The Dilemma of Library Censorship; E. C. Beisner

The Dilemma of Library Censorship by E. Calvin Beisner I n her 1991 annual report, the librarian of the local public library decried the descent of "book censors" like a "plague" on her library. Yet what she condemns in others she practices herself. She rightly called the effort by some to exclude certain sexually explicit and pro-homosexual books from the library's collection, or to shield child patrons from them, censorship. But she also reported her own rejection of Ku Klux Klan liter ature on the grounds that it was "a revisionist his tory that attempts to disprove that the Holocaust could have ever happened." We can respect her courage in standing firm against the KKK. But her blindness to her own censorship is typical of the inability of many bureaucrats to see their own infringements on oth ers'liberties. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a censor as "an official who examines materials (as publications or films) for objection able matter" and the verb censor as "to examine in order to suppress or delete anything considered objectionable."

The librarian is an official of the library. She examined the material donated by the KKK-how else could she describe it? She determined that it was objectionable. She suppressed or deleted it from the library's collection. She is a censor. She imposes her censorship on all who support the library. There is nothing wrong with that. It is Calvin Beisner is a visiting lecturer at Covenant Col lege, Lookout Mountain, Georgia. unavoidable. The library has limited funds to purchase, catalogue, and circulate books, limited space in whichto displaythem, and limited person nel to care for them. Selection-receiving some, rejecting others-is unavoidable in the finite world of libraries, just as in every other finite world. And selection necessarily rests on some stan dards-however ill defined, and whether adopted only personally by the librarian or officially by the library board. The only alternative is to put all book titles into a lottery and select strictly by chance-which might do nasty things to the library's budget and its usefulness to patrons. (It would also make much of the librarian's job unnecessary.) The librarian's errors are several. First, she either failsto recognize censorship for what it is, or dishonestly pretends it isn't what it is. Confusion seems the more likely, granted that in the same report she contradictorily cites the Freedom to Read Statement's directive to libraries, "It is in the public interest for publishers and librarians to make available the widest diversity of views and expressions, includingthose whichare unorthodox or unpopular with the majority," and yet reports her rejection of KKK materials.

Second, her blanket condemnation of censor ship (except her own, whichshe doesn't recognize) implies that censorship is necessarily a bad thing. But like most unavoidable things, censorship may be good or bad. Deciding which in any given case requires careful judgment informed by standards properly applicable to the case. 416 Third, she mistakes those standards. She insists that those who would like certain books excluded from the library, or given restricted access, threat en the First Amendment to the Constitution. This is patently absurd. The relevant part of the Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of ... the press." Neither the citizens who opposed placing the sexually explicit books in the library nor the city,its council, or its library board is Congress. The First Amendment does not govern them. Even if it did, it would not apply to this particu lar action. The critics have not opposed publica tion and circulation of the questioned books. They have simply opposed subsidy of their circulation by the taxes that support the library. The courts have ruled repeatedly that while the First Amend ment protects expression, it does not entail any right to have expression promoted by any level or branch of government.

Neither, by the way, does the First Amendment prohibit any government official's promoting any expression or idea, which is why the librarian's unbalanced promotion of five liberal books and a Democratic presidential candidate in an April 15 newspaper column, however distasteful, was not unconstitutional. Finally, she insists that the debate is over peo ple's "right to read." It is not. It is over the stan dards by which books shall be selected for, or rejected from, the public library. Her opponents believe the selection should closely reflect the val ues of the citizens who pay for the library. Therein lies the great difficultynot only of pub lic libraries but also of every venture of govern ment into the promotion of ideas-including pub licschools. It is diffiCultfor many people to identify their own values, let alone to express them. It is more difficult still to ascertain the values of a majority, or even a plurality, so as to ensure that public policy promotes them. Even if we could do that with reasonable certainty on any single issue, that would not be enough; the values of the minor417 ity would reasonably demand minority represen tation.

Extending this argument to its logical conclu sion prompts the simple but impracticable solution of polling the public on every issue to see what per cent embraces each of a potentially unlimited number of options, and then adjusting government action to ensure that it promotes all of the different views in precise proportion to the segments of the public that embrace them. If we think government is slow and unwieldy and its policy is incoherent now, we shall find it infinitely more so if we adopt such a tactic. But if time and expense prohibit the library's determining all its selections by repeated public polling, some other standard of selection becomes necessary. Aside from this fastidious reflection of public values, only three other standards are pos sible: the whim of the officialswho make the deci sions (we call this tyranny, and in most public libraries it is the status quo), dominant public expression in open debate (which rapidly degener ates into the tyranny of special interests, particu larly those who have little better to do with their time than to attend public meetings), or some moral criteria.

The two tyrannies are objectionable, but so is the option of resorting to some moral criteria. Whose criteria shall they be? Who shall determine them? In a society committed both to pluralism and to public expenditure to promote learning, thought, and ideas, the dilemma admits no solu tion. What shall we do? Consider a radical idea: end government's role in promoting ideas and restore its original role of protecting the freedom to express ideas. Make libraries private, not public, and force no one to pay for books he detests. Pri vate libraries that wish to stock books promoting fornication or homosexuality,or racism, or democ racy, or Christianity, or paganism, or tyranny, or liberalism, or conservatism, or any other notion or perversion-may do so. But they may not force anyone to pay the bills for them. D Does Occupational Licensing Protect Consumers? by John Hood I t takes more to become an auctioneer in North Carolina than just experience, desire, and above-average verbal dexterity. It also requires a license from the North Carolina Auc tioneer Licensing Board. Similarly,while a flashy television ad and a good reputation can giveretail ers of hearing aids a competitive edge in Missouri, they won't sell a single device without first obtain ing a licensefrom the state's board regulating hear ing aid dealers.