Catch the Little Foxes; J. Williams

John K. Williams Catchthe LittleFoxes! A FRIEND of W. C. Fields once dis covered the comedian diligently reading the Bible. Surprised by this uncharacteristic display of piety, the friend asked Fields what he was doing. "What do you think?" re torted Fields. "I'm looking for loopholes!" That, I suppose, is one way of read ing the Bible. There are countless other ways. One of these ways sim ply involves seeking out and delight ing in the images used by the Bib lical writers. One such image, quaint but charming, I would bring to your attention. "Catch us," requests the author of The Song ofSolomon, "the The Reverend Doctor John K. Williams has been a teacher and is a freelance writer and lecturer based in North Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. He was res ident scholar at FEE this past summer. 618 foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vineyards."! Most defenders of freedom are aware of, and have thought about, the great and powerful forces which today conspire to spoil the vineyards of economic and political liberty. We do well, however, also to be alert to the "little foxes" -the sneaking, sly realities that nip away at and in time devastate the liberties our forefathers planted and we are called to tend. When we look, we discover that the number of these "little foxes" is alarmingly large.

The Little Fox of Snobbery A strange phenomenon has re cently become widespread in my country. It is fashionable to deplore and sneer at fast-food chains and soCATCH THE LITI'LE FOXES! 619 called family restaurants. Liberals given to haunting those tribal ritu als called "cocktail" or "sherry" par ties become quite animated at these gatherings when the conversation turns to the actual or threatened ar rival of a MacDonald's outlet or Den ny's Restaurant in their fashionable suburb. Noisily, they lament the al legedly plastic smiles, plastic food, and plastic architecture of these establishments. Some liberals have gone further, writing articles and penning little books bewailing the evils of fast food and family restaurants. It would seem that these twentieth century phenomena have become, for many liberals, the apotheosis of cap italism, the very epitome of the socio-economic system they deplore.

Hence, while unable to take the lib eral mentality as seriously as it takes itself, I invite you briefly to ponder this loathing of institutions which seem, at least on the surface, innocuous. Strangely, the liberals have at one point got something right. Fast-food chains and family restaurants do capture something of the essence of the free market. In and through these enterprises the market is doing what it always has done: transform ing luxuries once reserved for a priv ileged few into commonplace activ ities taken for granted by the many. Writes Joseph Schumpeter: "It is the cheap cloth, the cheap rayon and cotton fabric, boots, motorcars and so on that are the typical achieve ment of capitalist production, and not as a rule improvements that would mean much to a rich man. Queen Elizabeth [the First] owned silk stockings. The capitalist achieve ment does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort."2 Not so long ago, dining out was considered-at least in my country a luxury. The wealthiest frequently patronized restaurants. Moderately comfortable families dined out only on special occasions. Those yet to en joy even "moderate comfort" dined out rarely if at all.

The Achievement of Capitalism But the market worked its magic. Consider what capitalism has done. The pleasurable practice once en joyed by a few became available to the many. Tastes once perceived as evidence of refinement-namely, choosing one's meal from a menu and being waited upon-were revealed as universal and thus "ordinary." Or dinary folk gained. Yet some people lost-lost the plea sure derived from "feel[ing] and act [ing] smugly superior" by displaying "tastes and interests" distinguish ing them from the masses. So deriv ing pleasure is, according to the dic620 THE FREEMAN October tionary, the defining characteristic of snobbery. That a snob, so the dic tionary affirms, is "a vulgar or os tentatious person," perhaps merits mention! Still, people desperate to seem "different" can entertain their whims. Accompanying the advent of fast-food chains and family restau rants has been the emergence of ex traordinarily expensive dining places boasting a "homey atmos phere" and "home-cooked food."

People of self-sty led "refinement" can thus pretend to be dining at home and, during their meal, con template the rare and special tastes distinguishing them from the masses. Indeed, affluent liberals to day tend to regard taking their friends to restaurants as somewhat gauche. They thus flock to courses in gourmet cooking and, after a tiring day slaving over a hot stove, invite one another to home-cooked meals served by themselves. They thus re main "special." Remain "different." Remain "snobs." And nip away at the free market for robbing them of their snobbish privileges. The Little Fox of Obsessive Democracy First cousin to the little fox of snobbery is the little fox of obsessive democracy. The obsessively demo cratic little fox actually enjoys what the snobbish little fox would like to enjoy: tastes and attitudes quite distinct from those held by ordinary mortals. Yet in the case of the ob sessively democratic little fox, "en joy" is a misleading verb. He or she dislikes being different, and yearns to be simply "one ofthe boys" or "one of the girls."

Usually, the little fox of obsessive democracy is an academic. By virtue of their training, academics fre quently are elitist in their tastes, in the literal meaning of that sadly abused word, "elitist." The aca demic savors the novels of Dostoev sky; the masses devour the works of Jackie Collins. The academic listens with delight to the music of Mozart; the masses spend vast sums upon re cordings of the noises made by "Boy George." And the obsessively dem ocratic academic is profoundly disturbed. Grounds for being disturbed cer tainly do exist. While holding that economic value is purely subjective, signifying not some property of an object but a relationship between an appraising mind and an object ap praised, I see no more reason to as sume that aesthetic value is subjec tive than to assume a subjective theory of truth. If informed that a Jackie Collins novel or a "Boy George" song is really on a par with The Brothers Karamazov or The Magic Flute, I shall treat my infor mant with courtesy, but nothing more. The informant is sadly mis guided and, while praying that a soul 1985 CATCH THE LI'ITLE FOXES! 621 might be delivered from barbarism, I shall not meditate at length upon a grotesquely perverse point of view.

Typically, however, the obses sively democratic academic is not content merely to lament error. Nor does it suffice to instruct the ill informed and thereby foster the cause of civilization. A glaring dif ference must be explained away. The obsessive democrats like to believe that their tastes and interests are really "natural" and would be shared by all were it not for some distorting process debasing the val ues of so-called "ordinary" people. And the free market provides the sought-for scapegoat! It even caters to a demonstrably democratic desire for villains to hiss! The masses, so obsessively democratic academics muse, would agree with them were it not for the demonic manipulation and destruction of "authentic feel ings" engineered by profit-seeking entrepreneurs and advertisers work ing in and through the market. George J. Stigler puts the matter well. "It is ... a basic function of the intellectual to define the standards of good taste more clearly, and to persuade people to approach them more closely. It is proper to denounce vulgarity of taste, and to denounce it more strongly the more popular it is.... [YJet I say that complaints of deficiencies in tastes are misplaced when they are directed to the mar ket place. . . . The market place responds to the tastes of consumers with the goods and services that are saleable, whether the tastes are ele vated or depraved. It is unfair to cri ticize the market place for fulfilling these desires, when clearly the de fects lie in the popular tastes them selves. I consider it a cowardly concession to a false extension of de mocracy to make sub rosa attacks on public tastes by denouncing the peo ple who serve them. It is like blam ing the waiters in restaurants for obesity.' '3 Consumer Tastes and Values The market place reveals, with un canny and not undisturbing accu racy, popular tastes and values. Cas tigating the market for what it re veals is lUre denouncing wet roads for inclement weather. Yet the ob sessive democrat, temperamentally, must sustain the illusion that he or she is really "one of the people." It is not merely egalitarianism; it is profound insecurity combined with egalitarianism. Perhaps an element of guilt is also present, an academic wondering whether a salary deter mined by the market place for a per son specializing and delighting in early Elizabethan literature would be quite as generous as that granted by an essentially government-funded school or college. Be that as it may, the villain has been uncovered. The' obsessive democrat's tastes are those of "the people," but of "the people"

622 THE FREEMAN October as they would be were it not for the destructive, alienation-producing market. So what, as Lenin once asked, is to be done? The answer is clear. Tinker with the market. A tax on popular novels here; a subsidy for "worth while literature" there. Extract money from football fans and movie buffs to underwrite performances of opera and ballet. Challenge the rule of radio stations playing recordings by "Boy George" by "publicly funded" radio stations featuring Mozart. And, of course, launch vig orous attacks on the evils of advertising. The little fox of obsessive democ racy is, I suggested, first-cousin to the little fox of snobbery. The differ ences are obvious, but so is the fam ily resemblance. Each sets about spoiling the vineyards of liberty to protect personal convictions chal lenged by the choices of countless in dividuals through the workings of the market. One wishes to feel "dif ferent," possessed of rare and re fined tastes. The market, transform ing luxuries "into commonplace opportunities, reveals that the tastes in question are universal. The other wishes to be "one of the people," but the market, dutifully providing the people with what they value, reveals that the tastes of the masses and those of the obsessive democrat are radically different. In each case, the market shatters a cherished illusion. Not surprisingly, the market is thoroughly disliked!

The Little Fox of Moralism The third little fox spoiling the vineyards belongs to a different fam ily. The little fox of moralism is not the victim of illusion. Rather, he is merely confused. His values, while essentially sound, are impressionis tic. His knowledge of the workings of the free market is almost zero. Yet, at least in theory, reason and argu ment might lead to his becoming a guardian rather than a destroyer of the vineyards. The moralist values the coopera tive and compassionate spirit. He is anxious to see justice· realized and destitution abolished. He measures the market against these less than precise values, and declares the mar ket wanting. The market is immo ral. Or so the little fox of moralism believes. Sincerely believes. And with admirable intentions, he sets about spoiling the vineyards. The sincerity and good intentions of moralists, religious and secular, who attack the free market in a free society, need not be questioned.

However, a brief perusal of history suffices to establish the havoc and devastation wrought by the sincer est of people from the best of motives. G. K. Chesterton somewhere ob serves that were a lunatic wielding an axe to be pursuing one in the sin cere belief that the world would be 1985 CATCH THE LITTLE FOXES! 623 unspeakably enriched by one's de mise, the lunatic's sincerity-and, indeed, good intentions-do not ob ligate one to assist him in his hom icidal endeavors. The moralist yearns to see desti tution abolished. Astonishingly, that yearning leads him to oppose the free market. All the evidence available suggests that an allocation of scarce resources by political rather than by market forces perpetuates poverty. The Swedish economist, Sven Ry denfelt, recently published a volume in which he examines the perfor mance of fifteen diverse nations em bracing socialism. A single story emerges. "From disillusioned farm ers to poor harvests, from food sub sidies to foreign loans from massive debts to bankruptcy, the socialist state is doomed."4 The hungry are not fed; the naked are not clothed; the homeless are not housed. The survival of the unhappy inhabitants of these nations rests upon the pro ductivity and generosity of the very capitalist nations so many moralists deplore.

That this is so should not surprise. A small tribal society may well be able to cope with a centrally planned economy. Wants are few and are known. Skills also are few. Raw ma terials available to the tribe are bas ically known. Tribal elders, or the tribe as a whole, can collate infor mation about these wants, skills, and available resources, and direct the tribe's productive activities by ref erence to this information. This cannot be done in a large and complex society. People want innu merably different things. Countless skills are diffused through millions of people, and constantly change as new technologies are devised. Raw materials are distributed globally, and are characterized by constantly changing relative scarcities. No ex perts could conceivably collate, syn thesize, and make economic deci sions by reference to this totality of information. Yet in the absence of this information, resources inevita bly will be misallocated, people fail ing to use what they have to acquire what they want.

The Market Process But in a free market the requisite information is available. As Fried rich A. Hayek 5 , building on the work of Ludwig von Mises, has so cogently argued, changing relative money prices in the market "encode" the relative data. Suppose, for instance, that the price of one sort of fish in creases relative to the price of other sort of fish. Fish consumers use the more expensive fish sparingly, and start seeking for alternatives. Fish providers, anxious to secure a pleas ing return for their labors, seek to increase the supply of the expensive fish or discover a pleasing alterna tive. Maybe an alert entrepreneur devises a means of farming the fa624 THE FREEMAN October vored fish. Both consumers and pro ducers know what they must do to adapt to the new social situation and to improve their personal lot, and have every incentive to behave in the appropriate wa:y. Planning is still a reality, but it is planning by individuals who know precisely what their abilities and wants are rather than by alleged "experts" who cannot even begin to calculate what wants and abilities are there to be considered, coordi nated' and satisfied. Cooperation is the essence of the exercise, but it is the uncoerced cooperation of individ uals who, to improve their own sit uation, must take account of their fellow citizen's wants, and whose productive activities rest upon and presuppose the different productive activities of their fellows.

Indeed, it is a society coordinated by political commands that involves a morally suspect form of "compe tition" as against "market coopera tion." Such a society inexorably de clines into factions competing for the attention and favors of those ex ercising political power. Each fac tion seeks a larger share of available goods in the full knowledge that suc cess in securing such a share means less for others. In a market economy, an economy coordinated by individ uals seeking to improve their own situations, the only "competition" obtaining is the competition to dis cover new and better ways of satisfying the desires of others. Doubt lessly some individuals seek to curry favors from the politically powerful, but the extent to which success fol lows these attempts measures the distance towards socialism the com munity in question has traveled. Simply, a desire to alleviate pov erty, to foster cooperation, and to fur ther consideration of the needs of others, favors not a socialist com mand economy, but the free market that moralists so angrily denounce.

The moralist perceives something "unjust" about disparities of income and wealth distribution effected by market forces. Yet what in this con text can the words "just" and "un just" signify? Absolute equality of income and wealth is usually con ceded to be "unjust," in that it takes no account of different needs, differ ent wants, and different efforts, and demands constant coerced redistri butions to "correct" inequalities generated as people freely exchange what is theirs. What then is re quired? The Rule of Law The answer usually is disarmingly simple: a distribution taking ac count of all relevant personal fac tors. Yet what are these factors? And how is such a distribution to be achieved? Maybe in a family or even schoolroom, burdens and benefits can be distributed related to individ ual wants and moral deserts, but in 1985 CATCH THE LITTLE FOXES! 625 both the family and schoolroom a parent or teacher knows each indi vidual involved and can, with mod erately successful accuracy, deter mine such wants and deserts. Yet the smallness of the group involved is the sine qua non of this state of af fairs. In a complex society of literally millions, such knowledge is inacces sible and such a distribution there fore impossible.

Yet both the words "justice" and "injustice" can still operate. Think again ofthe family or classroom. The parent or teacher ignoring individ ual needs and deserts may well be regarded as "unfair" or "unjust," but so is the parent or teacher who has a "favorite" or "pet." In some circum stances "fairness" or "justice" may demand a consideration of the per sonal situation of individuals, but in other circumstances what is de manded is the impartial enforce ment of rules applicable to all. The first use of the words "fairness" or "justice" cannot, as argued, be ex tended beyond the small and inti mate group to "society as a whole," but the second use can. Indeed, only the second use can. In a large and complex society, '~ustice" demands rule by purely general principles of conduct, equally applicable to all. The "justice" of a particular distri bution of income or wealth is deter mined not by some characteristic of the distribution itself, but by the be havior or procedures generating the distribution. The question to be asked is whether that behavior de fied or complied with general rules of conduct equally applicable to all.

If, for example, the behavior gener ating a particular distribution of in come or wealth defied rules pro scribing force, theft and fraud, the behavior is "unjust" and thus the distribution is unjust. Conversely, if the behavior was voluntary and in accordance with the rules-if the be havior, let us say, did not involve force, theft or fraud-the behavior and thus the distribution is "just." Justice and Impartiality Such a model of "justice," appli cable to a large and complex society, should appeal to many moralists, particularly members of the Chris tian clergy. It reflects the impartial ity of the One Who "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matthew 5:45). Admit tedly, it falls short of the "justice" which will be meted out on the Last Day, when He who knows all things, incl uding the innermost secrets of every human being's heart, judges each, but such justice cannot be em ulated by finite creatures who do not and cannot know all things, yet who nonetheless must create social order.

In one sense, "justice" understood as the rule of purely general principles of conduct equally applicable to all may be a "second best," but given a 626 THE FREEMAN social group larger than the small and intimate unit of the family or family-like body, it is the only form of ~)ustice" available to finite, falli ble beings. Politicians may speak of a large modern nation as a "family"; some clergymen may cling to a social ideal based upon the small feudal village. The reality of a large and complex society is, however, ill served by a model of "justice" ap propriate only to such rhetoric and nostalgic yearnings. In sum, the moralist objects to a market economy, but typically dis plays a morally culpable ignorance of the workings of such an economy and of the problem any attempt to devise a socio-economic system must solve: how, in the absence of the per fect knowledge an omniscient being alone enjoys, to allocate scarce re sources and move beyond the arbi trary rule of the powerful.

Truly, the little fox of moralism is a mightily confused little fox. He re mains confused even when decked out in a clerical collar or a bishop's gaiters. He may well be sincere, but the measure of that sincerity is his willingness to listen to a few home truths and modify his attitudes in the light of what he hears and con cedes to be true. Conclusion Our list of "the little foxes that spoil the vineyards" could be ex tended. Sufficient, however, has been said to make our task clear. Our first task, as ever, is to toil in the vine yards our forefathers planted, that we may pass on to our children the inheritance that rightly is theirs. Yet a second task also is ours. De pending upon our capacities and sit uation, let us become either amiable but alert guard dogs sniffing out the little foxes spoiling the vineyards, or scarlet-clad hunters riding after these foxes in dedicated pursuit.

Either way, let us "catch the foxes, the little foxes, that spoil the vineyards." @) -FOOTNOTESlThe Song of Solomon, 2:15. 2J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), p.67. 3G. J. Stigler, The Intellectual and the Market Place and Other Essays (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963), p. 7. 4S. Rydenfelt, A Pattern For Failure: Socialist Economies In Crisis (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), dust-jacket summary. SF. A. Hayek, "The Telecommunications Sys tem of the Market," 1980s Unemployment and the Unions (London: Institute of Economic Af fairs, 1980), pp. 25-37.