Part I. Political Ideas

In his introduction to A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants, Professor Laski says, "In the sixteenth century there are two main forms of political doctrine, of which the Republique of Bodin, and the Vindiciae of Duplessis-Mornay are perhaps the best examples." And somewhat further on he represents the Jesuits as the inheritors of the monarchomachs. But it is hard to see why they should have drawn on these latter when they could 23 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY find in St. Thomas himself the doctrines to which Professor Laski points a8 the ground for his conclusion. Mariana, it is true, in the first chapter of his De Rege gives an account of the origin of society very similar to that of the Epicureans and of some Stoics such as Seneca, a view common not only to Duplessis-Mornay but to all the Protestant political theorists on the side of freedom from Duplessis-Mornay down to Milton and Locke. But then Mariana concludes by showing that society is the natural state for man rather than the state of nature, and his position is wholly at variance with that of the author of the Vindiciae when the lat ter maintains that "In the first place everyone consents that men by nature loving liberty are born rather to command than obey, have not willingly admitted to be governed by another and re nounced as it were the privilege of nature by submitting themselves to the commands of others, but for some special and great profit that they expected from it." (A Defense of Liberty, p. 139.) Another important distinction is that between the natural and the conventional, or the due and the established order. Mariana's views in this respect are not those of Monarchomachs such as Duplessis-Mornay. The latter's idea of the law of nature (Ibid., 190.) as an instinct common to men and animals is the Stoic and Roman law notion, but not that of the scholastics. In him, more over, we find the Roman idea of contract (Ibid., p. 175) which looked to the will of the parties, substituted in the place of the earlier medieval idea which the Jesuits maintained and which looked to the objective relation between the ruler and the ruled, and derived traditionally from St. John Chrysostom and St. Augus tine. It might, moreover, not be out of place to call attention to the fact that this is the idea so strikingly insisted upon by Burke in the well-known passage in his Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs. As fol"! the conventional element, ,i,both Hotman and Duplessis-Mornay differ very. widely from the more traditional understanding of Mariana. As Duplessis-Mornay states it, "Prin ces are chosen by God and established by the people. As all par ticulars considered one by one, are inferior to the prince; so the whole body of the people and officers of state, who represent that body, are the princes' superiors." (Ibid., p. 212.) As is clear from the first Book, 8th chapter, of Mariana's De Rege, he understands 24 INTRODUCTION the relative position of ruler and people in the sense in which St.

Thomas does in the 6th chapter of the first Book of the De Regi mine Principum. The question of how far the people may control the ruler is a matter depending upon previous positive enactment or agreement. Hence Mariana in his historical treatment of the question of the relation of public bodies to the king is more fully in line with the sounder and older traditional view as found ex pressed by Philippe Pot at the Estates General held at Tours in 1484 (cf. History of France from the Death of Louis XI., by John S. C. Bridge, V. I., p. 77); and in a book dedicated in 1589 to the Chancellor Montholon by Mathieu Zampini (cf. La France en 1614, by Gabricl Hanotaux, p. 263). According to this view, the ruler is superior to the people although power may revert to them or to their representatives in certain cases. Underlying these important differences and rendering them more or less inevitable are the essential differences in theological point of view, an aspect of the question that might not suggest itself to the non-Catholic student as inseparably bound up with such questions. Yet a slight reminder would appear to suffice in order to make it clear that anyone committed to the Calvinistic or Lutheran conception of human nature, and of God was no longer in a position to think in terms of natural law and of institutional freedom in the sense in which the earlier Middle Ages and the scholastics understood these matters. This point has been rather fully treated only recently by Georges de Lagarde in his Re cherches sur l'Esprit Politique de Ia Reforme.

March, 1928. MOORHOUSE F. X. MILLAR, S.j., Professor of Constitutional Law, Fordham University 25 Chapter I The Origin of the State· M ARIANA'S book on royalty was intended to be a mirror for kings in the hands of the tutor of the royal princes. That is, it was to serve a practical purpose. We cannot, therefore, expect a philosophic treatment of the nature, origin and purpose of the State, because this would not be adapted to the mental capacity of a young prince. Never theless, all these matters are touched upon in De Rege, in terms which make the reading of the book pleasant and easy. According to Mariana men originally lived without a social organization, and without a positive law. They simply followed the law of nature and attended to nothing except supplying food for themselves and their families. Children obeyed their elders and the whole family, including children and grandchildren, lived together in perfect happiness until the death of the head of the family. Then the common home was broken up, and the several members spread to a"djacent districts. Each formed another large family, or rather a group of families which Mariana calls pagi (tribes ).1 Even at this stage men had no civil authority and no positive law. Nature gave freely what was needed for their 1 Soli vagi initio homines incertis sedibus ferarum ritu pererrabant: uni sustentandae vitae curae. et secundum earn, uni procurandae educandaeque prolis libidilli serviebant, nullo jure devincti, nullius rectoris imperio tenebantur, nisi quatenus naturae instinctu et impulsu in quaque familia, ei honor deferebatur maximus, quem aetatis praerogativa caeteris videbant esse praelatum .... Sublato rectore. parente aut ava, filii nepotes que in multas familias mapalium instar dissipati, ex uno pago plures pagos effecere. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 1, pp. 12-13.

27 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY maintenance. Their wants were few and simple: 1 they nourished themselves with the fruits of the fields and the milk of domestic animals; they quenched their thirst with water from the spring. Skins of animals protected them from the cold and they found rest under shady trees. I-Iere they also celebrated their modest, simple feasts and enjoyed friendly intercourse and conversation with each other. They were guileless and honest; fraud and lying were unknown. They had no social obligations because there were no rich among them to how to or to flatter. Amhition and war were unknown, and all lived peacefully and happily on equal terms. Nor had avarice claimed the goods of the earth from their common use as private property. . All things helonged to all. Unfortunately, this happy state of affairs did not last long. Men soon began to feel more and larger wants which they yearned to satisfy. This desire was good, for God had created men with manifold insufficiencies in order to induce them. to comhine into a perfect society. Whereas He had supplied all other living creatures with food and given them weapons with which to defend themselves against their enemies, He had placed man upon the earth, destitute of all help, an infant who could do nothing but cry and look to his parents for assistance. Nor is man self-sufficient when he has grown to manhood. He needs many things which the individual alone cannot supply: clothing, instruments to work with, weapons, articles of ornament, dealers to supply 1 Ratio vivendi quieta erat nullaque solicitudine ~ravis. parvo enim contenti pomis agrestibus arborum, baccis sponte natis, lacteque pecons famem, sitim, si admoneret, aqua profluenti .sedare soliti erant, pellibns animantium adversus frigoris et aestus injurias se munire, sub frondosa arbore jucundos capt are somnos, instruere agrestia convivia, Iud ere cum aequalibus, sermones familiares miscere. Nullus locus fraudi, nulla mendacia, nulli potentiores, quorum salutare limina, quibus assentiri opus habebant, nulli ambitus nulli bellici fragores quietam vitam eorum hominum solicitabant. Nondum rabida et furens avaritia divina beneficia interceperat, sibique omnia vendi carat, sed ut quidam ait Mallebant tenui contenti vivere cnltu: Ne signare quidem, aut partiri limite campum Fas erato De Rege, Lib. I, Cap. 1, p. 13.

28 ORIGIN OF THE STATE things necessary and to dispose of things abundant. Man must co-operate with others in order to cultivate the land and to protect it from raging rivers, to irrigate barren fields and to build ports and bridges. Man needs the help of his fellows to restore his weakened health and to supply num berless other wants without the satisfaction of which life would no longer he human.! Primitive man needed above all protection from enemies, -wild animals and especially fellowmen whose rapacity had made them more cruel and dangerous than the beasts. The strong frightened the weak, robbed and killed them pitilessly. Murderous hands organized and pillaged neigh boring tribes. Original happiness and harmlessness had disappeared, violence, robbery and theft reigned every where. Human life even was not respected. 2 Primitive man realized his helplessness. His Creator had purposely placed him in this condition in order that he might seek for help from his fellowman. The gift of speech enabled him to exchange ideas with his neighbors, to ask help and to give advice and assistance. Moreover, men observed how the weaker animals banded together to supplement by their number what was wanting in strength. When, therefore, the weaker individuals saw themselves surrounded hy the violence of the strong and powerful, they resolved to look for a leader to protect them against their oppressors and enemies. They chose the most virtuous man from their midst and charged him to lead them 1 Quibus bonis de felicitate cum coelestibus certare potuissent, illisque convitium facere: nisi multarum rerum indigentia premeret, imbecillitasque corporis externis injuriis opportunos faceret. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 1, p. 13.

2 Accessit imbecillitas corporis ad propulsandam externam vim, prohibendam injuriam. Nam neque vita hominum a feris immanibu& quarum erat magnus numerus, nondum cultu terrae suscepto, nondum extirpatis incensisl1.ue sylvis, tuta erat: et ipsi homines ut quisque maxime viribus fidebat, bestiae instar ferocis et solitariae terrentis alias, arias timentis, in tenuiorum fortunas et vitam nullo prohibente grassabantur: praesertim cum aliis inita societate, multorum manus in agros, pecora et villas irruebant, agentes ferentesque omnia, si quis resistere pararet, in vitam etiam saevientes, miserabilis rerum facies. Ubique latrocinia. direptiones caedesque impune exercebantur. Ibid., PP. 15-16. 29 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY to hattIe and to settle their quarrels and disputes. 1 "Thus came into existence urban communities and the royal power. . Thus originated from the want of many things, from fear and the consciousness of frailty, human rights (by reason of which we are human beings) and the civil society under the control of which a good and happy life is led." 2 Such is Mariana's conception of the origin of the State.

In the main it clings to the Aristotelian theory according to which man is a social and a political animal and as such needs hoth the help of his neighbor and a political organ ization to secure a powerful protection against domestic and foreign enemies and satisfaction of those common wants which no individual alone could supply. For, besides the individual welfare there is also a common good, to provide for which is the end of the State. Still, there are many details in Mariana's scheme which it is very difficult if not impossible to account for. If men were originally innocent and harmless, how was it that violence and injustice soon reigned among them? If they were satisfied with simple food and water, why did they feel the numherless wants which Mariana enumerates? If they owned everything in common, how could the strong rob the weak who possessed nothing as their own? These are questions which our author does not answer satisfac torily. As long as men were innocent, they obviously did not oppress their fellowmen; if they were content with scanty food, they felt no such wants as Mariana ascribes to them in a long rhetorical discussion; if there was no private property, there was also nohody who could be rohhed.

1 qui a potentioribus premebantur, mutuo se cum aliis societatibus foedere constringere, et ad unum aliquem justitia fideque praestantem respicere coeperunt: cujus praesidio domesticas externasque injurias prohiberent. De Rege: Lib. I, cap. 1, p. 16. l! Hinc urbani coetus primum regiaque majestas orta est. . . . Sic ex multarum rerum indigentia, ex metu et conscientia fragilitatis, jura humanitatis (per quam homines sumus) et civilis societas, qua bene beateque vivitur, nata sunt. Ibid. 30 ORIGIN OF THE STATE Mariana's idea seems to he that the state of primitive in nocence lasted only a short time and that very soon many yearnings for a more comfortable life made themselves felt. Then the stronger would naturally take advantage of their strength to appropriate to themselves what had before been common property. They would even kill those who might ohject to their violence. If this was Mariana's line of thought, it is surprising that the story of Cain and Ahel, which could not have heen unknown to so great a theologian as he was, did not teach him a somewhat different lesson.

From the biblical record he would have learned that primi tive man was not so absolutely harmless and peaceful as he seemed to think. Whatever may have heen the original condition of the human race, it is probable that men very early endeavored to improve their manner of living and that in so doing they came into conflict with the interests of their fellows. It is, then, likely that the first idea of a civil society was suggested by the need of protection and division of labor. Mariana speaks of enemies banded to gether for the purpose of robhing neighhor trihes, hut he does not say whether he holds that these hands were already suhstantiallya civil society, welded together for the purpose of warfare. If they were, it would follow that at least some of the early States were formed for purposes of conquest. However this may he, the point involved does not altogether destroy Mariana's hypothesis that all civil societies were founded for mutual help and co-operation and for the at tainment of wants which the individual could supply only with the help of others. Thus regarded, Mariana does not materially differ from the Aristotelian view, which was also held hy St. Thomas Aquinas and in general hy the scholastic school. That this was his opinion becomes clear from other passages in his works. In the twelfth chapter of the third 31 MARIANA:-POIJTICAL ECONOMY book of De Rege he says that (civil) "society was constituted above all for this reason that by mutual help the wants of all might be satisfied, since no one can supply by himself alone what he needs for the support and refinement of life." 1 Therefore the end of civil society is, according to Mariana's view, mutual aid and satisfaction of the common wants. In other words, it is the co-operation of all for the common good.

From this it follows that the State has an end of its own, the common good of the community,-which will sometimes conflict with the direct interests of individuals. There are other obligations besides preserving one's life. These social duties may eventually demand of a man that he risk his life for the general good, because the common weal is more important than the private interest. In this way Mariana meets the objection of those who say that it is foolish to harm oneself in order that others may be benefited. If man adopted this view he would be nothing more than a beast of prey. Man's life, moreover, does not terminate with his earthly career but is only a preparation for another im mortal existence. Therefore it is imperative that he con temn earthly things the sacrifice of which will bring him eternal recompense. Mariana has asserted that primitive society was formed by mutual consent. Some will say, he admits, that all great empires were a result of conquest and violence. He does not and cannot deny the fact that some States came into existence in this way, but he maintains that others originated by mutual consent and extended their borders by just wars only. He firmly believes that empires based upon violence 1 Quae societas ea maxime de causa constituta est, ut quoniam uni non suppetunt, quae ad victum cultumque vitae necessaria Bunt, altern a ope cunctorum suppleatur inopia: uti in corpore animantis videmus membra inter se suas functiones participare quodam ~enere commercii: quo sublato, quid vita humana calamitosius esset, quid foedius? De Rege, Lib. III, cap. 12, p. 311.

32 ORIGIN OF THE STATE and injustice can never become legitimate even through subsequent legislation. This is Mariana's theory of the origin and end of the State. He has deduced it, he believes, from primitive his tory of the human race. We see, of course, that many of his assumptions are arbitrary and partly contradictory. A strictly logical examination would have revealed to the famous historian the weakness of his assumptions. To substantially the same conclusions as Mariana held his brother in religion, Francisco Suarez, the greatest Span ish Jesuit scholastic, also arrived. Suarez follows a strictly logical method. He finds the necessity of the State in the insufficiency of the individual and of the family to supply all the wants of life. His arguments are: (1) A political society is necessary because no family is self-sufficing. (2) If divisions existed between the various families, there could be no peace. Therefore, they must be united into one society. And since man needs a political society he also needs a political power, because a society without such a power could not accomplish its end.

1 Suarez foresees objections to his argument. Some will say: Man is by nature free and subject to no one. The answer is, man is at least subjicibilis, i.e., it is not con trary to his nature to be subject to a human power. Others will say that there can be no true or legitimate political 1 dicendum est primo, magistratum civilem cum potestate temporali ad regendos homines, justum esse et humanae naturae valde consentaneum .... Imo inde sumitur argumentum, talem modum potestatis esse consentaneum ipsi naturae quatetius ad conveniens regimen humane communitatis necessaria est. ... Primum est hominem esse animal sociale, et naturaliter, recteque appetere, in communitate vivere .... Haec autem communitas (scI. domestica) ... non est sibi sufficiens, et ideo ex natura rei necessaria ulterius est in genere humano communitas politica, quae civitatem saltem constituat, et ex pluribus familiis coalescat; quia nulla familia potest in se habere omnia ministeria, et omnes artes necessarias ad vitam humanam, et multo minus potest sufficere ad assequendam omnium rerum necessariarum cognitionem. Item quia si singulae familiae essent inter se divisae, vix posset pax inter homines conservari, neque injuriae possent ordinate propulsari, aut vindicari, ... Haec autem communitas ulterius augeri pot est in regnum vel principatum per societatem plurittm civitatum, quae etiam est valde conveniens humano generi, saltern ad melius esse, propter easdem rationes cum proportione applicatas, quamvis necessitas non sit omnino aequalis. De Legibus ac Deo Le(fislatore, Lib. III, cap. 1, nn. 1-3.

33 MARIANA:-POIlTICAL ECONOMY power save by free agreement among the members of the hody politic, and will ask how Suarez can account for the fact that the royal power was often introduced by force of arms. Suarez admits this fact but maintains that it does not alter the true nature of political power, since it hap pened per accidens, i.e., by exception to the general rule. He maintains that power imposed by unjust force of arms never can become legitimate except by the suhsequent con sent of the subjects, t~lCit or explicit. Without this con sent a conqueror cannot become a true or legitimate ruler. He is merely a robber 'and a tyrant without any real political power. A third class of adversaries will declare that man in the state of original innocence would not have needed a political society, because there had been no violation of justice. Suarez replies that the end of the State is not merely to repress violence and injustice but also to foster the common weal: that is, to supply the common wants which no individual alone would be able to satisfy. This end would also have been present in the state of original innocence. Hence, men would have needed a poltical society, even if they never had lost primitive innocence; but the State would then have had no coercive power because there would have been no need of coercive power.

It is interesting to compare modern views of the origin of the State with the doctrine of the Spanish Jesuits. Pro fessor Willoughby believes that the State came into exist ence as soon as there existed among a group of individuals a sense of mutual rights and obligations and of unity as one collective personality, and as soon as expression had heen given to this feeling. Such a view does not seem to differ materially from the theory of Suarez. 1 Suarez makes 1 • • • the fact that an aggregate of persons has a conscious feeling of its unity and gives expression to this unity by organizing itself as a collective personality and constituting 34 ORIGIN OF THE STATE a careful distinction between a multitude of men without any organization in political society and a body of men who form a State. A mere multitude of men as such has no political power, but as soon as they organize themselves into a community so that they form a whole, a mystical hody, they need a political power. Otherwise they could not co-operate or be directed to a common end.

How, then, was the unorganized multitude transformed into a body politic? Professor Willoughby says that it came about naturally in that these men gradually developed a feeling of mutual unity and of mutual rights and obliga tions. As soon as they felt their common wants, the State was substantially in existence. All that was necessary was that these men give expression to this feeling of unity and organize themselves as a collective personality. An explicit contract was not necessary, therefore, because it would have heen merely a formal declaration of this general feeling. l Suarez, on the other hand, believes that there was no poli tical power until men entered into a free explicit or tacit compact to form a perfect society.2 He reasons: In the beginning there was no need of a political power; when men multiplied they felt the need of a political society, but this society came into existence only when they freely agreed to organize themselves as such. He realizes that some his torians would object that as a matter of fact many states were formed hy conquest, i.e., without a free agreement (or compact). Suarez admits this fact, hut denies to such a itself as a volitional and active subject. An Examination of the Nature of the State, page 119.

. . . if there existed among individuals a feeling of mutual rights and obligations, there is a State already in its essence. Thus a formal contract would be a merely formal declara tion of this general feeling. Ibid., page 123. 1 Ibid. 1I Alius ergo modus multiplicationis familiarum, seu domorum, est cum distinctione domestica et aliqua unione politica, quae non fit sine ali quo pacto expresso, vel tacito, adjuvandi se invicem nee sine aliqua subordinatione singularum familiarum et personarum ad aliquem superiorem vel rectorem communitatis, sine qua talis communitas constare non potest. De Opere sex Dierum, Lib. V, cap. 7, n. 3. 35 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY society the character of a true body politic unless the con" quered people consent to the rule of the conqueror. His argument is that no man has authority over his fellowmen except by their free consent. His so-called compact, then, is that which ought to he per se i.e., under ordinary cir cumstances, hut he concedes the irregularity of conquest with suhsequent consent of the people.

1 Comparing Mariana and Suarez, we see that their views are not in exact agreement. Mariana is patently influenced by the doctrine of classical antiquity, especially as expressed in the writings of Polybius and Seneca,-a fact which is not surprising to one who notes in how many respects his writings reveal the influence of the Renaissance. His Latin is elegant and his presentation fascinating. He wants to entertain as well as to instruct the reader. His hooks be came, as a matter of fact, very popular and were widely read. Suarez, on the other hand, closely follows St. Thomas and the scholastic school both in his views and in his method. He does not enter upon a consideration of what was the condition of mankind hefore the existence of civil society, hut takes it for granted that the State hecame a necessity as soon as the human race had multiplied to such an extent as to render it impossible for the individual to supply all wants or to protect himself against domestic and foreign violence. Mariana and Suarez agree, however, on the one important point that all political power must be based upon the consent of the people. In this respect their views bear a striking resemblance to those of more recent political theorists.

1 d. Suarez, De Legibus, Lib. III, cap. 2, nn. 3-4. 36 Chapter II The Origin and Transfer of Political Power W E may now follow Mariana a littl,e further. When men had elected a leader to protect them against their enemies and to settle their quarrels and differences, they no longer constituted an unorganized multitude hut a hody politic, a people organized as a State with a king at its head. The king led the people to hattIe, he had the right to settle their petty quarrels and to punish crimes. In other words, he had supreme power, something which formerly had not existed among these men. Where did this come from? Mariana does not answer clearly. He frequently repeats that the king has received his power from the people, but whence the people derived it he does not say. Does he helieve that the people transferred to the king portions of their individual rights? One might be tempted to think so because Mariana uses expressions which, taken as they stand, would imply such an opinion. When he discusses the delicate question as to whether the king has more power than the people, he uses the following words: "According to my explanation the royal power, whenever it is legitimate, takes its origin from the citizens, by whose grant the first kings in every State were raised to the throne.

"1 And a little later in the same chapter he gives 1 Me tamen auctore, quando Regia potestas, si legitima est. a civibus ortum habet, iis concedentibus primi Reges in quaque republica in rerum fastigio collocati sunt . . . . foetus parente. rivus origine esset praestantior. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 8, pp. 69, 71. 37 MARIANA:-POLITlCAL ECONOMY this reason why the people could not give the king greater power than the whole community retained: "(For) the offspring would (then) be greater than its parent, the river greater than its source." The latter utterance especially seems to indicate that the people are the source of all polit ical power, which would he exactly the teaching of Locke and Rousseau. Nevertheless it cannot he inferred from this that Mariana is a forerunner of Rousseau. If he really held that the people are the source of all power he would have ahandoned the traditional scholastic doctrine. This charge was never raised against him until brought forward recently by scholars who confused the "compact" of Suarez and other Jesuit writers with the "social contract" of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau. Lord Acton believed that "the greater part of the political ideas of Milton, Locke, and Rousseau, may he found in the ponderous Latin of Jesuits who were subjects of the Spanish Crown, of Lessius, Molina, Mariana, and Suarez." 1 Mariana has been severely criticized hy his hrethren and other Catholic authors, but none of them has ever made the charge that he abandoned the scholastic doc trine which holds that all political power comes directly from God. Nor can his utterances he understood in Rous seau's sense, especially when taken in their context. De Rege is moreover to he considered not as a strictly philo sophic treatise hut as a mirror for future kings, adapted to the mental capacity of young princes. It is full of hald assertions which cannot stand the test of logical analysis.

The point Mariana wishes to make is simply that the king has received his power from the people and that he must not use it except to further the good of the people. Other wise the people would have the right to reclaim what they 1 The History of Freedom, page 82. 38 POLITICAL POWER had given. This doctrine does not differ from that of Suarez and other scholastic writers of the time. Suarez holds that as soon as the people make up their mind to form a political society they receive from God political power which they can then either transfer to an individual or to a hody of nohles, or retain for themselves. In the first case they would decide upon a monarchical form of government, in the second upon an aristocracy, and in the third upon a democracy. They were free to choose any of these forms of government or a combination of two or of all three. The State was formed not at the moment in which the govern ment was decided upon by free consent, but when the com pact of forming a political society was entered into. As soon as the State originated, there also existed a political power; and since the people had not as yet decided upon the form of government, this power rested with the whole peo ple. Thus, according to Suarez, the most natural form of government is a democracy, not for the reason that the people were the source of political power hut hecause the people had received this· power immediately from God and were at liberty to dispose of it or to retain it.

The question is now whether Mariana meant that the people are the source of this power, or, in other words, whether he maintained that it does not come directly :from God but is created by the people or has from the beginning resided in the people. The answer is, he did not mean these things. After telling us ahout primitive man, he also re marks that God wanted to lead this man to the formation of a political society through the realization of his helpless ness and dependence. God had indeed created man in a state of helplessness and dependence, hut at the same time had endowed him with the light of reason and the gift of speech that he might know how to supply his shortcomings 39 MARIANA:-POIJTICAL ECONOMY by co-operation with his fellows.! God's wisdom has or dained that man, though weak by nature and left to his own resources, should hecome strong by being united with others into a society.

2 From this it appears that Mariana considers political society necessary to human nature. Man was not horn into such a society but had all the prerequisites to enter into it, and it was God's will that he should do so. From this it follows that as soon as man formed a body politic, God granted him what was necessary for such a society, i.e., political power. This power, then, is not a creation of man or something that existed from the beginning, but something added hy God to perfect human nature as soon as it was needed-that is at the moment when men made up their minds to form a political society. As previously stated, Mariana does not explicitly prove that this power comes immediately from God. Such a proof was not necessary for his purpose, especially as he had no intention of writing a strictly philosophical and systematic treatise. Suarez, a systematic philosopher, explains himself very clearly about the origin of political power. He defi nitely maintains that it comes directly from God and proves his assertion thus: This power was not in the unorganized multitude, hut as soon as it organized itself into a body politic (or, as he says, into a mystical body) it had this power even though it may not have wanted it. It is then 1 Enimvero parens humani generis et sator Deus cum mutua inter homines caritate, et amicitia nihil praestantius esse cerneret: neque ali posse excitarique mutuum inter homines amorem liceret, nisi in unum locum et sub eisdem legibus, multitudine hominum sociata: quibus sermonis facultatem dederat ut congregari possent, animi sensus et consilia aperire invicem. • • • eosdem ut vellent ac necessario facerent, multarum rerum indigos, multisque periculis malisque obnoxios procreavit. Quibus supplendis et procurandis multorum vires et industria sudaret .... De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 1, p. 14.

II Verum in homine accusant quidam quod inops, quod multis rebus indigeat, quod inermis et imbecillus procedat in lucem. In quo tamen naturam vituperant seu divinam sapientiam, in eo vis ejus mirabilius apparet. Quod enim homines non solitariam vitam agunt, sed in coetus et urbes conveniunt, et mutuae charitatis vinculis constringuntur, qua nihil est dulcius, ex imbeciIIitate corporis ex multarum rerum indigentia natum est, ut quod singulis deerat, multitudine certe et societate suppleatur. De Marte et Immortalitate, Lib. II, cap. 9, p. 405. 40 POLITICAL POWER an unmistakable sign that this power cannot come from the community and that it arises independently of the will of the community. Just as a woman entering marriage be comes thereby subject to her husband by necessity even if not by choice, so when men make up their minds to form a State they have at once a power which none of them nor all taken together possessed before. To employ Suarez' language, they prepare the matter for a body politic to which God at the moment of this act of their will gives the form, which is the power necessary to lead this society to its end, the common good. This comparison also explains very well how human liberty enters into the formation of the State.

It is up to man to decide when a State is to be formed, but it is beyond man's power or will to give to the State what it needs to accomplish its end. 1 Another reason why political power does not or cannot originate with man is the fact that it comprises rights which are far beyond any man's individual claim but are reserved to God alone, e.g., the power over human life, legislative power, power to bind in conscience, punitive power. If, then, no individual has these powers, the sum of all indi viduals cannot confer them, for they cannot give more than each individual had before. 2 1 In contrarium vero est, quia priusquam homines in unum corpus politicum congre gentur, haec potestas non est in singulis, nee totaliter, nee partial iter : imo nee in ipsa rudi (ut sic dicam) collectione, vel aggregato hominum existit, ut capite praecedenti declaratum est; ergo nunquam potest haec potestas provenire immediate ab ipsis hominibus. In hac re communis sententia videtur esse, hanc potestatem dari immediate a Deo ut auctore naturae, ita ut homines quasi disponant materiam, et efficiant subjectum capax hujus potestatis: Deus autem Quasi tribuat formam dando hanc potestatem. . . . Et potest suaderi, quia ut antea dicebam, supposita volun tate hominum conveniendi in una politica communitate, non est in potestate eorum impedire hanc jurisdictionem; ergo signum est proxime non provenire ex eorum voluntatibus, quasi ex propria causa efficienti. Sicut in matrimonio recte colligimus, virum esse caput mulieris ex dono ipsius auctoris naturae, et non ex voluntate uxoris. quia licet ipsi voluntate sua matrimonium contrahant, tamen si matri monium contrabant, hanc superioritatem impedire non possunt. . • . De Legibus, Lib. III, cap, 3, nn. 1-2.

2 DecJaratur sec undo, quia haec potestas habet plures actus, qui videntur excedere humanam facultatem, prout est in singulis hominibus; ergo signum est, non esse ab illis, sed a Deo. Primus actus est punitio malefactorum; etiam usque ad mortem; nam cum sol us Deus sit Dominus vitae, solus ipse videtur potuisse dare hane potestatem. , .. Secundus actus est, constituere in materia aliqua medium virtutis necessarium ad honestatem 41 MARIANA:-POUTICAL ECONOMY This latter reason is also the strongest argument against Locke's contractual theory of the State. Locke maintains that before the formation of civil society every man had rights similar to those which now belong to the State: that he could, for example, avenge himself for injuries suffered, even to the point of taking the life of his fellow. This con cession Locke had to make in order to show that the people gave all these rights to the sovereign, for they thought that it was safer for the common good, if some third party were to decide the amount of revenge to be taken. Some might go too far if it were left to them alone, since nobody is a good judge in his own cause. This assertion can hardly be proved. In case the State should not avenge a man's right effectively enough, he might reclaim that right and carry out his own revenge. This would, however, very seriously threaten the common good and make the power of the State practically useless. Thus Locke's view, if followed to its ultimate consequences, leads to a denial of the necessity of the State. Nor would modern students of Political Science admit Locke's deduction. Professor Willoughby says that the general will is not identical with the sum of the will of individuals, and that there are general interests not identical with the sum of individual interests. From this it follows by simple inference that in a State there are rights other than individual rights or the sum of individual rights, and that political power is more than a sum of individual rights transferred to the State.

1 Here Professor Willoughby agrees with the scholastics, although he does not hold their views on other political questions. Though Mariana has not explained himself clearly about ejus. Tertio cum hoc statu conjunctus est efIectus obligandi in conscientia .•••Quartus est vindicare injurias singulorum. . .• Ergo signum est hanc potestatem esse divinam, alioqui potuissent homines alium modum vindicandi injurias usurpare, quod est contra naturalem justitiam. Ibid., nn. 3-4. 1 An Examination of the Nature of the State, pages 123, 124, 42 POLITICAL POWER the orz,g~n of political power he is very definite about its transfer. He repeats many times that the people gave kings their power, 1 and that the people have a right to reclaim this power whenever it is not used for their good. He was provoked, very likely, by the many writers of his age who held to the theory of the divine right of kings, as did King James I of England and Scotland. Mariana is a strong opponent of the champions of absolutism, whose doctrine is, according to him, either a form of flattery or a fallacy.

The people give power to kings for these to use not for their own interests but for the benefit of the people. In this particular Suarez agrees with Mariana. He also holds that political power was first in the hands of the people who could and sometimes did transfer it to kings. He holds, therefore, that democracy is the most natural form of gov ernment, since political power was directly given to the whole people at the very moment when they agreed by mu tual understanding to form a political society. The next step was to determine the form of government of the body politic which was already a State. This latter act, according to all scholastics, was a free act of the whole people. 2 Mariana is so positive about this that he seems even to imply that the people not only transferred the power hut created it. Suarez also maintains that no one can hold supreme power in a State except hy popular voice.

1 • • • qui a potentioribus premebantur, mutuo se cum allis societatis foedere constringere, et ad unum aliquem justitia fide que praestantem respicere coeperunt: cujus praesidio domesticas externasque injurias prohiberent .... De Rege, Lib. T, cap. 1, p. 16. Quid! quod nec ducis munus nec rectoris eam facuItatem dat. Sed potius quando a republica earn potestatem accepit reditibus designatis quibus vitam principalem sustineret, impositis muneribus satisfaceret si ea vectigalia augeri cupit, adeat neeesse erit eos qui initio eos reditus numero definito designarunt. De Monetae Mutatione, cap. II, p. 194. 1I Primum est, quod licet haec potestas absolute sit de jure naturae, determinatio ejus ad certum modum potestatis, et regiminis est ex arbitrio humano .... Secundo sequitur ex dictis, potestatem civil em, quoties in uno homine, vel principe reperitur legitimo, ac ordinario jure, a populo, et a communi tate manasse, vel proxime, vel remote, nee posse aliter haberi, ut justa sit. Haec est sententia communis jurisperitorum .... Ratio ex dictis est, quia haec potestas ex natura rei est immediate in communitate; ergo ut juste incipiat esse in aliqua persona tam quam in supremo principe, necesse est, ut ex consensu communi tat is HH tribuatur. De Ligibus, Lib. III, cap. 4, nn. 1-2.

43 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY He knows that some governments were the results of war, hut holds that if these wars were just the people had per force to consent to the rule of the conqueror. If, however, the war was unjust the king never acquired a just title to reign except by subsequent consent of the people, explicit or, at al~ events, tacit. A hereditary monarchy also can be legitimate only if the people have originally transferred the power to an individual with the explicit or tacit understand ing that it should be transmitted to his descendants. 1 Ma riana does not hesitate to call the great conquerors like Ninus, Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar and others tyrants, on the ground that they obtained power by injustice and robbery. 2 The general reason why the scholastics held this doctrine is their assumption that no individual man has a right to rule over his fellowmen except by consent of the ruled, at least at the time of the establishment of the government. After the government has once been constituted, all who are born in the commonwealth are born subject to the legitimate authorities.

1 Secundo potest haec potestas esse in rege per successionem haereditariam . . • Quapropter necesse est, ut primus habuerit potestatem supremam immediate a republica; successores autem illius ab ilIa habeant mediate et radicaliter .... Tertius titulus re~iae potestatis solet esse bellum, quod oportet esse justum ut verum titulum, et dominlUm conferat. Et hinc multi existimant, in principio introducta esse regna per tyrannidem potius quam per veram potestatem .... Quando ergo regnum per solam vim injustam possidetur, non est vera potestas legislativa in rege: fieri autem potest, ut successu temporis populus consentiat, et admittat talem principatum, et tunc reducetur potestas ad populi traditionem et dominationem. Interdum autem contingere potest, ut respublica antea non subjecta regi per justum bellum subjiciatur ... et tunc ipsa tenetur parere et cons entire suhjectioni, atque ita etiam ille modus quodammodo inc1udit con8ensum rei publicae, vel exhibitum, vel debitum . . . ergo semper reducenda est haec potestas regia ad aliquem, qui non per bellum, sed per justam electionem, vel populi consensum illam comparaverit; ergo a sufficienti divisione recte conc1uditur potestatem hanc a repuhlica ad principem manasse. De Legibus, Lib. III, cap. 4, nn. 2-4.

2 Progrediente vero tempore sive plura habendi cupiditate impulsi, sive laudis et gloriae ambitione incitati. . . gentes lib eras subjugare, cupiditatem imperandi causam belli habere, Reges caeteros ditionibus pellere, et in omnium fortunis soli coeperunt dominari, ut Ninus, Cyrus, Alexander, et Caesar, qui magna constituerunt primi et fundarunt imperia, non legitimos fuisse Reges, non monstra domuisse sublata per terras tyrannide, non vitia ut videri volebant depulisse, sed praedatoriam exercuisse videantur, tametsi vulgi opinione immensis laudibus celebrentur et gloria. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 2, p. 19. 44 Chapter III The Best Form of Government. Sovereignty. F OLLOWING the Aristotelian scheme, Mariana enumer ates six forms of government: (1) monarchy or the rule of one person; (2) aristocracy or the rule of the best; (3) republic (res publica proprio nomine), or the rule of all according to rank and ability. These are the good forms of government. The three others are bad: (1) tyranny, which is a rule of the injustice and violence by one man; (2) oli garchy, or the rule of a few, selected not according to merit or ability, hut according to riches; (3) democracy (och locracy), or the rule of the masses without any regard for distinction. Of all six forms, monarchy is the best and tyranny the worst kind of government. Mariana considers monarchy relatively the ideal form of government, for these reasons: (1) The rule of one is most in conformity with the laws of nature, because there is one ruler of the universe, the one God; hecause in every living creature there is one central organ, which directs all the members of the body; because the bees are decidedly governed hy one queen; (2) the family, the city and the tribe have each a single head; (3) monarchy was the first form of government, if one credits Aristotle. Hence the saying, Rex unicus esto (the king should he only one); (4) there will he greater unity under a monarchy hecause there will he less difference of opinion; and so monarchy fosters greater peace and con45 MARIANA:-POI1TICAL ECONOMY cord; (5) there will be less danger of corruption, and thus more perfect justice; (6) there will be greater efficiency of administration and greater power in time of war.

These advantages are partly offset by several disadvan tages. There is likely to be greater prudence and probity in the many than in the one, just asa rich meal is preferable to a simple repast. One man may easily be biased. Dis honest people find it easier to blind the vision of a king with Hattery than to mislead a government consisting of many. Very few have the courage to criticize the king, because that is often dangerous. A monarchy is very much exposed to the danger of action that is arbitrary and careless of the welfare of the people. The great philosophers oppose mon archy because it implies the exclusion of many valuable and capahle men from government. But more serious than all these drawhacks is the danger of tyranny which, in the opinion of Mariana, is greatest in the case of a monarchy. On the other hand, a rule comprised of the many does not avoid all the dangers of monarchy. Since votes are counted rather than weighed, there is great danger that the bad will outvote the good. Jealousy, ambition, civil wars, discord will likewise he the necessary results of a distribution of power among many. After reviewing all these pros and cons, Mariana decides in favor of a monarchyl because it assures greater concord and peace. Monarchy should, how ever, be mitigated by a senate of worthy men to whose coun sel the king has been ohliged to listen.

2 1 In non dispari enim argumentorum pondere, et earum sententiarum varietate animus inclinabat ut crederem, ac vero pro certo ponerem, unius principatum ceteris omnibus reipublicae formis esse praeferendum . • . et ut sunt res humanae fluxae inconstant esque, prudentis viri partes Bunt, non omnia incommoda, sed majora vitare, persequi quae majores opportunitates afferre videantur, ac praesertim concordia inter cives retinenda, (sine qua quid esset respublica?) aptissimum esse unius principatum nemo dubitabit. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 2, p. 25. 2 Verum ita unius principatum praeferendum judicamus, si optimos quosque cives in cons ilium adhibeat, atque senatu convocato ex eorum sententia res publicas et privatas administret. Ibid., p. 26. 46 SOVEREIGNTY After considering this discussion one may he tempted to think that Mariana advocates absolute monarchy with the very slight limitation of a senate as an advisory body to whose advice the king should listen, but by whose decisions he is not compelled to abide. But from the whole spirit of De Rege it appears that Mariana was not at all an absolutist but an ardent defender of a limited monarchy. He not only flatly denies that ahsolute monarchy could ever exist among civilized nations, but he also maintains that it would he bad for hoth king and people if the royal power were to assume unlimited proportions. He is always a strong opponent of absolutism, and an ardent defender of popular rights. It is true that by the term "people" he meant first of all the ruling classes of clergy and nohility. The most Mariana would grant the defenders of absolutism is that, strictly speaking, a people can transfer political power to an indi vidual without reservation or limitation, even if it would he foolish and unreasonable on the part of the people to alienate sovereignty unconditionally, and unwise on the part of the king to accept such a transfer. Power is not the same thing as money, the more of which you acquire the richer you become. Rather it is like food: it is just as harmful to take too much as to take too little, for hoth are destructive of the organism., Moreover, an unlimited monarchy is scarcely ever found except among barbarous and uncivilized peoples. It should not nor will it ever. exist among civilized nations, since we cannot suppose that reasonable people have acted unreasonably when they have transferred politi cal power to a monarch.

1 1 Est autem perspicuum, id institutum (unlimited power) in quibusdam gentibus vigere, ubi nullus est publicus consensus, nunquam populus aut proceres de republica deliberaturi conveniunt: obtemperandi tantum necessitas urget, sive aequum sive iniquum Regis imperium sit. Potestas nimia proculdubio, proximeque ad tyrannidem vergens, qualem inter barbaras gentes vigere Aristote1es affirmatum re1iquit ..•. Nos hoc loco non de barbaris, sed de principatu Qui in nostra gente viget et vigere aequum est, deque optima et saluberrima imperandi forma disputamus. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 8, p. 70. 47 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY Our author goes on to show that the people always will and always must reserve to themselves certain rights, for example the right of taxation, the right to accept or reject laws, the right to determine succession in a case when a king has no heir, and the right to depose or even kill a prince if he abuses his power and becomes a tyrant. Ordi narily, the king should have enough power to transact the regular business of administration. Nor should there be any appeal from the king to the people. Such appeals have been abolished by custom, although in principle it should be understood that the people are above the king and that in certain cases the king cannot act without popular consent.

This is especially true in cases of taxation, of the abrogation of laws and the regulation of the succession. Should a king become a tyrant the people have the right to depose and even kill him. It strikes us that Mariana's reasoning is not entirely con clusive. All he has proved is that it is desirable that the people reserve to themselves certain rights, and that this reservation has heen made in Aragon and, to a certain extent, in the rest of Spain. The example of taxation, for instance, he drew from actual conditions as he found them in Spain, a fact w:hich does not necessarily give his principles a uni versal application. In fact, Mariana did not explicitly make this universal inference. His book was written primarily for the king of Spain, and so served a practical purpose. Nevertheless, he insinuates clearly enough that the same principles should hold good everywhere among civilized nations.

The most important difFerence between Mariana and Sua rez lies in their theories of the nature of royal power. In order to characterize their respective viewpoints in a few 48 SOVEREIGNTY words, we may say that, in Suarez' view,l the king has unlimited power unless there exist clear indications that it was limited at the time of transfer, whereas Mariana believes that ordinarily it is to be assumed that the royal power was transferred with a number of limitations, to the most im portant of which he calls attention. Moreover, Suarez con siders the transfer of power a real alienation of sovereignty to the king, so that the State or the people become inferior to the sovereign. Mariana, on the other hand, believes that the people do not altogether alienate the sovereign power but retain the supreme rights in substance so that the king is indeed superior to any individual in the State but inferior to the people as a whole. In other words, Suarez holds that the royal power is per se unlimited, while Mariana main tains that it is per se limited. Both authors agree that the king must use his power for the general good, and that the people have a right to depose him if he should abuse it and become a tyrant. To illustrate his point of view Suarez employs the comparison of a man who has made himself 2 the slave of another man. After giving up his liberty he is no longer free but bound to obey his master. In a similar way a people, after having transferred supreme power to one person or a body of persons, have deprived themselves of sovereignty and are subject to their rulers. Nor can this power be lawfully reclaimed save in case of tyranny, since the sovereign has acquired a just title to it by the people's 1 Primo, ubicumque regimen non est democratic urn, populus transtulit supremam potestatem in Principem, sive sit ille una persona, ut in Monarchia, sive sit con~ilium procerum. ut in Aristocratia. sive sit mixtum aliQuod ex utroQue. ut est Dux cum senatu.

vel Rex cum comitiis regni. De Legibus, Lib. III. cap. 19, n. 17. 2 Sicut quando unus homo privatus se vendit. et tradit alteri in servum. dominium illud ab homine simpliciter est; illa vera contractu suppasito, jure divino, et naturali obligatur servus par ere Domino. Et ita patet responsum ad confirmationem, negando simpliciter sequelam, quia translata potestate in regem, per iIIam efficitur superior etiam regno, quod iIIam dedit, quia dando illam se subjecit, et priori libertate privavit, ut in exemplo de servo. servata proportione, constat. De Legibus, Lib. III, cap. 4, n. 6. 49 MARIANA:-POUTICAL ECONOMY grant, just as a man who has freely made himself a slave cannot reclaim the liberty to which his master has acquired a strict title by a free contract. If we compare the two views, we may say that Suarez' opinion is philosophically the better and the more con sistent. If the people are necessarily superior to the king or magistrate, they can at any time depose the ruler or change the form of government, a situation menacing to peace and tranquillity. Mariana, trying to find an escape from this logical inference, maintains that although the peo ple are superior to the ruler, they should interfere with his rule only in very important matters. Yet it is hard to draw a line of demarcation between ordinary acts of government and such important matters as concern the common good in a very special manner. It would seem that Mariana con fuses what ought to be with what actually is. If he proves anIthing, he shows that it is highly desirable that the king be limited by constitutional law. Here indeed lies his val uable contribution to the development of democracy. The struggle between Parliament and the Stuarts in England was materially influenced by Mariana's writings (as noted by Moorhouse T. X. Millar, S. J.), especially his plea that taxes should he imposed only with the consent of the people.

This is evident from a statement of Sir Roger Twysden pub lished in 1849 hy John Mitchell Kemhle from the Manu script of the author. Sir Twysden writes: "For Spayne, Mariana, in his hook De Rege, approved by the Jesuites, examined by the king's command, and allowed upon it as a peece of great worth, disputing whether 'respublica uni versa, aut qui ejus partes gerunt, viri primarii,' have the greater authority, sayth, 'Experimento comprobatur in His pania vectigalia imperare regem rwn posse, populo dissen tiente,' etc. and a litle after hee shewes their ancestors, 50 SOVEREIGNTY heing wise men, did estahlish this moderation, 'ut reges intra modestiae fines continerent.' The whole passage is too long to he heere transcribed, the hooke it selfe heinge every where. Truly if this and what else he hath there of that monarchy doe not shew a mixture or limitation of it, I do not understand what is." 1 This interesting passage shows how widely Mariana's De Rege was spread among the Eng lish people, and it is hut natural that it had a great influence upon the development of democracy in that country. Ma riana found that this method of taxation prevailed in Spain, but as Suarez tells us, it was granted freely by the king as a check on royal extravagance, and was not instituted be cause the people had a right to it. Here Mariana again identified actual Spanish conditions with the general theory of political government.

1 Certaine Considerations upon the Government of England, pp. 18-19. 51 Chapter IV Law and Legislation. M ARIANA'S view of law is intimately associated with his theory of the State. He has told us that in the beginning the oppressed people chose the best man from amongst them to be their leader and judge. As long as his justice and impartiality were not questioned, there was no need of a definite law. He decided all cases according to the principles of justice and equity. Very soon, however, people believed they had reason to question his impartiality and, in order to secure an equal standard of justice for all citizens and for all times, laws or norms of justice were formulated according to which all decisions were to be given. Another reason for the need of law was that injustice and violence constantly increased. At the beginning justice was very mild, no severe penalties were required as deterrents from crime. As violence and human passion intensified, laws necessarily hecame more severe so as to prevent the spread of crime. Originally, for instance, there had heen no death penalty; hut more and more having been added to the severity of punishment, death finally became the pun ishment imposed for grievous transgressions. When an or dinary manner of death no longer sufficed, exquisite tortures had to be devised to check human violence.

1 1 Scribendi leges duplex causa exstitit. Principis aequalitate in suspicionem vocata, quod unus vir non praestabat, ut pari studio omnes complecterentur, ira odioque vacaret: 53 MARIANA:-POLITlCAL ECONOMY Law, according to Mariana, is "a norm of reason free from all perturbation, drawn from the divine mind, pre scribing the good and salutary and forbidding their oppo sites." 1 The first laws were not only very mild hut also very few and very clear. They did not need a special authorita tive interpretation. At present, however, as Mariana mourn fully remarks, their number is so great that the country suffers no less from laws than from crime. From this re mark we can also infer Mariana's ideal of law: Laws should he few and they should he so clear as to make additions and interpretations unnecessary. It may he of interest to compare these statements with Suarez' theory of law, presented in a most thorough fashion in his De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, one of his principal works. Suarez defines law in the sense of St. Thomas as "a rule and measure according to which a person is moved to action or deterred from it." 2 Though the wording of this definition is retained, Suarez makes a number of restrictions and distinctions hecause he considers it is too general and capable of application to irrational as well as to rational crea tures, to works of art, good and bad. Law also comprises counsels, that is, norms which may induce men to act or refrain from action, though without any moral obligation or necessity. Law, then, is according to Suarez a rule and measure of action for rational creatures which implies an obligation of obedience and a sanction for transgression.

Suarez agrees with Mariana that man needs both divine and human law. We hav~ no time to develop here the vari ous divisions of law which Suarez enumerates. He speaks leges sunt promulgatae, quae cum omnibus semper atque una voce loquerentur. • • • Deinde hominum exaggerata malitia, armis satellitum et majestate deterrita, severitate legum rnetuque judiciorurn ilIigata est: ut durn singuli rnetuebant supplicia, sese facilius universi a fla~itio contine rent. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 2, p. 18. 1 Est enim lex ratio omni perturbatione vacua, a mente divina hausta, honesta et salutaria praescribens. prohibensque contraria. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 2, p. 18. I De Legibus etc., Lib. I, cap. 1, n. 1. 54 L~W AND LEGISLATION of an eternal law in God, according to which every creature must follow the right order. Man's participation in this eternal law is the natural law, i.e., a norm inherent in the human mind and binding upon man to regulate his actions according to this rule. Man needs this law to discern in a general way what order of life he is to follow if he would achieve his destiny. We shall not enter the discussion of the diyine supernatural law, which is added to the natural law in order to attain the higher or supernatural end of man. Since the natural law comprises only the general principles of action and at the best some immediately evi dent inferences from these principles, it was necessary for man to learn more in detail what he has to do or not do in order to regulate his life, especially in so far as his social obligations are concerned. This end is accomplished by human positive law. Man is a social animal and as such needs a political society, the State. This society cannot at tain its end, the common good, unless its members are told what they have to do or what they have to omit with regard to the common weal: "Men taken as individuals find out only with great difficulty what serves the common weal and, as a rule, rarely seek it of themselves. Consequently, human laws are necessary to provide for the general good by show ing what should be done to promote this good and by en forcing its execution." 1 From this comparison it will appear that Suarez treats law from the philosophical standpoint, whereas Mariana speaks as an historian who is not indeed basing his opinion on actual historical facts, but on what he believed had most likely occurred. Mariana's reasoning is, therefore, vastly 1 Singuli autem homines, et difficile cognoscunt id, quod expedit ad commune bonum, et raro iJlud per se intendunt; et ideo necessariae fuerunt leges humanae, quae communi bono consulerent, ostendendo quid agendum sit propter tale bonum, et cogendo ut fiat. De Legibus, Lib. I, cap. 3, n. 19.

55 MARIANA:-POUTICAL ECONOMY inferior to that of his hrother in religion. His premises are of a merely prohlematical character and, unless con firmed hy facts, will prove very little. He is neither a sys tematic philosopher nor a pure historian, hut a combination of both. In this lies his strength and his weakness. If all are bound by the laws of the country what shall one say of the sovereign himself who, according to some, is above the law? Should he he hound by his own laws and if so, can he be called to account or be punished for violating them? In answering this question, Mariana makes a number of distinctions. The king must undoubtedly observe the laws given hy the whole people, such as laws concerning taxation, succession and religion, and the people may com pel him to obey and, if necessary, punish his disohedience. On the whole, a sovereign must observe the laws for the sake of giving a good example. He should also abide by those which do not detract from his dignity or handicap him in his functions as a sovereign. But he is free from the laws regulating dress, expenditures, etc., although his good example will greatly promote the common good, in so far as it will induce the people to obey. No lawgiver can be compelled to observe the laws which he himself gives.

On this last point, Suarez is more definite and more thor ough than Mariana. He distinguishes between a community which has made laws for itself, and an individual lawgiver. There is no doubt that a community is bound by its own laws. But the answer is not so simple in the case of an individual legislator. If the laws in question are a matter of justice, binding upon the whole community, it is clear that they also will bind the legislator, as happens in the case of price fixing. The legal price implies that whoever should demand something over and above the legally fixed amount would act unjustly. 56 LAW AND LEGISLATION If the laws in question do not concern a matter of justice, the question arises as to whether a sovereign legislator is bound in conscience to observe them. The saying "that the prince is free from his laws" seems to imply that he is not bound in conscience, and yet the general opinion is that he is not free from moral obligation. But it is certain that he cannot he hound hy any human power since as a sov ereign ruler he has no political superior. Whence then does this moral obligation arise? Suarez answers, from the law itself. For God gave legislative power immediately to the State and mediately to the sovereign, with the obligation that their respective laws should bind all members of the community.! This is necessary for the common good, for the sake of which all legislative power was conferred by God. The fact that a sovereign is bound in conscience by general laws does not mean, however, that he can forcibly be prevented from breaking them. No superior on earth has jurisdiction over him. If the king should unjustly take the property of one of his subjects, a court of law might bound to make restitution, but it cannot compel him to ac very correctly declare that he has acted unjustly and is cept such a decision.

When the opinions of Mariana and Suarez are compared, it would seem that Suarez offers the more correct explana tion. He holds it necessary that all members of the State, the head not excepted, obey the law, whether that has been enacted by the whole community or by the sovereign alone. 1 Respondeo igitur, Deum, qui est prineipalis auctor hujus potestatis, ilIam conferre sub conditione praedicta (viz., that all members of the State should be bound by its laws) .... Deus ... vult legislatorem hum anum non habere potestatem ad ferendas leges, nisi cum universali obligatione illarum, qua totam rempublicam ut constantem ex corpore, et capite comprehend at. . . . Probatur minor ex ipsa necessitate communis boni, ad quod haee potestas ordinatur; datur enim in aedificationem, non in destructionem. Quod autem ad hujusmodi bonum commune pertineat, potestatem hane ita esse datam Principi, ut lieet in voluntate ejus sit, legem ferre; si tanem feratur, universalis sit et ipsum comprehendat, declarant sufficienter testimonia Scripturae, et rationes adductae .•.. De Legibus, Lib.

III, cap. 35, n. 11. 57 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY It is, then, not merely a question of a good example but a matter of moral obligation that a sovereign prince keep his own laws. True though it be that this obligation is merely moral without coercive power, yet it is a real and valid obli gation in conscience. Many students of Political Science number Suarez, Ma riana and the scholastics in general among the proponents of the contractual theory of the State which was held by Hobbes., Locke and Rousseau; but it would be extremely difficult to prove such an assertion. The fundamental differ ence between the scholastics and the contractualists lies in the radical divergence in their premises. The scholastics stress the existence of a natural law., i.e., a law prior to any human law or political power which binds man's conscience. Natural law is that aspect of God's eternal law which ordains that every created being must obey its due natural order.

This law is promulgated to man by the light of reason but it operates with necessity in the existence of irrational crea tures in that they follow the laws of nature. Most of the contractualists, on the other hand, deny that any law at all existed before the establishment of a human legislative power. In other words, they admit no law excepting posi tive law. If there be no law there can be neither trans gression of the law nor injustice; hence it is not a sin for a man to seek his own advantage even at the expense of his neighbor., unless he has bound himself by a social contract with his fellows to respect their lives and property on the condition that they in turn respect his life and his property. This is the teaching of Hobbes/ Locke's conception 2 ad1 The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it...• Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues." Leviathan, chap. 13.

1I1Two Treatises of Government, Book II, chaps. 1·9. 58 LAW AND LEGISLATION mits, to a certain extent, a natural law, but he differs radi cally from the scholastics in his explanation of the origin of political power. Rousseau! expressly denies that there is any law in the state of nature and maintains that all law is based upon human convention or voluntary agreement. The state of nature, which is instinctive and violent, is replaced by the state of right and justice, through the me dium of the social contract. Rousseau holds that by nature man has a right (hecause of original freedom) to get for himself all he can even at the expense of his neighhor, and that it is only after becoming a party to the social contract, that he is no longer permitted to follow his predatory in stinct. The fundamental difference between this doctrine and the scholastic teaching is this: the scholastics hold that man has strictly moral obligations of justice to his neighhor which antedate the existence of political society; the con tractualists maintain that no moral ohligation of any kind exists before the establishment of the State. The contractu alists do not, like the scholastics, distinguish between a moral obligation with a legal sanction and a moral demand of justice which always persists even without the existence of any coercive human 'power. It is one thing to say that there is no moral obligation without a coercive human sanc tion and another to assume that there may be a moral obli gation independent of a human sanction, although it may be morally necessary that there be such a sanction in order to enforce the strict observance of a merely moral law.

1 Contrat social, chap. 8. 59 Chapter V Tyrannicide. ~s we have seen, Mariana is best known for his teaching ~ on the killing of tyrants; and so a survey of his political ideas would be incomplete if this point were not touched upon. Other scholastic writers on this subject make a care ful distinction between a ruler who is a usurper-i.e., an illegitimate ruler-and a sovereign who has acquired the right to the throne in a legitimate way but is abusing his power to the detriment of the people. We find no such clear distinction in Mariana's writings. When he speaks of a tyrant he means a ruler who is oppressing his people and who has, in most cases, obtained his power by force of arms or other unjust means. The fifth chapter of De Rege gives a vivid and, we may say, most fantastic description of the tyrant monster. The author employs the strongest terms, and one sees instantly how deeply he abhors the creature he is describing. He contrasts him with that legitimate and noble king who has obtained his power by the people's con sent and who has a fatherly concern for the good of his subjects.

After making his reader gasp with horror at the spectacle of a creature so fantastic that he has probably never been realized in human history, Mariana raises the question as to whether it be lawful to destroy such an enemy of the people. His discussion is not merely abstract. He refers at 61 MARIANA:-POUTICAL ECONOMY the beginning 0:£ the sixth chapter of the first book to the assassination of Henry III of France by the Dominican friar, Jacques Clement, offering this as an example of how im portant it is that the people be satisfied with the reign of their rulers. He relates how King Henry had revealed his intention to transfer the reign of France to the Calvinistic Henry of Navarre, who had been excommunicated by the Pope on account of heresy. The French .nobles, under the leadership of the Duke 0:£ Guise, endeavored to :£orestall the king's attempt. Henry thereupon apparently changed his mind and called the Duke and the Cardinal of Guise to his camp at Blois near Paris. Instead of settling the matter to the satisfaction of the Catholic party, he assassinated both the Duke and the Cardinal and arrested the Cardinal of Bourbon, the nearest Catholic heir to the throne.

Thereupon, the people and above all the city of Paris rebelled against the king to avenge the murder of the Catho lic leaders. Henry proceeded to besiege his capital; and when he was almost at the point 0:£ seizing it he was struck down by the dagger of the young friar. After a very minute description 0:£ the assassination, Mariana concludes this pass age of the story by saying: "By the assassination of the king he (Jacques Clement) made a famous name for him self, blood was expiated with blood and the Duke of Guise, slain in breach of trust, was avenged with royal hlood. Thus perished Clement, an eternal ornament of France, as has heen the general belief." 1 Mariana tells us that opinions were divided as to legiti macy of the friar's deed and then gives the reasons advanced by those who condemned it. Clement's critics refer to King 1 Caeso rege in gens sibi nomen fecit, caede caedes expiata, ac manibus Guisani ducis pedide perempti regio sanguine est parentatum. Sic Clemens periit, aeternum Galliae decus, ut plerisque visum est. . • • De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 6, p. 69 (according to the first edition, Toledo, 1599).

62 TYRANNICIDE David who dared not kill Saul although he himself had been unjustly threatened with death, and to the first Chris tians who patiently suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Roman Emperors. Moreover, the killing of rulers involves hardships, greater perhaps than those created by tyranny, since rebellion gives rise to all kinds of calamities. "The patrons of the people" produce the following arguments: The people from whom kings receive their power have a right to call them to account if circumstances warrant; and if they are not listened to, they may deprive kings of their power. As a matter of fact, the killers of tyrants, they say, were always considered heroes by the people, and this gen eral conviction cannot be wrong. If we are allowed and even obliged to defend our mothers and wives when violence is done them, how much less can we suffer that our country, to which we owe much more than we do to our parents, be maltreated and disturbed hy the whims of a tyrant? Phi losophers and theologians permit anybody to kill a usurper.

If the tyrant is a legitimate ruler, we must tolerate him until he neglects the laws of morality and decency." 1 Nor should a ruler be deposed lightly, because the evils of rebellion are great. "But if he harms the State, makes spoils of public and private property, if he despises public laws and sacro sanct religion, if he boldly puts his strength in pride and in wickedness against the heavenly powers, he is not to be suf· fered any longer." 2 After having enumerated these arguments, Mariana tells us what his own opinion is, when he continues: "These are the bulwarks (strong points) of each side, a careful scrutiny 1 Nam si Princeps populi consensu aut jure hereditario imperium tenet, ejus vitia et Iibidines ferendae sunt eatenus, quoad eas leges honestatis, quibus est adstrictus, negligat. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 6, p. 59. :I Si vero rempublicam pessundat, publicas privatasque fortunas praedae habet, leges publicas et sacrosanctam religionem contemptui: virtutem in superbia ponit in audacia atque adversus superos impietate, dissimulandum non est. Ibid.

63 MARIANA:-POIJTICAL ECONOMY of which will easily show what to think about the matter under consideration." 1 In other words, Mariana believes that Jacques Clement was right in killing Henry III. The next paragraph of Mariana's discussion is a practical application of the doctrine set forth on the preceding pages. Having indicated when a tyrant must he resisted, he con tinues: "One must, however, consider carefully what method is to be taken in deposing (such) a prince, lest evil be heaped upon evil, or crime vindicated by crime." 2 If there is an opportunity to hold a convention of the people, this ought to be convoked and the course of action be decided upon by general consent. The king should first be prevailed upon hy arguments to listen to reason, and if he should hearken no further course is to he taken. If he despises the warning given by the people and there is no hope for amendment, he may lawfully be declared deposed. If he should take up arms, the people may defend themselves and may declare him an enemy of the country whom anybody may lawfully kill.8 .•.1 ",i But what if it is impossible to assemhle the people? Ma riana's opinion is that if there is no other chance of getting rid.of the tyrant, no one can'rightly hlame the private citizen who, at his own initiative and with the tacit approval of the people, makes an attempt on the king's life.4. To meet 1 Haec sunt utriusque parHs praesidia, quibus attente consideraHs, quid de proposita quaestione statuendum sit, explicare non erit difficile. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 6, p. 58.

1I Attente tamen cogitandum quae ratio ejus Principis abdicandi teneri debeat, ne malum malo cumuletur, scelus scelere vindicetur. Ibid., Lib. I, cap. 6, p. 59. a Monendus in primis Princeps erit atque ad sanitatem revocandus, qui si moram gesserit, si rei publicae satisfecerit, peccataque correxerit vitae superioris, resistendum arbitror, neque acerbiora remedia tentanda. Si medicinam respuat, neque spes ulla sanitatis relinquatur, sententia pronunciata licebit reipublicae ejus imperium detrectare primum. Et quoniam bellum necessario concitabitur, ejus defendendi consilia explicare, expedire arm a, pecunias in belli sumptus imperare populis: etsi res feret, neque aliter se respublica tueri possit, eodem defensionis jure ac vero potiori auctoritate et propria, Principem publicum hostem dec1aratum ferro perimere. Eademque facultas erit cuicumque privato, qui spe impunitatis abiecta, neglecta salute in conatum juvandi rempublicam ingredi voluerit. Ibid., p. 60.

'Roges quid faciendum, si publici conventus facultas erat sublata: quod saepe potest contingere. Par profecto, mea quidem sententia, judicium erit, cum Principis tyrannide oppressa republica: sublata civibus inter se conveniendi facultate voluntas non desit delendae tyrannidis, sce1era Principis manifesta modo et intoleranda vindicandi, exitiales conatus M TYRANNICIDE the ohjections advanced against such a doctrine, our author tries to show that it will not unduly threaten the common good. He emphasizes that it is not left to the arbitrary judgment of a private citizen to take the life of his prince. One should first seek the advice of "erudite and grave men," unless the cry of the people against the tyrant be so evident that nobody can doubt that he deserves death. Nor is it to be feared that many will venture on so dangerous an enter prise. Very few are ready to risk their lives and, as a matter of fact, very few tyrants have died a violent death. On the other hand, it will be salutary for rulers to realize that they must not abuse their power over their suhjects and that they may be called to account by the people.

In the seventh chapter Mariana discusses the question whether it be lawful to poison a tyrant. Even though it be certain that the tyrant deserves death, our author would not grant that it is lawful to make him take poison with his own hand. This would be cruel and contrary to natural law/ If, however, the poison were to work from the outside the case would be different. If the tyrant were to succumb to an attempt on his life by poisoned garments or furniture or weapons, this would no longer be damnable, it always being understood that he really deserves death. This distinction seems silly indeed, because there could be no question of suicide if a person should unknowingly poison himself. Here Mariana tries to avoid a gnat and swallows a camel, as B. Antonides pointed out. 2 Such is Mariana's notorious teaching on tyrannicide. No one who calmly reads the sixth and seventh chapters of the comprimendi: ut si sacra patria pessundet, publicosque hostes in provineiam attrahat: QUI VOTIS PUBLICIS FAVENS EUM PERIMERE TENTARIT, HAUDQUAM INIQUE EUM FECISSE' EXISTIMABO. De Rege, Lib. I, cap. 6, p. 59.

1 G. Jellinek calls attention to the fact that in this question Mariana closely followed John of Salisbury, using almost the same words. G. JelIinek, Die Monarchotnachen, p. 44. 1I Der gute Mariana verschluckt das Kamel und sucht die Miicke auszuseien. Die Staatslehre des Mariana, in Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, V. 21, 1908, p. 315. 65 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY first book of De Rege can absolve him from being guilty of very serious error in his doctrine on the killing of tyrants, a doctrine which would greatly endanger the common good and which cannot, therefore, be accepted as sound political philosophy. It was not accepted by the Jesuit Order. As we have said before, l the first edition of De Rege had no sooner been published than the General of the Order told the author to correct the offensive passages. Later, in 1610, he addressed a solemn decree to his subjects, forbidding them to teach that it is lawful to kill tyrants.

2 One must deny, therefore, that Mariana simply pronounced openly what was taught by all Jesuits secretly. P. Janee indicates that tyrannicide was commonly advo cated in those days. The monarchomachs who opposed royal claims to unlimited power had representatives among both Catholics and Protestants. G. J ellinek classifies Mariana among these writers. 4 The defenders of the divine right of kings endeavored to show that the people must under all circumstances suffer the rule of a legitimate king, no matter how grievously he might abuse his power, for the reason that he had received his authority directly from God. If his rule became tyrannical, it is because God wanted to use him as an instrument of wrath for punishing the sins of the people. Naturally, this extreme view aroused the opposition of these who defended the rights of the people. It had al ways been the clear conviction of mediaeval philosophy that 1 Palle 4.

II The French version of the decree reads: "Nous enjoignons, en vertu de la saincte obeissance, soubs peine d'excommunication et d'inhabilite a tous offices, et de suspension a divinis et aut res peines arbitraires a nous reservees, qu'aucun religieux, soit en public ou en particulier, lisant ou donnant advis, et beaucoup plus mettant quelques <:euvres en lumiere, n'entreprenne de soustenir qu'il Boit IQisible a qui que ce soit, et soubs quelconque pretexte de Tyrannie, de tuer les Roys ou Princes, ou d'attenter sur leurs personnes, afin que telle doctrine n'ouvre Ie chemin a la ruine des princes, lesquels nous devons honorer et respecter comme personnes sacrees et etablies de nostre Dieu." (Franciae histor., t. III, p. 79.) Henri Fouqueray, S.]., Histoire de 1(11 Compagnie de Jesus en France, Tome III, p. 247. 8 See footnote 2 on page 5. 6 Die Monarehomaehen, p. 44. 66 TYRANNICIDE the people do not exist for the king, but that the king does exist for the people. Catholics were not alone in opposing the unreasonable claims of rulers. Luther, Melanchthon and other reformers were similarly antagonistic. Luther says that the community as a whole may condemn a tyrant to death. Melanchthon maintains that the killing of a tyrant is the most agreeable offering man can make to God. The Calvinist Junius Brutus believed that subjects had no right to kill a legitimate tyrant, but that resistance must be author ized by a representative council of the people. John Knox affirmed that it was the duty of the nobility, judges, rulers, and people of England to condemn Queen Mary Stuart to death.!

Bearing these things in mind, we need not be amazed to find similar doctrines professed by some scholastics. St. Thomas Aquinas had conceded the right of rebellion against extreme tyranny; and Mariana, who hated nothing more than he did tyranny, believed that if the community had no way of ridding itself of a tyrant, a private citizen, acting in the name of the whole people, would have the same right as the community to act. He thereby went farther than any of the great Catholic theologians. St. Thomas gives the community the right to depose a tyrant, 2 but says that if it is impossible to achieve this end through popular action, the only lawful thing remaining is to ask the King of Kings to relieve his people. S 1 Catholic Encyclopedia, article "Tyrannicide." 9 Primo quidem si ad jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat (i.e. si tyrannus non habet supra se superiorem) sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destrui, vel refrenari ejus potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nee putanda est talis multitudo infidel iter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam si eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat: quia hoc ipse meruit, in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. De Regimine Principum, c. 6.

3 Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum saevitiam non privata praesumptione ali quorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum .... (Then follows the place quoted in the precedini' footnote.) Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rei'e, expectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam ...• Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad omnium regem Deum, qui est adjutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione. Ejus enim potentiae subest, ut cor 67 MARIANA:-POLITICAL ECONOMY Suarez, who has sometimes heen charged with defending tyrannicide, makes a very careful distinction hetween a usurper who is always a tyrant hecause he has no right to the royal power and a legitimate king who rules tyrannically. According to him a usurper is an enemy of the State and is engaged in actual warfare with the community. Conse quently, every citizen may treat him as an enemy of the country, i.e., kill him, since it is a correct assumption that the State wants to urge its right against. an unjust usurper. Even in this case, however, it may not he lawful for a citizen to act in the name of the State. If the people consent to the rule of the illegitimate ruler, he thereby he comes legitimatized; and if action against tyranny threatens to throw the country into disaster or if a greater tyranny is likely to result, it would he inexpedient for the State to remove the usurping tyrant and hence no private citizen could lawfully kill him. Moreover, it is never lawful to kill even an illegitimate ruler if there he other ways and means of ending his tyranny/ If a legitimate king becomes a tyrant, the community as a whole alone has a right to remove him. Suarez, following St. Thomas, clearly denies a private citizen the right to make tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem ..• secundum Salomonis sententiam Provo 12,1: "Cor regis in manu Dei: Quocumque voluerit, inclinabit illud." De Regimine Prin cipttm, C. 6.

1 Tyrannus in titulo licite oceiditur ...• Communiter enim inter haec duo genera tyrannorum constituitur discrimen, nam asseritur hunc tyrannum quoad titulum, interfici posse a quacumque privata persona, quae sit membrum reipublicae quae tyrannidem patitur, si aliter non potest rempublicam ab illa tyrannide liberare. Ita sentit D. Thomas, in 2, dist. 44 . . . quem fere omnes Doctores eitati secuti sunt. . • • Ratio ergo est, quia tunc non occiditur princips, sed hostis rei publicae. Quae requiruntur ut tyrannus in titulo a privato occidi possit. Addit vero supra D. Thomas limitationem, nimirum hoc licere quando nullus recurs us est ad superiorem, per quem judicium de invasore fieri possit. . . . Etiam quando non est superior ad quem recurratur, necessarium est ut tyrannis et injustitia sit publica et manifesta; nam si sit dubia, non licet per vim depellere eum, qui possidet, cum in dubio melior sit ejus conditio, nisi certum etiam sit possessionem fuisse tyrannicam. Praeterea, ut licita sit occisio talis tyranni, opertet, necessaria sit ad libertatem regni obtinendam, nam si alia via minus crudeli possit tyrannus depelli, non licebit statim eum occidere sine majori potestate, et causae examinatione .... Praeiterea intellig-enda est communis sententia, nisi inter tyrannum et populum foedus aloquod, vel treg-ua, aut pactum juramento firmatum inter cesserit ••••Defensio Fidei Catholicae, Lib. VI, cap. 4, nn. 7, 8, 9.

68 TYRANNICIDE an attempt upon the life of the tyrant. 1 Mariana, then, has gone further than any of the great Catholic thinkers in that, under certain conditions, he allows a private person to kill a legitimate ruler who has become a tyrant. A detailed survey of Mariana's teaching on tyrannicide seemed necessary, not because the matter is intrinsically important enough to deserve a full treatment, but because it has often been misrepresented. Some of Mariana's critics seem to feel that all he taught was tyrannicide, while others insinuate that his is merely the clearest and most typical expression of a dangerous "Jesuitical doctrine." Still others assert that he did not teach tyrannicide at all. There can be no doubt that our author went too far on the question of tyrannicide, but it is also certain that his brethren in religion did not share his opinion, and that his order as a body did not sanction his views.

1 At vera in praesenti non tractarnus de ilIa casu, in quo rex actu infert helIum aggressivum ipsi reipuhlicae ad destruendam ill arn, et multitudinem civium occidendurn, sed quando in pace regnans aliis modis rempublicarn vexat, eisque noxius est, t:t tnne non hahet locum defensio per vim vel insidias contra vitam regis, quia tunc non infertur actualis vis rei publicae, quam vi repellere liceat. Unde tunc aggredi principern esset bellum contra ilium movere privata auctoritate, quod nullo modo licet, quia ordo natural is mortalium paci accomrnodatus, hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas penes rempublicam seu principem sit, ut dixit Augustinus, lib. 22, contra Faustum, cap. ?4. Ibid., Lib. VI, cap. 4, n. 6. 69 Chapter VI Principles of Government. M ARIANA'S work on royalty is a practical handbook for kings and so we must expect it to contain many prac tical principles of government. It would lead us too far and it would also be beyond the purpose of this monograph to give an exhaustive description of all of them. We shall, therefore, touch only upon those which are characteristic of our author and which show his originality. His sugges tions regarding the appointment of officers and his prin ciples of law and justice seem to bring out best two out standing characteristics, common sense and democratic spirit.

Some writers have maintained that ~Iariana defends, in . a measure, the same principles of government as Machia velli. This view is an error or a misrepresentation. Our author undouhtedly knew Machiavelli's works hut explic itly denied his adherence to them. He tells us that certain "men of great and excellent talent" 1 have maintained that a ruler cannot always he honest like other people but must use simulation, fraud, lying and similar means in order to promote the common good. These men even go so far as 1 Magno et excellenti ingenio viri, prudentiae opinione maxima, Principem ad regendam populi multitudinem, alta dissimulatione opus habera persuadent Caeteros mortales simplici via ad honestatis studia aut utilitatis contendere: Principum non eandem esse rationem, quibus salus multitudinis credita est, variae, multiplicis, inconstantis, neque ejusdem semper voluntatis aut judicii. ... Itaque hi Principem ex dolo, fraude et mendacio componunt: fronte probitatem ostentare jubent: libidinem, saevitiam, avaritiam, ut res erunt, suscipere concedunt. quae res privatis probro essent. Principi afterre laudem.