Special Interest and Internment of Japanese-Americans; S. Baudill and M. Hill

When war erupted in Europe, FDR placed J. Edgar Hoover's FBI in charge of the nation's internal security. Before the attack on Pearl, the FBI and· Naval Intelligence maintained lists of alien suspects. Though Professor Caudill teaches economics at Auburn University and Ms. Hill is an undergraduate student. the lists contained 250 to 300 suspects, only 40 or 50 were considered real threats. 1 Within two days of the attack on Pearl, all of the suspects and many others were de tained. The FBI contended that these mea sures adequately controlled any threat of espionage, and that the relocation of Japa nese and Japanese-Americans was unnec essary .2 As additional evidence that secu rity was not the reason for the internment, note that no mass detainment of people of Japanese ancestry occurred in Hawaii, which is closer to Japan and home to many Japanese and Japanese-Americans. In Ha waii, only suspect Japanese individuals were incarcerated. If espionage was not the reason for the evacuation in California, what was the reason? The answer: special interest groups seeking protection from the competition of Japanese and Japanese Americans residing on the West Coast.

Labor unions and farmers wanted the Jap anese out of California and off the land long before the attack on Pearl. World War II and the bombing of Pearl Harbor provided a handy opportunity for these groups to com plete a task that they started several years earlier. 444 The Foundation for Economic Education Irvington-on-Hudson, New York 10533 Tel. (914) 591-7230 Fax (914) 591-8910 July 1995 Degenerate Democracy W hen all the mysticism is stripped away, the people who comprise the government (the legislators, administrators, judges, and policemen), are guided by human inter ests, desires, beliefs, notions, and preju dices, just like other people. They have neither superhuman wisdom nor extra ordinary virtue. Nevertheless, they are expected to render an important service: to protect the life and property of each and every individual. They are to restrain wrongdoers, meet force with force, and punish peace-breakers.

Toward that end, they are entrusted with the necessary instruments of coercion: the armed forces, police, and prisons. Governments maybe democratic or totalitarian, pluralistic or monistic, republican or monarchical. The form springs from the common notions of human behavior in society. Belief in a propensity to strife and conflict as a nor mal condition of human existence gives rise to authoritarian government. If social life consists of unending conflict, of war of all against all, society is in need of an authoritarian government as the best means of regulating the conditions of conflict. In contrast, belief in a harmo ny of interest of all members of society tends to give rise to limited government that merely seeks to restrain the peace breakers. No matter what the origin of govern ment may be, the democratic form ren ders an important service that is lacking in all others forms. It provides a proce dure by which individuals acquire power and are removed from power.

Democratic government makes lawmak ers dependent on the people's wishes, and thereby facilitates peaceful changes if conflict should occur. Changes are subject to majority rule. Yet, rule by "simple majority" differs from" constitu tional democracy" that recognizes cer tain individual rights and gives them some form of constitutional protection, thereby placing limitations on the whims and wishes of the majority. Majority rule inevitably raises the question of the scope and extent of majority power. Should the vote of a simple majority always prevail over the opposition? The advocates of majoritari anism readily answer in the affirmative; any other rule, they argue, enables a minority to frustrate the majority and thus, in a sense, rule and prevail over it. Requirement of more than a simple majority, they maintain, places undesir able obstacles in the way of government. The opponents of unlimited majority power are quick to reply that Congressional representatives may not express the will of the majority of their constituents; guided by their own interests, they may not vote the wishes of the majority, but rather their own and those of their supporters. They may represent the interests of the largest bloc of voters who may actually consti tute a minority of the population, or they may not even know the majority opinion because few voters may bother to form an opinion, which is probably true in most issues confronting legislators.

Strict majoritarianism tends to destroy the conditions of its own existence wher ever the majority routinely violates the basic rights of individuals. It may sup press the basic freedom of expression and association, deny the minority any consideration and weight, deprive it of the right to participate in the political process, and refuse it fair treatment and "due process." It may even relegate minorities to inferior positions in politi cal, social, and economic life, assign numerous duties and liabilities, and extract from them an inordinate share of their income and wealth. In possession of all the powers of coercion, majoritari an government may blithely ignore and defy the moral laws that proscribe all forms of harm to any and all individuals. Social peace and harmony can be pre served only if all members of society are free to participate in democratic institu tions and are treated equally before the law. Yet, many champions of majoritari anism never tire of criticizing this politi cal and legal equality for being inade quate; they would extend the scope of equality to economic life through "fair er" distribution of income and wealth.

They would forcibly reduce economic inequality, although their efforts would necessitate the use of much coercion and violence. After all, people differ in capacity, skill, strength, industry, and health, which necessarily results in unequal income and wealth. Individual inequality, in fact, is a great advantage to both the individual and society, bringing forth man's division of labor and social cooperation. To enforce equality is to deny human nature and work evil on everyone including those it is supposed to benefit. A policy designed to enforce econom ic equality opens the doors for dema goguery and politics at its worst. It invites expedient politicians to stir up the resentment of the poor against the rich so that they may elect the dema gogues to positions of power and largess. It appeals to envy and covetous ness, and elevates demagoguery to an important device of democratic politics.

In the end, politics is likely to become an art of promises, evasions, and systematic pursuit of expedience, making the body politic the primary source of social con flict and strife. All democratic societies have foundered on the rocks of moral decay and domestic strife. Envy is more irreconcilable than hate. It is the most corroding of all political vices and also a great power in our land. The friends of freedom are content to be envied, but envy not. Hans F. Sennholz INDEPENDENCE DAY SALE Jacob Burckhardt Reflections on History Written in the 1890s but published nearly 50 years later under the title Force and Freedom, this volume is notable for its uncannily accurate predictions of the all-devouring state. Introduction by Gottfried Dietze. Clarence B. Carson The American Tradition A profound and exciting social history of the United States and its foundations. The Flight from Reality A brilliant analysis of our intellectual flight from economic and political reality.

Richard M. Ebeling, editor Disaster in Red: The Failure and Collapse of Socialism A brilliant exposition of the causes that lead to tyranny and oppression. Burton W. Folsom, Jr., editor The Spirit of Freedom: Essays in American History An anthology of essays and articles on the freedom movement throughout American history. Fred Holden Total Power of One Discover what you need to know, why and how to be a more powerful person and citizen. Hardcover Edmund A. Opitz, editor Leviathan at War A collection of essays which reveal the link between big government, interventionism, and war. Leonard E. Read Pattern for Revolt A collection of political speeches the author would give if he were to run for and be elected to the Presidency of the United States. The FEE Library Fifty-two titles from the 1995 FEE Book Catalogue. $650 when bought singly. Regular $12.95 12.95 15.95 24.95 14.95 21.95 14.95 4.95 520.00 Sale $10.95 9.95 12.95 19.95 10.95 16.95 10.95 3.95 470.00 Sale Ends August 31, 1995 Postage and handling: Please add $3 per order of $25 or less; $4 per order of $26-$50; $5 per order of more than $50. Send your order, with accompanying check or money order, to FEE, 30 South Broadway, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York 10533. Visa and MasterCard telephone and fax orders are welcomed: (800) 452-3518; fax (914) 591-8910.

Light a fire for freedom! Launch a Freeman Society Discussion Club! j oin the growing ranks of Freeman readers who have become part of FEE's net work of Freeman Society Discussion Clubs. More than 80 clubs have been orga nized in the 27 states and 5 foreign countries. Leonard E. Read once observed that rancid intellectual soil nurtures an unend ing variety of socialist fallacies and that "finding the right is the key to salvation." FEE is making the right both known and prevalent by launching discussion clubs nationwide, and by providing free literature and speakers to improve understand ing of the moral and intellectual foundation of a free society. Club members receive a number of special benefits, including discounts on FEE publications and invita tions to special FEE events. For more information about starting a discussion club, or joining a Freeman Club that may already be meeting in your area, write Felix R. Livingston, Vice President and Director of Freeman Services, 2814 Hilsdale Harbor Way, Jacksonville, FL 32216, or calli fax (904) 448-0105.

Last Call 1995 Summer Seminars At FEE P or the 33rd consecutive summer, FEE will conduct its noted seminars in the freedom philosophy and the economics of a free society. Here, in the company of like minded individuals, with experienced discus sion leaders, and in a setting ideal for the calm exchange of ideas, is an opportunity for those who believe that the proper approach to eco nomic problems is through the study of individual human action. Each seminar will consist of 40 hours of classroom lectures and discus sions in economics and government. In addition to the regular FEE staff, there will be a number of distinguished visiting lecturers. The FEE charge for a seminar-tuition, supplies, room and board-is $400. A limited number of fellowships are available. First session: July 23-28, 1995 Second session: August 13-18, 1995 Write or call Dr. Barbara Dodsworth, The Foundation for Economic Education, 30 South Broadway, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY 10533; Tel.

(914) 591-7230 or Fax: (914) 591-8910.

The Historical Backdrop to Japanese Internment The story of the internment is really the story of immigration in California. A pattern was repeated, first with Chinese immigrants and later, Japanese immigrants. The state of California, through various laws, initially made it difficult for immigrants to enter the state and then, if they managed to enter, unattractive to remain. The main difference between the Japanese and the Chinese in California was the strong Japanese desire to own land. This difference led to special land-use legislation aimed at the Japanese. Between 1850 and 1882, over 280,000 Chinese entered California. 3 The influx of Chinese occurred because the enormous growth in the California economy required a cheap labor source and the Chinese pro vided a solution. The Chinese were wel comed at first, but by 1869 the railroad opened up California to the eastern half of the United States, and a recession was beginning. Organized labor argued that the Chinese were no longer needed and lobbied for an end to Chinese immigration. As early as 1875, California enacted legislation halt ing Chinese immigration into California (though this statute was later declared un constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court).

California and organized labor then turned to Washington for help. Their efforts were rewarded when, on May 6, 1882, the first Chinese Exclusion Act went into effect. This act eliminated the immigration of Chi nese laborers for a period of 10 years; it also barred the Chinese from becoming natural ized citizens. The agitation leading up to the Chinese Exclusion Act made it clear to many that something drastic regarding Chi nese immigration was about to occur, and even before passage of the Act, labor re cruiters began visiting Japan to find replace ments for the lost Chinese. 4 The first large numbers of Japanese la borers who came to the U.S. territory were contract laborers. In 1884 and 1885 several hundred contract workers landed in Hawaii, which at the time was a protectorate of the United States. Californians were concerned 445 that the Japanese might leave Hawaii for California. Consequently, on February 26, 1885, the U.S. Congress enacted a bill to "prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the District of Columbia. "

California on its own took steps making Japanese immigration difficult. The Con gressional Act of August 3, 1882,imposed a head tax of fifty cents on all immigrants. Soon afterward labor union leaders turned their attention to the "Japanese problem." In 1905 the Asiatic Exclusion League was formed. Initially this group consisted mostly of union leaders and workers, but support eventually was widespread: On the second Sunday in 'May, 1905, dele gates from sixty-seven local and nearby labor organizations met to form what became the Asiatic Exclusion League. From the day of the League's formation on May 14, 1905, until after the end of World War II, there was in California, an organized anti-Japanese move ment that would eventually draw support from all segments of the state's population. In the beginning, the organized movement was an extension of San Francisco labor unions. The most prominent labor leaders attending the initial meeting of the league were Patrick Henry McCarthy, head of the Building Trades Council of San Francisco, and Andrew Furu seth and Walter MacArthur, both of the Sail or's Union. A satellite of McCarthy, Olaf Tveitmore, was named its president. All four of these men were immigrants from Europe. 5 Immigration Restrictions In an effort to reduce tensions, Japan attempted to voluntarily restrict immigra tion to the United States. In 1900 the Japa nese government stopped issuing passports for laborers headed for the United States, but continued to allow immigration to Ha waii. In California there was again concern that Japanese would enter through Hawaii.

Consequently, the Asiatic Exclusion League prompted the legislatures of other Pacific Coast states to adopt resolutions restricting Japanese immigration from Ha446 THE FREEMAN • JULY 1995 waiL In light of this agitation, the Japanese government started to limit immigration to Hawaii, and in April 1905Japan temporarily suspended all immigration. Other legislation was designed to make life in California unattractive to Japanese Americans. In April 1905 the union-domi nated San Francisco Board of Education submitted a plan to the board of supervisors to segregate Japanese publicschool chil dren. On October 11, 1906,with part of the city still in ruins from the earthquake, the board of education passed the segregation order. The move outraged Japan, and the U.S. government attempted to intervene. A compromise was reached and the problem was resolved with the passage of the Immi gration Act of 1907. The Act listed 20 different classes of workers, collectively called contract labor, who were prevented from immigrating. The provisions of this legislation succeeded in keeping Japanese laborers from entering the United States through a third country or territory.

The next political issue was direct immi gration. Restrictions on direct immigration of Japanese were achieved through the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1908. Japan agreed to limit immigration to "relatives," "former residents," and "settled agricul turalists." The term, "settled agricultural ists" is defined to mean "a person who had invested capital in the enterprise, and whose share in its proceeds, if it is carried on in partnership, will be in proportion to the amount of his investment." The Gentleman's Agreement achieved an immediate decline in immigration. Soon, departures exceeded arrivals. This changed in 1913 when large numbers of "picture brides" immigrated. The number of Japa nese entering the country slowed to a trickle. Efforts now focused on legislation making life in California unattractive to Japanese-Americans. A large part of this effort was aimed at land-ownership restric tions.

During the 1909 legislative session in California, at least 17 anti-Japanese bills were introduced, and the 1913 session was flooded by more than 30 anti-Japanese measures. Most proposals dealt with the holding of agricultural land. Out of this session emerged the Heney-Webb Alien Land Law of 1913,tying land ownership to citizenship. This statute also provided that aliens ineli gible for citizenship could lease land for no more than three years. State Attorney Gen eral Webb, co-sponsor, was not shy about its intent, stating, It is unimportant and foreign to the ques tion, whether a particular race is inferior. The single and simple question is, is the race desirable .... It [the law] seeks to limit their presence by curtailing their privileges which they may enjoy here: for they will not come in large numbers and long abide with us if they may not acquire land. And it [the Actlseeks to limit the numbers who will come by limiting the opportunities for their activity when they arrive. 6 The 1913 Act prohibited aliens from ac quiring, possessing, enjoying, transmitting, and inheriting real property. Japanese Americans began to put .land titles in the names of their U.S.-born children who were citizens and thus entitled to hold property.

In 1919, state senator J. M. Inman intro duced an alien-land law designed to plug this loophole. The heart of the new act was that it was now illegal for an alien to provide funds to purchase land if the title was held in the name of another person and if the intent was to avoid the law. The act also prohibited leasing any land to persons inel igible for citizenship. The measure was placed on the ballot in the general election of 1920in the form of an initiative. On Novem ber 2, 1920,the measure passed by a vote of 668,483 to 222,086. Still, white Californians were unsatisfied. They hoped to put an end to all Japanese immigration (as they had done earlier with the Chinese). That goal was achieved when on May 15, 1924, a bill that became known as the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 passed the House of Representatives. Despite this anti-Japanese legislation, the growth of the Japanese involvement in ag riculture during this period was impressive.

By 1940Japanese farmers produced at least 90 percent of snap beans, celery, peppers, THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS 447 and strawberries. Japanese farmers also produced 50 to 90 percent of artichokes, celery, cucumbers, fall peas, spinach, and tomatoes for canning, and 25 to 50 percent of the asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, car rots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons. 7 Agitation Increases It is not surprising that when the attack on Pearl Harbor heightened agitation against the Japanese-Americans, the Caucasian farmers of California were eager for intern ment as well as for the land held by the Japanese. Austin Anson, the managing sec retary of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable As sociation, a farm organization, is quoted as saying: We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came to this valley to work, and they stayed to take over. They offer higher land prices and higher rents than the white man can pay for land. They undersell the white man in the markets. They can do this because they raise their own labor. They work their women and children while the white farmer has to pay wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows.

And we don't want them back when the war ends, either. 8 The fact that Japanese farmers were not welcomed back after the war contradicts the security arguments given for the evacua tion. Security concerns certainly did not exist after the war. It is quite clear that some viewed the situation in California immedi ately following the attack on Pearl Harbor as a unique opportunity to get rid of com petitors. In May 1942, O. L. Scott, another member of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association wrote to Congressman Ander son: If it were not for the "white-skinned Japs" in this country there wouldn't be any Japanese question. What can you suggest I do and thousands of Californians be led to do, that may make it possible to get rid of all Japs, sending them back to Japan either before or after the war is won. I am convinced that if it is not done or at least the action completed before the war is over, it will be impossible to get rid of them.... The Japanese cannot be assimilated as the white race [and] we must do everything we can to stop them now as we have a golden opportunity now and may never have it again.9 As a consequence of the evacuation, farms owned by Japanese-Americans were sold for a few cents on the dollar to Cauca sian farmers. One estimate of the value of Japanese farmland in 1940 was over $72 million. After the war, internees were paid only a small fraction of the value of their losses. Attempting to remedy this situation, the government passed a bill in 1988 that did two things. First, the government apol ogized to Japanese-Americans for the in ternment, also admitting that the relocation was not justified for security reasons. Sec ond, the bill provided that each of the 60,000 internees or their descendants be paid a lump sum of $20,000. Perhaps these funds should have come not from the taxpayers· of this country at large, but from the farmers who benefited directly from the land and crops taken from the Japanese-Americans in 1942. [] 1. See Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japa nese Americans (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Co., 1975).

2. See also Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans. 3. See Frank Chuman, The Bamboo People: The Law and Japanese-Americans (Del Mar, Calif.: Publisher's Inc., 1976). 4. See also Frank Chuman, The Bamboo People. 5. See Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961). 6. See also Frank Chuman, The Bamboo People. 7. See Theodore Salutos, "The Immigrant in Pacific Coast Agriculture, 1880-1940," Agricultural History 49 (January 1975), p. 192. 8. See Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). 9. See also Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, p. 20.