Reader's Forum

33 Readers' Forum To the Editors: Robert James Bidinotto (The Freeman, September 1989) is too hasty in dismissingprison work programs. They don't reduce recidivism, and they can be used to mount prisoner escapes, he argues. Faced with rising prison costs and problems with prisoner idleness, many states have looked to prison work as a solution. Fifteen American states have now initiated programs involving the employment of prison inmates by private compa nies. Prisoner employees are paid at the market rate (except where minimum wage laws intrude), and deductions are made to pay for prison ac commodation, for victim compensation, and to pay taxes. What remains is put into a savings fund, available to the offender upon release. These programs have not emerged as the re sult of lobbying by what Bidinotto calls the "Ex cuse-Making Industry." They usually have as much support from conservatives as from the left, because they reduce prison costs at the same time as aiming at something more constructive than incarceration. The programs are also ethically sound, because they help to make amends to the victim. Without work, offenders languish in prison at the expense of their victims.

There is evidence to show that the programs reduce recidivism. In California, prisoners are employed by TWA as flight reservation agents. The scheme has been in operation for only three years, but early evidence shows substantially low er rates of re-conviction for those who have passed through the program. This evidence has been carefully dissected and does not suffer from any statistical bias. Individual evidence also points to the success of these programs. Take a young unskilled of fender, provide him with a marketable skill, and this gives him an alternative to crime when he is released back into society. To quote an offender who benefited from one of the programs run by the private company PRIDE in Florida: "I have developed a new sense of direction towards a productive life. It was the push in the right direc tion that I needed." Criminologists are agreed that the most impor tant influence on re-offending is whether the ex prisoner secures a job in the first few weeks of re lease. Prison industry programs help in three ways: First, they provide the offender with a mar ketable skill; second, the savings fund accumulat ed while inside can be used to help them through their first few weeks of freedom; and third, some of the companies involved will provide the of fender with a job upon release.

Part of the appeal of these schemes is that they are profit-making. For the companies involved, prisoners are a flexible work force, providing them with labor during holiday periods and over weekends. Once training has been given, the company will retain staff because they are valued employees. Most workplace facilities are located within the perimeter of the prison, so the possibility of escape does not arise. In any case, evidence shows that most prisoners are on best behavior in order to retain their places in the program. The nationwide study made by the University City Science Center found that work programs have been accompanied by a fall in disciplinary offens es (Grant G. Grissom, Impact of Free Venture Prison Industries Upon Correctional Institutions, University City Science Center, January 1981). Mr. Bidinotto's hostility to what he regards as soft-options for criminals is based on his image of the typical criminal as a violent fiend. In any 34 THE FREEMAN • JANUARY 1990 prison system the majority of inmates are non-vi olent offenders. Also, there are large numbers of remanded prisoners-people who have not been convicted of any offense. Criminals are as diverse as the crimes that they commit, and there is little point in presenting a caricatured stereotype: the rogue immune to any type of reform process.

Nor is there much to be gained from retribu tive spleen, from complaining about more re laxed regimes in prisons. It is no great surprise that prison inmates-just like other folk-do not react well to being oppressively governed. Private enterprise managers of U.S. prisons are known to maintain very soft regimes inside their prisons: Prison guards are known as correctional staff and wear T-shirts rather than uniforms. They do this, not from any heinous liberal motives, but be cause it makes the prison more tranquil, cuts costs, and helps the company to attain the recidi vism targets written into its contract with the state government. There is a growing realization on both sides of the Atlantic that prisons have so far been a fail ure, Mr. Bidinotto's rather depressing solution is to build more of them. A more imaginative solu tion would be to make prison work the basis of the whole system.

NICK ELLIOIT London Mr. Bidinottoreplies: Mr. Elliott disputes the "image of the typical criminal as a violent fiend," arguing that "the ma jority of inmates are non-violent offenders." This is untrue. Due to prison overcrowding, most non violent offenders are given probation or "alterna tives to incarceration"; most prison beds are, in fact, reserved for dangerous and chronic felons. To repeat an example from my series, the Mas sachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), whose policies typify those around the nation, concedes "the fact that 85 percent of the DOC in mate population has a present or past violent criminal history." He contends that prisons are "a failure." But that depends on what one intends them to ac complish. My main argument for imprisonment was neither retribution nor even deterrence: it was incapacitation. One hundred percent of those behind bars are prevented from committing other crimes against those on the outside-a per fect rate of success.A Federal study I cited found that the average state prison inmate, while free, had been committing 187 crimes per year, at an estimated cost to society of $430,000per criminal.

Putting just 1,000 more criminals behind bars for a year would have averted about 187,000crimes and saved society over $400 million,net. He is upset with my dismissal of various "prison work" programs. These, he says, provide a young offender "with a marketable skill." De spite his protestations to the contrary, that's just another way of saying that unemployment causes crime-a claim I rejected in Parts I and III. A causal relationship between unemployment and crime is indeed present: criminalitycausesunem ployment. The typical criminal, who "is at heart antiwork" (as Stanton Samenow puts it), isn't go ing to be enticed away from the fast buck of a drug deal or burglary by what he views as the "trap" of a 40-hour work week. Mr. Elliott cites a California work program which, he claims, has measurably reduced inmate recidivism, even after carefully controlling for "statistical bias." But is that true? Invariably, the worst, most dangerous inmates are screened out of such programs. Measuring the recidivism of the select group allowed to participate always gives glowing,but biased, results. That's no doubt the case here. Otherwise, we'd have to believe that TWA is indiscriminately hiring the full range of prison inmates, from rapists to murderers, to man its ticket counters.

Likewise the study by the University City Sci ence Center: we've heard it all before. Exhaus tive research (such as that reviewed in Wilson and Herrnstein's Crime and Human Nature)indi cates that work programs make no real differ ence in reducing recidivism rates. Upon review, occasional studies claimingotherwise reveal a va riety of self-servingmethodological biases. To be sure, recidivism isn't 100 percent. So there are always individual "successes" in such programs-just as there are criminals who claim to have been "reformed" by finding a good wom an, religious inspiration, or some other positive influence. But whether such influences will work depends upon the prisoner's receptivity, his own earnest desire to change. Regrettably, most do not. Despite years of such programs, a new Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study of 108,580 released inmates found that over 60 percent were rearrested within three.

years. A 1988report for the BJS summed up: "By the end of the .1970s, the vast bulk of research criticized the effectiveness of rehabilitation pro grams for criminal offenders . . . [T]here can be little argument that, empirically, rehabilitation has not worked." It all comes down to one's view of human na ture, particularly, the nature of the typical crimi nal. I've cited in my series abundant evidence that the criminal chooses to be predatory in his outlook and values. If so, there's simply no way to "rehabilitate" him without his compliance. To suggest otherwise is to embrace some form of de terminism. And like other correspondence my se ries has generated, Mr. Elliott's letter reveals that sympathy for the free market system does not necessarily rest on consistent "free will" premises concerning human nature. Another theme arises in a few critical respons es to my crime series. Some seem to forget that the government's very reason for being is to pro tect our individual rights against any initiation of force, fraud, and coercion. In making cases against the dangers of an unchecked government, they've lost sight of the very danger government was established to confront: the danger of crimi nals in our midst.

Today,by any reasonable gauge, criminals pose a far more immediate and serious threat to most of us than do our government officials. At their worst, American officials must operate under many legal constraints and face political account ability,while individualsusually have considerable legal and political recourse against their abuses. Criminals, however, now operate with virtual im punity and pose increasing risks to individuals, who have little legal protection against them.' Some free marketers have lost all perspective about such things. When U.S. officialscommitted a petty burglary against political rivals, it was seen as such a scandalous abuse of power that even a President was ousted. Yet while constantly citing such marginal incidents as evidence of the imminent peril to our rights posed by govern ment, many advocates of liberty remain utterly mute about the three million reported burglaries committed by criminals against private individu als in 1988.

Let's be sensible. Having to pay taxes, preREADERS' FORUM 35 dictably and non-violently, for a hodgepodge of programs both good and bad, isn't remotely equivalent to being unpredictably confronted by some sociopath wielding a sawed-off shotgun and demanding money, or awakening to the sound of a burglar's footsteps downstairs. Facing the prospect of military conscription with a variety of legal options at your disposal is not remotely as horrifying as boarding an airliner with a terrorist hijacker on board, or having your child kid napped from the sidewalk by a serial killer. We lose all credibility with the American peo ple when our abstract concerns and fears are so disproportionate and so removed from the very real threats they see at hand. How can they take seriously those who ignore the pressing problem of violent crime, while railing against, say, the Federal postal monopoly? Agreed, that monopoly is a costly,unjust, and unnecessary im position on us all. But in all honesty, who poses a greater danger in one's neighborhood: the post man or the pedophile?

No one familiar with my work can contend that I've failed to speak out against the threats posed by unconstrained government. We must continue our vigilance against all efforts to un leash it. But realistically, the threat of dictator ship still remains distant and hypothetical. Such is not the case with the threat of crime, a clear and present danger in our midst. Through what dis torting lens, then, do many alleged champions of individual rights view a largely benign govern ment as a greater menace to its citizens, than those cold-blooded predators whom it was consti tuted to pursue and punish? I would be gratified if "Crime and Conse quences" could help to change such perspectives and public perceptions about this vital issue. ROBERT JAMES BIDINOTTO New Castle, Pennsylvania To the Editors: I agreed with almost everything in Robert James Bidinotto's stunning three-part series on our criminal justice system, but I do have two criticisms.One concerns his setting up free will as being diametrically opposed to determinism (The Freeman, July 1989, p. 261). The philoso pher David Hume showed in 1739 (Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sections 1 and 36 THE FREEMAN • JANUARY 1990 2-"Of Liberty and Necessity") that free will is not only not incompatible with determinism, but actually depends on it, for exactly the same rea son Mr. Bidinotto stated that "human volition, then, isn't an affront to the law of causality:it's an instance of it" (same page as above).

Hume's arguments were reiterated and ex panded upon in 1939 by Moritz Schlick (Prob lems of Ethics, translated by David Rynin, chap ter VII-"When is a Man Responsible?") to include criminal justice, and constitute what is known as "the Reconciliationist" position (recon ciling free will with determinism). Both Mr. Bidinotto and the Objectivist philosopher David Kelley, whom he referenced in Part I, are con fused on this issue. Ironically,Mr. Bidinotto con ceded that he does indeed believe both in deter minism and free will in the second paragraph of Part III when he stated "... Aristotle's point about causality applies: the nature of an entity determines what it will do" (my emphasis). Es sentially, the Reconciliationist viewpoint is that, yes, everything is determined, but to have one's actions determined by one's own atoms, one's own molecules, one's own cellular structure and neuronal circuitry,one's own brain, i.e. oneself, is really just another way of saying that one has free will-free in the sense that no external coercive force is involved-free to behave according to one's own nature. I refer the interested or uncon vinced to Schlick'sessay.

My second criticismis of Mr. Bidinotto's unsup ported statement that "in cases of pre-meditated murder in which there is no question of guilt, it [capital punishment] should be the standard sen tence" (The Freeman, September 1989, p. 348). As far as I'm concerned, society is justified in us ing only that amount of force necessary to protect itself, i.e., a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. I consider capital punish ment to have a brutalizing effect on society.I have no desire for it, and don't wish to have a State-ap pointed executioner killingin my name. HAROLD KYRIAZI University of Pittsburgh Mr. BidinottorepHes: Dr. Kyriazi did not define his terms, so I'm not sure I grasp the nuances of his position. If I inter pret him correctly, he believes something like the following: "Causality" and "determinism" are inter changeable concepts. The free will of human na ture can be reconciled with both of these; but to do so, we must redefine our terms. "Human na ture" must be defined so narrowly as to include only physical attributes, such as our atoms, cells, and biochemistry. And "free will" must be de fined to mean only the independence of these in ternal bodily attributes from external forces. This biological determinism is apparently what he means by "being free to behave according to one's own nature."

By contrast, I defined "free will" as "the premise that the individual can make some pri mary,irreducible choices about his thoughts, feel ings, or actions." I argued that free will is a spe cial instance of "causality," and hence compatible with it. I also argued that "determinism" -the theory that all human thoughts, feelings, or ac tions are necessitated by antecedent factors-is the logicalantithesis of "free will." In essence, Dr. Kyriazi shrinks the traditional notion of "free will" so as to fit within the narrow confines of determinism. I argue that the tradi tional notion of "causality" must be expanded so as to admit free will. Our disagreement hinges on whether "causali ty" is the same.thing as "determinism." Dr. Kyri azi insists on using the two terms interchangeably. I argue that causality need not imply determin ism-if volition itself is a primary cause. Thus, when I wrote that "the nature of an entity deter mines what it will do," I was not implying any link between "causality" and "determinism." By emphasizing that human nature includes free will, I was arguing quite to the contrary.

As I wrote in Part I, equating "causality" and "determinism" stems from thinking of causality only in mechanical, "billiard-ball" terms. Note that Dr. Kyriazi'sdescription of "oneself" consists exclusively of physical attributes: atoms, molecules, cells, neurons, the brain. This narrow, reductionist view of human nature excludes voli tionaliy directed awareness as a primary, irre ducible cause of subsequent human action. Thus Dr. Kyriazi's "free will" is not free at all. By his view,man is enslaved not to external social forces, but to inner biological ones. To be deter mined exclusivelyby atoms, molecules, cells,neu rons, and the physical brain is to be-have, not to act. His view is no "reconciliation" of free will with determinism: it simply rejects the former for the latter. To take his position seriously, one would have to conclude that Dr. Kyriazi had no choice about the conclusions he has expressed: his biochemistry made him do it.

Finally, regarding capital punishment. By "us ing ·only that amount of force necessary to pro tect itself," society would be rejecting the goal of justice, and saying that its only aim in sentencing is future public safety, by incapacitating the of fender from committing other offenses. While my primary argument for imprisonment is incapacitation of the career offender, I don't want to imply that such goal~ as retribution (jus tice) and deterrence are irrelevant. If we sen tence solely according to the presumed future threat a criminal poses, instead of commensurate with the seriousness of his past crime, there could be no justice in the system. Sentencing would have no relation to the offense committed. Retributive justice does not simply make vic tims and survivors feel better. It constitutes the premise that the level of punishment must fit the severity of the crime. This does not mean a literal "eye for an eye": society need not sink to the spe cific tactics of the criminal. But it does mean that society recognizes gradations of evil, and reacts accordingly.

In a society whose ultimate premise is that the individual life is an end in itself, pre-meditated READERS' FORUM 37 murder is a crime in a class by itself. It negates the highest end of civil society: the irreplaceable individual life. Society would certainly be safer by locking up a murderer for life (assuming "life" really meant "life"). But a life term in prison still allows the murderer a multitude of values, op tions, and experiences his victim will never know. And in many cases, it prevents the victim's sur vivors-who are also crime victims-from ever burying their pain and resuming their lives. To deny the sentence of capital punishment for murder, then, is to deny the very principle of fit ting punishments to offenses. On what grounds can we uphold that principle of equity for lesser offenses, if we dismiss it for the most serious of crimes? Far from brutalizing society, capital punish ment for wanton murderers is society's way of af firming the supreme value of innocent life-and the existence of a class of irredeemably evil acts.

It is a way of announcing: "We respect innocent life so mUCh, that we won't tolerate those who presume the right to take it. They must be pre pared to pay with their lives for those they take." RJB Note: Copies of the special "Crime and Conse quences"reprint are stillavailable-single copies, $3.00 each postpaid. To order, contactThe Foun dationfor EconomicEducation,30 South Broad wa)J, Irvington-on-Hudson,New York10533.