Two Sense of Human Freedom; T. Machan

But there are those, too, who dispute this contention. Not only do they criticize capital ism for failing to ensure for us well-being and equality of opportunity, they also hold that cap italism is, in fact, an enemy of individual free dom. Marx made this point in the 19th century, and in our time many have followed his lead. For example, in his posthumously published work, Grundrisse, Marx notes that "This kind of [capitalist] individual liberty is ... at the same time the most complete suppression of all individual liberty and total subjugation of indi viduality to social conditions which take the form of material forces-and even of all powerful objects that are independent of the in dividuals creating them. ,,1 Professor Larry Preston, following in Marx's footsteps, has advanced a similar claim, namely, that "a capitalist market, understood as a system in which production and distribu tion are based on the pursuit of private interest through the acquisition and transfer of privately Tibor R. Machan teaches philosophy at Auburn University in Alabama.

owned property, generally denies freedom to most participants. ,,2 Preston defends this posi tion by first advancing the following character ization of freedom: "Free decisions and actions are identified as those in which an agent's con scious deliberation has played an essential role. ,,3 He clarifies this by adding that "The prerequisite of deliberate choice can only be determined with reference to specific activities associated with particular roles.' ,4 Further more, "A choice is voluntary (freely made) if the persons who agree to it possess, before they decide, the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberation regarding the proposed trans action. ,,5 In contrast, within the Anglo-American po litical tradition, freedom has been characterized quite differently. According to F. A. Hayek: It meant always the possibility of a person's acting according to his own decisions and plans, in contrast to the position of one who was irrevocably subject to the will of an other, who by arbitrary decision could coerce him to act or not to act in specific ways. The time-honored phrase by which this freedom has often been described is therefore "inde pendence of the arbitrary will of an other. " . . . In this sense "freedom" refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by men.6 For Marxists the emphasis has always been on possessing the requisite abilities-including resources and information-to act in any way one might wish to act after necessary delibera34 THE FREEMAN. JANUARY 1989 tion. In Hayek and the classical liberal tradi tion, however, the emphasis is placed on a choice being that of the agent, that it be "his own" decision. Furthermore, unlike Preston, Hayek does not insist that deliberation has an ,'essential role" in free choice.

The difference between the two conceptions of freedom seems to be that whereas Preston does not stress personal autonomy and self determination, Hayek does; and while Hayek seems to accept decisions of any sort (whimsi cal, intentional, negligent, or deliberate), Pres ton allows only deliberative or self-consciously calculated decisions to be free choices. What Is "Real" Freedom? Preston holds that "real" freedom is not the libertarian, capitalist sort. What his theory, fol lowing a very respected tradition, proposes is that one can be really free only if one is on the right path. Consider again Marx on freedom: "[F]reedom . . . can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regu lating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of en ergy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature.,,7 Marx was invoking the idea of freedom which ordinary people invoke when they say they wish to be "free" of worry, trouble, hard ship, psychological blocks, bad memories, dis ease, or whatnot. From the time of Plato this sense of "human freedom" has been a power ful contender. It refers to our capability of at taining full human flourishing, unhindered by such obstacles as ignorance, illness, or sin. In our day many think of this sense of freedom when they refer to Marxist-Leninist type liber ation. Unlike the more libertarian sense of this term-within the American political tradition liberation here means guiding one toward emancipation. Compare the liberation of France to the liberation of Poland! And consider the character of Marxist-Leninist liberation move ments, which all reject libertarian freedom.

Now Preston's idea of freedom does not state explicitly that his understanding of "free to choose' , implies that only those are free to choose who in fact choose properly. But this is the result of his characterization, nevertheless. This is because the "relevant capacities and conditions for deliberations" would in the final analysis include the individual's ability to select wisely from among the alternatives. It would also include the absence of any impediments to such wise decisions, including ignorance and poverty, whether imposed by other persons, or by nature, or by the social system in force. No doubt, if a social system protects property rights, this also means that those who have no wealth or health, or squander them, will face the obstacle of poverty or ill health in their ef fort at successful living. That there may not be any system that could "remedy" this situation is, of course, one of the major problems of characterizing freedom along these lines. But by speaking as if such life circumstances were limitations of liberty, Marx (or Preston) suggests that there may be social systems that do not place any restrictions before persons who might at some stage of their lives aspire to success. Marx hints at this when he points to "the absurdity of considering free competition as being the final development of human liberty.,,8 Presumably there is a final development.

Another problem with the Marxian idea Pres ton advances is that a deliberation is a rare pro cess. Most people proceed through their days without deliberation, yet acting intentionally that is, fleetingly thinking of their objectives and almost automatically using the means to attain them, as when they switch on a light as they enter a room. The intentional character of such actions may be gleaned from the fact that if some mishap is associated with them, persons who took the actions are held responsible for what they did. These, then, are treated as per fectly free actions when they are not forced on the doers by others. For Preston, however, they would be unfree actions since they did not in volve deliberation-the self-conscious, self monitored mental process characteristic of in tellectual activities (such as theorizing about freedom). It is also important that in Preston's and Marx's characterization of freedom, there is no consideration of the place of free will. If per sons are metaphysically free-possess free will or the power of self-determination-they might not elect to inform themselves about the facts that may make a choice a wise one. They may then be regarded as unfree in the Marxist sense.

Nevertheless, in the liberal sense of the term "freedom," they are free, since they might have placed themselves in a position of being better informed-even though they did not do this-which would mean they are essentially free. Women's Liberation The different meanings of "human freedom" can be more fully appreciated in connection with the women's liberation movement, in which two meanings of "liberty" are promi nent, though not always noted. First, women's liberation sometimes means the absence of re straints imposed by other people who would keep women under a yoke or treat them as if they were not of age but in constant need of guidance (from males or the state). Second, wo men's liberation sometimes means being guided to a higher state of consciousness and human emancipation. Another way-hinted at before-to distin guish the two ideas of liberty is to recall the contrasting meaning of "liberation" for the So viet Union and the United States vis-a-vis the countries of Europe they helped liberate in World War II. The Soviet Union "liberated"

by helping to defeat the Germans and then fully occupying the eastern European countries, while the United States helped cast off the Ger man forces (e.g., in France) and then left, which freed these countries to develop them selves. Which sense of the term "freedom" is then primary? On the one hand, if we are focusing on progress toward human flourishing, human freedom may well mean what has been meant in the tradition from Plato, through Rousseau, He gel, Marx, T. H. Green, and many contempo rary intellectuals. These thinkers would all join Marx in the view that the liberal/libertarian con ception of human freedom is limited and incom plete. To pretend to be concerned with human freedom when one is really only interested in freedom from the aggressive intrusion of other people-as so well expressed in the Colonial TWO SENSES OF HUMAN FREEDOM 35 slogan: "Don't tread on me!,,_is, according to this line of thinking, to distort an important value in human existence. (Even some neoclas sical economists prefer to mean by freedom the maximizing of our options, creating a broad range of possibilities. Our freedom, they say, is enhanced with an increase of our wealth.)9 There is something to this, of course. It is arguable that full human freedom-being unim peded by various obstacles in life in reaching one's proper goal of self-development-should mean what members of this tradition have meant. Yet, on the other hand, the view that human freedom or liberty, in the aforemen tioned sense, is a political concern, lack of which ought to be dealt with through law and politics, is highly disputable. This view simply fails to credit individuals with self-initiated ef fort. It demeans them, treats them as helpless and always in need of guidance from above. It is paternalistic and ultimately self-defeating if we extend it to everyone, including those who advocate totalitarian measures to liberate us.

The ultimate reason behind this drastic and devastating error is that the conception of free dom embraced by the tradition following Plato, and today mostly promoted by Marxists, pre supposes a conception of human nature which is contrary to fact. Marx did not credit human in dividuals with a basic kind of freedom, namely, freedom of the will or the power of self determination. Neither do Preston and other Marxists (e.g., Andrew McLaughlin, Charles Taylor, G. A. Cohen). Preston notes that "Capitalist ex changes have become coercive because partici pants can recognize an alternative situation which would provide them with substantially greater freedom, a situation that the capitalist market prevents them from having. ,,10 In other words, people are not acting freely under capi talism because by virtue of the structure of the system-i.e., its framework of private property rights-they are forgoing options that they might enjoy and that it would be beneficial for them to enjoy.

This treats people as helpless, inept crea tures, who are unable on their own initiative to come to terms with lacking some of what they might want and benefit from in life. And while such a conclusion is warranted in societies 36 THE FREEMAN. JANUARY 1989 where people face persecution, oppression, and liquidation from the state if they try to remedy their circumstances by individual initiative (in cluding forming economic alliances), for a so ciety in which no such political limits to liberty are sanctioned, the judgment comes to little more than either stressing the exceptions or de meaning human ability. The "freedom" Preston thinks people might enjoy involves what people could benefit from in their relationship to others, namely, greater access to information, better conditions for de liberation, etc. For example, they might be bet ter educated, they might possess more wealth, etc. This is, of course, not political freedom but a better standard of living. To obscure the dif ference is dangerous.

Making the Most of Our Lives When Marxists say that we lack freedom or liberty under capitalism, they don't make clear that what they have in mind is something we probably would lack far more under any other system-the ability and opportunity to make the most of our lives. And that is perhaps because if put this way, it becomes clear that at least under capitalism everyone has his or her political lib erty-freedom from other people's forcible in trusion into one's life-and in the main this provides most with a good chance of attaining a high standard of living. While capitalism is not preoccupied with the equal distribution of wealth-or, rather, poverty-it is a system un der which those who make a good try have the chance of reaching considerable economic suc cess. (Nor does capitalism assume that every one would, or even should, want this!) The Marxist position sees persons as we do trees or flowers that grow not from their own determination but are spurred on by the natural environment. And if there are deficiencies in this environment, there will be impediments standing in the way of growth.

As Preston puts it, "We now realize that the exchanges of capitalism generally do not repre sent agreements in which both (or all) partici pants are better off if 'better off' is viewed as gaining access to the resources needed to exer cise freedom. ,,11 Once Preston has defined "free choice" as, in effect, "the best possible choice one could make," it is no wonder that he views capitalist exchanges as not being' 'free. " It may not be immediately obvious that Preston and this entire tradition hold this conception of "freedom," but it becomes so, once it is clear that here the objective is to ensure human per fection, the full emancipation of human be ings-not merely their freedom to do what they choose to do, regardless of the outcome. Pres ton, like others in this tradition, in effect iden tifies human freedom with human success. Without that identification, human freedom or liberty simply have no value to him.

The liberal tradition, however, sees human freedom (from aggression by others) as valu able in itself, because it is a constituent part of human goodness-without the freedom to choose one's conduct, one is not the agent of whatever good behavior one might engage in. This is not always clearly put in the liberal tra dition, but it is there, nevertheless. In the liberal tradition, government aims at protecting the individual's role as the agent of his own conduct. That is why it stresses indi vidual liberty and rights. Once persons enjoy this protection, they will then do what they choose, well or badly. Society is not perfect, but it is politically best if it secures for everyone a sphere of jurisdiction or personal sovereignty. The rest is in the hands of individuals. In contrast, for the Preston/Marx position the primary task of good government-of those who understand and have the power to upgrade the species-is to free human beings from im pediments to growth. This is clearly not accom plished simply by protecting people against the aggressive intrusion of other human beings.

No, they need total "liberation" -the preven tion of all intrusions such as poverty, disease, ignorance, illness, and even sin. Thus Preston holds that "Physical force need not always be either morally objectionable or a denial of free dom. Efforts physically to restrain drug addicts from gaining access to drugs may be done for moral reasons and in the interest of freedom to enhance the addicts' ability to make deliber ate choices." 12 This is a convenient example for Preston, be cause even in contemporary near-capitalist so cieties people are not granted the right to consume the drugs they choose. But for Preston, the scope within which lack of free choice is appropriate is far greater. It is only a short dis tance to the view that forcing people not to ad vocate anti-revolutionary policies or the wrong religion, or censoring the viewing of trashy movies and the reading of bad literature, is mor ally justified because it enhances the ability of people to live properly.

Many people who advocate Marxism but find the Soviet Union politically reprehensible insist that the Soviets have distorted Marx and that a proper understanding of Marxism will avoid the kind of policies that have characterized the U.S.S.R. throughout its brief history. Some of those who hold such views are, nevertheless, wholly disenchanted with capitalism, whether its ideal version or the watered-down type evi dent in some Western societies. Indeed, some of these people hold out hope for societies whose leaders proclaim themselves to be Marx ists--e.g., Cuba, Nicaragua--even when these societies are directly allied with the Soviet Union. The confusion arises from failing to distin guish between what Marx might have liked, and what his views usher in, especially when his vision of the future is not coming about auto matically, as a matter of historical necessity. Maybe Marx would have hated Stalin or even Gorbachev, no one knows. But that the policies of these Soviet leaders most closely follow Marx's views, given that those views are basi cally wrong, cannot reasonably be denied.

Marx may have thought that capitalist soci eties will tum socialist without much need for violence. But since this hasn't happened, soTWO SENSES OF HUMAN FREEDOM 37 cialists have resorted to coercion to force so cialism upon various countries in the name of Marx. And there are plenty of concepts in the Marxist edifice that give philosophical fuel to the idea of forced socialization. One of these is the conception of freedom that Marx and his followers embrace. Their idea of liberty may have some grounding in ordinary language. But in one sense that idea is most destructive toward the freedom of one individual from the intru sions upon his life by another. This is the sense in which it encourages the idea that people must be made to be "free," whether they choose this or not. 0 1. Karl Marx, Grundrisse (abridged), ed., D. McLellan (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 131. 2. Larry M. Preston, "Freedom, Markets, and Voluntary Exchange," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 78 (De cember 1984), p. 961. A somewhat oblique answer to Preston's analysis may be found in Paul Craig Roberts and Matthew A.

Stephenson, Marx's Theory of Exchange, Alienation and Crisis (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1973). Roberts and Stephenson show that substituting rational planning for the exchange system introduces tyranny. The choice, then, may be between mar ket exchange, which can involve some "exploitation, " meaning the opportunity of some to take advantage of the circumstances of oth ers, and totalitarian rule, which guarantees that exploitation will occur, as a pennanent and unalterable feature of the system. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., p. 964. 5. Ibid. 6. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution ofLiberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 12. An interesting group of discussions on the concept of liberty may be found in John A. Howard, ed., On Freedom (Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1984). The most recent "classic" on this topic is I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Lon don: Oxford University Press, 1958).

7. Karl Marx, Selected Writings, D. McLellan, ed. (Oxford: Ox ford University Press, 1977), p. 496. 8. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 131. 9. See George Stigler, "Wealth and Possibly Liberty," Journal ofLegal Studies, Vol. 7 (June 1978), pp. 213-17. Cf. E. C. Pasour, If., "Liberty, and Possibly Wealth," Reason Papers, No.6 (Spring 1980), pp. 53-62. 10. Preston, p. 965. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. Freedom as a Moral Principle T he most important among the few principles of this kind that we have developed is individual freedom, which it is most appropriate to regard as a moral principle of political action. Like all moral principles, it demands that it be accepted as a value in itself, as a principle that must be respected without our asking whether the consequences in the particular instance will be beneficial. We shall not achieve the results we want if we do not accept it as a creed or presumption so strong that no considerations of expediency can be allowed to limit it.

-F. A. HAYEK IDEAS ON LIBERTY 38 Readers' Forum To the Editors: In your September 1988 issue, you carried a piece entitled "What Should We Do About Luck?" Without wishing to plunge into the in tricate philosophical issues raised by the ques tion of whether having "character" is a matter of luck, I do wish to make one important ob servation. If being competent, self-assured, and therefore successful is a matter of luck, this is all the more reason not to penalize success. If we are, basically, subject to determinism, then it is surely essential to structure penalties and rewards in such a way as to manipulate people into having successful, rewarding lives. The more scope there is for character to be self grounded, the more we might expect people to strive and succeed without tangible rewards, al though we might still want to say that character is admirable and should be rewarded. But if character and aptitude are determined mechan ically by the outside world, let us by all means create an outside world in which as many peo ple as possible are determined into having char acter and aptitude. Either way, reward success, not failure.