XIII. Trial and Compromise

OHAPTER XIII. THIAL AND COMPROMISE. § 82. In the foregoing two chapters the case on bebalf of Egoism and the case on behalf of Altruism have been stated. The two conflict; and we have now to consider what verdict ought to be given. If the opposed statements are severally valid, or even if each of them is valid in part, the inference must be that pure egoism and pure altruisul are both illegitimate. If the maxim-" Live for self," is wrong, so also is the maxirn "Live for others." Henoe a compromise is the only possibility. This conclusion, though already seeming unavoidable, I do not here set down as proved. The purpose of this chapter is to justify it in full; and I enunciate it at the outset because the arguments used will be better understood, if ( the conclusion to which they converge is in the reader's view. How shall we so conduct the discussion as most clearly to bring out this necessity for a comprolnise ? Perhaps the best way will be that of stating one of the two claims in its extreme form, and observing the implied absurdities.

To deal thus with the principle of pure selfishness, would be to waste space. Everyone sees that an unchecked satisfaction of personal desires from moment to moment, in absolute disregard of all other beings, would cause universal conflict and soc;ial dissolution. The principle of pnre unsel.

220 THE DATA OF ETHICS. fishness, less obviously mischievous, may therefore better be chosen. There are two aspects under which the doctrine that others' happiness is the true ethical aim presents itself. The" others'" may be conceived personally, as individuals with whom we sta.nd in direct relations; or they may be conceived impersonally, as constituting the c01umunity. In so far as the self-abnegation implied by pure altruism is concerned, it matters not in which sense" others" is used. But criticisln will be facilitated by distinguishing between these two forms of it. We will take the last form first. ~ 83. This commits us to an exalnination of "the greatest happiness principle," as enunciated by Benthaln and his followers. The doctrine that "·the general happiness" ought to be the object of pursuit, is not, indeed, overtly iden tified with pure altruism. But as, if general happiness is the proper end of action, the individual actor must regard his own share of it simply as a unit in the aggregate, no more to be valued by him than any other unit, it results that since this unit is almost infinitesimal in comparison with the aggregate, his action, if directed exclusively to achievement of general happiness, is, if not absolutely altruistic, as nearly so as may be. Hence the theory which makes general happiness the iUlnlediate object of pursuit, may rightly be taken as one form of the pure altruism to be here criticized.

Both as justifying this interpretation and as furnishing a definite proposition with which to deal, let me set )ut hy quoting a passage from Mr, Mill's Ut'iUtaTian·isrn. U The Greatest-Happiness Principle," he says, "is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum) 'everybody to C0unt for one, nobody for more than one,' :might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary" (p. 91.) Now though the meaning of "greatest happiness" as au TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 221 end,ishere to a certain degree defined, the need for further definition is felt the moment we attempt to decide on ways of regulating conduct so as to attain the end. The first question which arises is-J\tfust we regard this" greatest happiness principle" as a principle of guidance' for the cOlnmunity in its corporate capacity, or as a principle ot guidance for its members separately considered, or both?

It the reply is that the principle must be taken as a guide for governnlental action rather than for individual action, we are at once met by the inquiry,-What is to be the guide for individual action? If individual action is not to be regulated solely for the purpose of achieving" the greatest happiness of the greatest number," some other principle of regulation for individual action is required j' and "the greatest happiness principle" fails to furnish the . needful ethical standard. Should' it be rejoined that the individual in his capacity of political unit, is to take further ance of general happiness as his end, giving his vote or otherwise acting on the legislature with a view to this end, and Fhat in so far· guidance is supplied to him, there· comes the further inquiry---Whenceis to come guidance for the remainder of individual conduct, c'onstituting by far the greater part of it? If this private part of individual conduct is not to have general happiness as its direct aim, then an ethical standard other than that offered has still to be found.

Hence, unless pure altruism as thus formulated confesses its inadequacy, it must justify itself as a sufficient rule £01" all conduct, individual and' social. We will first deal with it as the alleged right principle of public policy; and then as the alleged right principle of private. action. § 84.. On trying to understand precisely the statement that when taking general happiness as an end, the rule must be-" every body to count for one} nobody for more than one.." there arises the idea of distribution. We can form 22a THE DATA OF ETHICS. no idea of distribution without thinking of something distributed and recipients of this something. That we may clearly conceive the proposition we must clearly conceive both these elements of it. Let us take first th~ loecipients. (( Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one." Does thie mean that, in respect of whatever is portioned out, each is to have the sanle share whatever his character, whatever his conduct? Shall he if passive have as much as if active? Shall he if useless have as much as if useful?

Shall he if criminal have as much as if virtuous? If the distribution is to be made without reference to the natures and deeds of the recipients, then it must be shown that a system which equalizes, as far as it can, the treatment of good and bad, will be beneficial. If the distribution is not to be indiscriminate, then the formula disappears. The some· thing distributed must be apportioned otherwise than by equal division. There must be adjustment of amounts to deserts; and we are left in the dark as to the mode of adjust,ment-we have to find other guidance. Let us next ask what is the something to be distributed- ? The first idea which occurs is that happiness itself must be divided out among all. Taken literally, the notions that the greatest happiness should be the end sought, and that in apportioning it everybody should count for one and nobody for more than one, imply that happiness is something that can be cut up into parts and handed round. This, however, is an impossible interpretation. But after recognizing the impossibility of it, there returns the question-What is it ill respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one?

Shall the interpretation be that the concrete means to happiness are to be equally divided? Is it intended that there shall be distributed to aU in equal portions the necessaries of life, theappliallces to comfort, the facilities for amuse ment? As a conception simply, this is more defensible.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 223 But passillgover the question of policy-passing over the question whether greatest happiness would ultimately .he secured by such a process (which it obviously would not) it turns out on examination that greatest happiness could not even proxirnately be so secured. Differences of age., br growth, of constitutional need, differences of activity antI consequent expenditure, differences of desires and tastes, would entail the inevitable result that the material aids to happiness which each received would be .more or less un adapted to his requirements. Even if purchasing power were equally divided, the greatest happiness would not be achieved if everybody counted for one and nobody for more than one; since, as the capacities for utilizIng the purchased means to happiness would vary both with the constitution and the stage of life, the means which would approximately suffice to satisfy the wants of one would be extrerr1ely insufficient to satisfy the wants of another, and so the greatest total of hAppiness would not be obtained: means might be unequally apportioned in a way that would produce a gi'eater total.

But now if happiness itself cannot be cut up and dist~ibuted equally, and if equal division of the material . aids to happiness would not produce greatest happiness, what is the thing .to be thus apportioned ?-what is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one? There seems but a single possibility. There remain to be equally distributed nothing but the conditions under which each may pursue happiness. The ·limitations to action-the degrees of freedom and restraint. shall be alike for alL Each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others; and one as much as another shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts, carried on within these limits, obtain. But to say that in respect of these conditions everybody shall count for one and nobody for more than one, is simply to say that equity shall be enforced. 16 224 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Thus, considered as a principle of public policy, Bentham'e principle, when analyzed, transforms itself into the principle he slights. Not general happiness becomes the ethical standard by which legislative action is to be guided, but universal justice. And so the altruistic theory under this form collapses. § 85. From examining the doctrine that general happines8 should be the end of public action, we pass now to examine the doctrine that it should be the end of private action. It is contended that from the standpoint of pure reason, the happiness of others has no less a claim as an object of pursuit for each than personal happiness. Considered as parts of a total, happiness felt by self and like happiness felt by another, are of equal values; and hence it is inferred that, rationally estilnated, the obligation to expend effort for others' benefit, is as great as the obligation to expend effort for one's own benefit. Holding that the utilitarian system of morals, rightly understood, harmonizes with the Christian maxim-" Love your neighbour as yourself," ]\tIr. Mill says that '4 as between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianisrIl requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." (p. 24) Let us consider the alternative interpretations which may be given to this statement.

Suppose, first, that a certain quantum of happiness has in some way become available, without the special instrllmen t1lity of A, B, C, or D, constituting the group concerned. Then the proposition is that each shall be ready to have this qnantum of happiness as much enjoyed by one or more of the others as by himself. The disinterested and benevolent spectator would clearly, in such a case, rule that no one ought to have more of the happiness than another. But here, assuming as we do that the quantU111 of happiness has become available without the agency of any among the group, simple equ'ity dictates as much. :N'0 one having in any way establi8hed a claim different from.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 225 the claims or others, their claims are equal; and due regard for justice by each will not permit him to monopolize thtl happiness. Now suppose a different case. Suppose that the quantum of happiness has been made available by the· efforts of one member of the group. Suppose that A has acquired by labour some material aid to happiness. He decides to act as the disinterested and benevolent spectator would direct. What will he decide ?-what. would the spectator direct? Let us consider the possible suppositions; taking first the least reasonable. The spectator may be conceived as deciding that the labour expended by A in acquiring this material aid to happiness, originates no claim to special use of it; but that it ought to be given to B, 0, or D, or that it ought to be divided equally among B, 0, and D, or that it ought to be divided equally arnong all members of the group, including A who has laboured for it. And if the spec tator is con0eived as deciding thus to-day, he mnst be con ceived as deciding thus day after d~y; with the result that one of the group expends all the effort, getting either none of the benefit or only his nUlnerical share, while the others get their shares of the benefit without expending any efforts.

That A might conceive the disinterested and benevolent spectator to decide in this way, and might feel bound to act in conformity with the imagined decision, is a strong supposition; and probably it will be admitted that such kind of impartiality, so far from being conducive to thr general happiness) would quickly be fatal to everyone. But this is not all. Action in pursuance of such a decision would in reality be negatived by the very principle· enun ciated. For not only A, but also B, C, and D, have to act on this principle. Each of them must behave as he con ceives an impartial spectator would decide. Does B con ceive the impartial spectator as awarding to him, B, the product or. A's labour? Then the a.3sun1ption is that R ' 226 THE nATA OF ETHICS. conceives the impartial spectator as favouring himself, B,. 1110re than A conceives him as favouring hil11sel£, A; which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Does B, in con ceiving the impartial spectator, exclude h1s own interests as ('cnnpletely as A does? Then how can he decide so much to his own advantage, so partially, as to anow.him to take from A an equal share of the benefit gained by A's labour, towards which he and the rest have done nothing?

Passing rrom this conceivable, though not credible, deci sion of the spectator, here noted for the purpose of observ ing that habitual confornlity to it would be impossible,there remains to be considered the decision which a spectator really impartial would. give. 1-Ie would say that the happi ness, or material aid to happiness, which had been purchased by A's labour, was to be taken by A. He would say that B, 0, and D had no claims to it, but only to such happi .. ness, or aids to happiness, as their respective labours had purchased. Consequently, A, ncting as the imaginary iln.. partial spectator would direct, is, by this test, justified in appropriating such happineBs or aid to happiness as his own efforts have achieved. ." And so under its special form as under its general form, the principle is true only in so rar as it embodies a dis guised justice. Analysis again brings out the result that making "general happines~3" the end of action, really meanf!1 1naintaining what we call equitable relations among indi.

viduals. Decline to accept in its vague Iorm "the gl'eatest happiness principle," and insist on knowing what is the im plied conduct, public or private, and it turns out that the principle is meaningless save as indirectly asserting that the claims of each should be duly regarded by all. The utilitarian altruism becomes a duly qualified egoism. § 86. Another point of view from which to judge tIle altruistic theory may now be taken. If, assuu1il1g the proper object of pur~uit to be general happiness, we proceed TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 227 rationally, we must ask in what d~fferent ways the aggregate, general happiness, may be composed; an:d must then· ask what composition of it will yield the largest sum. Suppose that each citizen pursuet) illi:l own happiness independently, not to the detriment o! others but without active concern for others; .then ttrlh united happinesses constitute a cert.ain SUill-a certain general happiness. Now suppose that each, instead of m&l.dng his own happiness the object of pursuit, makes the happiness of others the object of pursuit j then, again, there results a certain sum of happiness. This sum must. be less than, or equal to, or greater than, the first. If it is admitted that this sum is either less than the first or only equal ~h it, the altruistic course of action is confessedly eithfJf lyOrSe than, or no better than, the egoistic. rrhe assumptJQn must be that the sum of happiness obtained is greater. Let us observe what is involved in this assumption.

If each pursues exclusively the happiness of others; and jf each is also a recipient of happiness (which he must he, for otherwise no aggregate happine!4s can be forlned out of their individual happinesses); then the implication is that each gains the happiness due to altruistic action exclusively; and that in each this is greater in amount than the egoistic happiness obtainable by him, if he devoted himself to pursuit of it. Leaving out of consideration. for a moment these relative amounts of the two, let us note the conditions to the receipt of altruistic happiness by each. The syulpathetic nature gets pleasure by giving pleasure; and the proposition is that if the general happiness is the object of pursnit} each will be made' happy by witnessing others' happiness. Bn t what in such case constitutes the happiness of others? These others are also, by the hypothesis, pursuers and receivers of .altruistic pleasure. The genesis of altruistic pleaBure in each is to depend on the display of pleasures by others; wh ieh is again to depend on the display of plc:asures by others j and so on perpetually. Where) then) i~ _thepleasur(j) 228 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

to begin? Obviously there must be egoistic pleasu!" some where, before there can be the altruistic pleasure caused by synlpathy with it. Obviously, therefore, each must be egoistic in due amount, even if only with the view of giving others the possibility of being altruistic. So far from the sun} of happiness being made greater if all make greatest happiness the ex.clusive end, the SUIll disappears entirely. How absurd is the supposition that the happiness of all can be achieved withou~ each pursuing his own happiness, will be best shown by a physical simile. Suppose a cluster of bodies, each of which generates heat; and each of which is, therefore, while a radiator ,of heat to those around, also a receiver of heat from then1. Manifestly each will have a certain proper heat irrespective of that which it gains from the rest; and, each will have a certain heat gained from the rest irrespective of its proper heat. What will happen r So long as each of the bodies continues to be a generator of heat, each continues to maintain a temperature partly derived from itself and partly derived from others. But if each ceases to generate heat for itself and depends on the heat radiated to it by the rest, the entire cluster becomes cold. Well, the self-generated heat stands for egoistic pleasure; the heat radiated and received stands for sympathetic pleasure; and the disappearance of all heat if each ceases to be an originator of it) corresponds to the disappearance of all pleasure if each ceases to originate it egoistically.

A further conclusion may be drawn. Besides the im plication that before altruistic pleasure can exist, egoistic pleasure must exist, and that if the rule of conduct is to be the same for all, each lllUSt be egoistic in due degree; there is the implication that, to achieve the greatest sum of happiness, each must be more egoistic than altruistic. For} speaking generally, sympathetic pleasures mnst ever con tinue less intense than the pleasures with which there is sympathy. Other things equal, ideal feelings cannot be as vivid as real feelings. It is true that those having strong TRIAI:i ,AND COM.PROMISE. 229 imaginations may, especially in cases where the affections are engaged, feel the moral pain if not the physical pain of another, as keenly as the actual sufferer of it, and may participate with like intensity in another's plea sure: sometimes even mentally representing the received pleasure as greater than it really is, and so getting reflex pleasure greater' than the recipients' direct pleasure.

Such cases, however, and cases in whiuh even apart from exaltation of sympathy caused by attachment, there is a body of feeling sympathetically aroused equal in amount to the original feeling, ·if not greater, are necessarily excep tional. For in such cases the total consciousness includes many other elements besides the mentally-represented pleasure or pain -notably the luxury of pity and the luxury of goodness; and; genesis of these can occur but occasion ally: they could not be habitual concomitants of sympathetic pleasures if all pursued these from moment to moment. In estimating the possible totality of sympathetic pleasures, we must include nothing beyond the representations of the pleasures others exp81~ience. And unless it be assert'3d that we can have other's states of consciousness perpetually reproduced in us more vividly than the kindred states of consciousness are aroused in ourselves by their proper personal causes, it must be admitted that the totality of altruistic pleasures cannot become equal to the totality of egoistic pleasures. Hence, beyond the truth that before there can be altruistic pleasures there must be the egoistic pleasures from sympathy with which the~r. arise, there is the truth that, to obtain the greatest sum of altruistic pleasures: there must be a greater sum of egoistic pleasures.

§ 87. That pure altruism is suicidal may he yet other wise demonstrated. A .perfectly moral law must be one which becomes perfectly practicable as human nature be comes perfect. If its practicableness decreases as hu man 230 THE DATA OF ETHICS. nature improves; and if an ideal human nature neces· sitates its impractioability; it cannot be the moral law sought. Now opportuniti8s for practising altruism are numerous and great in proportion as there is weakness, or incapacity, or imperfection. If we pass beyond the limits of the family, in which a sphere for self-sacrificing activities must be pre .. ~erved as long as offspring have to be reared; and if we ask how there can continue a social sphere for self-sacrificing activities; it becomes obvious that the continued existence of serious evils) caused by prevalent defects -of nature, is implied. As fast as men adapt thernselves to the require ments of social life, so fast will the demands for efforts on their behalf diminish. And with arrival at finished adaptation, when all persons are at once completely self-con served and completely able to fulfil the obligations which society imposes on them, those occasions for postponement of self to others which pure altruism contemplates, disappear.

Such sel£-sacrifices become, indeed, doubly impracticable. Carrying on successfully their several lives, men not only can not yield to those around the opportunities £01" giving aid, bGt aid cannot ordinarily be given them without interfering with their normal activities, and so diminishing their pleasures. Like every inferior creature, led by its innate desires spontaneously to do all that its life requires, man, when completely moulded to the social state, must have desires so adjusted to his needs that he fulfils the needs in gratifying the desires. And if his desires are severally gratified by the performance of req aired acts, none of these can be performed for him without balking his desires. Acceptance from others of the results of their activities can take place only on condition of relinquishing the pleasures derived from his own activities. .Dinlinution rather than increase of happiness would result, could 3.1truistic action in su.ch case be enforced.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 231 And here, indeed, we are introduced to another baseles~~ assumption which the theory makes. § 88. The postulate of utilitarianism as formulated in the statements above quoted, and of. pure altruism as otherwise expressed, involves the belief that it is possible for hil,ppiness, or the means to happiness, or the conditions to happiness, to be transferred. .Without any specified limita tion the proposition taken for granted is, that happiness in general admits of .detachment from one and attachment to another-that surrender to any· extent is possible by one and appropriation to any extent is possible by another . . But a moment's thought shows this to be far from the truth. On the one hand, surrender carried to a certain point is extremely mischievous and to a further point fatal; and on the other hand, much of the happiness each enjoys is self generated and can neither be given nor received.

To assume that egoistic pleasures may be relinquished to any extent, is to fall into one of those many errOl'S of ethical speculation which result from ignoring the truths of biology. When taking the biological view of ethics we saw t.hat plea sures accompany normal amounts of functions, while pains accompany defects or excesses of. functions; further, that complete life depends on cOlllplete discharge of functions, ftnd therefore on receipt of the correlativepleaRures. Hence, to yield up normal pleasures is to yield up so much life; and there arises the question-to what extent may this be done? If he is to continue living, the indiVIdual must take certain nmounts of those pleasures which go along with fnlfilLnent of the bodily functions, and ?nust avoid the pains which entire non-fulfilment of them entails. Completeabnegation means death; excessive abnegation means illness; abnega tionlessexcessive means physical degradation and consequent loss of power to fulfil obligations,personal and other.

When, therefore, we attempt to spc. c~alize the proposal to live not for s91£-satisfaction but for the satisfaction of others, we 232 THE DATA OF ETHICS. lneet with the difficulty that beyond a certain limit this cannot be done. And when we have decided what decrease of bodily welfare, caused by sacrifice of pleasures and acceptance of pains, it is proper for the individual to make. there is forced aLl us the fact that the portion of happiness, or means to happiness, which it is possible for him to yield up for redistribution, is a limited portion. Even more rigorous on another side is the restriction put upon the transfer of happiness, or the means to happiness. The pleasures gained by efficient action-by successful pursuit of ends, cannot by any process be parted with, and cannot in any way be appropriated by another. The habit of arguing about general happiness sometimes as though it were a concrete product to be portioned out, and sometilnes as though it were co-extensive with the use of those material aius to pleasure which may be given and received, has caused inattention to the truth that the pleasures of achieve ment are not transferable. Alike in the boy who has won :l, game of marbles, the athlete who has performed a feat, the statesman who has gained a party triumph, the inventor who has devised a new machine, the Inan of science who has discovered a truth, the novelist who has well delineated a character, the poet who has finely rendered an en10tion, we see pleasures which must, in the nature of things, be enjoyed exclusively by those to whom they come. And if we look at all such occupations as luen are not inlpelled to by their necessities-if we contemplate the various ambitions which play so lalge a part in life; we are reminded that so long as the consciousness of efficiency remains· a dominant pleasure, there will remain a dominant pleasure ,vhich cannot be pursued altruistically but must be pursu{ld egoistically.

Cutting off, then, at the one end, those pleasures which 111'e inseparable from maintenance of the physique in an uninjured state; and cutting off at the other end the pleasures of successful action j the amount that remains is so TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 233 _ greatly diminishod, as to make untenable the assumption that ha,ppiness at large admits of distribution after the manner which utilitarianism assumes. § 89. In yet one more way may be shown the inconsistency of this transfigured utilitarianism which regards its doctrine as embodying the Christian maxirn-" Love your neigh bour as yourself," and of that altruislll which, going still further,: enunciates the maxirn-" Live for others." A right ru Ie of conduct must be one which may with advantage be adopted by all. "Act accordin g to that nlaxim only, which you can wish, at the saIne time, to become a universal law," says Kant. And clearly, passing over needful qualifications of this maxim, we m'1Y accept it to the extent of admitting that a mode of action which becomes impracticable as it approaches universality, must be wrong. Hence, if the theory of pure altruism, implying that effort should be expended for the benefit of others and not for personal henefit, is defensible, it must be shown that it will produce good results when acted upon by all. Mark the consequences if all are purely altruistic.

First, an impossible combination of moral attributes is implied. Each is supposed by the hypothesis to regard self AO little and others so much, that he willingly sacri fices his own pleasure~ to give pleasures to them. But if this is a universal trait, and if action is universally con gruous with it, we have to conceive each as being not only a sacrificeI' but also one who accepts sacrifices. While he i8 so unselfish as willingly to yield up the benefit for which he has laboured, he is so selfish as willingly to let others yield up to him the benefits they have laboured for. 'ro make pure 'altruism possible for all, each must be at once· extremely un egoistic and extremely egoistic. A-s a giver, he must have no thought for self; as a receiver, no thought for others. Evidently, this impl1es an inconceivable mental constitution. The sympathy which is so solicitous for others THE DATA OF ET HIes.

as willingly to injure self in benefiting them, cannot at the same time be so regardless of others as to accept benefits which they injure themselves in giving. The incongruities that emerge if we assume pure altruism to be universally practised, may be otherwise exhibited thus. Suppose that each, instead of enjoying such pleasurns as come to him, or such consumable appliances to pleasure as he has 'worked for, or such occasions for pleasure as reward his efforts, relinquishes these to a single other, or 3dds them toa common stock from which others benefit; what will result? Different answers Inay be given according as we assume that there are, or are not, additional influences brought into play. Suppose there are no additional influences. Then, if each transfers to another his happiness, or means to happiness, or occasions for happiness, while sonle one else does the like to him, the distribution of happiness is, on the average, unchanged; or if each adds to a common stock his happiness, or means to happiness, or occasions fot' happiness, from which COllInon stock each appropriates his portion, the average state is still, as before, unchanged.

The only obvious effect is that transactions must be gone through in the redistribution; and loss of tin1e and labonr Inust result. Now suppose some additional influence which makes the process beneficial; what must it be? The totality can· be increased only if the acts of transfer increase the quantity of that which is transferred. The happiness, or that which brings it, must be greater to one who derives it from another's efforts, than it would have been had his own efforts procured it; or otherwise, sup.' posing a fund of happiness, or of that which brings itJ has been formed by contributions from each, then each, in appropriating his share, must find it larger than it wonld have been had no such aggregation and dispersion taken place. To justify belief in such increase two conceivable assumptions may be made. One is that though the sum of plea~nres, or of pleasure~yielding things, relnalns the same TRIAL, AND COMPROMISE. 335 yet the kind of pleasure, or of pleasure-yielding things, which each receives in' exchange. from another, or from the aggre gate of others) is one which he appreciates more than that for which he laboured. Butta assume this is to assume tlUtt each labours directly for the thing which he enjoys less, ['~ther than for the th~ng w1.J.ich he enjoys more, which is nb3urd. The othel" asslunption is that while the exchanged or redistributed pleasure of· the egoistic kind, remains the same in amount for each, there is added to it the altruistic pleasure accompanying the exchange. But this assumption is clearly inadmissible if, as is implied, the transaction is universa!-is one through which each' becomes giver and 'feceiver to equal extents. For if the transfer of pleasures, or of pleasure-yielding things, from one to another or others, is always accompanied by the consciousness that there will he received from him or them an equivalent; there results merely a tacit exchange, either direct or roundabout. Each beC0111eS altruistic in no greater degree than is implied by being equitable; and each, having nothing to exalt his happiness, sympathetically or otherwise, cannot be a source of syn1pathetic happiness to others.

§ 90.. Thus, when the Ineanings of its words are inquired into, or when the necessary implications of its theory are exatuined, pure altruism, in whatever form expl'essed, conlmits its adherents to various absurdities. If "the greatest happiness of the greatest num ber," or in other words, "the general happiness," is the proper end of action, then not only for all public action but for all private action, it must be the end; because, otherwiso, the greater part of action remains unguided. Consider its fitness for each. If corporate action is to be guided by the principle, with its interpreting comment-" every body to count for one, nobody for more than one" there must be an ignoring of all differences of character and conduct, ,merits and_ demerits, among citizens, since 236 THE DATA OF ETHICS. no discrimination is provided for; and nloreover, since that in respect of which all are to count alike cannot be happiness itself, which is indistributable, and since equal sharing of the concrete means to happiness, besides failing ultimately would fail proximately to produce the gr6atsst happiness; it results that equal distribution of the conditions under which happiness may be pursued is the only tenable Illeaning: we discover in the principle nothing but a round ...

about insistance on equity. If, taking happiness at large as the allll of private action, the individual is required to judge between his own happiness and that of others 'as an impar tial spectator would do, we see that no supposition concern ing the spectator save one which suicidally ascribes partiality to hiln, can bring out any other result than that each shall enjoy such happiness, or appropriate such means to happi ness, as his own efforts gain: equity is again the sole content. When, adopting another lnethod, we consider how the greatest sum of happiness may be composed, and, recognizing the fact that equitable egoism win produce a cer·tain sum, ask how pure altruism is to produce a greater sum; we are shown that if all, exclusively pursuing altruistic pleasures, are so to produce a greater snm of pleasures, the implication is that altruistic pleasures, which arise fron1 sympathy, can exist in the absence of egoistic plea sures with which there may be synlpathy-an impossibility; and another implication is that if, the necessity for egoistic pleasures being admitted, it 1S said that the greatest sum of happiness will be attained if all individuals are n10r8 altruistic than egoistic, it is indirectly said that as a genera truth, representative feelings are stronger than presentative feelings-another impossibility. Again, the doctrine of pu re al truism assumes that happiness ll1ay be to any extent transferred or redistributed; whereas the fact is that plea sures of one order cannot be transferred in large ll1easure without results which are fatal or extremely injurious, and that pleasures of another order cannot be transferred in any '!'RIAL AND .COMPROMISE. 231 degree. Further, pure altruism presents this fatal anomaly; that while a right principle of action must be more and more practised as men improve, the altruistic principle becomes less and less practicable as men approach an ideal form, because the sphere £01' practising it continually de e.r\3ases. Finally, its self-destructiveness is made manifest on observing that for all to adopt it as a principle o£ action, which they must do if it is a sound principle, implies that all are at once extremely unegoistic and extremely egoistic-ready to injure self for others' benefit, and ready to accept benefit at the cost of injury to others: traits which cannot coexist.

The need for a compromise between egoism and altruism is <thus made conspicuous. We are forced to recognize the claims which his own well-being has on the attention of each by noting how, in some directions we come to a deadlock, in others to contradictions, and. in others to disastrous results, if they are ignored. Conversely, it is undeniable that disregard of others by each, carried to a great extent is fatal to society, and carried to a still greater extent is fatal to the family, and eventually to the race. Egoism and altruisnl are therefore co-essential. t 91. What form is the compromise between egoism and altruism to assume? how are their respective claims to be satisfied in due degrees? It is a truth insisted on by moralists and recognized in common life, that the achievement of individual happiness is not proportionate to the degree in which individual happiness is made the object of direct pursuit; but there has not yet· become current the belief that, in like manner, tho achievement of general happiness is not proportionate to the degree in which general happiness is made the object of direct pursuit. Yet failure of direct pursuit ill the last case Is more reasonably to be expected than in the first.

When discussing the relations of means and e~dsJ we saw 238 THE DATA OF ETHICS. that as individual conduct evolves, its principle becomes more and more that of making fulfilment of means the proximate end, and leaving the ultimate end, welfare or happiness, to come as a result. And we saw that when general welfare or happiness is the ultimate end, the saIne principle holds even more rigorously; since the ultima t~ end under its ilnpersonal form, is less determinate than under its personal form, and the diffieulties in the way of achieving it by direct pursuit still greater. Recognizing, then, the fact that corporate happiness still more than individual happiness, must be pursued not directly but indirectly, the first question for us is-What must be the general nature of the means through which it is to be achieved. It is admitted that self-happiness is, in a measure, to be obtained by furthering the happiness of others. May it not be true that, conversely, general h1ppiness is to be obtained by furthering self-happiness? If the well-being of each unit is to be reached partly through his care for the well-being of the aggregate, is not the well-being of the aggregate to be reached partly through the· care of each unit £01' himself? Clearly, our conclusion must be that general happiness is to be achieved lnainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happinesses by individuals; while, reciprocally, the happinesses of individuals are to be achieved in part by their pursuit of the general happiness.

And this is the conclusion embodied in the progressing ideas and usages of mankind. This compronlise between egoism and altruism has been slowly establi::;hing itself; and towards recognition of its propriety, men's actual beliefs, as distinguished from their nominal beliefs, have been gradually approaching. Soeial evolution bas been bringing about a state in which the claims of the individual to the proceeds of his activities, and to such satisfactions as they bring, a:ce more and UlOre positively asserted; at the same time that insi:3tance on others' claims, and habituaJ 'JRIALAND COMPROMISE. 239 respect for them, have been increasing. Among the rudest savages personal interests are very vaguely distinguished from the int.erests of others. In early stages of civiliza tion, the proportioning of benefits to efforts is extremely rude: slaves and serfs get for work, arbitrary amounts of food and shelter: exchange 'being infrequent, there is little to develop the idea of equivalence. But as civilization advances and status passes into contract, there comes daily experience of the relation between advantages enjoyed and labour given: the industrial system maintaining, through supply and demand, a due adjustment of the one to the other. And this growth of voluntary cooperation-this exchange of services under 3greement, has been necessarily accompanied by decrease of aggressions one upon another, ,and increase of syn1pathy: leading to exchange of services beyond agreement. That is to say,· the more distinct asser tions of individual claims and more rigorous apportionin~ of peraonal enjoyments to efforts expended, has gone hand in hand with growth of that negative altruism shown in equitable conduct and that positive altruism shown in gratuitous aid.

A higher phase of this double change has in our own times becomes conspi~uous. If, on the one hand, we note the struggles for political freedom, the contests between labour and capital, the judicial reforms made to facilitate enforcement of rights, we see that the tendency still is towards complete appropriation by each of whatever benefits are dne to hiul,and consequent exclusion of his fellovvs £r()m such benefits. On the other hand, if 'we consider what is meant by the surrender' of power to the ma,sses, the abolition of class-privileges, the efforts to diffuse know le(lge, the agitations to spread temperance, the multitudinous philanthropic societies; it becomes clear that regard for the well-being of others is increasing pari paS8U with the taking of means to secure personal well-being. What hoM.s of the relations within each society holds to 17 240 THE DATA OF ETHICS. some extent, if to a less extent, of the relations between societies. Though to maintain national claims, real or imaginary, often of a trivial kind, the civilized still make war on one another; yet their several nationalities are more respected than in past ages. Though by victors portions of territory are taken and money compensations exacted; yet conquest is not now, as of old, habitually followed by entire appropriation of territories and enslavement of peoples.

The individualities of societies are in a larger measure preserved. Meanwhile the altruistic intercourse is greater: aid is rendered 011 occasions of disaster by flood, by fire, by famine, or otherwise. And in international arbitration as lately exemplified, implying the recognition of claims by one nation upon another, we see a further progress in this wider altruism. Doubtless there is mueh to be said by way of set~off; for in the dealings of the civilized with the un. civilized, little of this progress can be traced. It may be urged that the primitive rule-a Life for li£e," has been developed by us into the rule-" For one life many lives," as in the cases of Bishop Patteson and Mr. Birch; but t.hen there is the qualifying fact that we do not torture our prisoners or mutilate them. If it be said' that as the Hebrews thought themselves warranted in seizing the lands God promised to them, and in some cases exterminating the inhabitants, so 'we, to fulfil the "manifest intention of Providence," dispossess inferior races whenever we want their territories; it may be replied that we do not kill many 1110re than seems needful, and tolerate the existence of those who subnlit. And should anyone point out that as Attila, while conquering or destroying peoples and nations, regarded himself as "the scourge of God," punishing mon for their sins, so we, as represented by a High Commis sioner and a priest he quotes, think ourselves called on to chastise with rifles and cannon, heathens who practise poly gamy; there is the rejoinder that not even the most ferocious disciple of the teacher of mercy would carry his vengeance TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 241 eo far as. to depopulate whole territories and erase scores of cities. And when, on the other' hand, we renlember that there is an Aborigines Protection Society, that there are Commissioners in certain colonies appointed to protect native interests, and that in some cases the lands of natives have been purchased in ways which, however unfair, have implied some recognition of their claims; we may say that little as the compromise between egoism and altruism hae progressed in international affaire, it 118,5 still progressed somewhat in the direction indicated.