The Sagebrush Rebellion; D. E. Wentz

35 The Sagebrush Rebellion by Douglas E. Wentz I n a flurry of recent magazine and news paper articles, authors across the country have criticized attempts by federal, state, and local governments to sell or to lease public lands for private development. 1 The "Sage brush Rebellion," or the movement to en courage the privatization of western public lands, has been characterized as a deceitful at tempt by vested interests to channel public treasure into private pockets. At risk, say groups of leading environmentalists, are the nation's parks and wilderness lands, if not the very air we breathe and water we drink. In response to such criticisms, Reagan Ad ministration officials and others involved in the Sagebrush movement generally have relied upon cold facts and "fiscal responsibility" to support their case. It is noted, for example, that Uncle Sam's vast holdings, covering 727 mil lion acres or about one-third of the nation's land area, seem more than adequate to allow both the sale of selected properties and the preservation of park and wilderness lands. 2 Moreover, it is estimated that the sale by the federal government of certain properties, such as the 1774 acres at the entrance to the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco (that currently is being used, free of charge, by a private golf club), could raise in excess of $17 billion in revenue, providing substantial and badly needed funds in the fight to lower the national debt. 3 There is, however, a second and perhaps © 1986 by Douglas E. Wentz. Mr. Wentz is an associate with the law firm of Drinker Biddle & Reath in Philadel phia.

Artemisia tridentata common sagebrush more fundamental reason for supporting those who encourage the privatization of western public lands. In the context of a common prop erty resource such as a body of water or a wil derness forest, it often is private ownership, and not government regulation, that best as sures the maintenance of favorable environ mental conditions. Indeed, from both an eco nomic and an environmental standpoint, pri vate ownership can produce incentives to preserve property for the long term, while gov ernment regulation can and has produced inef ficiencies that are both frightening and real. As an example to illustrate this point, let us consider the case of the Bristol Bay area of central Alaska, location of one of the richest runs of sockeye, or red, salmon in the world. Over the course of many years, American fish erman drew ever increasing catches from the waters of the bay until, by 1950, the salmon run had declined markedly. The Alaskan gov ernment, in an attempt to reverse the trend, set about to regulate virtually every aspect of the salmon fishing industry, and administrative rules governing fishing hours, boats, and gear increased in complexity until today they can be summarized as follows: 36 THE FREEMAN. JANUARY 1987 Not unexpectedly, the impact of these regu lations was immediate and direct. Today, Alaska's fishermen generally are poor, both because they are forced to use small boats and inefficient equipment, and because they can fish only a small fraction of the time and only then in designated areas. American consumers, for their part, pay an unusually high price for salmon, a price much higher than that which would be charged if efficient fishing methods were permitted. And Alaska taxpayers, of course, bear the cost of creating and enforcing their state's myriad regulations.

And what about the salmon runs the Alaskan government's regulations presumably were de signed to protect? Ironically, rather than thriving, the salmon runs have continued to de cline, and it is not difficult to understand why. Under the current non-ownership arrangement, no individual fisherman is particularly con cerned with the preservation of the salmon run. In fact, given the current state of affairs, the incentives are quite the opposite! The fish erman's best interests are served by catching as many fish as possible during anyone season. This of course contrasts sharply with the re sult that would be obtained if the Bristol Bay were privately held. In this case, the fisherman/ owner would have not one but two goals: to use the most efficient technology to catch salmon at the least cost, and to permit enough salmon to survive to perpetuate the runs. The owner would be encouraged to act in a manner that is both economically "efficient" and environ mentally sound.

The analogy, of course, is not limited to salmon runs and bodies of water. Some of this nation's greatest forests, for example, already are owned or are leased by large, responsible companies such as the Weyerhaeuser Company which each year spends hundreds of thousands of dollars not only to harvest timber, but also to plant young trees for future generations. In such cases, the government's sale of surplus timberland has assured the survival of the very forests that opponents of privatization have sought to protect. As the above examples show, it is not neces sarily destructive of environmental goals to support the privatization of public lands. Quite to the contrary, in many cases only private ownership can create the incentives necessary to produce a result that is both economically efficient and environmentally sound. D 1. E.g., Bruce Hamilton and Brooks Yeager, "Paradise Leased," Sierra 81: 38-43 (March/April 1986); George Reiger, "Sagebrush Rebellion III," Field & Stream 90: 29-30 (July 1985).

2. Randy Fitzgerald, "Uncle Sam's Surplus Land Scandal," Reader's Digest, 128: 33-36 (January 1986). 3. See Fitzgerald. 4. State of Alaska Administrative Code, Title 5, Chapter 6 (Bristol Bay Area), Art. 3 (5 AAC 06.001 - 5 AAC 06.990).