Chapter 107 of 115 · The Freeman 1982 by Foundation for Economic Education
A Guide to Principled Self-Defense; R. J. Bidinotto
My friend accepts the free market philosophy, and knew of my special interest in such issues. He wondered if I had any information that might help him prepare a talk. A week or two later I gave him a written analysis of the question. He seemed somewhat astonished at its seeming complexity, and intimated that he felt inadequate to achieve similar results on his own. He sug gested that since I had read more than he had on such topics, I had a specialized knowledge he could not match. This got me thinking. Actually, Mr. Bidinotto is a freelance writer in Milford, Massa chusetts. 728 most of my argument had rested not upon vast scholarship, but upon a reasoned analysis of the question it self. Certainly a knowledge of the free market literature is extremely valuable. But while some might have the time and inclination to acquire such an education, most busy people do not; and some, such as my friend, are inclined toward individualism and capitalism based upon limited reading, general experience, and "common sense." These people feel vulnerable to technical arguments from collectivists who are educated specialists in the humanities.
Can an engineer, housewife, or computer operator effectively de fend himself against professors of economics, political science, and philosophy? Can the individualist layman hope to hold his own against the collectivist professional? If successful intellectual self-deA GUIDE TO PRINCIPLED SELF-DEFENSE 729 fense depended upon education alone, the amateur would always be a pushover for the professional. But all of us share the capacity to reason. No matter how well informed a col lectivist may be, his doctrine re mains irrational; so no matter what the relative scales of knowledge, the individualist need not be over whelmed by a collectivist oppo nent-ifhe employs valid principles of thinking. It is not possible to discuss all such principles here. So I shall discuss just a few, then illustrate how I applied. them to my friend's speech topic: "Who should own/control the work place?"
1. Define your terms. It is astonishing how many dis cussions are based upon concepts whose meaning nobody bothers to specify. Most people literally "don't know what they're talking about." Their concepts-the building blocks of every statement-are left open to implication. Politicians are especially guilty of this, since their careers are erected upon a foundation of ambiguity. A classic relic in their verbal collec tions is "the public interest." Speci fying nothing, it permits anything. One of the best defenses against being steamrollered is to require an opponent to define his terms. A good definition distinguishes a concept from all others, by (1) identifying the factual basis of the abstraction, (2) specifying the] context in which it arises or applies, and (3) naming the essentials, the fundamental charac teristic(s), upon which most of the concept's other characteristics de pend.I For example, a good defini tion of "justice" is: the act of evalu ating human character and/or actions solely on the !basis of factual evi dence' by reference to an objective moral standard. This states pre cisely the referents, context, and fundamental essence of '~ustice" and thereby distinguishes it from any other virtue,! such as "honesty"
(which is not'limited to character evaluation, i.el., a social context). Since facts" context, and funda mentals are the very elements ab sent from collectivist doctrines, the act of defining terms may be suffi cient to dem~lish most arguments based upon th~se doctrines. 2. Determine the context. Is the discussion about politics, economics, or philosophy? Does it concern factual knowledge (cogni tive concepts):or evaluations of facts (normative concepts)? Is it a funda mental issue, or does it rest upon some moreoasic, implied premise that must be addressed first (Le.,does it involve "question begging")? One must determine the context of the discussion by answering such ques tions as these. In cognitive issues, conclusions 730 THE FREEMAN December depend entirely upon logical pro gression from established facts. The chief responsibility is to determine the relevant facts, then to reason from them, admitting no logical con tradictions.
Normative issues are built upon cognitive concepts. The tipoff to any normative or ethical issue lies in its (implicit or explicit) advocacy of some action or choice; frequently, norma tive premises signal their presence in a discussion by the words "should" or "ought" ("There ought to be a law ... "). There is nothing wrong with ethical advocacy as such. The dan ger begins when ostensibly political or economic debates "beg the ques tion" of a moral standard, as they almost always do. The reason is that political discussions are, at root, dis cussions of social ethics; and most people are either unwilling or un able to specify and justify their un derlying moral premises. Ethical arguments-open or dis guised-must be identified and val idated. This means they must be tied to basic facts of human nature and of man's basic relationship to exis tence. This is true of any alleged "political" question which involves advocacy of some action that "should"
or "should not" be taken. No advo cacy position can be taken seriously that evades the answers to the ques tions: "By what standard?" and "For what purpose?" Failing. an intelligi ble response to these questions, a person's position may be dismissed out of hand, as an arbitrary asser tion. Unless the context of discussion is clearly established, it will be impos sible to know which principles can be applied to resolve· the issues in volved. 3. Establish the burden of proof. Once definitions and context are determined, the burden of proof can be established. That burden always rests with the person asserting or advocating something (the person "taking the positive"). The person to whom an opinion is merely asserted, without sufficient evidence and proof, is under no obligation to demon strate or disprove anything: nobody is obligated to "disprove" an arbi trary assertion ("prove a negative").
Whoever is making the case, whether collectivist or individualist, bears the burden of proof. Since an swering a question usually requires an asserted position from the person answering, he assumes the burden of proof. Thus in any discussion with a knowledgeable adversary, it is wise to follow the example of Socrates and ask a lot of questions. Two excellent questions are: "What do you mean?" and "Why?" The first forces an opponent to clarify his terms; the second forces him to jus tify his position. Both, used repeat edly, can reduce a vague discussion to clear-cut essentials while keeping 1982 A GUIDE TO PRINCIPLED SELF-DEFENSE 731 an opponent under the burden of proof. 4. Beware of smuggled-in "con tradictions in terms." One ofthe most prevalent and least understood logical fallacies consists of using concepts while denying their very roots and meanings. 2 A classic political example is Proudhon's infamous statement that "property is theft." Observe that the word theft has meaning only if there is a legitimate concept of property: "theft" means "the forcible acquisi· tion of somebody else's legitimate property." [fthere is noproperty, there can be no theft! Thus Proudhon's statement is a contradiction in terms.
The concept "property" is smuggled into the meaning of the concept "theft," while Proudhon denies that property even exists. Such sophistry has become a standby technique in philosophy discussions. If an opponent finds himself losing a debate, he may fre quently challenge the very grounds of debate, proof, and even thought itself. There are many modern philosophical doctrines that claim to "know" that knowledge is impossi ble, that claim to "disprove" the va lidity of logical proof, that deny the "reality" of existence, that claim no "awareness" of consciousness, that "reason" to the conclusion that ra tionality is an illusion, and so on. Every such assault on the foundations of knowledge and rational de bate entail smuggled-in "contradic tions in terms": they utilize the concepts they ~re denying. And such aS$aults are also self-in clusive, Le., they must include the person stating them. To argue against reason, logic, existence, awareness, and knowledge, means: to concede that oneself and one's po sition are devoid of any of these things.
All concepts and principles are structured in $. hierarchy. Make sure that an educated opponent's flowery prose does not bloom while he yanks up its roots. 5. Demand logical consistency. If concepts are the building blocks of thought, l(j)gic is its mortar. All arguments must be grounded in es tablished facts; and every conclu sion must gtow from these roots without contradiction. This is what we mean when we say: "Prove it!" Contrary tq current academic fad, logic is not some arbitrary system of rules unconnected to fact. It is based in the very nature of reality. All things exist ~n a specific, particular way. And be~use things have a spe cific nature and identity, they can not have a c9ntrary identity at the same time. The system of logic de fined by Aristotle is built upon the non-contradi~tory identification of things. To admit contradictions into discussions is to claim the impossi732 THE FREEMAN December ble, and thus to invalidate one's con clusions.
The ubiquity of irrational politi ~al and economic ideas is largely due to the fact that while they are re quired subjects in schools, logic is not. A good book on Aristotelian logic is a must for anyone serious about principled self-defense. In discussions, the basic approach is to take the opponent's premise to its logical conclusion, or to regress his conclusions back to their logi cally antecedent premises. In so doing, any follies should become ap parent. To summarize the principles: 1. Define your terms. 2. Determine the context. 3. Establish the burden of proof. 4. Beware of smuggled-in "contra dictions in terms." 5. Demand logical consistency. How do these principles apply to my friend's classroom topic, "Who should own/control the workplace?" The first thing I noticed was that the question was "loaded" with smuggled-in premises and assump tions. The word "Who" implies that "the workplace" is up for grabs-that no legitimate owner exists. This begs a question, thereby implying an equal burden of proof upon both support ers and opponents of private owner ship rights. Observe what happens when the begged question is asked: "Should there be any changes in current ownership of the work place?" Now the burden is upon those who would advocate such changes.
But to accept the question as worded by the Marxist professor is to accept the smuggled-in premise that cur rent ownership rights are dubious, and to assume (unnecessarily) some burden of proof. Secondly, the word "should" is a tipoff to a normative (ethical) con text, while the topic appears, super ficially, to deal with a political or economic question. Because of to day's ethical relativism and the ab sence of any agreed-upon morality, it is likely that no answer is going to be accepted as final. The purpose of asking such a question, then, seems to be to spread doubt and uncer tainty about current ownership rights to "the workplace." This is all accomplished by begging the ques tion:"By what moral standard can issues of ownership be resolved?" which helps disguise the essentially ethical context involved. Thirdly, observe the interesting usages of the concepts "own" and "workplace." "Own" (when defined) means "the exclusive right to keep, use, and dispose of something." Yet, as we have already seen, the ques tion itself implies that such an ex clusive right to keep "the work place" under control of its current owners is in doubt. Translated, the question means: "Since the exclu sive right to own the workplace is in 1982 A GUIDE TO PRINCIPLED SELF-DEFENSE 733 question, who should own the work·· place?" The Marxist professor is us·· ing the concept "own" while ques·· tioning its validity. (A clue that even he grasps what he is doing lies in his inclusion of the modifier or alterna tive concept, "control." But every thing I have said about the word "own" is true of the word "control.") It is a smuggled-in "contradiction in terms" -and a most subtle example at that.
As for the term "workplace," it is an ambiguity or euphemism for the concept "capital." Now consider the question. If i.t means: "Who should own the capi tal?"-the meaning is utterly triv ial (Answer: "Those who own it"- ownership being a moral claim of right). If it means: "Who is morally entitled to capital to which some men already hold moral title?"-the meaning, and the point, is utterly absent. If the question means: "Who should take the capital?"-the meaning is utterly clear, and utterly sinister. Remembering that the word "should" is a moral concept, and the idea of taking something from an owner (theft) is an immoral notion, the last interpretation is another smuggled-in "contradiction in terms." But supporting speculation that this is an accurate interpretation of the professor's question is the fact that he is a Marxist. In fact, the only intelligible mean ing of the question is that all currently held private capital is up for grabs, and "should" be redistributed on (unspecified) moral grounds.
That six words can beg several questions, obliterate the burden of proof, leave terms ambiguous, use a concept self-.,contradictorily, and sneak implied moral premises into an ostensibly) political-economic is sue, is a marvelous achievement of some sort. Notice that the foregoing analysis involves no s~ecialized political or economic knowledge, yet is suffi cient to deal with the professor's question. But!knowing that the pro fessor might pretend that all of this somehow "ducked the issue," I pro ceeded to employ a strictly logical analysis on the collectivist position as if the question could be taken at face value. L~t us assume that capi tal is up for grabs, and that our (un specified) motal standard behind the "should" is the collectivist "general welfare." Would a change of capital ownership promote "the general welfare"? ' This switclJ-esthe argument to an economic context. Any proposed so lution to th~ question that would deny private: capitalists the right to own and inv~st capital would make economic calculation impossible, thereby creating an economic chaos that would undermine the "general welfare." Why?
Human well-being is only possible if the economy fills human needs.
734 THE FREEMAN And this necessitates economic cal culation: the purposeful production of goods and services to fulfill con sumer demand. Economic calcula tion is only made possible by prices the signals established by the inter action of the forces of supply and de mand, in terms of money. The means by which these forces interact is competition in the marketplace. The competitors are entrepreneurs, who struggle to control the factors of pro duction, in accordance with con sumer demand. This means they must produce and market what they hope will bring the best return (profit) on their invested (risked) capital. But profit-seeking can only occur in the context of private own ership of capital. Without private ownership, there is no profit motive; hence, no invest ment; hence, no competition; hence, no prices; and hence, no possibility of rational economic calculation. This would create chaos and the harm of "the general welfare."
Without prices, the factors of pro duction must be allocated by decree, i.e., by political instead of economic considerations. Supply and demand forces can no longer interplay; pro duction is severed from consump tion. This means overproduction of the unwanted, and shortages of the needed. There is simply no way to duplicate the complexity of the au tomatic signaling system of market prices; but without private capital ownership, competition does not arise to establish prices, and that system breaks down.3 Thus the contradiction in collec tivism is that collectivist politics (public ownership or control of capi tall"the workplace") necessarily contradicts collectivist economics (maximizing "the general welfare"). The foregoing economic discus sion illustrates how one might pro ceed with a strictly "cognitive" is sue. While some basic knowledge of economic principles was required, exhaustive erudition was not: merely a clear grasp of the hierarchy of the relevant concepts and principles.
The Great Equalizer In the early days of America, the most urgent need was for some means of physical self-defense for the average man, and the revolver was regarded as "the great equalizer" of men. But today, men need the means of intellectual self-defense even more urgently. And the principled man's guide to self-defense-his "great equalizer" - is his power to reason.' -FOOTNOTES1For a most useful discussion of how to define concepts, see Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objec tivist Epistemology (New York: Mentor/New American Library, 1979). 2Described elsewhere as "the stolen concept." Ibid., Chapter 6. 3This argument was formulated by Ludwig von Mises. See Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape: Revised, 1951), pp. 520-1.
The Freeman 1982
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