Working paper from Mises Institute Working Papers
The Regulation of Insider Trading as an Agency Problem
Published by Ludwig von Mises Institute. Mises Institute Working Papers ran undated submissions, ongoing collection (site copy notes papers are not in final/published form).
"The Regulation of Insider Trading as an Agency Problem" is a free 247 KB PDF download at freecapitalists.org. It was written by Alexandre Padilla.
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- Author
- Alexandre Padilla
- Affiliation
- Metropolitan State College of Denver
- File
- 247 KB PDF
- Source name
Padilla5
This working paper's title and author were read from the paper's own submission record in the Mises Institute's archive, not guessed from its filename in the 2014 Mises.org mirror. Periodical facts come from Mises Institute Working Papers, verified 2026-07-21. A title appears here only when it was printed on the PDF's own first page or recorded on the paper's own submission; not every working paper in this collection has been matched to one of those sources yet.
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- Is "The Regulation of Insider Trading as an Agency Problem" free to download?
- Yes. The paper downloads free from this page as a 247 KB PDF, with no signup and no account.
- Who wrote "The Regulation of Insider Trading as an Agency Problem"?
- It was written by Alexandre Padilla.
- What collection is "The Regulation of Insider Trading as an Agency Problem" part of?
- Mises Institute Working Papers, published by Ludwig von Mises Institute. This archive holds 332 working papers, all free to download.
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Mises Institute Working Papers
332 PDFs in the archive, published undated submissions, ongoing collection (site copy notes papers are not in final/published form). Browse every issue or see all 18 periodicals.