The Morality of Good Intentions; R. J. Bidinotto

As the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1964) put it: "Few observers are inclined to find fault with capitalism as an engine of production. Criti cism usually proceeds either from moral or cul tural disapproval of certain features of the capi talist system, or from the short-run vicissitudes (crises and depressions) with which long-run improvement is interspersed." Mr. Bidinotto writes frequently for The Freeman and other publications. If not consequences, then, what? What does this "moral and cultural disapproval" consist of? Before we get to the root of today' s re maining hostility to individualism and capi talism, let us consider the residual criticisms against their alleged negative consequences. A central argument against capitalism stems from a vestigial' 'conflict-of-interest" doctrine, resurrected by Karl Marx as his theory of "class conflict." Under capitalism, he wrote, ,'exploitation" was the rule; and the resulting class tensions would lead inevitably to a "Communistic revolution." (See The Commu nist Manifesto.) But significantly-and contrary to his own prediction - it was not capitalistic nations which experienced communist revolutions, but anticapitalistic dictatorships. Pre-revolutionary Russia, China, Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and the now-Marxist regimes of Africa could not remotely be described as "capitalistic"; and the nations of Eastern Europe fell, not to communist revolutions, but to invading Soviet armies.

A society of state-imposed status is vulner able to violent revolution; a society of indi vidual opportunity and individual rights is not. Free societies must first be eroded intellectually and institutionally before they are ripe for in surrection; but by then, they are no longer free societies. What Marx did not grasp was that in dividualism is the antithesis of exploitation. And the general benevolence and high living standards associated with capitalism largely im munize truly capitalistic nations from social in stability.

106 THE FREEMAN. MARCH 1987 Today, Marx's "exploitation" theory is dead as a plausible critique of individualism and capitalism. It owes its last gasps not to em pirical evidence, nor to intellectual theory, but to a vague sense of envy of "the haves"-and to those "moral and cultural" considerations we shall address in a moment. What Causes Crises? How about the argument that capitalism leads to "short-term vicissitudes" such as crises and depressions? This argument held some plausibility during those periods-such as the Great Depression-when, to many, cap italism seemed to have failed. But since that time, several things have thrown that argument into disrepute. First is the wealth of literature now demonstrating that it was government in tervention in the marketplace-not the market place itself - which brought about such crises. Second is the generally-conceded failure of government interventionism to prevent such crises, or to end the purported "chronic"

problems of capitalism (e. g., unemployment, poverty, the business cycle, and so on). The failure of welfare-state interventionism is generally, if grudgingly, acknowledged. Meanwhile, the even more disastrous failures of collectivist economies have left capitalism's critics in the position of "the pot calling the kettle black." Even if these criticisms of capi talism's inevitable "downswings" were valid, most people now realize that collectivism means economic collapse, unrelieved by any "upswings" - hardly an enticing alternative. A similar example concerns the attack on capi talism for fostering monopolies - a charge coming from those who would centralize all economic planning in a single agency in Wash ington. Again, whatever following these arguments retain is rooted in the more basic "moral and cultural" concerns cited by the Britannica. Then there is the argument that capitalism causes the "alienation" of the worker. This is a kind of bridge between the economic, and the moral-cultural critiques. Even if capitalism gives the worker a higher income, critics charge, it does so only by imposing upon him meaningless, uncreative tasks in mass-production assembly lines, depriving him of any sense of identity, achievement, or control over his own life.

This, coming from advocates of central plan ning and individual sacrifice to the collective, is transparent hypocrisy. The rightless, voice less workers of socialized economies remain mired in state-directed drone work-or, as· in Poland, are threatened with Soviet invasion for demanding their rights. But meanwhile, Amer ican industrialists, competing for manpower in the free labor market, are exploring new methods to restore individual responsibility and creativity to the work place. And more and more repetitious tasks are being automated, leaving to people the creative tasks no machine can perform. The very market system which purportedly causes worker "alienation' 'is facing and resolving the problem-just as it competes to fulfill every other market demand. Perhaps the low point in anticapitalistic cri tiques came during the 1970s, with the ecology crusade. From the brain-cracking abstractions of dialectical materialism, which charged capi talism with exploitation and historical irrele vancy - the collectivist argument had collapsed to shrill, apocalyptic declarations that capi talism was creating smog, dirty water, and dwindling numbers of California condors.

This, coming from those who do not utter a word about mass murder in communist Cam bodia, enforced starvation in communist Ethi opia, scorched-earth genocide in communist Afghanistan, or massive environmental despo liation in communist Russia. Those who continue to. reject individualism and capitalism-as the Britannica admits seldom claim the superior consequences of so cialism or e 'en the "mixed economy" any longer. In fact, to argue the "evil" of the market economy, and the relative "good" of collectivism, one must dispense entirely with discussions of empirical consequences. This means appealing to some alleged "morality" in which consequences are irrelevant: an ethical premise which exonerates collectivism and condemns capitalism in spite of the conse quences. One might call this premise' 'the morality of good intentions. ' , Every proponent of the free society has expeTHE MORALITY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 107 rienced the exasperation of arguing with an ad versary who seems immune to facts, evidence, logic, proof. The morality of good intentions is the immunizing agent. Facts, evidence, logic, and proof are all irrelevant. What matters is one's moral intuitions-his "good inten tions. "

Good Consequences from Good Intentions? The morality of good intentions takes two forms. In its "soft" form, it still pays lip ser vice to intending good consequences-but per functorily, and in spite of all evidence to the contrary - as if actual results were, somehow, beside the point. For example, the die-hard interventionist proclaims his intention to raise the income of inner-city black youths via minimum wage laws-a good consequence. But does he seem excessively concerned that the minimum wage seems to exacerbate black teenage unemploy ment? He advocates rent control, with the stated intention of permitting the poor to have access to affordable housing: But does he seem distraught that the stock of available housing in rent-controlled areas is curtailed? He demands economic sanctions against South Africa for its racist apartheid policies. But does he hesitate when it is argued (even by many South African blacks) that the resulting economic hardships will fall mainly on the black majority? He would ban "home work"-in-home produc tion by garment makers-allegedly to prevent their "exploitation" by unscrupulous em ployers. But does he reconsider when they cry that working at home is the only viable way they can generate critically needed incomes?

In these, and scores of similar instances, the answer has frequently been a resounding' 'no. " The "soft" form of the morality of good inten tions pays lip service to good consequences but closes its eyes to actual results. It is important to distinguish the person holding this premise from the person who, from ignorance or confusion, honestly believes that interventionism or collectivism leads to good consequences. The point here is that, today, the ranks of the knowledgeably innocent advocates of statism are rapidly shrinkingand what is left are, quite often, those to whom the effects of their proposals are only a sec ondary concern. "Hard" Intentionalism The "hard" form of this premise totally di vorces moral intentions from consequences. The hard-core ' 'intentionalist" dismisses any concern for effects, blindly and exclusively fo cusing on a sense of duty-a duty to follow some moral edict regardless of context, in spite of consequences. This premise leads to the psy chology of the fanatic, as described in Eric Hoffer's The True Believer. The hard-core "in tentionalist" expresses only the most remote concern for consequences-usually, some vague, distant utopia. But this is, in most cases, a rationalization. His real satisfaction comes from a sense of "doing the right thing"

-even when "right" has, in his mind, no clear connection with reality. One exponent of this "hard" intentionalism was Lenin. In Modern Times, Paul Johnson cites some revealing facts about Lenin's men tality. At age 22, Lenin persuaded friends against collecting money for famine victims, since their misery might help them "reflect on the fundamental facts of capitalist society." Trotsky described him as a Robespierre and his methods as Jacobin; another contemporary called him an "illegitimate child of Russian ab solutism. " In any case, the direct consequence of his ideas on real people meant nothing to Lenin. "We'll ask the man, where do you stand on the question of the revolution. Are you for it or against it? If he's against it, we'll stand him up against a wall." All that mattered to Lenin was the idea of a communist society an abstraction to which mere humans were sac rificial offerings.

It is thus pointless to argue with proponents of "the morality of good intentions," hard or soft. Facts, reasons, evidence, logic, are all be side the point. What matters is only their sense of moral duty-an unshakeable loyalty to some moral premise severed from reality. The reward for such loyalty does not lie in the results: only in a feeling of self-righteousness, of "being right.' , Consider, now, the' 'intentions" of many of today's anticapitalists. Declaring their desire 108 THE FREEMAN. MARCH 1987 for a society based on "compassion" and "be nevolence," they condemn individualism and capitalism-not for their results-but because they are not based upon such compassionate in tentions. "It is not from the. benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we ex pect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest," wrote Adam Smith. "We ad dress ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." And this is precisely the problem-say the collecti vist proponents of "good intentions."

For instance, the following appeared in a letter to a newspaper: "Webster's . . . defines capitalism as 'the economic system in which the ownership and exploitation of wealth are left largely in private hands.' Webster's further defines exploitation as the way to 'turn (some thing) to one's own advantage; utilize self ishly.' This ... is a very good reason to ques tion the merits of capitalism. ' , Observe the nature of this all-too-typical moral criticism. There is no mention of the ac tual effects of capitalism-or of alternative systems. All that matters is the intention under lying the system . . . an intention which is not primarily "compassionate." Remaining un asked, hence unanswered, are the questions: Why is an action which enhances one's well being evil? And why is compassion alone the essence of morality? This gets to the crux of the modem assault on capitalism. Perhaps, admit collectivists, capi talism delivers the goods; perhaps it benefits the masses; but that isn't its intention. Far more "moral," they believe, to have a collectivist system which intends compassion and fails to deliver, than one which intends "selfishness"

and benefits all! Fortunately, there is no dichotomy between capitalism's moral and practical aspects. Capi talism is not simply the only practical social system; it is the only social system based upon moral responsibility and benevolence. The heart of the "morality of good inten tions" is irresponsibility. It requires of its prac titioners no more than a feeling or intention. Moral responsibility requires far more. It re quires one to reject hypocrisy by acting upon his convictions and intentions (integrity). It re quires one to concern himself with the real-life truth or falsehood of his convictions (honesty). It requires one to consider and accept personal accountability for the social consequences of his actions (justice). Self-Responsibility The essence of the philosophy of individu alism is self-responsibility. An individualist ac cepts full moral responsibility for forming rea soned judgments, and for living by the work of his own mind. He knows that nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed-that whatever values he seeks must have a basis in the natural requirements of human well-being. He knows that his survival and success depend ultimately on his integration of ends and means, values and virtues, practice and principle. He knows they demand his rigorous concern for facts, and entail his total personal accountability. In short, he grasps that individualism means integrity, honesty, and justice-and that to reject these natural laws is self-defeating.

Moral responsibility is the core of the capi talist system. In every aspect, capitalism re quires men to .live in accordance with their na tures as productive, self-responsible moral agents. When socialists sniff that capitalism is only concerned with "the bottom line," they are rebelling against the fact that capitalism mirroring reality itself-is focused on conse quences, not mere intentions. To survive, man cannot merely wish for his means of survival, but must produce them. Likewise, to succeed under capitalism, one must do more than simply "mean well" (who doesn't?). One must produce and trade real goods and services others ·want and need. Capitalism is the only social system which takes cognizance of human nature and the requirements of reality. Every other social system-from fascism to feudalism, from imperialism to socialism-at tempts to by-pass the moral requirements of in dividual human life. In the place of integrity, honesty, and justice, they demand conformity, obedience, and parasitism. Yet because reality demands these virtues as the price of survival, the only option is systematic plunder of those who do assume their moral responsibilities.

THE MORALITY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 109 Deep down, even die-hard "good intention alists" know that "meaning well" will not feed, clothe, or shelter anyone. Even they know that necessities and luxuries must be produced and provided by those who have assumed the moral responsibility to do more than "mean well." Hence their eagerness to concoct social systems which harness morally responsible individuals in service to their "good intentions." Such a system indulges them the luxury of feeling self righteously moral through intentions alone while others must labor to turn those intentions into reality. But is their motive really a compassionate desire to help-or simply the desire to feel compassionate? If it were otherwise, why do they stubbornly resist decades of evidence dem onstrating the catastrophic consequences of their policies? Noone can forever claim to be benevolent in spite of the consequences. And while it is impossible to read minds, one must wonder at the stubborn blindness of self-styled moralists to their own chronic disasters. In my opinion, "the morality of good intentions"

constitutes their blinders. What About Benevolence? If the moral core of capitalism is self-respon sibility, then what about benevolence? Adam Smith was right: Under capitalism, most people's foremost priority is rarely "service to others." But that does not imply that their aim is to exploit others. Nor does it mean that be nevolence and compassion are incompatible with a self-interest rooted in self-responsibility. In fact, only a self-responsible individual can reject the notion that human interests are inher ently at war-and is thus free to feel general benevolence. Moreover, only productive people who are allowed to keep what they pro duce have the financial means to act upon com passionate feelings for the helpless. Today, the erosion of individualism and cap italism is bringing back the very misanthropic attitudes which they once vanquished. Under redistributionism, producers are becoming in creasingly incensed over their exploitation.

Many, equating today' s predatory welfare state with "capitalism," are coming to accept that "the system" is "dog-eat-dog." More and more are returning to the view that there is an inherent "conflict of interests" among men. Among the casualties of this trend are, of course, economic efficiency and productivity. But the less obvious casualties include honesty, integrity, and justice. Honesty-as men ratio nalize their parasitism. Integrity-as they abandon their principles of working for what they want. Justice-as they start to live at the expense of the shrinking number of producers. But there are even less tangible casualties ironically, the very qualities which government intervention was supposed to nurture in the "heartless" capitalist system: benevolence, compassion, and good will. As human survival comes to depend less on personal responsibility, and more on political pressure-group warfare, men learn to fight for their livelihoods by joining special interest groups. Like rodents fighting for cheese, men are reduced to feuding over govenment "ben efits. " Each resents paying more in taxes than he receives from the public troughs-and re sents the unearned benefits going to others. So he comes to regard his fellow men, not as friendly competitors, but as enemies in a battle for survival.

One cannot feel benevolence under a system of "loot or be looted." One cannot feel com passion when punitively taxed so that others may receive the plunder. One cannot feel good will toward those having a legal stranglehold on his life, liberty, and property. The economic case for capitalism has never been refuted. But itis seldom economics that is disputed anymore. The empirical case against collectivism is now openly discussed. But it is rarely the facts that are at issue today. Increasingly, the last remaining prop for col lectivism is the creaking crutch of a splintering morality-a morality of empty intentions. It is the last impediment to a fully capitalistic so ciety. For the self-responsible, confronting and banishing "the morality of good intentions" is an ethical imperative. And besides its obvious benefits to ourselves, such a crusade would constitute our greatest act of true compassion for the tortured human race. D 110 The Rhetoric of Antitrust by Thomas J. DiLorenzo I n theory antitrust regulation promotes com petition in the marketplace but,in reality its results are often anticompetitive.It is rou tinely used by businesses having problems competing as a tool to keep their competitors from cutting prices, expanding production; and differentiating their products. In short, the con ventional view that antitrust regulation is in the "public interest" is a myth. The rhetoric of an titrust is almost always emotional, but rarely logical. And emotion all too often dominates logic in matters of public policy.