XI. The United Nations Conspiracy

XI. The United Nations Conspiracy LE American people and Congress supported the United Nations, more hopefully than realistically, as an organization that would strive, by means of collective action, to maintain international peace and security. They. never suspected that the U.N. was the principal instrument of a gigantic conspiracy to control both the foreign and domestic policies of the United States, subvert the Constitution, and establish a totalitarian society. Washington revolutionists sought to vest direct control of American foreign policy in the U.N., which could be used by the Soviet Union and its satellites and the so-called "have not" countries to gang up on the United States. They planned to control American domestic policy indirectly through the U.N. and its specialized agencies, by means of "full employment" measures, trade concessions, and foreign aid which would ne cessitate excessive spending and taxing levels and gradually strangle free enterprise. Finally, the conspirators hoped to strengthen their control of American internal affairs by means of U.N. treaties, which could destroy the Bill of Rights and reduce Congress to the impotence of the German Reichstag under Hitler or the Supreme Soviet in Communist Russia.

Such a grandiose design for revolution seems fantastic, but the scope and purpose of the conspiracy are clearly shown by the official records of Congressional committees, the State De partment, the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Some of the plans of the revolutionists have been frustrated. But their ma jor objective-to tax the American people and spend their money on a scale undreamed of before World War II-has 180 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION been achieved, paradoxically, in the name of resistance to com munism. Alger Hiss, the State Department traitor, was the busiest of all the United Nations planners. According to the State De partment publication, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, he was active in planning work as early as the summer of 1942. He was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, at which the preliminary draft of the U.N. Charter was approved, and he was secretary general of the San Fran cisco conference, which completed the Charter. He was Presi dent Roosevelt's advisor on U.N. affairs at the Yalta confer ence. As head of the Office of Special Political Affairs (later U.N. Affairs) he organized the American delegation to the San Francisco conference and the conference itself. Later he helped organize and staff the American mission to the U.N. and the secretariat of the U.N. itself.

Postwar foreign policy preparations also included planning in such political and economic fields as relief and reconstruc tion, occupation policies for Germany and Japan, currency stabilization, and international trade. Primarily concerned in these discussions, besides the State Department, were the Treasury Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later Foreign Economic Administration), and the War Production Board (later Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion). All four agencies were infiltrated by Communists at policy making levels. In the State Department, besides Hiss, there were Laurence Duggan, head of the Latin American Division; Noel Field, close friend of Duggan and a highly placed member of the West European Division, and Henry Julian Wadleigh, in the Trade Agreements Section. Hede Massing identified Duggan and Field as members of her Soviet espionage apparatus. Dug gan was killed by a fall from a window of his New York office and Field disappeared behind the Iron Curtain during the Hiss case. Wadleigh was working for a Soviet spy ring and so testi fied in the Hiss trials. When former Governor (now Senator) Lehman of New York became head of the State Department's THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 181 Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, in 1943, David Weintraub moved over from the War Production Board to be Lehman's chief of studies and reports. Weintraub, who later went with Lehman to the U.N. Relief and Rehabilita tion Agency, and still later to the U.N. itself, was identified in sworn testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcom mittee as a Communist. Before the war he had been director of the National Research Project of the WPA, which the Com munists used as a convenient cover and meal ticket for their secret operatives.1 He was eased out of the Economics Depart ment of the U.N. in 1953.

TheFEA deputy administrator was Lauchlin Currie, who also was an administrative assistant to President Roosevelt. Currie was identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a memoer of a Soviet underground apparatus directed by her during the war. Frank Coe and Michael Greenberg, also identified by Miss Bentley as collaborators in the Kremlin's service, were FEA officials.Coe later became secretary of the International Mone tary Fund, and was fired in 1953 when he refused to say under oath whether he was a Communist. Irving Kaplan, who had been deputy to Weintraub in the National Research Project and later went with him to the U.N., was in the FEA. Unlike Weintraub, who denied that he was a Communist, Kaplan re fused to testify, invoking the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Still another FEA official was Max Lowen thal, a left-wing friend of Harry Truman who wrote a com munist-line book attacking the· FBI. Lowenthal denied under oath that he was a Communist. Some Communists refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to say whether they knew Lowenthal.

Victor Perlo, identified by Miss Bentley as the head of one Soviet apparatus under her direction, was an officialof the War Production Board. Harry Magdoff, Edward Fitzgerald and William Remington,also identifiedby Miss Bentley as mem bers of the Soviet underground, were other WPB officials.After the war, Remington was convicted of perjury in denying his 1. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Report, August 24, 1953.

182 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION Communist connections. Robert R. Nathan was head of the planning staff of the WPB and later became deputy director for reconversion of the OWMR. Nathan, although never iden tified as a Communist, was and is an extreme leftist. On leav ing the government, he represented the CIO as a consulting economist. The No. 1 Communist in the Treasury Department was Harry D. White, who became Assistant Secretary. Both White and Harold Glasser, another Treasury Department official, were members of Miss Bentley's Kremlin service and both were busily engaged in postwar planning. Another Communist in the Treasury Department was Kaplan, who came over from the FEA. The State Department report declares that in May, 1942, White became chairman of a committee to formulate plans for an international monetary fund and a world bank for recon struction and development. The report states that White "was primarily responsible for the Treasury's work in this field."

Hiss, White, Currie, Wadleigh, Glasser, Coe and Duggan, all identified in sworn testimony by competent witnesses as Communists, are mentioned repeatedly in the State Depart ment's book on postwar planning as members of committees and subcommittees on economic and political problems. Also frequently mentioned is Dean Acheson, then an Assistant Sec retary of State. Adolf A. Berle Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Un-Ameri can Activities on August 30, 1948, that Acheson headed a "pro-Russian" group in the department "with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant." Still another postwar planner frequently mentioned in the State Department publication is Paul Apple by, then assistant director of the Budget Bureau. Appleby is quoted in The Congressional Record of July 18, 1946, as'say ing: "A man in the employ of the government has just as much right to be a member of the Communist party as he has to be a member of the Democratic or Republican party."

Such were the credentials of the leading planners of our postTHE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY' 183 war foreign policy. Now let us consider some of the things they did. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter declares that the organiza tion, among other things, shall promote "full employment." Article 56 obligates all U.N. members to take "joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization" for the achievementof the purposesset forth in article 55. When the Charter was under consideration at San Francisco, few Ameri cans realized that this pledge, which seemed merely to express an aspiration, would be construed as a treaty obligation by which the United States could be held accountable to the U.N. for its domestic policies. Before the Charter had gone into effect the Truman administration's so-called "full employment" bill was introduced by Senator James E. Murray of Montana, a complacent dupe of the Communists. A Communist Party resolution said: "Push the fight for 60 million jobs.... Support the Murray full employment bill."2 The bill was denounced by conservative economists as a blueprint for collectivism.

A brief submitted by the Machinery and Allied Products Institute declared: "If full employment means that everyone has a regular full time job at a remuneration satisfactory to himself in· an occupation and location of his own preference then it may be put down as an impossibility in a free society or any other. Certain totalitarian states have attained what passes for full employment, but it is not of this character. It has been accompanied by impressment in labor camps, the forcible trans fer of workers from one vocation to another, the compulsory prescription of wage rates, and other forms of duress and coercion." One of the bill's reputed authors was Nathan of the OWMR. It was clamorously supported by such New Deal Jacobins as Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, whom the Commu nists supported for President in 1948; Chester Bowles, price administrator;and IsadorLubin, commissionerof laborstatis tics. The New Deal economists predicted that postwar unem2. House Un-American Activities Committee Hearings, July 7, 1953.

184 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION ployment would reach 6,000,000 to 9,000,000 by spring, 1946. They induced John Snyder, War Mobilization director, and Fred Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury, to support these ridicu lous estimates. According to the official census reports, post war unemployment actually reached a peak of 2,710,000 in March, 1946. Congress drastically modified the Murray bill, even elimi nating the phrase "full employment" from the title. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the Democratic leader, sarcastically re marked that the measure, as passed, "guarantees everybody out of work the right to seek a job if he can find one." While Congress was debating the "full employment" bill the State Department planners drew up proposals for an interna tional conference on trade and employment, made public on December 6, 1945. Attention was directed to the U.N. Charter pledge of "joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization to achieve . . . higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development." Draft proposals were included for an Inter national Trade Organization, to work for "an expanding world economy" and "the establishment and maintenance in all coun tries of high levels of employment and real income." The ITO charter, drafted at a conference in Havana in 1948, has never come into force for want of ratifications. The American Con gress refused to approve it.

In August, 1949, the U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution directing the secretary general to appoint a group of so-called experts for a study of "national and inter national measures required to achieve full employment." David Weintraub, who had come to the U.N. from UNRRA and was director of the Division of Economic Stability and Develop ment, recommended the following "experts," who were ap pointed by Trygve Lie: John Maurice Clark, professor of economics at Columbia University, who worked in association with Professor Arthur Smithies of Harvard University; Nicholas Kaldor, fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Pierre Uri, ecoTHE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 185 nomic and financial advisor to the Commissariat General du Plan, Paris; and E. Ronald Walker, economic advisor to the Australian Department of External Affairs. This committee, interpreting the "full employment" pledge in the Charter as a treaty obligation, recommended adoption by member governments of a self-starting spending plan based on the theories of the late John Maynard Keynes, who was de scribed before the war as "the Englishman who rules America."

Once Congress had approved the scheme it would cease to have any responsibility, except the obligation to provide the money. Government spending and other compensatory measures would come into force automatically whenever unemployment ex ceeded a pre-announced level. The suggested level was five and one half per cent of the total working force. The committee recognized the inflationary dangers of such a program and recommended government controls to maintain price stability, such as "qualitative or quantitative credit controls, direct con trols over inventories, and selective controls over prices." This audacious attempt to dictate the domestic policies of member governments, particularly the United States, was sol emnly debated and generally approved by members of the Eco nomic and Social Council and the General Assembly. Isador Lubin, United States representative on the Economic and So cial Council, was mildly critical of the proposal, possibly be cause he thought Congress would never approve it, but he moved to place the full employment question on the Council's agenda each year and to call for periodic reports from mem ber governments on their employment policies. This was ap proved and the United States gives the U.N. a periodic ac counting.

The postwar plans of the revolutionists were based on large scale spending on public wor:((sto maintain "full employment," and on foreign assistance, through UNRRA, the World Bank and InternationalMonetaryFund, and directAmericanaid to foreign countries. The Communists must have foreseen the so called cold war, for the inevitability of a death struggle between 186 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION the Soviet Union and the United States is an article of their faith, but it is unlikely that they expected this country to spend as much as fifty billion dollars a year on armaments and foreign aid. Now the U.N. planners believe they have a vested interest in continued American spending on an undiminished scale. An other group of experts selected by Weintraub and appointed by Lie, pursuant to an Economic and Social Council resolution, prepared a report on "measures for International Economic Stability." Professor James W. Angell of Columbia University, was chairman of this group.

Its report, submitted in November, 1951, said: "... we be lieve that in future the real danger to the economic stability of the rest of the world lies in recessions originating in the United States: partly because of the dominant position of the United States in international trade and payments, and partly because of the institutional and economic factors which make the United States economy more liable to internal fluctuations in effective demand than are the economies of other important trading nations. . . . Beyond the present problems of inflation and shortage lies the possibility of a post-rearmament recession, particularly in the United States. No one can say how long the rearmament program will continue, or how it may expand or contract. ... But any substantial or sudden cutback in rearma ment would clearly involve a serious risk of recession, and even a levelling off of the program would mean a drop in the sec ondary defense demands for inventories, plant and equipment."

Still another report by a group of "experts" appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, issued in May, 1951, declares that a two per cent increase in the per capita national incomes of the so-called underdeveloped countries of the world "cannot be brought about without an annual capital import well in excess of 10 billion dollars." This is an indication of the size of the burden these global planners would like to place upon the backs of the American taxpayers. And regardless of rebuffs and dis appointments, they never give up. The proposed treaty on hu man rights contains an article requiring governments to adopt THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 187 policies "to achieve steady economic development and full and productive employment." In the spring of 1946, the Acheson-Hiss group in the State Department attempted a coup d'etat. Their plan was to seize· control of the State Department's policymaking functions from the careerforeignservicepersonnel;to centralizecontrolof all foreign intelligence in the department; to create a global propa ganda machine in the department; to control the hiring and firing of department personnel; to shift control of American foreign policy to the U.N., and to control the U.N.

The buildup for the State Department D-Day began in Sep tember and October, 1945, when the Budget Bureau, controlled by the revolutionists, devised a plan by which President Tru man, in executive orders 9608, 9621, and 9630, transferred the Office of War Information, the intelligence and research units of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Inter American Affairs, the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Foreign Liquidation into the State Department. This involved a merger of 25,000 government employes. The State Department was inundated with the Communists and fellow travelers of the wartime agencies. State Secretary Byrnes, who was away most of the time attending international conferences, was awed by the task of assimilating such a formidable mass of ideological freaks, so he brought in his former law partner, Donald S. Russell, as assistant secretary for administration, and hired J. Anthony Panuch as deputy assistant secretary for administration with the special job of "coordinating and integrating" the functions transferred to the department by the President's executive or ders. Panuch, a dynamic New York lawyer, Republican, and unadulterated American, had been special advisor·to General Lucius Clay, director of materiel in the War Department, and later special advisor to Director Byrnes in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

On March 5, 1946, shortly after returning from the first ses188 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION sion of the General Assembly in London, where he was a senior advisor to the American delegation, Hiss submitted his plan to Byrnes. It was a charter to give Hiss' Office of Special Politi cal Affairs: "Charge of international organization and security affairs, for the formulation and coordination of policy and ac tion relating to such affairs, with special emphasis on the main tenance of international peace and· security through organized action." Moreover, the plan proposed to elevate Hiss' office above the level of the geographic and economic offices of the department and place it directly under the undersecretary, who happened to be Dean Acheson. The geographic offices, staffed by foreign service officers, functioned under a charter giving them responsibility "for the formulation of overall United States policy toward the countries within their jurisdiction, and for coordination, as to these countries, of the programs and activities of other offices." Hiss was trying to grab all of this responsibility for himself.

On March 7, 1946, Panuch wrote a confidential memoran dum on the Hiss plan to Russell, which was placed in the record of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee when he testi fied on June 25, 1953. It said: "I have read with mingled feelings of admiration and horror the outline of the Hiss plan. The plan's simplicity of design is admirable; its concept is grandiose.... "In examining the plan and assessing its implications in terms of control, it should be remembered that Dr. Hiss exer cises Svengali-like influence over the mental processes of Jun ior Stettinius, the United States delegate to UNO. Through Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, his designee for the post of secretary gen eral of the United States delegation to UNO, Dr. Hiss will en joy 'working control' over the flow of papers in and out of the secretariat of the United States group. The proposed plan would establish a similar control setup within the state department, where Dr. Hiss already wields considerable influence with the counselor, Benjamin V. Cohen, on UNO matters. This would be effected by the simple device of establishing a new office for United Nations affairs.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 189 "If this ambitious project should be approved, it is obvious that the operations of the new office, as the 'initiating and co ordinating center within the department' for UNO affairs, will, for all practical purposes, supplant and supersede the functions of the geographic and economic· offices of the department. In such event, the question arises to what extent the de jure policy output of the department will be diluted by the day-to-day de facto policy product as established by Mr. Stettinius' coun terpart of the State Department, functioning within the UNO orbit of influence in New York. If Dr. Hiss should succeed in causing Dr. Appleby to be designated as the UNO assistant secretary general for administration, the Hiss group will have achieved infiltration in, or control of, four critically strategic points: (a) UNO itself (Feller, Appleby); (b) the United States delegation (Stettinius and Rothwell); (c) the state de partment (Hiss, Ross, OUNOA), and (d) bureau of the bud get (Harold Smith,.Schwarzwalder) ."

(Cohen was counselor of the State Department. Rothwell, Hiss' designee for secretary general of the United States mis sion to the U.N., was appointed and held that job for about a year, while it was being staffed and organized. Abraham H. Feller was general counsel of the U.N. In the fall of 1952, when a federal grand jury arid the Senate Internal Security Subcom mittee were questioning American Communists in the U.N., he killed himself by jumping from a window of his New York apartment. There was no evidence that Feller was a Commu nist Party member, although as a former New Deal lawyer he had been closely associated with Hiss and other Soviet agents. Apparently he was a victim of schizophrenia, induced by a con flict of loyalties. Appleby, Hiss' friend in the Budget Bureau, did not get the U.N. job of assistant secretary general for ad ministration. John C. Ross, Hiss' deputy in the State Depart ment, became a deputy United States. representative to the U.N. and still has that job. Harold Smith was directorof the Budget Bureau and George Schwarzwalder, one of Smith's as sistants, was the candidate of the revolutionists for J. Edgar Hoover's job as director of the FBI.) 190 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION Panuch's memorandum killed the Hiss reorganization plan, but the influence of the Hiss-Acheson group was by no means destroyed. Hiss deftly outmaneuvered Byrnes and Panuch with a duplicitous plan to introduce American Communists into the U.N. Secretariat. Early in 1946, he obtained approval of a State Department rule that no recommendations would be made regarding American applicants for U.N. jobs. Whether this rule was approved by Acheson, in Byrnes' absence, or by Byrnes, on Acheson's recommendation, is not clear, but State Department officials told a House Judiciary Subcommittee in 1953 that such a policy was adopted. Trygve Lie, former U.N.

Secretary General, told the General Assembly on March 10, 1953, that one of his first acts was to request the United States gov~rnment for help in finding qualified personnel for the Sec retariat. He said the United States refused, on the ground that it wished to avoid the appearance of influencing the selection of personnel. If the State Department had complied with Lie's request for help, applicants for U.N. jobs would have been screened by the department's Security Committee, under Panuch's juris diction, by the Civil Service Commission, or by the FBI, and that would have been awkward for Hiss' communist friends. With the no-recommendation rule in force, however, Hiss clan destinely recommended job seekers to his friends who already held influential positions in the U.N. Secretariat. According to the report of the Judiciary Subcommittee, Hiss secretly recom mended nearly five hundred persons for U.N. employment.

Many of them were employed, and some of them later became "public issues," the subcommittee reported. The "public issues" referred to had refused, on the ground of self-incrimination, to tell the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee whether they were or had been Communists, or were engaging or had en gaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States. Eighteen Secretariat members and five others recently separated from the payroll took refuge under the Fifth Amend ment to the Constitution when questioned in 1952 and 1953 about communist activities. Lie fired these and about twenty THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 191 others as a result of hearings by the Senate subcommittee and a federal grand jury in New York. However, nineteen of those dismissed appealed to the U.N. administrative tribunal, which ruled that membership in the Communist Party or refusal to testify on the ground of self-incrimination is not a valid ground for the discharge of a Secretariat member. U.N. employes·dis missed for refusing to testify about communist or espionage activities must either be reinstated or compensated, the tribunal ruled. If upheld by the assembly, this decision would cost the U.N. more than $200,000 for "termination indemnity" pay ments to eleven employes whose appeals were upheld.

Lie disclosed that the State Department refused to give him any information whatever regarding reports of subversive ac tivitiesby American members of the. Secretariat until late in 1949, when the U.N. entered into a secret agreement with the department. Under this agreement, the department gave the U.N. no. information except its bare opinion, and then only when the opinion was adverse on security grounds. Often the report would consist of a single word, Lie said. The House Judiciary Subcommittee reported that the department sub mitted only fifty-six adverse comments from 1949 to 1953, eight of them on applicants for jobs and forty-eight on em ployes. It reported that nearly. 100 U.N. employes were ques tioned by the federal grand jury. It said the FBI reported highly derogatory information on fifty-three of these to the State De partment, but in some cases the department refrained from making adverse reports to Lie and in others it waited up to three years before submitting such reports.

From its inception the U.N. was a fraud on the innate yearn ing of mankind for peace. Roosevelt originally opposed the creation of a new world league. According to Sumner Welles,3 Roosevelt declared at the Atlantic Charter conference in Au gust, 1941, that "nothing could be more futile than the re constitution of a body such as the assembly of the League of Nations." He believed that the United States and Britain should 3. Where Are We Heading?

192 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION police the world after the war was over. Later he became en. amoured of the project of creating a new peace league to justify America's intervention in the war. He brooded over the stupen dous cost of the war in blood and treasure, about the prospect that the United States would be called upon to spend far more for postwar relief and reconstruction than any vanquished coun try in history had paid in reparations, and about the danger, as he saw it, that postwar disillusionment would revive the isola tionism that followed World War I. Accordingly he embraced the U.N. project in the hope that its promise of saving "future generations from the scourge of war" would be accepted by the people as justification for the deception by which he took the country into World War II. Roosevelt also was obsessed by the delusion that he could enchant and bribe Stalin to cooperate for peace. Stalin, eager to be bribed, professed to be enchanted. On returning from Teheran Roosevelt was almost delirious with self-satisfaction as he told Miss Perkins how he charmed Stalin, how "the ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers."4 Roosevelt agreed to give the British Commonwealth six votes and the Soviet Union three in the General Assembly, where the United States has only one, although it pays one third of the cost of the 60-member organization. Roosevelt made territorial concessions to Stalin which gave the Soviet Union mastery of eastern Europe and eastern Asia. There can be no explanation save madness or treasonous intent for the professed belief that the Bolsheviks would cooperate for peace in the U.N. In writings that were reprinted and circulated throughout the Soviet Union all during World War II, both Lenin and Stalin had reiterated that the communist goal of world revolution could be achieved only by violence. In Prob lems of Leninism, of which 13,774,000 copies had been printed before a new edition was brought out in 1940, Stalin affirmed Lenin's dictum that "the existence of the Soviet republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable.

One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end 4. The Roosevelt I Knew, by Frances Perkins.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 193 supervenes a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable." Moreover, Stalin had demonstrated his perfidy by deeds as well as words. He had made his deal with Hitler in the hope that western Europe would destroy itself in war and the vulture of communism could batten on the ruins. He had pounced upon stricken Poland with the cowardice of a jackal, after Hitler had destroyed the Polish army. He had greedily swallowed Lithu ania, Latvia, and Estonia, and he had launched unprovoked aggression against Finland. All of these territorial grabs were made in violation of solemn nonaggression pacts. Despite these enormities, the American people were told that "Uncle Joe" Stalin was a benevolent patriarch whose most cherished desire was to be remembered by posterity as the co adjutor of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the creation of a millenium of peace.

Stalin happily accepted an invitation to associate with rep resentatives of the so-called civilized countries on terms of equality and mutual respect in a pretended peace organization. Such an association imparted an aura of dignity and respecta bility to his bloody tyranny. The U.N. was a perfect mask for his murderous plans for world revolution. He had written that "the revolutionary accepts reform in order to use it as a cover for his illegal work." Instead of peace and security, which was the promise of the U.N., '!Ie have a global cold war with Soviet communism. We fought a three-year, inconclusive shooting war in Korea in the name of the U.N., at a cost of 145,000 American casualties, 30,000 of them dead. We have shooting wars in Indochina and Malaya, and unresolved states of war in the Middle East (Pal estine) and on the subcontinent of India (Kashmir). There is smoldering unrest among the colonial and semi-colonial peo ples of Africa and Asia. The U.N. was supposed to "relieve mankind from the crushing burden of armaments." The organ ization is in its ninth year, and the American people are paying fifty billion dollars a year for armaments and foreign aid.

194 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION U.N. apologists cannot dispute these facts, but they argue that the world situation would be even worse, that we might be engaged in a global atomic war, if the organization did not exist. The answer to that argument is that the U.N. has not solved a single political question which could not and would not have been settled by the traditional processes of diplomacy if the U.N. had never been created. We are told that the U.N. got the Soviet troops out of Iran. Actually they did not leave until the Kremlin's demand for an oil concession in northern Iran had been met by the Iranian prime minister. The Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Iran, pursuant to a wartime agree ment, because it was not ready to risk war with the United States and Great Britain, not because of any respect for the Security Council. Concurrently with the Iranian dispute, Stalin was demanding bases on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

When Turkey threatened to fight and the United States and Britain said they would support the Turks, Stalin backed down. This dispute closely paralleled the Iranian case, and its settle ment cannot be called a U.N. victory because it was not before the U.N. In the Palestine war, both the Jews and the Arabs defied the U.N. when it appeared to suit their interests, and hostilities ceased only with the victory of Israeli arms. This was a triumph of force, not moral authority and not collective security. After the Israeli victory, the U.N. negotiated an armistice agreement, but in more than five years it has not been able to effect a peace settlement or to solve the problem of the 850,000 Palestinian Arabs who were displaced from their homes by the war. In Indonesia, the Dutch defied the Security Council until Merle Cochran, a wise American diplomat, finally persuaded them that no matter what sacrifices they were prepared to make they could never subjugate the Indonesians. Yielding to American pressure, the Dutch granted independence to the In donesians.

In Kashmir, India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire in re sponse to U.N. appeals, but there is no reason to doubt that they would have responded similarly to conciliation efforts by THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 195the United States and Britain. After more than four years of futile U.N. mediation efforts, India and Pakistan washed their hands of the organization and said they would try to settle their own differences. The U.N. is credited with saving Greece from destruction by communist guerrilla forces supported by the Soviet Union and its Balkan satellites. Actually Greece was saved by direct American military and economic assistance, costing about two billion dollars, and by Communist Yugoslavia's break with the Kremlin. Yugoslavia had been the main base of the guerrilla operations against Greece. The Security Council's attempt to end the Berlin blockade was frustrated by a Soviet veto. Months later the question was settled by direct negotiations. It is slightly ludicro.us to give the U.N. credit for this settlement on the ground that it .provided the diplomatic contact which resulted in the direct negotiations.

The United States and the Soviet Union have diplomatic con tacts in the major capitals of the world, and need not depend on chance meetings in U.N. washrooms. The Security Council tried and failed to settle Great Britain's dispute with Egypt over the future of the Sudan and the defense of the Suez Canal. Aided by American mediation, a function of old-fashioned diplomacy, Britain and Egypt have happily reached an agreement on the .sudan. Despite recriminations and vicissitudes, it appears probable that negotiations for the evacuation of the Suez canal zone by British troops will suc ceed. The Security Council also tried and failed to settle Britain's oil dispute with Iran. The General Assembly at first refused to consider Arab complaints that France was oppressing the Mo roccans, in violation of the U.N. Charter, and the Security Council later refused to consider similar charges against the French in Tunisia. When the Assembly finally took up both questions, it sought to appease the French, who were staging a Soviet-style boycott of its sessions. The Assembly adopted resolutions inspired by the United States and sponsored by a group of Latin American countries, which expressed confidence 196 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION in France's intentions regarding the Tunisians and Moroccans.

For its labors, the Assembly incurred the contempt of France and the resentment of the whole Moslem world from Morocco to Indonesia. The response of the U.N. to the communist aggression in Korea is acclaimed by its supporters as a victory for the collec tive security principle in its first test. Actually it would be dif ficult to imagine a more convincing demonstration that such a system is not collective, and does not provide security. State Secretary Dulles, addressing the General Assembly on Septem ber 17, 1953, declared that when the Security Council called for help in Korea "almost every member responded in one way or another." This was an understatement, for all sixty members responded "in one way or another," including the Soviet Union, which boasted of its material assistance to the communist forces. Only fifteen U.N. members besides the United States sent com bat units to Korea, and the United States, according to repeated statements by Winston Churchill, bore "nineteen-twentieths"

of the burden. Of course this calculation excludes the sacrifices of the South Koreans. Although called a U.N. operation, it was primarily an Amer ican war, Truman's war, as the late Senator Taft candidly dubbed it. Truman ordered American armed forces into action before the Security Council called for armed assistance to the South Koreans. The Council's first resolution, adopted on June 25, 1950, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon all members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution." Armed intervention was neither mentioned nor contemplated. On June 27, President Truman announced that he had ordered Ameri can forces into action. He said he had done this in conformity with the Council's resolution of June 25. About nine hours later, however, the Council adopted an American resolution recommending "that the members of the United Nations fur nish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be neces sary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Confronted by a fait accompli, and THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 197 lightly assuming that the United States could defeat the North Korean Communists without calling upon them for substantial help, the other Security Coun,citmembers voted for armed ac..

tion. So far as the United,States was concerned, the U.N. served only as a convenient pretext for the President to enter the war without a declaration by Congress, as required by the Consti tution. The General Assembly stalled for three months after Com munist China entered the war before adopting, on February 1, 1951, a resolution accusing the Peiping regime of aggression. It waited another three and one half months before adopting, with even greater reluctance, a resolution calling for an em bargo on the shipment of war materials to Red China. It never called for a complete cessation of trading with the enemy, and some U.N. members, particularly Britain, never did stop such trade. On June 6, 1953, Senator McCarthy's Permanent In vestigations Subcommittee listed the names of 96 ships of Brit ish registry, and 62 flying the flags of other noncommunist countries, as participants in trade with Communist China from December 29, 1952 to April 20, 1953. This information was confirmed by the Defense Department. On May 28, the Senate subcommittee made public a detailed account of three voyages by two British owned ships which actually transported enemy troops while the war was going on in Korea.

Defenders of the U.N., particularly State Secretary Dulles, are wont to extol its so-called moral authority. Dulles sancti moniously discourses about "mobilizing and focusing the moral judgment of the world" upon aggressors. Yet the U.N. has never pronounced a moral judgment upon the Soviet Union. former State Secretary Acheson told the Assembly's political commit tee on October 24, 1952, that the communist aggressor forces in Korea were "raised, heavily equipped and tactically and strategically advised by the Soviet Union government."Henry Cabot Lodge, United States representative, told the same com mittee on February 25, 1953, that "Soviet planning instigated the original aggression, which was subsequently maintained 198 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION by Soviet training and equipment . . . the flow of Soviet equip ment is constant and steady and accounts for the increase of combat effectiveness of the enemy over the past year." On September 18, 1953, Lt. General Samuel E. Anderson, com mander of the Fifth Air Force, announced in Seoul that entire Soviet air force units fought in the Korean war for two and a half years. He said the Russians used the war to gain combat experience for their pilots, just as they did in the Spanish Civil War.

When this writer asked Lodge why the U.N. did not con demn the Soviet Union for its part in the Korean aggression, Lodge replied: "It doesn't do any good to call names unless you are prepared to go to war." Since the U.N. did condemn the North Koreans and even the Chinese Communists, however reluctantly, as aggressors, it appears to have a double moral standard, one for small or weak aggressors and one for big aggressors. A persistent and widely propagated myth about the U.N. is that the noncommunist members are united; that they are faith ful to their obligations under the Charter, and that obstruction by the Soviet bloc is the sole reason for the impotence of the organization. The Soviet Union has flagrantly abused its veto in the Security Council, but the U.N. could do anything the Charter authorizes it to do, including the use of armed force, on a recommendation by the General Assembly, in which there is no veto. After the fortuitous, or perhaps deliberate, absence of the Soviet delegation permitted the Council to recommend armed action in Korea, the Assembly adopted the so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution, proposed by former Secretary Acheson. This resolution authorizes the Assembly to meet on twenty-four hours' notice and recommend collective action against aggression whenever the Security Council is stymied by a veto. It also calls upon all U.N. members to maintain units of their armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could be made available to the U.N. on its call. The response to the Acheson plan demonstrated the futility of tryTHE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 199 ing to organize a universal collective security system which would bind its members to fight in remote parts of the world for some abstract principle, regardless of their national inter ests as conceived by their responsible officials. Only Thailand agreed to earmark a special armed unit for U.N. service. Only the United States made a blanket commitment to fight for U.N.

principles whenever and wherever aggression might occur. Britain, France, and other members said they would fight for U.N. principles in defense of their own possessions. U.N. members obstructed the prosecution of the war by re peatedly admonishing the United States against measures pro posed by General MacArthur to defeat the Communists. In November, 1950, after the intervention of Red China, the Gen eral recommended the use of 50,000 to 60,000 Chinese Na tionalist troops from Formosa, but was repulsed by Washington. The response was the same when he proposed to institute a naval blockade of Communist China, to attack its coastal cities and particularly to bomb its airfields and communications facili ties across the Yalu river in the "privileged sanctuary" of Man churia. The Truman administration heeded the lamentations of the Anglo-Indian appeasement bloc in the U.N., as well as the counsel of the revolutionaries in the State Department. On December 1, 1950, General MacArthur told the U. S. News and World Report that the limitations imposed upon his com mand constituted "an enormous handicap without precedent in military history." On March 24, 1951, he issued a public statement declaring that Red China would be "doomed to the risk of imminent military collapse" if the U.N. would depart from its policy of confining the war to Korea. Finally, on April 11, 1951, Truman peremptorily removed MacArthur from command, on the ground that he was "unable to give whole hearted support to the policies of the United States government and the United Nations." Testifying at the Senate MacArthur inquiry on May 7, 1951, General Marshall, then Defense Sec retary, said MacArthur "would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Com munist China, both from the sea and from the air.... He 200 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world."

There is impressive evidence that both China and North Korea could have been liberated from communism if Mac Arthur's program had been carried out. Mao Tse-tung's Red regime was in serious trouble and might have been wrecked. The war, famine, the pillaging of farmers and business men, and the systematic liquidation of millions of so-called reaction aries had created sullen discontent throughout China. 5 A naval blockade, together with bombing attacks on China's railroad centers, might have disrupted its supply system and produced widespread havoc and chaos. General Van Fleet, who commanded the Eighth Army in Korea for twenty-two months, declared in an article in Life magazine that our greatest mistake was that we "consistently underestimated the Koreans and overestimated the Chinese Reds." He said the war was costing the Chinese Communists much more than it was costing us. Even General Marshall acknowledged at the Senate hearing on May 8, 1951, less than a year after the war began, that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had suffered between 500,000 and 800,000 casualties and that "no people can con tinue at that rate very long." Before the armistice was signed, the Chinese Communists alone lost more than 1,000,000 cas ualties.

Our so-called allies in the U.N. had no desire to defeat the Communists. They suspected that the.United States was out to defeat communism in Asia, not just aggression in Korea, and this idea was abhorrent to them. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's external affairs minister, who was president of the General As sembly's seventh session, declared in a public speech at Har5. On October 23, 1952, the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor, basing its finding on, announcements made by the Chinese Communists themselves, reported that no less than 14,000,000 persons had been put to death by Mao Tse-tung's regime in five years. ' THE UNITED NATIONS CONSPIRACY 201 vard University on June 11, 1953, that some Americans re garded Asian communism as an implacable foe which must be defeated by every action short of war and even at the risk of war. "There are few countries inside the western alliance will ing to accept this obligation, especially in the terms in which it is sometimes presented in this country," said Pearson.

While restraining the United States, the U.N. members gave aid and comfort to the Communists by addressing prayerful armistice appeals to Peiping and Pyongyang, thereby disclos ing the weakness, disunity and timidity of the noncommunist membership. The most abject of these supplications, drafted by Pearson, Benegal Rau of India, and Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, was approved by the Assembly's sixty member political committee, with the support of Acheson's State Department, on January 13, 1951. In effect it offered the Chinese Commu nists both Formosa and admission to the U.N. in exchange for an armistice. In June, 1951, the U.N. members induced the United States to walk into a bear trap by accepting Moscow's proposal for armistice talks, at a time when the Communists were hard pressed militarily and needed time to build up their forces. From May 15 to May 30 they had been driven back twenty miles and had suffered more than 100,000 casualties. Assured by U.N.

spokesmen that they had nothing to fear, the Communists dragged out the truce negotiations for more than two years, while·the United States made one concession after another and compromised one principle after another. U.N. spokesmen maintained that an armistice approximat ing the 38th parallel would accomplish the organization's de clared purpose to "repel the armed attack." Korean unification was a political objective but there had never been any intention to achieve it by force, said the U.N. apologists. This was a mendacious argument, for the General Assembly, on October 7, 1950, adopted a resolution clearly aimed at unification by force. It declared that the essential objective of the U.N. was the establishment of "a unified, independent and democratic Korea," and it recommended that "all appropriate steps be 202 THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea." Fi nally it declared that "United Nations forces should not remain in .any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving" the stated objective of unification. Moreover, the U.N. could not honestly claim that it had ended the aggression, for the armistice agreement left 1,000,000 Chinese Communist soldiers on Korean soil.

The major obstacle to an armistice agreement concerned the fate of some 50,000 anticommunist Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war, who had surrendered in response to leaflets distributed by the United States and promising that un der no circumstances would they be returned to the communist authorities against their will. The question was important on strategic as well as moral grounds. In World War II, the Ger man armies had been welcomed as liberators in Russia and hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers had laid down their arms. They stopped surrendering on a wholesale basis only when they learned that Hitler mistreated prisoners. At the end of the war the United States delivered hundreds of thousands of anticommunist war prisoners and civilians to the Russians. If the United States should break faith with the anticommunist prisoners in Korea, it could expect few soldiers to surrender in any future war with a communist country.