Book Reviews

Laurence W. Beilenson, in a stimu lating book, Survival and Peace in the Nuclear Age (Regnery-Gateway, Chicago, Illinois, 169 pp., $10.95) has a natural sympathy for the lib ertarian's position, but he is sure that simple trust is not enough. To keep one's enemies at a distance in the age of the intercontinental bal listic missile requires a canny mix ture of what Beilenson calls avoid ance and deterrence. Avoidance demands nimble diplomats; deter rence dictates the spending of money, which, of course, brings the hated tax collector into the picture. Since Mr. Beilenson believes in 188 freedom, he wants to make the best deal for his country that can be managed within the bounds of real ism. As the author of The Treaty Trap and Power Through Subver sion he knows that we have always had wars in the past and, presum ably, could have them in the future. When wars do occur, the embattled governments may follow conven tions up to a point. But nobody is going to forswear the use of a weapon, no matter how hideous, if, by turn ing to it, one can insure one's sur vival. The chances are that nuclear weapons would come into play in a war for western Europe the minute that one side or the other was threatened with defeat.

Mr. Beilenson doesn't want to give western Europe to the Communists. But, on the other hand, he doesn't SURVIVAL IN THE: NUCLEAR AGE 189 A FlexibleStand With the two values in mind, we ,1V0uld be forced to rely on the same type of thinking that has enabled the followers of Lenin to win victo ries without risk of premature em broilment. The Leninists have fol lowed a double-pronged strategy, Inixing subversion with opportunist E~xploitation of occasional revolu tionary situations. Detente and ((wars of liberation" are ideologically in c:ompatible, but when they are sep arated geographically they have not resulted in any worldwide ((final conflict." Mr~ Beilenson doesn't ask for any foolish consistency from our policy makers as long as the Rus sians are permitted their inconsiswant to see the United States trapped by its present commitment to pour conventional forces into a theater where reliance on convention would be abandoned practically at the out set.

a real power center on its own, the United States will no longer be the primary target for Soviet ballistic missiles. Europeans shouldn't object to this, for with two targets to worry about, the Soviets would be less in dined to start anything. A Policyof Deterrence With American ground forces Thinking the ((unthinkable," Mr. 'withdrawn from Europe and Asia, Beilenson calls for an approach that and with Washington matching accepts nuclear war as the norm in :Moscow ((nuke for nuke," we would the European theater unless some be combining a minimum of forward way is to be found to forestall war of . area provocation with a maximum any kind. Treaties signed with the of reserved menace if, by any chance, Communists won't help-the Sovi-our diplomacy should fail. Mr. ets used SALT I as a screen behind Beilenson's proposal creates an odd which they vastly added to theirnu-perspective. But the perspective ac clear capabilities. What the United commodates the two values of avoid States should do is to match the So-ance and deterrence.

viets in deterrence, but with an ef fort to develop simpler and cheaper weapons (say the neutron bomb and the cruise missile). Civil defense should come into the picture. Then, having informed the world through our actions that we mean to defend ourselves, we should put it up to the West Europeans to do something on their own behalf. Mr. Beilenson would share our nuclear knowledge and weapons with the other NATO nations even at the risk of wide atomic proliferation. The West Germans should have nuclear weapons on their own soil. Mean while our forward garrisons in West Germany should be reduced over a five-year period. Once western Eu rope has been persuaded to become 190 THE FREEMAN March tency. His suggested rules amount to what he calls ((the Lenin Adapta tion in Reverse." The rules begin with a statement that ((we are for peace and we will not go to war to aid communist dissidents." But if we do not propose to be an ((interna tional busybody," we should never theless stand ready to give financial and other aid to dissidents short of sending troops.

Angola would have been a good staging area for the Lenin Adapta tion in Reverse. Mr. Beilenson thinks Jimmy Carter acted wisely when he refused to send American soldiers to oppose the Cubans in Angola. But Carter was mistaken when he put his faith in merely deploring what Castro had done. In Beilenson's opinion Carter should have ((sent American foreign aid for freedom af ter open announcement. He should have said bluntly: (The Cubans are foreign intruders in Africa. To any Africans willing to kill the Cuban intruders, the United States will give cannon. And the weapons we give will match in quality the Soviet weapons.' " This would be giving the Soviets tit for tat. Our policy of subversion should be conducted in the open, not ((covertly." It should be just as hon est as Lenin's own opportunism. Mr. Beilenson thinks that much of our so-called strategic thinking in regard to ((flanks" and ((lifelines" is based on past wars. To be worried about the control of the oil ((lifeline"