VII. The Psychological View

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. § 40. TIle last chapter) in so far as it dealt with feelings in their relations to conduct) recognized only their physio ... logical aspects: their psychological aspects were passed over. In this chapter, conversely, we are not concerned with the constitutional connexions between feelings, as in~ centives or deterrents, and physical benefits to be gained or nlischiefs to be avoided; nor with the reactive effects of feelings on the state of the organism, as fitting or unfitting it for future action. Here we have to consider represented pleasures and pains, sensational and emotional) as consti ... tuting deliberate motives-as forming factors in the can... scious adjustments of acts to ends. § 41. The rudimentary psychical act) not yet differentiated from a physical act) implies an excitation and a motion. In a creature of low type the touch of food excites prehension.

In a somewhat higher creature the odour from nutritiYe matter sets up motion of the body towards the matter. A.nd where rudimentary vision exjsts, sudden obscuration of tight, implying the passage of something large, causes con... vulsive muscular movel1lents which m.ostly carry the body nway from the source of danger. In each of these cases we may distinguish four factors. There is (a), that property of tJhe ex.ternal object which prinlarilyaffects the organismTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 103 the taste, smell, or opacity; and, connected with such property, there is in the external object that character (b), which renderssei~ure of it, or escape fi~onl it, beneficial. Within the organism there is (c),. l/he impression or sensation which the property (a)~ produces, serving as stirnuIus; and there is, connecteu with it, the motor change (d), hy which seizure or escape is effected. Now Psychology is chiefly concerned with the connexioll between tho relation a b, and the relation c· d, under all those forins which they aSSUluein the course of evolution. Each of the factors, and each of the relations, grows 111ore involved as organization advances. Instead of being single, the ideI:ltifying attribute aJ often becornes, in the environment of a superior animal..

a cluster of attributes; such as the size, form, colours, motions, displayed by a distant creature that is c1,angerous. The factor b, with which this combination of attri butes is associated, becurnes the congeries of characters, powers, habits, which constitute it an enemy. Of the subjective factors, c becomes a complicated set of visual sensations coordinated with one anotheI" and with the ideas and feelings established by experience of such enemies, and constituting the nlotive to escape; while d becomes the iutricate, and often prolonged, series of runs, leaps, doubles, dives, &c., made in eluding the enemy. In human life we find the same four outer and inner factors, still more multi£orlu and entangled in their con1positiol1s and connexiol1s. 'rhe entire .assem blage of physical attributes a, presented by an estate that is adverti~ed for sale, passes enullleration; RPd the assembIngo of various utilities, h, going along with! these attributes, is also beyond brief specifica-bion. The perceptions and ideas, likes and dislikes, c, set up by the aspect of the estate, and which, compounded and re-compounded, eventually form the motive for buying it, l11ake a whole too large and complex for description; and the transactions, legal, pecuniary, and other" gone through in making the 104 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

purchase and taking possession, are scarcely less numerous and elaborate. Nor lJ]ust 'vve overlook the fact that as evolution progresses, not only do the factors increase in cOluplexity but also the" relations anlong them. Origi nally, a is directly and simply connected with b, while c is directly and sinlply connected with d. But eventually, tho counexions between a and b, and between e and d, beCOIn8 very indirect and involved. On the one hand, as the first illustration E5hows us, sapidity and nutritiveness are closely bound together; as are also the stimulation caused by the one and the contraction which utilizes the other. But, as we see in the last, illustration; the connexion between the viRible traits of an estate and those characters which COll stitute its value, is at once remote and complicated; while the transition fronl the purchaser's highly-composite lllotive to the numerous actions of sensory and motor organs~ severally intricate, which effect' the purchase, is though an entangled plexus of thoughts and "feelings constituting his decision.

After this explanation will be apprehended a truth otherwise set forth in the P'rinc·iples of Psychology. lVlind consists of feelings and the relations among feelings. By composition of the relations, and ideas of relations, intelli gence arises. By composition of the feelings, and ideas of feelings, emotion arises. And, other things equal, the evolution of either is great in proportion as the con1positioll is great. One of the necessary implicatjol1s is that cognition becoules higher in proportion as it is reuloter from reflex action; while emotion becomes higher in proportion as it is J'emotor from sensation. A.nd now of the various corollaries from this broad view of psychological evolution, let us observe those which concern the 1110tives and actions that are classed as mora] and il1ln1oral. § 42. The mental process by which, in any case) tho THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 105 adjustment of acts to ends is effected, and which, under its higher forms, becomes the subject-matter of ethical judgments, is, as above implied, divisible· into the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive, and the thought or thoughts through which the motive is shaped and finally issues in action. The first of these elements, originally an excitement, becomes a, simple sensation; then a compoulid sensation; then a cluster of partially presentative and partially representative sensations, forming ttn incipient emotion; then u, cluster of exclusively ideal or representative sensations, forming an emotion proper; then a cluster of such clusters, forlning a compound emotion; and eventually becon1es a stj Umore involved emotion composed of the ideal forIns of such compound emotions. The other element, beginning with that immediate passage of a single stimulus into a· siIigle motion, called reflex action, presently comes to be a SAt vf associated discharges of stimuli producing associated nl0tions, constituting instinct. Step by step arise more 8n1iftngledcombinations of stimuli, somewhat variable in theirID(ldes of union, leading to complex motions similarly variabJe in their adjustments; whence occasional hesitations in tht1 sensori-motor processes. Presently is reached a stage at which the combined clusters of impressions, not all p",esent together, issue in actions not all simultaneous; implying representation of results, or thought. After ...

wSl/rds follow stages in whlch various thoughts have time to pass before the composite motives produce the appro" lwiate actions. Until at last arise those long delibex:a... tions during which the probabjlities of various consequences are estiu1ated, and the promptings of the correlative feel~ ingsbalanced; ~constituting calm judgment. That under either of its aspects the later forms of this mental process are the higher, ethically considered as well as otherwise considered, will be readily seen. For· froIn the first, complication of sentiency has accom... panied better and more numerous adjustments of acts to L06 THE DATA OF ETHICS. ends, as also has COlllplication of movement, and oompli. cation of the coordinating or intellectual process uniting the two. Whence it follows that the acts characterized by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for guidance.

Some examples will make this clear. Here is an aquatic creature guided by the odour of organic matter towards thiugs serving for food; but a creature which, lacking any other guidFlnce, is at the mercy of larger creatures coming near. Here is another which, also guided to food by odour, possesses rudimentary vision; and so js made to start spasmodically away from a moving body which diffuses this odour, in those cases where it is large enough to produce sudden obscuration of light-usually an enemy. Evidently life will frequently be saved by con £vrming to the later and higher stimulus, instead of to the earlier and lower. Observe at a nlore advanced stage a p3Jrallel conflict. This is a beast which pursues others for prey, and, either lacking experience or prompted by raging hunger, attacks one rnore pow81"ful than itself and gets destroyed. Convel"sely, that is a beast which, prompted by a hunger equally keen, but either by individual experience or effects of inherited experience, made conscious of evil by the aspect of one nlore powerful than itself, is deterred from attacking, and saves its life by subordinating the primary motive, consisting of craving sensations, to the secondary motive, consisting of ideal feelings, distinct or vague. Ascending at once from these exanlples of conduct in aninlals to exalTIples of human conduct) wo shall see that the contrasts between inferior and superior have habitually the same traits. The savage of lowest type devours all the food captured by to-day's chase; and, hungry on the morrow, has perhaps for days to bear the pangs of starvation.' The superior savage, conceiving more vividly the entailed sufferingos if no game is to be found, is deterred by his complex feeling from giving way entirely to his THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 107 simple feeling. Similarly are the two contrasted in the inertness which goes along with lack of forethought, and the activity which du.e forethought produces. The primitive ruau, idly inclined, and rul~d by the sensations of the mOIDrnt, will not exert himself until actual pains have to bo cscnped; but the man somewhat advanced, able more dis..

tint~tly to imagine future gratifications and sufferings, iR pr :nnptcd by the thought of these to overCOlue his love of ease: decrease of misery and mortality resulting from this predominance of the representative feelings over the presentative feelings. Without dwelling on the fact that among the civilized, those who lead the life of the senses are contrasted in the same way with those whose lives are largely occupied with pleasures not of a sensual kind, let me point out that there are analogous contrasts between guidance by the less cOlnplex representative feel ings, or lower emotions, and guidance by the more complex representative feelings, or higher emotions. When led by his acquisitiveness...;,.-are-representative feeling which, acting" under due control, conduces to welfare-the thief takes another man's property; his act is determined by certain imagined proximate pleasures. of relatively simple kinds, rather than by less-clearly inlagined possible pains that are more' remote and of relatively involved kinds. But in the conscientious man, there is an adequate restraining motive, still more re-representative in its nature, including not only ideas of punishment, and not only ideas of lost reputation and ruin, but including ideas of the clalllls of tho porson owning the property, and of the pains which loss of it will entail on him: all joined with a general aversio'n to acts injurious to others, which arises from the inherited eflects of experience. And here at the end we S8H, as we saw at the beginning, that guidance hy the more complex: feeling, on the average conduces to welfare more than does guidance by the simpler feeling.

Tho like holds with the intellectual coordinations through lOB THE DATA OF ETHICS. which stirnuli issue in motions. The lowest actions, called reflex, in which an impression made on an afferent nerve causes by discharge through an efferent nerve a contraction, shows us a very limited adjustment of acts to ends: the iUlpression being simple, and the resulting nlotion simple, the internal coordination is also simple. Evidently when there are several senses which can be together affected by an outer object; and when, according' as such object is discriminated as of one or other kind, the movements lllade in response are combined in onp-or other way; the intermediate coordinations are necessarily rnore involved. And evidently each further step in the evolution of intelligence, always instrumental to better sel£:preservation, exhibits this same general trait. The adjustments by which the more involved actions arc made appropriate to the more involved circumstances, imply 11lore intricate, and consequently more deliberate ~nd conscious, coordinations j until, when we come to civilized ll1en., who in their daily business taking into account n~any data and· conditions adjust their proceedings to various consequences, we see that the intellectual actions, becoming of the kind we call judicial, are at once very elaborate and vcry deliberate.

Observe, then, what follows respecting the relative authorities of motives. Throughout the ascent from low cl~eatures up to man, and from the lowest types of nlan up to the highest, sel£-preservation has been increased by the subordination of simple excitations to compound excitations-the subjection of ilnmediate sensations to the idea's of sensations to come-the over-ruling o£ presenta. tive feelings by representative feelings, and of represeuta tive feelings by re-representative feelings. As life has adY'~nced, the accompanying sentiency has become in~ creasingly ideal; and among feelings produced by the compounding of ideas, the highest, and those which have evolved latest, are the re-compounded or doubly ideal. Henc8 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL V1EW. 109 it follows that 3S guides, the feelings bave artthotities proportionate to the degrees in which they are removed by their complexity and their ideality from simple sensa tions and appetites. A further implication is ma~eclear by studying the intellectual sides of these mental·· processes by owhich acts are adjusted to ends.

Where they are low and silnple, these comprehend the guiding only of. ° ilnmediate . acts by immediate sti muli~the entire transaction in each case, lasting but a moment, refers only to a prOXilllate result. But with the development of intelligence and the growing ideality of the motives,the ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclu~ively immediate. The more ideal motives concern ends that are more distant; and with approach to the highest types, present ends become jncrea~ingly sub ordinate to .those future ends which the ideal motives have for their objects. Hence there arises a certain presuulptioll in favour of a motive which refers to a remote good, in comparison with one which refers to a proximate good. § 43. In the last chapter I hinted that besides the sevel'al influences there namoed as fostering the ascetic belief that doing things which are agreeable is detrimental while bearing disagreeable things is beneficial, there remained to be named an influence of deeper origin. This is shadowed forth in the foregoing paragraphs.

For the general truth that guidance hy such simplB pleasures and pains as result from fulfilling or denying bodily desires, is) under one aspect, inferior to guidance by those pleasures and pains which the complex ideal feelings yjeld) has led to the belief that the promptings of bodily desires should be disregarded. Further, the general truth that pursuit of proximate- satisfactions is, under one aspect, infeI'ior to pursuit of ultimate satisfactions, has led totha belief that proxinlate satisfactions must not be valued. In the early stages of pvery science, the generalization~ 110 THE DATA OF ETHICS. reached are not qualified enough. The discriminating state ments of the truths formulated, arise afterwards, by limitation of the undiscrinlinating statenlents. As with bodily vision, which at first appreciates only the broadest traits of objects, Rndso leads to rude classings which developed vision, inlpressible by TI1ino1" differences, has to correct; so with rnental vision in relation to general truths, it happens that at first the inductions, wrongly made all-embracing, have to wait for scepticislU and critical observation to restrict them, by takilJg account of unnoticed differences. Hence, we may expect to find the current ethical conclusions too sweeping. Let us note how, in three ways, these dominant beliefs, alike of professed moralists and of people at large, are made erroneous by lack of qualifications.

In the first place, the authority of the lower feelings as guides is by no means always inferior to the authority of the higher feelings, but iB often superior. Daily occur occasions on which sensations must be obeyed rather than sentiments. Let anyone think of sitting all night naked in a snowstorm, or going a week without food, or letting his head be held under water for ten minutes, and he will see that the pleasures and pains directly related to main tenance of life, may not be wholly subordinated to the pleasures and pains indirectly related to maintenance of life. rr'hough in many cases guidance by the simple feelings rather than by the complex feelings is injurious, in other cases guidance by the complex feelings rather than by the sinlple feelings is fatal; and throughout a wide range of cases their relative authorities as guides are inde terminate. Grant that in a man pursued, the protesting' feelings acconlpanying intense and prolonged effort, must, to preserve life, be over-ruled by the fear of his pursuers; it may yet happen that, persisting till he drops, the resulting exhaustion causes death, though, the pursuit having been abandoned, death would not otherwise have resulted. Grant tbat a widow left in poverty, TIlust deny her appetite that YHE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 11 t she may give enough food to her children to keep them alive;' yet the denial of her appetite pushed too far, may"

leave them not only entirely without food but without guardianship. Grant that, working his brain unceasingly from dawn till dark, the Ulan in pecuniary difficulties mu~ t disregard rebellious hOflily sensations in obedience to the conscient.ious desire to liquidate the claims on him.; yet he may carry this subjection .0£ simple feelings to complex feelings to the extent of shattering his health, and failing in that end which,with less of this subjection, he :night have achieved. Clearly, then, the subordination of lower feelings must be a conditional subordination. The supre macyofhigher feelings must be a qualified supremacy. In another way does the ge'heralizationordillarily made err by excess. With·· the truth that life .. is high in pro portion as the simple presentative feelings are under the control of the compound representative feelings, it joins, as though .. they.···were corollaries, certain propositions which are not corollaries. The·cnrrent"conception .is, not that the lower must yield to the higher when the two conflict, but that the lower must be disregarded even when there is no conflict. This tendency which the growth of moral ideas has generated, to condemn.o bedience to inferior feelings when superior feelings protest, has begotten a tendency to condemn inferior feelings considered intrinsically. "I really think she does things because she likes to do them," once said to me one lady concerning another: tho form of expression and the 111anner both implying the belief not only that such behaviour isvyrong', but also that everyone must recognize, it as wrong. And there prevails widely a notIon of this kind. In practice, indeed, the notion is very generally inoperative. Though it prot.npts various. incidental asce ticisms, as of those who think it alike manly and salutary to go without a great coat in cold weather, or to persevere through the winter in taking an· out .. o£-door plunge, yet, generaJIy,thepleasurahle feelings accompanying due £ulfil9 112 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ment of bodily needs, are accepted: accepta.nce being} indeed, sufficiently peremptory. But oblivious of these contradictions in their practice, men commonly betray a vague idea that there is something degrading,. or injurious, or both, in doing that which is agreeable and avoiding that which is disagreeable. "Pleasant but wrong," is a phrase frequently used in a way implying tbat the two are naturally connected. As above hinted, however) such beliefs result from a confused a.pprehension of the general truth that the more compound and representative feelings are, on the average, o£higher authoIity than the simple and presentative feel ings. Apprehended with discrimination, this truth implies that the authority of the simple, ordinarily less than that of the compound but occasionally greater, is habitually to be accepted when the compound do not oppose. In yet a third "ray is this principle of subordination n11sconceived. One of the contrasts between the earlier eV0lved £e~lings and the later-evolved feelings, is that they refer respectively to the mOl'e in1mediate effects of actions and to the more relllote effects; and speaking generally, guidance by that which is near is inferior to guidance by that which is distant. Hence has resulted the belief that, irrespective of their kinds, the pleasures of the present must be sacrificed to the pleasures of the future. We see this in the maxinl often iUlpressed on children when eating their meals) tl)at they should reserve the nicest Jnorsel till the last: the check on ilnprovident yielding to immediate impulse, being here joined with the tacit teaching tl1at the sanle gratification becolues lTIOre valuable as it becomes Inure distant. Such thinking is traceable throughout daily conduct; by no Ineans indeed in all, but in those who are distinguished as prudent and '\Tell regulated in their conduct. Hurrying over his breakfast that he may catch the train, snatching a sandwich in the middle of the day, and eating a late dinner when he is so ,vorn out that he is incapacitated for evening recreation, the man of business THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 113 pursues a life in which not only the satisfactions of bodily desires, but also those of higher tastes and feelings, are, as far as may be, disregarded, that distant ends ma,ybe achieved; and yet if you ask what are these distant ends, you find (in ca~es where there are no parental responsibilities) that they are included under the conception of more comfortable . ·\i~ing in time to come. So ingrained is this belief that it is wrong to seek immediate enjoyments and right to seek remote ones only, that you may hear from a busy man who has been on a pleasure excursion, a kind of apology for his conduct. He deprecates the unfavourable judgments of his friends by explaining that the state of his health had com pelled him to take a holiday. Nevertheless, if you sound him with respect to his future, you find that his ambition is by-and-by to retire and devote himself wholly to the relaxa tions which he is now somewhat ashamed of taking.

The general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct, sub-human and human, that for the better preser vation of life the primitive, simple, presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved, compound, and repre sentative feelings, has thus COllle,in the course of civilization, to be recognized by men; but necessarily at first in too indiscriminate a way. rhe current conception, wbile it errs by implying that the authority of the higher over the lower is unlimited, errs also by implying -that the rule of the lower must be resisted even when it does not conflict with the rule of the higher, and further errs by implying that a gratification which forms a proper aim if it is remote, forms an improper aim if it is proxirnate. ~ 44, Without explicitly saying so, we· have been here tracing the genesis of the moral consciousness. For un questionably the essential trait in the moral consciou~ness, is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings.

Among the higher '1nimals we may see, distinctly enough, L14 ~[HE DATA OF ETHICS. the conflict ot feelings and the subjection of simpler to more compound; as when a dog is restrained frout snatching food by fear of the penalties which may come if he yields to his appetite;. or as when he desists from scratch ing ata ho~.0 lest he should lose his lllaster, who has walked on. Here, however, though there is subordination, there is not conscious subordination-there is no introspection l'€Yealing the fact that one feeling has yielded to another. So is it even with human beings when little developed mentally. The pre-social man, wandering about in· families and ruled by such sensations and emotions as are caused by the circumstances of the moment, though occasionaUy subject to conflicts of motives, meets with comparatively few cases in which the advantage of postponing the immediate to tho remote is forced on his attention; nor has he the intelligence requisite for analyzing and generalizing such of these cases as occur. Only as social evolution renders the life morc cOlTIplex, the restraints many and strong, the evils of ilTIpulsiveconduct marked, and the comforts to. be gained by providing for the future tolerably certain, can there conle experiences numerous enough to make familiar the benefit ofsubordinatillg the simpler feelings to the more cOlllplex ones. Only then, too, does the:t;e arise a sufficient intel~ lectual power to nlake an induction from these experiences, followed by a sufficient massing of individual induotions into a public and traditional induction impressed on each generation as it grows up.

And here we are introduced to certain facts of profound signifioance. This oonscious relinquishment of imluediatc Rnd special good to gain distant and general goodJ while it is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called moral) is also a cardinal trait of self-restraints other than those ca1led moral-the. restraints that originate from fear of the visible ruler, of the invisible ruler, and of society at large. Whenever the individual refrains from doing that which the passing desire prompts, h~5t be should afterwardlS suffer THB PSYCHOLOGICAL VI1CW. 115 legal punishment, or div:~e vengeance, or -pUblic r~pro. batioD,or all of them, he surrenders the near . and definite pleasure rather· than risk the remote and· greater, thongb less definite, pains, which tftking it may· bring on him; and, conversely, when he undergoes some present pain, that he may .reap some probable future pleasure, political, religious, or social. But though all these four' kinds of internal control have the C()lllnOncha,racter that the simplel' and less ideal feelings are consciou~ly over-ruled by the more -complex and ideal feelings j' and though, at first, they are practically co-extensive and undistingnished; yet, in the course of social evolution they differentiate; .and, eventually, the moral· control with its accompanying .conceptions and sentiments, emerges as independent. Let us glance at the leading aspects of the process.

While, as in the rudest groups, neither political nor religious rule exists, the leading check to the immediate satisfaction of each desire as it arises, is consciousness ot the, evils· which the anger of fellow savages may entail) if satisfaction of the desire is obtained at their cost. In this early stage the imagined pains which constitute the governing motive, are those apt to be inflicted by beings of ··like nature, undistinguished in power: the political, religious, and social restraints, are as yet represented only by this mutual dread of vengeance. When special strength) skill, or courage, makes one ofthelU a leader in' hattIe, he necessarily inspires greater fear tha.n any other; and there comes to he a more decided check on such satisfactions of the desires as will .injure or offend him. Gradually as, by habitual war, chieftainship is established J the evils thought of as likely to arise from angering the chief~not· only by aggression upon him but by disobedi ..

ence to him, become distinguishable both. from the smaller evils which other· personal antagonisms cause, and from the more diffused evils thought of as arising from social l'eprobation. That is, political control begins to dif"

116 THE DA'rA OF ETHICS. ferentiate from the more indefinite control of mutual dread. Meanwhile there has been developing the ghost-theory. In all but the rudest groups, the double of a deceas~d man, propitiated at death and afterwards, is conceived as able to injure the survivors. Consequently, as fast as the ghost-theory becomes established and definite, there grows up another kind of check on immediate ~atisfaction of the desires-a check constituted by ideas of the evils which ghosts may inflict if offended; and when political lleadship gets settled, and the ghosts of dead chiefs, thought of as more powerful and more relentless than other ghosts, are especially dreaded, there begins to take shape the forn1 of restraint distinguished as reli. gious. For a long time these three' sets of restraints, with their correlative sanctions, though becoming' sepnrate in consciousness, remain co-extensive; and do so because they mostly refer to one end-success in war.

The duty of blood-revenge is insisted on even while yet nothing to be called social organization exists. As the chief gains predominance, the killing of enemies becolueR a poli tical duty; and as the anger of the dead chief comes to bo dreaded, the killing of enemies becomes a religious d.uty. Loyalty to the ruler while he lives and after he dies, is increasingly shown by holding life at hIS disposal lor purposes of war. The earliest enacted punishments are those for insubordination and for breaehes of observances which ex... press subordination-all of them militant in origin. "''''hile the divine injunctions, originally traditions of the dead king's will, mainly refer to the destruction of peoples with whom he was at enmity; and divine anger or approval are conceived as determined by the degrees in which suhjection to hinl is shown, directly by worship and indirectly by fulfilling these injunctions. The Fijian, who is said on entering the other world to commend himself by narrating his successes iu battle, and who) when alive, is described as sometimes greatly distreRsed if he thinks he has not killed enemies enough t<J THE· PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 117 please lis gods, shows us the result,ing ideas and feelings; and reminds us of kindred ideas and feelings betrayed by ancient races. To all which add that the control of social opinion, besides being directly exercised, as in the earliest stage, by praise of' the brave and blame of the cowardly, comes to be indirectly exercised with a kindred general effect by applause of loyalty to the ruler and piety to the god. So that the three differentiated forms of control which grow up along with militant organi zation and action, while enforcing kindred rebtraints and incentives, also enforce one another j and thoir separate and joint disciplines have the common character that they in...

volve the sacrifice of immediate special benefits to obtain more distant and general benefits. At th; same time there have been developing under the same three sanctions, restraints and incentives of another order, sirnilarly characterized by subordination of the proxi mate to the remote. Joint aggressions upon men outside the society, cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society. War implies cooperation; and cooperation is prevented by antagonisms among those who are to co..:operate. We saw that in the primitive un governed group, the main check on immediate satisfaction of his desires by each man, is the fear of other men's vengeance if they are injur~d by taking the satisfaction; and through early stages of social development, this dread of retaliation continues to be the chief motive to such forbearance as exists. But though long after political authority has become established the taking of per80nal satisfaction for injuries persists, the growth of political authority gradually checks it. The fact that success in war is endangered if his followers fight among themselves, forces itself on the attention of the ruler. He has a strong motive £01" restraining quarrels, and therefore for preventing the aggressiong which cause quarrels; and as his power becomes greater he forbids the aggressions and inflicts punishments for disobedience.: 118 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Presently, political restraints of this class, like those of the preceding class, are enforced by religious restraints. The sagacious chief, succeeding in war partly because he thus enforces order anlong his followers, leaves behind him (\ tradition of the conlmands he habitually gave. Dread ofhis gll(Jst tends to produce regard for these commands; and they eventually acquire sacredness. With further social evolution come, in like manner, further interdicts, checking aggressions ofless serious kinds; nntil eventually there grows up a body of civil laws. And then in the way shown, arise beliefs concerning the divine disapproval of these minor, as well as of the major, civil offences: ending, occasionally, in a set of religious injunctions harmonizing with, and en 4 forcing, the political injunctions. While sitnultaneously there develops, as before, a social sanction for these rules of internal conduct, strengthening the political and religious sanctions.

But now observe that while these three controls, political, religious, and social, severally lead men to subordinate proximate satisfactions to remote satisfactions; and while they are in this respect like the moral control, which habi tually requires the subjection· of simple presentative feelings to complex representative feelings and postponemen.t of present to future; yet they do not constitute the moral control) but are only preparatory to It-are controls within which the moral control evolves. The cornnland of the political ruler is at first obeyed, not because of its perceived rectitud.e; but simply because it is hif' comUHl.ll d, which there will be a penalty for disobeying. Th a check is llot a mental representation of the evil consequ 3nces which the forbidden act will, in the nature of things, cause; but it is a mental representation of the factitious evil eonse .. quences. Down to our own time we trace in legal phrases} the original doctrine that the aggression of one citizen on another is wrong, and will. be punished, not, so much because of the injury done him, as because of the implied "TIlE PSYCHOLOGICA.L-V'IEW. 119 disregard or the king'swill. Similarly, the sinfulness of breaking a divine injunction was universally atone time, and is still by many, held· to consist· in the disobedience to God, rather than'in the deliberate entailing of injury; and even now it is a common belief that acts are right· only if perfol'medin conscious fulfilulent of the divine will:· nay, are eV8n wrong if otherwise performed. The like holds, too, with that fut,ther control exercised by public opinion.

On listeJ?:ing to the rernarks made respecting conformity to social rules, it is noticeable that breach of them is condemned not· so much because of any essential impropriety· as becauso the world's authority is ignored. How imperfectly the truly moral control is even now differentiated fromtheso controls within which it has been evolving, we see in the fact that the systems of morality criticized at the outset, severally identify. moral control with one or other of them. For moralists of one class derive moral· rules from the com mands ofasupreme political power. Those of another class recognize no other origin for them than· the· revealed divine will. And though men who take social prescription for their guide do not formulate their doctrine, yet the belief, frequently betrayed, that conduct which society permits is not blameworthy, implies that there are those who think right and wrong can be made such by public opinion.

Before taking a further· step we must put together tho results of this analysis. Tho essential truths to be carried with us respecting these three forms of external control to which the social unit is subject, are these:-First, that they ]lave evolved with· the evolution of society, as means ~J Bocialself-preservation, necessary under the conditions; and th~t, by implication, .they are in the main congruous with one another. Second, that the correlative internal restraints generated in the social unit,. are representations of· remoto l'esults· which are incidental rather than necessary-a legal penalty, a· supernatural punishment, a social reprobation. rhird, that these results, simpler and more directlywronght l20 THE DATA OF E'l'HIC~. by personal agencies, can be more vividly conceived thtUl can the results which, in the course of things, actionR naturally entail j and.the conceptions of them are therefort' more potent over undeveloped rninds. Fourth, that as with tbe restraints thus generated is always joined the thought of external coercion, there arises the notion of obligation; which so becomes habitually associated with the surrender of immediate special benefits for the sake of distant and general benefits. Fifth, that the moral control corresponds in large measure ·with the three controls thus originating, in respect of its injunctions j and corresponds, too, in the general nature of the nlental processes producing conformity to those injunctions; but differs in their special nature.

§ 45. ]Tor now we are prepared to see that the restraintR properly distInguished as moral, are unlike these restraints out of which they evolve, and with which they are long confounded, in this-they refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions but to their intrinsic effects. The truly moral deterrent from murder, is not constituted by a representation of hanging as a consequence, or by a representation of tortures in hell as a consequence, or by a representation of the horror and hatred excited in fellow men; but by a representation of the necessary natural results-the inflic tion of death -agony on the victim, the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to hiR belongings. Neither the thought of imprisonment, nor of divine anger, nor of social disgrace, is that which constitutes the D;l.oral check on theft j but the thought of injury to tho person robbed, joined with a vague consciousness of tlH.l general evils caused by disregard of proprietary rights.

Those who reprobate the adulterer on moral grounds, have their luindsfilled, not with ideas of an action for damages, or of future punishment following the breach of a com ~ mandment, or of loss of reputation; but they are occupied with ideas or unhappiness entailed on the aggrieved wife 01' THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 12] husband, the damaged lives of children, and the diffused mischiefs which go along with disregard of the marriage tie. Conversely, the man who is moved by a moral feeling to help another in difficulty, does not picture to himself any reward here or hereafter j but pictures only the better condition he is trying to bring about. One who is morally. prompted to fight against a social evil, has neither material benefit nor popular applause before his mind; but only the mis chiefs he seeks to remove and the increased well-being which will follow their removal. Throughout, then, the moral motive differs from the motives it is associated with in this, that instead of being constituted. by representations of incidental, collateral, non-necessary consequences of acts, it is constituted by representations of consequences which the acts naturally produce. These representations are not all distinct, though some of such are usually present; lrlt they form an assemblage of indistinct representations accumulated by experience of the results of like acts in the life of the individual, superposed on a still more indistinct but voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects 0f such experiences in progenitors: forming a feeling that is at once massive and vague .

.And now we see why the 1l}oral feelings and corre lative restraints have arisen later than the feelings and restraints that originate froln political, religious, and social authorities; and have so slowly, and even yet so inco.m pletely, disentangled themselves. For only by these lower feelings and restraints could be maintained the conditions nnder which the higher feelings and restraints evolve. It it' thus alike with the self-regarding feelings and with the other-regarding feeling-so The pains which improvidence will bring, and the pleasures to be gained by· storing up things for future use and by labouring to get such things, can be habitually contrasted in thought, only as fast as settled social arrangements make accumulation possible; and that there may arise such settled arrangements, fear o£ 122 THE DATA OD' ETHICS. the seen ruler, of the unseen ruler, and of public opinion..

must come into play. Only after political, religious, and social restraints have produced a stable community, can there be sufficient experience of the pains, positive and negative, sensational and emotional, which crin1es of aggres .. slon .cause, as to generate that moral aversion to them constituted by consciousness of their intrinsically evil results. And more manifest still is it that such a moral ~entiment as that of abstract equity, which is offended not only by material injuries done to Inen but also by political arrangements that place them at a disadvantage, can evolve only after the social stage reached gives familiar experience both of the pains flowing directly fronl injustices and also of those flowing indirectly from the class-privileges which make injustices eaRJ. That the feelings called moral have the na.ture and origin alleged, is further shown by the fact that we assoc~ate the name with them in proportion to the degree in which they have these characters-'-firstly of being re-representative; secondly of being concerned with indirect rat4er than with direct effects, and generally with remote rather than imme diate; and thirdly of referring to effects that are mostly general rather than special. Thus, though we condemn one man for extravagance and approve the economy shown by another man, we do not class their acts as respectively vicious and virtuous: these words are too strong: the present and future results here differ too little in concreteness and ideality to nlake the words fully applicable. Suppose, however, that the extrav8gance necessarily brings distress on wife and children-brings pains diffused over the lives of others as well as of self, and the viciousness of the extravaganee becomes clear. Suppose, further, that prompted by the wish to relieve his family from the misery he has brought Oll them, the spendthrift forges a bill or corl1mits some other fraud. Though, estimated apart, we characterize his over ruling" emotion as moral, and make allowance for him in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 123 consideration of it, yet his action taken as a whole we condemn as immoral: we regard as of superior authority, the feelings which respond to men~s proprietary claims feelings which are re-rApresentative in a higher degroe and refer po more remote diffused consequences. The djfference, habitually recognized". between the relative elevations of justice and generosity, well illustrates this truth. The motive causing a gen.8rous act has reference to e££ectso£ a more concrete, special, andproxi ..

mate kind, than has the motive to do justice; which, beyond the proximate effects, usually thelnselves less concrete than those that generosity contetnplates, includes a consciousness of the distant,· involved, diffused effects of maintaining equitable relations. And. justice we hold to be higher. generosity. Comprehension. of this long argument will be aided by here quoting a further passage from the before-named letter to Mr. Mill, following the passage already quoted from it. c; To make any· position fully understood, it seems needful to add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral .. Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral intuitions are the results of accull).ulated experiences of Utility, gradually· organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of c~onscious experience. Just in the same way that. I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developednervous organizationg ---just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and cOUlpleteby personal experiences, has practically become a form. of thought, apparently quite independent of experience ; so do I believe that the ex· periences of· utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, h&ve been producing corresponding··nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us. certain ia.cult~es ofmora,l intuition-certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.

I also hold that just as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them; 80 win moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them." rrothis) in passing, I will ~dd only that < the evolution ..

L24 THE DATA OF ETHICS. hJrpothesis thus enables us to reconcile opposed moral theories, as it enables us to reconcile opposed theories of knowledge. For as the doctrine of innate forms of intellectual intuition falls into harmony with the ex perjeritial doctrine, when we recognize the production of intellectual f.aculties by inheritance of effects wrought by experience; so the doctri.ne of innate powers of moral per ception becomes congruous with the utilitarian doctrine, when it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of pleasurable and painful experiences in progenitors. § 46. One further question has to be answered-How does there arise the feeling of moral obIigation in general? Whence comes the sentiment of duty, considered as distinct from the several sentiments which pro1l1pt temperance, providence, kindness, justice, tl'uthfulness, &c.? The answer is that it is an abstract sentin1ent generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated.

The idea of each colour had originally entire concreteness given to it by an object possessing the coloo.r; as some of the unmodified names, such as orange and violet, show us. The dissociation of each colour from the object specially associated with it in thought at the outset, went on as fast as the colour came to be associated in thought with objects unlike the first, and unlike one another. The idea of orange was conceived in the abstract more fully in proportion as the various orange-coloured objects remembered, cancelled one another's diverse attributes, and left outstanding their com mon attribute. So is it if we ascend a stage and note how there arises the abstract idea of colour apart from particular colours. Were all things red the conception of colour in the abstract could not exist. Imagine that every object was either red or green, and it is manifest that the Inental habit would be to think of one or other of these two colours in connexion with wnything named. But multiply THE PSYCHOLOGICA.L VIEW. 125 theculours so that thought ranlbles undecidedly among the iieas of them that occur along with any object named, and there results the notion of indeterminate colour -the COillU10U property which objects possess of affecting us by light from their surfaces, as well as by their forms. FOl' evidently the notion of this common property is that which remains constant while imagination is picturing every pos sible variety of colour. It is the uniform trait in all coloured things; that iscolour in the abstract. Words referring to quantity furnish cases of more marked dis sociation of abstract from concrete. Grouping various things as sUlan in cornparison either with those of their kind or with those of other kinds; and similarly grouping some objects as comparatively great; we get the opposite abstract notio"ns of smallnnssand greatness. Applied as these are to innumerable very diverse things -not objects only, but forces, times, numbers, values,-they have become so little connected with concretes, that their abstract meanings are very vague. Further, we must note that an abstract idea thus formed often acquires an illusive independence; as we may perceive in the case of motion, which, dissociated in thought from all particular bodies and velocities and directions, is sOtIletimes referred to as though it could be conceived apart from something rnoving. Now all this holds of the subjective as well as of the objective; and among other states of con sci0usness, holds of the emotions fl,S known by introspection.

By the grouping of those re-representative feelings above described, which, differing among themselves in other respects 'have '3J component in cornn10n; and by the con sequent mutual cancelling of their diverse components ;this COUlmon component is lllade relatively appreciable, and becomes an a1?stract feeling. Thus is produced the senti ment of moral obligation or duty. Let us observe its genesis. We have seen tha~ during the progr~ss of animate existence" the later-evQlved, more compound and more re..

126 THE D~\.TA OF ETHICS. presentative feelings, serving to adjust the conduct to morc; distant and general needs, have all along had an authoL·ity as guides superior to that of the earlier and simpler feelings -excluding cases in which these last are intense. This superior authority, unrecognizable by lower types of croatures which cannot generalize, and little recogl1iz~ble by primitive men, who have, but feeble powers of generalizatiolJ, has become distinctly recognized as civilization and aCCOln· panying mental developnlent have gone on. Accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that guidanco by feelings which refer to remote and general results, is usually lllore conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately gratified. For what is the common character of the feelings that prompt honesty, truthfulness, diligence, providence, &c., which men habitually find to be betterp1'onlpters than the appetites and simple im pulses? They are all complex, re-representative feelings, occupied with the future rather than the present. The idea of authoritativeness has therefore come to be connected with feelings having these traits: the implication being that the lower and simpler feelings are without authority. And this idea of authoritativEness is one element in the abstract con sciousness of duty.

But there is another element-the element of coercive ness. This originates from experience of those several forms of restraint that have, as above described, established thelTIselves in the course of civilization-the political, re ligious, and social. To the effects of punishments iuflicteil by law and public opinion on conduct of certain kinds, J)r. Hain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation. And I agree with him to the extent of thinking that by thelu is generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word obligation indicates. The existence of an earlier and deeper element, gene .. rated as above described, is however, I think, implied by t,be fact that certain of the. higher self-regarding THEPSYCHOLOGTCAL VIEW. 127 Feelings, instigating prudence and· economy, havo 0, moral authority in opposition to the simpIer self~regarding feelings: showing that apart from any thought of factitious penalties on improvidence, the feeling constituted by representation of the natural penalties has acquired anacknowledgec1 superiority. But accepting in the main the view that fears of the political and social penalties (to which, I think, the religious must be added) have .generated that· sense of coercivene<ss which goes along with the thought of post poning present to future and personal desires to the claims of others, it here chiefly concerns us to note that this sense of coerciveness becon~es indirectly connected with the feelingsdist.inguished as moraL For since the political, religious, and social restraining motives, are mainly formed of represented future results; and sinee the moral restraining moti ve is mainly formed of represented future results; it - happens that the representations, having much in common, and being often aroused at the same time, the Jear joined with three sets of them becomes, by association, joined with the fourth. 'rhinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act,excites a dread which continues present while the in tl"insiceffects of the act are thought of; and being thus linked with these· intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion. Emerging as the moral motive does but slowly from amidst the political, religious, and social motives, it long participates in that consciousness of sub ordination to some external agency which is joined with them; and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this aSRociated consciousness-only then docs the feeling of obligation fade.

This remark inlplies the tacit conclusion, which· will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obli. gation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases~ Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. Even now· progress towards the implied uhhllate state is traceable. The observation is uCit 10 128 THE DATA OF ETJTrCS. infreqnent that persistence in performing a duty ends in lTIaking it a pleasnre j and this amounts to the adlnission that while at first the motive contains an element of coercion} at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perfol'lTIit. The contrast between the youth on whom diIi.. gence is enjoined, and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he cannot be induced to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it ought to be done, nuty eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation comes to be reversed j and the man of business persists in ,york from pure love of it when told that he ought not.

Nor is it thus with self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting of wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified by these actions, with out any thought of ?nust j and that the fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing occupation without any coercive feeling of ought; are obvious truths which show us that even now, with some of the fundament111 other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has retreated into the background of the mind. And it is in sorne degree so with other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscien tiousness has in many outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there to be found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social compulsion, when he discharges an equitable claim on him; but he is without thought of sel£-compulsjon. He does the right thing with a sinlple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it.

Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is ex pressed by the word obligation, will disappear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL. VIEW. 129 will be as much ma,tters or course as are those lower actions which the siluple llesiresprompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do tho sensations. And though, joined with their regulating in .. fluence when this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which nonconformity would bring; these will occupy the mind no more than do ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied hy a nleal. § 47. This elaborate expositIon, which the extreme com~· plexity ot the 8ubject has necessitated, may have its leading ideasre-stated thus :Symbolizing by a and b, related phenomena in the envi ronment, which in some way concern the welfare of tho organism; and symbolizing by cand d, the impressions, simple or cotnpound, which the organism receives fron1 the one, and tlJe motions, single or combined, by which its acts are adapted to meet the other; we saw that psycho'logy in general is concerned with the connexion between the relation a b and the relation c d. Further, we saw that by impli cation the psychological aspect of Ethics, is that aspect under which the adjustment of c d to a, b, appear,,:, not as an intellectual coordination simply, but as a coordination in which pleasures and pains are alike factors and results.

It was shown that throughout Evolution,' motive a.nd act become more complex, as the adaptation of inner related actions to outer related actions ext~ds in range and variety. Whence followed the corollary that the later-evolved feelings) more representative and' re-repre sentative in their constitution, and rt>£erring to remoter and wider needs, have, on the average, an authority as guides greater than have the earlier and sirnpler feelings. After thus observing that even an inferior creature is ruled by a hierarchy of feelings so constituted that general I 130 THE DATA 0]1 ETHICS. welfare depends on a certaln Sil bordination of lower to higher, we saw that in man, as he passes into the social state, 'there arises the need for sundry additional subordina tions of lower to higher: cooperation being made possible only by them. To the restraints constituted by mental representations of the intrinsic effects of actions, which, in their simpler forms, hav~ been evolving from thB beginning, are added the restraints caused by mental repre sentntions of ext,rinslc effects, in the shape of political) religious, and social penalties.

With the evolution of s~)Ciety, ulade possible by institu tions maintaining order, a~nd associating in men's minds the sense of obligation "7ith prescribed acts and with desistances fronl forbidden acts, there arose opportunities for seeing the bad consequences naturally flowing from the conduct interdicted and the good consequences froIL the conduct required. Hence eventnaUy grew up rnoral aversions and approvals: experience of the intrinsic effects necessaril)T here coming later than experience of the eAtrinsio effects, and therefore producing its results later. The thoughts and feelings constituting theBe mora) aversions and approvals, being aU along closely connected with the thoughts and feelings constituting fears of· political, religious, and social penal ties, necessarily came to participate in the accompanying sense of obligation., The coercive element in the consciousness of duties at large, evolved by converse with external agencies which enforce duties, diffused itself by association through that consciousness orduty, pro perly called III oral, which is occupied with intrinsic results instead of extrinsic results.

But this self-compulsion, whiclLat a relatively-high stage becomes more and more a snbstitute for conlpulsion from without) must itself) at a still higher stflge, practically dis appear. If some action to which the spcc:al motive is insufficient, is performed in obedience to the feeling of moral obligation, the fact proves that the special taculty conTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 131 cerned is llO~ yet equal to its function-has not acquired such strength that the required activity has become its norma] activity, yielding its due amount of pleasure. With complete evolution then, the senseo£ obligation, not ordinarily present in consciousness, will be awakened only on those extra ordinary occftsions that prompt breach of the laws otherwise spontaneously conformed to. And this brings us to the psychological aspect of that conclusion which, in the last chapter, was reached under its biological aspect. The pleasures and pains which the mora] sentiments originate, Will, like bodily pleasures and pains, become incentives and deterrents 80 adjusted in their strengths to the needs, that the moral conduct will he the natnrttl conduct.