VI. Justice

CHAPTER VI. JUSTICE. § 138. Perhaps the soul of goodness in things evil is by nothing better exemplified than by the good thing, justice, \vhich, in· a rudinlehtaryform, exists within the evil thing revenge. Meeting aggression by counter-aggression is, in the first place, an endeavour to avoid being suppressed by the aggressorjand to maintain that ability to carry on life which justice implies; and -it is, in the second place, an endeavour to enforce justice by establishing __ an equality 'with the aggressol : inflicting injuries as great as have been received. .This rude process of. balancing claims usually fails to es tablish equilibrium. Revenge, habitually carried not as far only as suffices to compensate for injuries received but, if possible, farther, -evokes re-revenge, which also, if possible, is carried to excess;_ and so there result chronic wars be tween _tribes and chronic antagonisms bet~Teen families and between individuals. These commonly continue .from gen eration to generation .

. But occasionally there is sho,vna tendency towards estab lishment of an -.equilibrium, by bringing aggression -and counter-aggression to·-a _definite balance, achieyedby _meas~ ure. Let us look at the evidence. § 139. Men of various rude types, as the Australians,con stantly show the idea, tacitly asserted and acted upon, that the loss of aJife in one tribe .IDust be cOlnpensated by the 370 THE INDUOTIONS OF ETHIOS. infliction of a death in another tribe; SOUle member of "\\Thich is known, or supposed, to haye caused the said loss of life. And since deaths from disease and old age are, alnong others, ascribed to the machinations of foes-since equiy alent deaths lllUSt be inflicted for these also, there haye to be frequent balancings of losses. [It seeIns clear, however, that these revenges and re-revenges cannot be always carried out as alleged. For if not only deaths by violence but deaths by disease entail thelll the two tribes must soon dis appear by mutual extirpation.] Races much Inore advanced in SOlne cases carry out, not this secret balancing of Inor tality-accounts between tribes, but an oyert balancing. This is the case ",,,ith the SUlnatrans, arnong wholn the differences are squared by money payments.

This maintenance of inter-tribal justice, prolnpted in part by consciousness of that corporate injury which loss of a member of the tribe entails, and requiring the infliction of an equivalent corporate injury on the offending tribe, has the trait that it is indifferent what member of the offending tribe is killed in compensation: whether it be the guilty man or some innocent Ulan matters not. This conception of inter tribal justice is repeated in the conception of inter-family justice. Those early types of social organization in which the family is the unit of cOlnposition, show us that in each family there arises an idea allied to the idea of nationality; and there results an allied system of reprisals for the bal ancing of injuries. The Philippine Islands supply eyidence. "In the proyince of La Isabela, the Negrito and Igorrote tribes keep a regular Dr. and Or. account of heads." A further interesting illustration is yielded by the Quianganes of Luzon. From an account of them given by Prof. F.

Blumentritt, here is a translated passage:" Blood vengeance is a sacred law with the Quianganes. If one plebeian is killed by another, the matter is settled in a simple manner by killing the murderer or some one of his family who is likewise a plebeian. But if a prominent man or noble is killed by a plebeian, vengeance on the murJUSTICE. 3'71 derer, a mere plebeian. is not enough; .the victim of the sin-offering must be an equivalent in rank. Another nobleman must fall for the murdered noble, for their doctrine is,-What kind of an equivalent is it to kill some one who is no better than a dog ~ Hence the family of the slain noble looks around to see if it cannot find a relative of the murderer to wreak vengeance upon, who is also a noble; while the murderer himself is ignored. If no noble can be found among his relatives, the family of the murdered man wait patiently till some one of them is received into the noble's caste; then the vendetta is prosecuted, although many years may have elapsed. When the blood-feud is satisfied a reconciliation of the contending factions takes place. In all the feuds the heads of the mnr dered champions are cut off and taken home, and the head-hunters cele brate the affair festally. The skulls are fixed to the front of the house."

Here the need for inflicting an injury of like· anlount, and so equalizing the losses, is evidently the dominant need. The Senlitic peoples in general furnish kindred facts. " It is a received law among all the Arabs, that whoever sheds the blood of a man, owes blood on that account to the family of the slain person. • . The lineal descendants of all those who were entitled to revenge at the moment of the man-slaughter, inherit this right from their parents." Burckhardt writes :-.... And respecting this system of administering rude justice by the balancing of deaths bet\veen falnilies, Burckhardt remarks:" I am inclined to believe that this salutary institution has contributed, in a greater degree than any other circumstance, to prm.~ent the warlike tribes of Arabia from exterminating one another. . . the terrible' blood revenge' tenders the most inveterate war nearly bloodless." The evide~t implication being that dread of this persistent revenge, makes members of different falnilies and tribes fearful of killing one another. That· with. the feelings and practices of existing Semites, those of ancient Semites agreed, there is good reason to believe. The authorization of blood-revenge between families, is inlplied in 1 Kings, ii, 31, 33, as well as elsewhere. How, among European peoples in early times, kindred conceptions led to kindred usages, need not be shown. in detail. The fact that when the systenl of taking life for life was replaced by the system of compensations, these "were adjusted to ranks, so that the murder of a person 1110re valuable to the group 11e belonged 372 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.

to "vas·compounded for by a larger fine payable to it, shows ho\v dominant was the idea of group-injury, and how domi nant \vas the idea ofequi valence. § 140. But these ideas of family-injury and family-guilt have all along been accompanied by ideas of individual injury and individual-guilt: here very distinct and there less distinct. They are very distinct among some peoples in early social stages, as is shown by the account \vhich 1m Thurn gives of the Guiana tribes. " In the absence of anything corresponding to police regulations, their mutual relations in everyday life are very well-ordered by the· traditional respect which each individual feels for the rights of the others, and by their dread· of adverse public opinion should they act contrary to such traditions •••.The smallest injury done by one Indian to another, even if unintentional, must be atoned by suffering a similar injury."

And that among the Hebrews there was a balancing of individual-injuries is a fact more frequently referred to than. is the fact that there was a balancing of family injuries; as witness the familiar "eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot" prescribed in .Deuterono1nyxix. The decline of family-responsibility and growth of indi vidual-responsibility, seem to be concomitants of the change in social organization from the type in which the family is the unit of cOlllposition to the type in which the individual is· the unit of composition. For, evidently, as fast as the family-organization dissolves, there cease to be any groups which can be held responsible to one another for injuries inflicted by their melnbers; and as fast as this happens the responsibility must fall on the members therllselves. Thus it naturally happens that along with social evolution, there emerges from that unjust form of retaliation, in which the groups more than their component men are answerable, that just form in which the lllen them selves are answerable: the guilty person takes the conse~ JUSTICE.

qu.ences<?fhis· acts, and does not leave thenlto be borne by other persons. Au instructive contrast in the literature of the Hebre~s supports this conclusion. In the earlier writings, God 'is represented as .punishing not only those who have sinned against hinl,but their posterity for generations. In the later writings; however, there~ occurs the prophecy of a time when this shall no longer be. Here is a passage from JereJniah, xxxi. 29, 30. "In those days they .shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But >every one shall die for his own iniquity : everyman that eatet~ the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge." That· in European peoples growth of this factor in the conception of justice has gone along with the lapsing of group-organization and the rise of individual citizenship, is clear. And it is interesting to observe how strange uow seem to us the old idea and sentiment, when we COlne in contact with them, as in China, where the group-organiza tion lingers,. and it is thought sufficient if, in compensation for one of our people who has been· murdered, a victim is I delivered up: no matter whether the victim be the guilty man or not.

§ 141. But while, in the more advanced social stages, maintenance of the relation between conduct and conse quence COlnes to be· recognized as required by justice; in early social stages the idea of equality is that which chiefly obtains recognition, under· the form· of an infliction· of equiv alent· injuries. It could scarcely be otherwise. During times of unceasing strife, with entailed wounds· and deaths, this is the onlyequality admitting of distinct maintenance. Evidently, however, from this practice of balancing deaths and mutilations, there tends to arise one component in the conception··of equity. We may see, too, that the activities of militant life them selves afford scope for some further developlnentof the 374 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS. idea; and occasionally there grow up usages requiring sonle maintenance of equality, even in the midst of conflict. Speaking of certain early wars recorded in the Indian books, Wheeler remarks that" The sentiment of honour which undoubtedly prevailed amongst the an cient Kshatriyas made them regard an attack upon a sleeping enemy as a heinous crime." "Aswatthama even whilst bent upon being revenged on the murderer of his father, awoke his sleeping enemy before slaying him."

And various histories yield occasional signs of the belief that under certain circumstances-especially in personal combats-foes should be placed under something like equal conditions before they ar.e attacked; though, very generally, the aim has been the reverse-to attack them under every disadvantage. That all along the idea of likeness of treatment has entered into human relations at large, but chiefly among lnembers of the same society, is manifest. But any con siderable development of it has been inconsistent ,vith rnilitant life and militant organization. W"hile war, even when retaliatory, has necessarily been a discipline in in justice, by inflicting wounds and death upon individuals who have mostly been guiltless of aggression, it has, at the saIne time, necessitated ,vithin each society a type of or ganization which has disregarded the requirelnents of jus tice; alike by the coercive arrangements within its fighting part, by the tyranny over slaves and serfs forming its industrial part, and by the subjection of women. Hence the broad fact that throughout civilization the relations of citizens have become relatively equitable only as fast as Inilitancy has become less predominant; and that only along with this change has the sentiment of justice become nlore pronounced.

As yielding converse evidence I must again refer to the habits andsenthnents which accompany entire peaceful ness. Already in the last chapter but one I have nalned some peoples whose unaggressivellesB towards other peoples JUSTICE. 3'75 is accompanied by unaggressiveness among themselves; and of course this trait is in part ascribable to that regard for others' claims which justice implies. Already, too, in the last chapter; I have quoted various travellers in proof of the great honesty characterizing tribes of this same class; and of course their honesty may be taken as, in a considerable degree, proof of the prevailing sentirnent of justice. Here, to this indirect evidence, I may add evidence of a more direct kind, furnished by the treatment of women and children among them. In The Principles ofSociology, §§ 324, 32'7, I have drawn a contrast between the low status of WOluen among luilitant savages, as well as the militant semi-civilized, and· the high stat1-l8 of women among these uncultured but unmilitant peoples; showing th~t by the Todas, low as they are in sundry respects, the women are relieved from all hard work, and "do not eY"en ~tep out of·doors to fetch water or wood;" that the wives of the Bodo and DhiffiaJs "are free from all out-door work whatever;" that among the Hos a wife "receives the fullest consideration due to her sex;" and that among the "industrious, honest, and peace-loving Pueblos," no girl is forced to marry against her will, and "the usual order of courtship is reversed" -facts an of them showing a recognition of that· equality of claill1swhieh is. an essential element in the idea of justice. And here I may add an instance not before nlentioned, furnished by the Manansas, who occupy a hill-country in which they have taken ref uge froIn the invading Bamangwatos and JVlako101o. Said one of thenl to Holub-.:-" We want not the blood of the beasts, much less do we thirst for the blood of men;" and hence they are regarded with great contempt by the more powerful tribes. Holub; however, testifying to their honesty -and fidelity, says that "nothing worse seems to be alleged against them than their habitual courtesy and good-nature;" and he adds~" They treat their women in a , ,yay that offers a very favourable contrast to either the 3'76 THE INDUCTIONS OF ETHICS.

Bechuanas' or the !tlatabele :" that is,- they are relatively just to thern. Similarly, in The Principles of Sociology, §§ 330-2, I have shown how much the way in which children are treated by warlike peoples who exercise over them the powers of life and death, and behave to boys far better than to girls, differs froIn the 'way in which they are treated by these unwarlike peoples, whose conduct to thern is both kind and equal; girls are dealt with as fairly as boys. To these indications that the sentiment of justice is Inarked where the habits are peaceful, something should be added respecting the overt expression of it. Little that is definite can be expected fronl the uncultured, since both the sentiment and the idea are complex. We lnay, how ever, infer that in a W ood-Veddah who cannot conceive that a Dian should take that which is not his own, there exists a sufficiently clear, if not a fornlulated, idea of justice; and we may.fairly say that this idea is. implied in the peaceful Tlulruswho, when they fly to the hills for refuge, "always leave any arrears of rent that may be due tied up in a rag to the lintel of their deserted house."

N or can we doubt that both the sentiment and· idea, from ,vhich result regard for other men's claims, must be dominant in the Hos, of wholn ","'e read that one suspected of theft is not unlikely to commit suicide, as also in th~ IJet-htas, an aboriginal hill-tribe in Burma, described as ideally good, anlong whom one accused by several of an evil act" retires to some secluded spot, there digs his grave and strangles himself." But it is only when we pass to peoples who have risen to a state of culture high enough to evolve literatures, that we get definite evidence concerning the conception of justice which has arisen, and among these we meet with a very significant fact. For throughout ancient societies at large, inilitant in their activities, in their types of structure, and in the universally-established system of statu8 or compulsory JUSTICE. 3'77 cooperation, justice is not differentiated in thought from altruism in general. In the literatures of the Ohinese, the Persians, the Ancient Indians, the Egyptians, the Hebrews, justice is in the main confounded with generosity and llumanity. The Inaxim commonly supposed to be especially Christian, but which, as we have seen, was in kindred forms enunciated alnong various peoples in pre-Christian days, shows us this. " Do unto others asyewould that they should do unto you," is an injunction which merges generosity and justice in one. In the first place, it makes no distinction be tween that which you are called upon to do to another on grounds of equity,and that which you are called upon to do to him on grounds of kindness; and, in the second place, it in cludes no recognition, overt or tacit,. of those claims of the doer which we call" rights." In the consciousness.of ju~tice properly so-called, there is included an egoistic as well as an altruistic element--aconsciousness of the claim of self and a sylnpathetiG.consciousness of the claims of others. Percep tion and assertion of this claim 01 self, cannot develop in a society·organized for warfare, and carried on by compulsory cooperation. Universal paralysis would ensue if each luan were free, within the limits prescribed by equity, to do as he iiked. Under a despotic rule there is scope for any amount of generosity but for only a limited amount of justice. The sentiment and the idea can grow only as fast as the external antagonisms of societies decrease and the inter~al harmonious cooperations of.their members increase.