Part V. The Ethics of Social Life

The mental action by "vhich 'froln fnoment to mOlnent we thus, in ways commonly too rapid to observe,class the objects and acts around, and regulate our conduct accord ingly, has been otherwise named by SOl11,e; and especially by Prof. Bain, " discrimination." Intelligence is,'in its every act, carried on by discrimination; and has advanced from its lowest stages to its highest by increasing powers of discrimi(263) 264 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. nation. It has done this for the sufficient reason that during the evolution of life under all its forms, increase of it has been furthered by practice or habit as well as by survival of the fittest; since good discrimination has been a n1eans of saving life, a:ld lack of it a cause of losing life. Let us note a few marked stages of its increase. Look out towards the sky ; shut your eyes; and pass your hand before thelu. You can discriminate between the presence and absence of an opaque object in front.

If, being passive, an object is moved before your closed eyes by some one else, you cannot say whether it is a hand, or a book, or a lump of earth; and cannot say whether it is a sTnall object close to, or a larger object farther off. This experience exemplifieH to us the smallest degree of 'visnal discrirnination, such as that ,vhich is achieved by 10'" creatures possessing nothing more than eye-specks minute portions of sensitive pigment in which light pro duces SOlne kind of change. Evidently a creature having only this nascent vision is at great disadvantage-cannot distinguish hetween the obscuration caused by the moving frond of a weed in the water it inhabits, and the obscura tion caused by a passing creature; cannot tell whether it results from a small creature near at hand or a larger one .at a distance; cannot tell whether this creature is harm less and may serve for prey or is predacious and must be avoided. Thus one of the appliances for Inaintaining life is deficient, and early loss of life is apt to occur.

Passing over all intermediate grades, observe next the re sults of presence or absence among herbivorous creatures of the power to discriminate between plants of different kinds and qualities. By appearance, or odour, or taste, one animal is warned off frOln a poisonous herb, which another anin1al, less keenly perceptive, eats and dies. As intelligence develops, complex groups of attributes are separated in consciousness from other complex groups to which they are in many respects similar, and survival KINDS OF ALTRUISM. 265 results from the discrimination; as when the fatal Monks hood is distinguished from the harmless Larkspur. As we rise to creatures of relatively great intelligence" increasingly-complicated clusters of attributes, relations and actions have to be distinguished from one another, UD der heavy penalties. Instance the ordinary case in which the shape and colour and movements of a distant animal . are nlentally united into a perception of an enemy, or else are discriminated as forming some not unlike perception of a harmless animal: the result being now a successful flight and now a successful chase.

§ 388. A much higher degree of discrhnination is reached in creatures capable of appreciating the differences not only between objects perceived or presented, but also between objects conceived or represented - between the imaginations of them. The degree of Inental power re quired for this is occasionally shown in small measure by the higher animals; as when a dog recognizes in. idea the difference in length between a road that goes round the angle of a field and a short cut across the field, and takes the last. But generally it is only among men that the ability to discrilninate between irnagined clusters of things and properties and relations becolnes appreciable. Even among Inen the discriminations often fail in consequence .either of inaccuracy of such observations as have been Inade, or of imperfect ability to reproduce in thought the things observed. The contrast between Monkshood and Larkspur may serve again. Able as they are, when these two plants ftre before thenl, to see that though the two are similar in their sizes, modes of growth, deeply.:cut leaves, colours· of flowers, &c., yet the structures of their flowers are unlike, the majority of people, even those having gar dens, cannot .so compare their ideas of these plants as to 'be able to say what the points of difference are.

If, then, between their imaginations of objects of but 266 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. moderate degrees 6£ complexity, most ordinarily - disci plined rninds fail to discriminate, still more will they fail to discriminate where the clusters of related attributes and properties and actions are itnmeasurably involved. Especially will they fail if, while lnany of. the components are coexistent, many ~f them are sequent; and if, too, the groups of ideas which have to be distinguished from one another, include not only forms, colours, motions, sounds, and the feelings implied in those who nlake them; but include both the immediate effects wrought by a par ticular kind of action and the effects to be hereafter wrought by it. When the combinations of thoughts which must be simultaneously kept in mind reach these degrees of involution, the ability to discriminate either from the other, 'which is like it in many respects but differs in sonle essential respect, fails even in many highly-cultured minds. Let us take instances.

Here is a geornetrical problern-say, how to erect a per pendicular at the end of a straight line. Following the established routine, an ordinary teacher either shovvs his pupil ,how to solve this problenl or tells hinl 'what he nlust do to solve it: the result being that the perpendicular is drawn as directed, and the pupil, not much interested in the proceeding, thenceforth knov,Ts how to draw it. Here is another teacher who, disapproving of this mechanical culture, adopts a different nlethod. Ilis pupil having been initiated through simpler problems, severally solved by his persevering efforts, takes to the new problenl with zest; and, trying various .experiments, in no very long time succeeds. In doing this he receives a relatively strong impression, due partly to the strained attention required, and partly to the pleasurable excitement of success. At the same time he acquires increased aptitude and increased courage; enabling him to deal by and by with more complex problems. Here, then, are tw'O clusters of actions and acquisitions and feelings, which are in KINDS OF ALTRUISM.

sundry respects alike. The problem is the same, the method of solution is the same, the knowledge acquired is the same; and the mechanical teacher, recognizing nothing more, does not discriminate between the two clusters of Inen tal actions, and thinks it just as well to teach by instruction as by discovery. Of more cOlnplex cases, one is furnished by a recent in cident-the case .of the Eastbourne salvationists. lVlost of the townspeople object to their processions headed by noisy bands; while these boisterous Christians say that they are simply. maintaining .that religious liberty which all now admit. But here comes the lack of discrimina tion. It is forgotten that while, in the interests of religious liberty, each citizen or group of citizens may rightly per form ceremonies ancillary. to his belief; in the interests of general liberty, individual citizens or groups of theIn, nlay rightly resist intrusions upon that peaceful course of life they are pursuing. There is inability to separate in thought those assertions of religious freedom which do not involve aggressions on otherss, from those which do involve aggres sions on others, in the forIn of· nuisances. And not only do these fanatics fail· to distinguish between religious' liberty and religious licence, but even our legislators (if we suppose thenl to be acting sincerely instead of seeking votes) also fail.

One more instance furnished· by the politics of the day may be added-the failure, alike by legislators and people, to discriIninate between the effects of Inoral injunctions on those having natures with which they are congruous,and their effects on those having natures with which they are incongruous. Here is a set of precepts, printed, read, ex 'plained, elnphasized; and here are children's minds with .their clusters of ideas, powers of understanding, and groups of feelings. The prevalent assumption is that since certain effects result where there is intellectual apprehension of these precepts plu8 resp.onsive sentiInents, like effects "rill result 268 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. where there is the saIne intellectual apprehension 1ninu8 the responsi ve sentiments. People think it needs only to teach children what is right and they will do w.hat is right! They expect that by education-nay, even by mere .acquisition of a kno'wledge which is not related to conduct-they ,vill di minish crime!

Discrilnination, then, characterizing intelligence from its lowest to its highest forIns, is certain to be still very incom plete where the things to be discriminated are not visible ob jects and actions, but are mental representations of complex aggregates of things and actions and feelings, and causes and effects; part of them belonging to the passing time, and part of them to the time coming. After observing the stretch of irnagination required for proper recognition of differences in this wide and obscure field, we may feel certain that alike in Sociology and in Ethics, failures to discriminate must be many and disastrous. § 389. But why this long psychological disquisition? The answer is foreshadowed in the title of the chapter Kinds of Altruisrn. That altruistic conduct has divisions which must be distinguished is obviously implied. That the conceptions of these respective divisions, made up of represented things, acts, relations, and results, present and future, are among those complex things which are difficult to part from one another, has been above shown by analogy.

That only those who are at once observant, critical, and have great powers of Inental representation, can adequately make the discriminations, is a further inlplication. And that grave evils result from the prevalent inability is a corollary . .As distinguished from egoistic actions, altruistic actions include all those ,vhich either negatively by self-restraint, or positively by efforts for their benefit, conduce to the 'welfare of fello\v-men: they include both justice and benefi cence. As we have seen in the last part, the first of these KINDS OF ALTRUISM. 269 great divisions of altruism irnplies a sympathetic recogni tion of. others' claims to free activity and the products of free activity; while the other great division implies a sym pathetic recognition of others' claims to receive aid in the obtainment of these products, and in the more effectual carrying on of their IiYes. In § 54 I pointed out that the highest form of life, individual and social, is not achievable under a reign of justice only; but that there nlust be joined with it a reign of beneficence. Here is a part of the argu ment:"A society is conceivable formed of men leading perfectly inoffen5ive lives, scrupulously fulfilling their contracts, and efficiently rearing their offspring, who yet, yielding to one another no advantages beyond those agreed upon, fall short of that highest degree of life which the gratu itous rendering of services makes possible. Daily experiences prove that everyone would suffer many evils and lose many goods, did none give him unpaid assistance. The life of each would be more or less damaged had he to meet all contingencies single-handed. Further, if no one did for his fellows anything more than was required by strict performance of contract, private interests would suffer from the ab sence of attention to public interests. The limit of evolution of con duct is consequently not reached, until, beyond· avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others, there are spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others."

Throughout the past there has been slo,vly growing into clearness the distinction· between these two primary divi sions of altruisnl. But though justice and generosity have in recent days come to be fairly well discriminated, the changes now going on are .confusing them again. The universal dissolution .by which the old order of things is being abolished while a new order is being established, is bringing with it a dissolution of old conceptions: many of thenlwrong but some of them right. Among the last is this distinction between justice and beneficence. On the one side the Dlany, eagerly expecting good, and on the other side the few, anxious to do good to theIn, agree in practically disregarding the line of demarcation between things which are to be claimed as rights and things which are to be accepted a~ benefactions; and 'while the division 270 THE ETHIOS OF SOOIAL LIFE. between the two is being obliterated, there is ceasing to be any separation rnade between means appropriate to the one and means appropriate to the other. Hot-headed philan thropy, impatient of criticisnl, is, by helter-skelter legisla tion, destroying normal connections between conduct and consequence; so that presently, when the replacing of jus tice by generosity has led to a redistribution of benefits irre spective of deserts, there ~Till be reached a state having for its motto the words :-It shall be as well Jor you to be in ferior as to be superior.

§ 390. The two great divisions of altruisln, Justice and Beneficence, are to be discrirninated as the one needful for social equilibrium, and therefore of public concern, and the other as not needful for social equilibriuln, and therefore only of private concern. Observe why the two must be kept separate. 'Ve have seen that justice in its prin10rdial £OrlTI, as seen throughout the anilnal kingdolll at large, r€;quires that each creature shall take the consequences of its own conduct; and among all ungregarious creatures this law operates with out any qualification. Along with gregariousness, especially 'when it reaches the degree 'which the human race exhibits, there arises a further requirement. While, as before, the relation between con duct and consequence has to be so maintained that actions shall be restrained by experience of results, actions have to be further restrained by the necessity· of so limiting thelll that the interference of each citizen with others shall not be greater than is implied by the associated state.

But, as shown in the above quotation, before life, indi vidual and social, can reach their highest forms, there must be fulfilled the secondary law, that besides exchange of ser vices under agreelnent there shall be a rendering of services beyond agreement. The requirements of equity must be supplelnented by the promptings of kindness.

KINDS OF ALTRUISM. 271 And here we come upon the truth ahove hinted, and now to be emphasized, that the primary law of a llar 111onious social co-operation nlay not be· broken .for the fulfilment of the secondary law; and that· therefore, ,vhileenforcement of justice must be a public function, the exercise of beneficence must be a private :func tion. A Inoment's thought will make this iInplication Inanifest. Beneficence exercised by a society in its corporate capacity, Inust consist in taking away from some persons parts of the prodncts of their activities, to give to other persons, whose activities have not brought them a suffi ciency. If it doe§ this by force it interferes ·with the normal relation between conduct and consequence, alike in those froID wholn property is taken and in those to whonl property is given. Justice, as defined in the fore going pages, is infringed upon. The principle o:fhar monious social co-operation is disregarded; and the disregard and infrtngement, if carried far, must bring disasters. There are three, which we may contemplate separately.

§ 391. If, that the inferior may have benefits which they have .not earned, there are taken from the superior benefits which they· have earned, it is luanifest that when this process is carried to the extent of·equalizing the positions of the two, there ceases to be any moti ve ~o be superior. Long before any such extreme is reached, there must re~ suIt an increasing discouragement of the industrious, who see the surplus products of their industry carried away; and there nlust result among these better citizens an intensi fying dissatisfaction, tending ever towards revolution. There . must be a decline towards an unprosperous state and an un stable state. . A further result must be a slow degeneracy, hodily and mental. If, by an indiscriIninate philanthropy, means of 272 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. subsistence are forcibly taken from the better for the im proved lllaintenance of the worse, the better, most of whom have means already insufficient for the good nurture of offspring, must have those means made still further defi cient; while the offspring of the worse Inust, to a like ex tent, be artificially fostered. An average deterioration must be caused.

An equally disastrous, or still more disastrous, effect remains to be named. The policy, if persistently pursued, leads on to communism and anarchism. If society in its corporate capacity undertakes beneficence as a function if, now in this direction and now in that, the inferior learn by precept enforced by example, that it is a State-duty not simply to secure them the unhindered pursuit of happiness but to furnish them with the lneans to happi ness; there is eventually formed alnong the poorer, and especially among the least deserving, a fixed belief that if they are not corufortable the government is to blame. Not to their own idleness and lnisdeeds is their misery ascribed, but to the badness of society in not doing its duty to thenl. What follows ~ First there grows up among nUlnbers, the theory that social arrangements IllUst be fundamentally· changed in such ways that all shall have equal shares of the products of labour-that differences of reward due to differences of merit shall be abolished: there comes comnlunism. And then among the very worst, angered that their vile lives have not brought them all the good things they want, there grows up the doctrine that society should be destroyed, and that each man should seize ,vhat he likes and "suppress," as Ravachol said, everyone who stands in his way. There comes anarchism and a return to the unrestrained struggle for life, as among brutes.

Such then are the ultimate results of not discrirninating between justice and beneficence, and between tne instrumen talities proper for carrying on the two.

KINDS OF ALTRUISM. 273 § 392. But no,,, we come to a question, no doubt existing unshaped in the luinds of many, the right answer to which clears up, in another ,yay, the prevailing con fusion. Let me put this question in the form lllost favourable to those whose illusions I a1l1 seeking to dis sipate. " You say that justice in its priInordial form requires that each creature shall receive the results of its own nature and consequent conduct. Of hUlnan justice, how ever, you say that ,vhile, as before, it demands that actions shall bring their natural consequences, the actions which do this must be limited to such as do not interfere "dth the similarly-limited actions of others. Obviously the result is that while, under the reign of brute-justice, each individual takes advantage of his powers, to the extent of injuring or destroying not only prey but also competitors, under the reign of human justice he may not do this-he is forbidden to injure conlpetitors. What. happens?

Being protected by the incorporated society, the inferior members are enabled to carryon their activities and reap all the benefits; which they could not have done had the superior used their superiorities without-control. ~Iay it not be~ then, that under the reign of human justice raised to a higher form,- the inferior, thus partially saved from the results of their inferiority, shall be still further saved fronl theIn-shall not only be equalized with the superior by pre serving for theIn their spheres of activity, but shall also be equalized with them in respect of the benefits they obtain within their spheres of activity ~" Doubtless, as I have elsewhere admitted, it seems, from one point of view, unjust that the inferior should be left to suffer the evils of their inferiority, for V\7 hich they are not responsible. Nature, ,vhich everywhere carries on the struggle for life with unqualified severity, so as even to prolllpt the generalization-" the la"w of murder is the law of growth," cares not for the claims of the weaker, even to 274 THE ETHIOS OF SOOIAL LIFE.

the extent of securing them fair-play; and if it be adrnittec that this severity of Nature nlay, among associated men, rightly be ITlitigated by artificially securing fair-play to the inferior, why ought it not to be further mitigated by saving them from all those evils of inferiority ,vhich may be arti ficially removed ~ Here we reach the place of divergence. Here we see the need for discrimination among complex conceptions. 1-1ere we see how important is recognition of the difference between justice and beneficence, and consequent difference . bet\veen the instrumentalities appropriate to the two. For with the adlnission that that ferocious discipline of brnte justice which issues in survival of the fittest, has, in socie ties of men, to be much qualified, not only by ,vhat we dis tinguish as human justice, but also by what we distinguish as beneficence, there Inust go the assertion that while the first may rightly be enforced, the second must be left to voluntary action. Denial that the second as ·well as the first should be attended to by the State, by no ITleanS involves denial that the second should be attended to; but l1lerely iInplies that it should be otherwise attended to. It is ad mitted that the evils caused by inferiority should be Initi gated in both ways; but it is asserted that while Initigations of the one kind should be public and general, those of the other kind should be private and special. For, as we have seen, the primary law of harmonious co-operation may not be broken for the purpose of fulfilling the secondary la\V ; since, if it is so broken to any great extent, profound miB chiefs result.

§ 393. For the discrimination thus demanded by a due regard for social stability, social prosperity, and social health, yet a further reason mnst here be urged. Only by Inaintaining this discrilnination can the reciprocal bene fits of beneficence, "blessing him that gives and him that takes," be preserved. When any of the evils which their KINDS OF ALTRUISM. 275 inefficiencies or other defects bring on the inferior, are di minished by aid which some of the superior voluntarily furnish, these are made better by the exercise of their fel low-feeling; but if, to mitigate them, funds are taken by force ·from the superior, none of this moralization results: often a demoralization-an excitement of ill-feeling. Not only, as the poet says, " the quality of mercy is not strained," but also the quality of beneficence in general. If it is strained it ceases to be beneficence. At the same time. there is a corresponding difference between the effects produced on the beneficiaries. Kindly acts spontaneously done, usually excite in them enlotions of gratitude and attachment; and a cOlnmunity containing beneficiaries thus related to benefactors, is one in which not only are the feelings of the lower favourably exer cised as wen as those of the higher, but one in which there is thereby produced an increased coherence and stability.

§ 394. Having, too elaborately perhaps, discriminated be tween the primary altruism we call justice and the secondary altruism· we call beneficence, and emphasized the need for the discrimination, we may now deal with the different kinds of beneficence. Let us first group these under certain sub divisions. There comes first the species of benefic.ent conduct which is characterized by passivity in deed or word, at times when egoistic advantage or pleasure might be gained by action. J\!Iany forIns of self-restraint, not commonly regarded as ethically enjoined, ought nevertheless to be so regarded; and have here to be pointed out and emphasized. These, which we have first to consider, fall under the general title-Nega tive Beneficence. After them there come to be dealt with those kinds of actions alone recognized in the ordinary conception of beneficence, but which are here distinguished as Positive56 . .

276 THJ1J ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. Beneficence. Under this head are cOlnprised all actions which imply sacrifice of something actually or potentially possessed, that another or others may be benefited sacrifice, it may be, of strength which would otherwise be econoITlized,sacrifice of the product of efforts actually obtained, or of the forthcoming product of efforts Inade in the past. In all these there is a proximate loss of pleasure or Ineans to pleasure; though there n1ay be an immediate or remote compensation in sympathetic pleasure. To con1plete preliminaries it needs to add that there is a cross-classification by which both of these groups have to be divided. The most conspicuous, though not the most familiar, kinds of beneficent actions, positive and negative, are those shown towards individuals who are inferior, or un fortunate, or both. But there are also beneficent actions, usually small but very numerous, which benefit those who are neither inferior nor unfortunate-actions ","hich further the gratifications of persons around, and raise the tide of happiness in all.

In treating these divisions and sub-divisions of beneficence in the order here indicated, we shall have to consider three sets of effects produced :-1, the reactive effects upon the benefactor, upon his dependents, and upon all who have claims on him; 2, the immediate effects on the. benefi ciary, as conducive to increase of his pleasure or diminution of his pain, and the remote effects as conducive to one or other change of character; and 3, the effects upon society at large, as influencing its stability, its immediate prosperity, and its remote prosperity.