Book Reviews

Evangelicals align with Catholics and orthodox Jews, prolife advocates do the same with capital punishment backers. Welcome to just part of the new, if confusing, alliance paradigm in the ongoing struggle to make sense of the Ameri can enterprise-how we define right from wrong, what is sociallyacceptable, and what should not be tolerated. It's a messy undertaking if only because so many cultural issues have turned into political ones, argues Professor Hunter, who teaches sociology and religious studies at the University of Virginia. But beneath all the hysterics and showmanship -burning flags on the Supreme Court steps, defy ing Federal marshals during abortion clinic demonstrations-there is something worth noting. No longer is American culture being defined through denominational struggles, Hunter main tains. Now, instead of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews fighting each other, we have them opposing secularists, who have a "progressive" agenda of compulsory tolerance for whatever fad or lifestyle gains their favor.

At stake is the mythical meaning of America. Progressives consider it to be framed in terms of equality. Traditionalists, whom Hunter terms the orthodox-both Jew and gentile-see a different definition, one based on freedom. But one won ders why they don't just say so instead of painting caricatures of each other: Elmer Gantry represent ing traditionalists, amoral libertines representing secularists. "With the realignment of pluralism, the boundaries separating groups have shifted," writes Hunter. "As the lines dividing Protestant, Catholic and Jew have become more indistinct, tolerance has increased among the denominations. 245 But as the lines dividing orthodox from progres sivistsor conservatives from liberals have become clearer and sharper, new bigotries have begun to take shape." Both sides claim the moral high ground and have appropriated and redefined the nation's orig inal egalitarian and libertarian ideals. It's little sur prise then that they might as well be speaking for eign languages to each other when they try to debate: "The fundamental reason why each side characterizes their rivals as extremists outside the mainstream is because each ardently believes that the other embodies and expresses an aggressive program of social, political, and religious intoler ance'" writes Hunter. "Given all of this it is entirely predictable that each side would portray the other as an exceedingly dangerous force in American publiclife."

This is obvious to anyone who follows special interest politics. For example, just how many rights has the American CivilLiberties Union told us we've lost during the "Reagan-Bush" years? Many,in their eyes at least. Why else the smearing of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas by secular ist-oriented special interests? Just remember how both jurists' political baggage, their written records of traditionalist opinions, were manipu lated to make them seem as if they alone would launch the assault on the implied rights that pro gressives have labored for the past half century to argue are inherent in our Constitution. Of course, traditionalists also fall prey to the same shrillness. Looking back on it, was it so necessary to agonize over the flag-burning issue? Surely it's a distasteful spectacle when it happens, but does the conduct of a handful of publicity-seeking misfits merit so much atten tion? Shouldn't we just let them prove them selves to be the hateful, alienated brats they are than have Congress tie itself into knots over such an occasional incident?

One would think the traditionalists and secular ists would know better than to resort to the politics of fear and resentment. After all, these are smart, articulate, charismatic, and connected people who head up, for example, the National Abortion Rights Action League and the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights. Why then does each side exhibit a "proclivity to indulge the temptation of social bigotry," as Hunter claims? Perhaps because they assume the common man 246 THE FREEMAN • JUNE 1992 and woman to be ignorant of the central role of symbols within our culture, which is probably somewhat true as one can hardly expect most peo ple to have handy the type of detailed history of religious movements, popular politics,and cultural mythology Hunter puts forth in this book. And given the pace of modern life, one can also hardly expect most people to follow the evolvingrelation ships between traditionalists and progressivists.

No, your "average Joe" is just as likely to tune out Jerry Falwell's Old-Time Gospel Hour as he is to chuck the hyperbolic, fund-raising junk mail of, say, People for the American Way, Common Cause, or anything with Molly Yard's picture on it. The real opinion swayer may just come in the form of the standard paycheck, which secularists, being good progressives, still want to diminish through redistribution via the government to such worthy endeavors as the National Endowment for the Arts, and then to obscene artists such as Andres Serrano. Who then can blame the Ameri can Family Association for asking, "Is this how you want your tax dollars spent?" D Jim Christie is a San Francisco-based journalist. RATIONALISMIN POLITICSAND OTHERESSAYS by Michael Oakeshott Liberty Press, 7440 North Shadeland Avenue, Indianapo lis, IN 46250-2028 • 1991 • 556 pages • $24.00 cloth; $7.50 paper Reviewedby RobertA. Peterson W hen British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott died in 1990, the world lost one of its greatest defenders of liberty. Not that Oakeshott ever stood near the Berlin Wall and asked for it to be torn down; nor had he published a systematic critique of the fail ures of socialism.Rather, Oakeshott's contribution lay in carrying on a continuing conversation on the origins, opportunities, and future prospects of human freedom. In doing so, he offered some important insights that other writers missed or ignored.

Fortunately, a transcript of much of that conver sation is now available from Liberty Fund. When Rationalismin Politicswas first published in 1962, it was a major event, promoting Oakeshott to the forefront of contemporary political philosophers. This new edition adds six essays, five previously published, and the never-before published "Politi cal Discourse," each of which is consistent with the themes of the original book. Along with Hobbes (Oakeshott was an expert on the author of Leviathan)Oakeshott agreed that life was short, but not necessarily nasty and brutish. What made life worth livingwere the pos sibilities offered by our ability to choose. But because life is short, it is impossible for any indi vidual or group to usher in an ideally "free" soci ety.Instead, much of life has to be spent in learning a culture's existing patterns of behavior and tradi tions, then making wise decisions based on these traditions. Traditions that enhance individual lib erty-trial by jury, voluntary associations, reli gious freedom, and so forth-should be encour aged, while those that inhibit the human spirit should be discarded.

Men and women are free to choose, but they will not always make the right decisions, Oakeshott says, and will consequently hold back the progress of human freedom. That there are those who fail is one of the mysteries of the human condition; there is no single formula for solving this defect. According to Oakeshott, the best we can do--- the only thing we can do-is follow those "inti mations" that lead to a better world. Oakeshott frequently employs the word "intimation" be cause he wants to avoid the idea that there is a logical, rational direction in which we can go. Timothy Fuller, who wrote the foreword, says that "Oakeshott the man wouldn't be so much concerned with where you planned to go as how you proposed to travel." Karl Marx had a seem ingly rational, detailed plan on how to order soci ety. Over 100 years later, many Russian, East European, and Chinese citizens know by hard experience the consequences of such rationalism in politics.

But Oakeshott doesn't stop at criticizing Marx ism; he turns his critical mind to all rational plans to remake society in man's image-the modern Towers of Babel. Whether it's ~ Great Society or a New Deal, rationalism in politics always runs roughshod over the existing practices, associa tions' and political traditions that men have devel oped to make life easier: "The Rationalist has rejected in advance the only external inspiration capable of correcting his error; he does not merely neglect the kind of knowledge which would save him, he begins by destroying it. First he turns out the light and then complains that he cannot see, ... In short, the Rationalist is essentially ineduca ble; and he could be educated outof his Rational ism only by an inspiration which he regards as the great enemy of mankind. All the Rationalist can do when left to himself is to replace one rationalist project in which he has failed by another in which he hopes to succeed. Indeed, this is what contem porary politics are fast degenerating into: the political habit and tradition, which, not long ago, was the common possession of even extreme opponents in English politics, has been replaced by merely a common rationalist disposition of mind."

To the practical American way of thinking, Oakeshott's armchair philosophy may seem too simplistic.We want a plan of action, a set of march ing orders. We want to do something,even if it's wrong. But as Oakeshott points out, every time social engineers have tried to solve problems through "rational politics," they have only created new ones that are worse. By contrast, most of the liberties we enjoy were developed during a long historical process, totally outside the offices of the world's central governments. New freedoms that we experience as part of the computer and infor mation age are coming not from rational political planning, but from private sector initiatives and voluntary associations. Oakeshott's laissezfaire philosophy may work in societies with long traditions of individualliber ty, such as the United States and Great Britain. But what about societies with no recent memory of freedom? We are already seeing how difficult it is for the Eastern European countries to free up their economies and people. What Oakeshott might suggest is that freedom in these countries cannot develop overnight, but only through many years in which existing institutions-the "black market," religious groups, the family, voluntary associations-are cultivated and allowed to take over spheres of life once dominated by govern ment.

Years ago, Oakeshott predicted the breakup of the Soviet empire, as he felt the human spirit could only be suppressed for so long. (Unlike many eco nomic historians, Oakeshott finds the origins of BOOKS 247 modern freedom in the works of the artists and artisans of the Renaissance.) But he was also con cerned that the nations which cast off Communism might replace one form of rational politics for another, and that the West might unwittingly aid in such folly. This book can help us avoid that temp tation. 0 Robert A. Peterson is the headmaster of The Pilgrim Academy in Egg Harbor, New Jersey. THE MACROECONOMICSOF POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA edited by Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards University of Chicago Press, 11030 S. Langley Avenue, Chicago, IL 60628. 1991 • 402 pages • $65.00cloth; $21.95 paper Reviewedby DougBandow T he decline of Latin America has long been one of the most potent indictments of interventionist economic policies. Coun tries like Argentina, once among the richest in the world, are now basket cases. But we may finally be seeing a turnabout, with Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico and Carlos Menem of Argentina, for instance, implementing serious economic reforms.

What makes their progress so dramatic is Latin America's history of populist economics. "Macro economic instability has long been a salient fea ture of the Latin American economies," write economists Dornbusch and Edwards. "Inflation ary outbursts, balance of payments crises, and painful stabilization attempts have dominated the economic history of the region since, at least, the early twentieth century." There is, of course, no guarantee that this cycle will not recur, and the situation in a number of Latin American countries, such as Peru, is not promising. Nevertheless, several nations in the region appear to have learned from their mistakes. This volume begins with a review of the com mon characteristics of the various populist episodes in the region. Although every country faces unique problems, the governments' overall economic strategies remained quite similar: expansive fiscal and monetary policies "to acceler ate growth and redistribute income."

248 THE FREEMAN • JUNE 1992 Nevertheless, there are at least two variants of Latin American populism. TuftsU niversity pro fessors Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege argue that "classical populism favored activist govern ments committed to a strong role in price determi nation, to protection of workers and wages, to policies of cheap food, to state ownership of key industries, to state allocation of credit at low inter est rates, and to favors for private industry." The more recent variety, symbolized by Peru's Alan Garcia, were more nationalistic and protectionist, intended to benefit selected businesses as well as labor. Ironically,both the old and new populism have tended to bypass the poorest segments of the pop ulation. Urban workers and businessmen, rather than peasants, have been the primary beneficiaries of populist economies. Moreover, since growth did occur in the short term, "these gains were more distributive than redistributive," conclude Car doso and Helwege.

Unfortunately, the end result of the recurrent bouts of populism have been the same all over-a disaster for everyone but the best-connected. Write Dornbusch and Edwards, "at the end of every populist experiment real wages are lower than they were at the beginning of these experi ences." Even this understates the agonies suffered by most "beneficiaries" of populist policies. In the short term, growth accelerates, but then bottle necks start appearing. Finally,explain Dornbusch and Edwards: "Pervasive shortages, extreme acceleration of inflation, and an obvious foreign exchange gap lead to capital flight and demoneti zation of the economy.The budget deficit deterio rates violently because of a steep decline in tax subsidies and by a real depreciation. Real wages fall massively,and policies become unstable." Of course, the economic and social problems that have so often led to populist excessesare very real. Because the Latin American economies have been badly manipulated by influential political elites, income inequality in Latin America is two and one-half times as great as in Asia, report pro fessors Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings.