages of books, but who en dured untold misery to remain with the Continental Army and provide the troops without which generals are of no account. The British Forces On paper, the British were so far superior to the Americans that no contest might have been ex pected. They had the most power ful navy in the world. They had an established government, the recog nition of foreign powers, central ized taxation, established credit, a much larger population on which to draw, much greater productive capacity, and an existing and dis ciplined army, though it was small.

They hired thousands of Germans to supplement their own forces. Moreover, Loyalists in America might support them. But the task of the British was much more complex and difficult than that of the Americans. Armies had to be transported across 3,000 miles of ocean in un predictable sailing ships. Not only that, but the army and navy had generally to be supplied from home, and this transport was fre quently exposed to Patriot priva teers along the thousands of miles 348 THE FREEMAN June of coast line of the American con tinent. Once their armies left the shelter of the supporting navies and moved inland, they were among a generally hostile popu lation which rallied against them, as Generals Burgoyne and Corn wallis were to learn to their sor row. They were· always short of transport for inland maneuvers, and George Washington saw to it that very little fen into their hands. If America was divided at home, so were the British, though it did not tell much for the first couple of years.

British strategy was threefold: to isolate the continent from the rest of the world by blockade, to divide and conquer America, and to destroy Washington's army. The policy of divide and conquer had many facets: rally the Loyal ists to the cause, separate the re gions from one another, capture the major seaports, and so on.Pa triot strategy was, above all, to keep an army in the field, and, hopefully, to drive the British from· the continent. The British aimed to keep down the atrocities so as not to turn more of the American population against them; in this they were frequently thwarted by armies which plun dered and raped wherever they went. Washington's armies were under strict orders not to plunder, but. they did engage in confiscations to gain stores and supplies. Hostilities broke out in Massa chusetts, of course, in April of 1775, more than a year before the declaring of independence. For the remainder of the year and into the next, the bulk of the British forces were concentrated at Bos ton and environs. This force was under siege and cut off on land by Patriots.

The first major battle of the war took place June 17, 1775. It has gone down in history as the Battle of Bunker Hill, though, in fact, it was a battle over Breed's Hill. The Americans, some 1,200 strong built a redoubt on Breed's Hill, which the British attacked with 2,200 men against a slightly reinforced American force. The British· took the hill, but at a cost of 1,000 casualties, two and a half times the losses by the Patriots. General Gage observed that he could ill afford another victory like that. Shortly after ward, Washington assumed com mand of the Patriot forces, and a stalemate ensued for the next sev eral months. Expedition Into Canada The scene of action shifted else where. For some time, Benedict Arnold, and others, had been pro moting the idea of an expedition into Canada. It was hoped that such an undertaking would bring 1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDENCE 349 . the Canadians in on the side of the states, would remove a haven from British forces who could from that vantage point launch an attack against the states, and would show to the British the de termination of America. The plan was the more attractive because Canada was lightly defended. Con gress was reluctant to authorize the expedition because there was still hope of reconciliation. Even so, permission was given for it finally.

Two armies were launched into Canada in late 1775. The main army which set out byway of Lake Champlain was initially un der the command of General Philip Schuyler, but he fell ill and was replaced by the much more· ener getic Richard Montgomery. This army met with a series of success es by taking Forts Chambly and St. John's, followed by Montreal. The way to Quebec, the historic key to dominance of Canada, now lay open. Meanwhile, the second army un der the command of Benedict Ar nold was making its way toward Quebec by a more easterly route. Arnold set out up the Kennebec river through Maine along a route the difficulties of which were only hazily grasped at the start. Arnold and his men braved rapids, unsus pected waterfalls, long overland portages, and some of the most miserable weather ever recorded to reach their destination. "So great were the hardships that officers of the two rear divisions turned back with 350 men. But the rest plunged on through a forbidding wilder ness, overcoming almost incredible obstacles. Some of them became lost; some died; all who could, struggled forward. . . . After a month of desperate effort, 600 scarecrows of men straggled into a camp on· the headwaters of the Chaudiere."G This was in early November; they reached Quebec a few days later.

On December 2, 1775, Montgom ery's army joined forces with Ar nold outside Quebec. Although they now had superiority in num bers over the British, they were unable to take advantage of it be cause Sir Guy Carleton chose to defend the city from behind its walls rather than come out into the open. An assault upon the city on December 31 failed. General Montgomery was able to get a small force within the walls, but he was killed, and Arnold's men who were supposed to make a ren dezvous with Montgomery's were turned back after Arnold, who was wounded, relinquished the com mand. For several months, Ameri cans continued to lay Quebec un der siege, but to no avail. Superior British forces eventually arrived; though American reinforcements 350 THE FREEMAN June were also sent to Canada, they were driven out in 1776. Washington vs.Howe Early in the year of 1776, Wash ington succeeded in placing cannon on Dorchester Heights over look ing the British positions around Boston. Sir William Howe, now in command of the British army, judged his position to be too ex posed, and in March the British abandoned Boston. Howe withdrew by sea to Halifax to await rein forcements. Meanwhile, Washing ton moved his army to New York in the expectation of a British at tack there. It came in August.

Howe drove Washington's army from Long Island, from Manhat tan, a:nd then from White Plains. It then became a near rout as the British under the field command of Cornwallis followed Washing ton in a retreat through New Jer sey . Washington managed to halt the British advance at the Dela ware River in early December. He had gathered all the boats in the vicinity to transport his army across the river; once he had the boats on the· other side, he kept them there. In any case, Howe did not fol low up his advantage. He went into winter quarters in New York City, leaving much of his army spread out over New Jersey. For the Continentals, it had been a year of defeats and withdrawals. On the heels of the Canadian losses had come the ousting of Washington's army from New ·York. The British were now with in a few miles from the capitol at Philadelphia. Washington had only the remnant of an army to oppose the military and naval might of Britain.

Howe could retire to the com forts of New York; he had vic tories enough to sustain him through the winter. No such pleas ant option was open to Washing ton who was faced with the immi nent dissolution of his army and, the way things were going, no prospects of another one. If the British would not attack, he must. Under the cover of darkness on Christmas night he crossed the Delaware with his army to attack the Hessian army at Trenton at daybreak. The Germans surren dered shortly after the attack be gan. A few days later, Washing ton engineered another victory at Princeton. From his base at Mor ristown, Washington continued to drive the British from their posi tions. The extent and impact of the continuation of this campaign is spelled out by Samuel Eliot Mor ison: "In a campaign lasting only three weeks, at a time of year when gentlemen were not supposed to fight, the military genius of America's greatest gentleman, and 1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDENCE 351 the fortitude of some five thou sand of his men, had undone ev erything Howe accomplished, re covered the J ersies, and saved the American cause."7 British Occupy Philadelphia In 1777, the British launched their great offensive aimed at di viding America and destroying the Patriot ability to resist. At the beginning of the year, the mass ive force of British arms was cen tered in New York City. Another large army was in Canada. It was placed under the tactical command of General John Burgoyne. Gen eral Howe conceived initially of the grand strategy of attacking north from New York to make a junction with an attacking force from Canada. Such a victory along the line of Lake Champlain, Lake George, and the Hudson could have cut off New England from the rest of the states. However, Howe changed his mind, decided to at tack Philadelphia instead, and put to sea with that destination in mind. He did leave behind an army, of sorts, under Sir Henry Clinton, but it was insufficient to perform both its tasks of occupa tion and conducting a major of fensive campaign.

For a good portion of the sum mer, Howe's destination was a mystery to Washington. The fleet was delayed first by an extended calm and then by contrary winds. Upon hearing that the fleet had been sighted to the south, Wash ington took the main body of his army to the vicinity of PhiJadel phia, leaving Burgoyne to the mercy of the New England militia, as he said. Washington tried to block Howe's advance with a small er army at Brandywine Creek in early September, but was defeated and driven off. Howe moved on to the occupation of Philadelphia, which Congress had lately aban doned in haste. Washington's. at tack early in October on the main British force at Germantown failed to dislodge it. He withdrew his army to Valley Forge after this defeat. Burgoyne's Surrender Burgoyne had about 8,000 men at his disposal, including Loyalists and .Indians. A detachment under Baron St. Leger was dispatched through the Mohawk valley from Oswego. toward Albany. This de tachment was dispersed by troops under Benedict Arnold. Burgoyne proceeded southward at a leisurely pace, one not entirely of his own choosing, since his path was fre quently blocked by trees newly felled by Patriots. Meanwhile, mil itia began to assemble around a core of Continentals whose task was to stop Burgoyne. Eventually, so many militia had gathered to 352 THE FREEMAN June augment the Continentals under the command of General Horatio Gates that Burgoyne was outnum bered two to one. His supply route was cut by Patriots. Burgoyne's hope of being relieved from New York City did not materialize; Clinton made only a foray up the rivel", stopping well short of Al bany. Burgoyne was cut off, sur rounded; he surrendered his army intact at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. Gates was credited with the victory, but men such as John Stark and Benedict Arnold led the aggressive actions which bottled up Burgoyne.

France Enters the War Saratoga was the first great American victory. Trenton and Princeton had been important bat tles for keeping up morale, but they had been won at the expense of contingents of British forces. Burgoyne surrendered one of the major armies in America at Sara toga. There had been much sym pathyamong Frenchmen for the American cause from the begin ning. America had sent emissaries even before declaring independ ence. By 1777, Congress had sent to France the best known Ameri can at the time and America's premier diplomat, Benjamin Franklin. An alliance was drawn up between France and the states in February 1778, and shortly thereafter France was drawn into the war. Not only did Saratoga bring France to the side of the Ameri can Patriots, but it showed to any of the British willing to learn the immensity of the task that lay be fore them. Contemporaries thought General Howe was much too cau tious, even lazy and indifferent, if not a secret sympathizer with the Patriots. Historians of a later date have belabored him for un imaginative tactics. Yet Howe was the only commanding general who ever put Washington's army to rout and administered successive defeats. But to those who would see, Burgoyne's defeat showed what could well happen to any British general who committed his forces beyond naval support. Far from finding numerous Loyalists in the hinterland, Burgoyne found the countryside swarming with militia waiting to demonstrate the marksmanship of the backwoods.

Nor would the continent succumb to the capture of this or that east ern port city, even if one was the capital. America had no central city; it was a land of farmers mainly who knew not the depend ence, common in Europe, on a single city. There was no Rome to fall in America. It is reasonable to conjecture that the American Patriots should have won the war in 1778. They 1972 THE WAR FOR INDEPEDENCE 353 now had an ally who could chal lenge the British fleet and over match the British army. The Americans had shown that they could defeat a British army. Brit ain was not in dire straits, but even the government was no long er so determined to win. Lord North got a bill through Parlia ment in February 1778 aimed at reconciliation· with America. A peace commission was dispatched a little later which was authorized to offer Americans just about everything they had asked for short of independence. A command crisis developed in the British forces in 1778. Burgoyne returned home· on parole and in disgrace.

The Howe brothers resigned com mand of the army and navy in America. General Howe may have been cautious, but Henry Clinton, who replaced him, was inept. Surely, all it would have taken to drive the British from America would have been a decisive mus tering of American strength. The Winter at Valley forge This was not to be the case, however. Perhaps a better omen than Saratoga for the immediate future was Valley Forge. The war was to drag on for the better part of five more years, and the condi tion of the Continental army at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-1778 tells us why, at least in part. One of Washington's biog raphers has described conditions this way: Thus, at the beginning of 1778, the Army was witnessing one of the strangest of races, a contest between the axes of the men building huts and the harsh wear-and-tear on the remaining garments of those who still had sufficient clothing to permit outdoor duty .... Although hospital huts were built early and in what was believed to be sufficient number, they soon were overcrowded with miser able men who died fast or, if they survived, received little attention. In spite of all exertion, it was the mid dle of January when the last of the troops were under roof. Even then they did not always have straw to take the chill from the earthen floor of their huts. Thousands had no bed covering.

Food, of course, was the absolute essential - and food, more than even clothing or blankets or straw, was lacking at Valley Forge .. , . "Fire cakes"frequently were all the half naked men had to eat in their over crowded, smoky huts. Early in the New Year most of the regiments had to be told the Commissary could is sue no provisions because it had none, none whatsoever .... These were desperate hours. Wash ington continued to watch and to warn. "A prospect now opens," he said February 17, "of absolute want such as will make it impossible to keep the Army much longer from dis solution .... "8 354 THE FREEMAN June Indeed, the army did seem to be on the verge of dissolution. "In December 1777, for example, over two thousand men went home. Hundreds of officers tendered their resignations; on one day alone, fifty threw up their commissions."!> Nor are these resignations and de sertions to be wondered at when the hardships of the army are con trasted with the relatively good life of civilians. It is generally be..; lieved that about the only people in America suffering privation were in the army. One historian says, "Civilians· declined to forgo their pleasures merely because the army was in want; at a ball at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in Janu ary 1778, over one hundred ladies and gentlemen gathered in all their finery to enj oy a 'cold colla tion with wine, punch, sweet cakes ... , music, dancing, singing ... "

which lasted until four o'clock in the morning."lO These revels were taking place only a short distance from Valley Forge. The incongruities here account for the American impotence. The reason for their existence needs now to be explained. t) • FOOTNOTES • 1 Quoted in Merrill Jensen, The Found ing of a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 663. 2 John R. Alden, The American Revo lution (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1954), p. 85. 3 Ibid., p. 86. 4 Piers Mackesy, The War for America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 36. 5 Quoted in ibid., p. 91. G John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 203-05. 7 Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford His tory of the American People (New York: Oxford UniversIty Press, 1965), p. 244. 8 Douglas S. Freeman, Washington, abridged by Richard Harwell (New York: Scribner's, 1968), pp. 373-74.

9 John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1948), p. 225. 10 Ibid., p. 223. IDEAS ON LIBERTY N ext: The Scourge of Inflation. Discipline CALL it high training, or culture, or discipline, or high breeding, or what you will, it is only the sense of what we owe to ourselves, and it is greater and greater according to our opportunities. From an essay by WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER HENRY HAZLITT THE THEME of this study is the conquest of poverty, not its "abo lition." Poverty can be alleviated or reduced, and in the Western world in the Jast two centuries it has been almost miraculously alle viated and reduced; but poverty is ultimately individual, and individ ual poverty can no more be "abol ished" than disease or death can be abolished. Individual or family poverty re sults when the "breadwinner" can not in fact win bread; when he cannot or does not produce enough to support his family or even him self. And there will always be some human beings who will tem porarily or permanently lack the abili ty to provide even for their own self-support. Such is the con dition of all of us as young chil dren, of many of us when we fall ill,and of most of us in extreme old age. And such is the perma nent condition of some who have been struck by misfortune - the blind, the crippled, the feebleHenry Hazlitt is well known to Freeman readers as author, columnist, editor, lecturer, and practitioner of freedom. This article will appear as the concluding chapter in a forth coming book, The Conquest of Poverty, to be published by Arlington House.