Notes

2. Ricarda Huch, Untergang des Romischen Reiches Deutscher Nation (Ziirich, 1954), 218f. If, on the other hand, we want to know what goes on in the soul of the modern city dweller and mass man, we have but to consult such books as the famous Kinsey Report or an enlightening British book by B. Seebohm Rowntree and G. R. Lavers entitled English Life and Leisure: A Social Study (London, 1951). Cf. Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago, 1954), 101ff., and idem, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice (Chicago, 1956), 187ff. 3. I have discussed this in more detail in my book L'economie mondiale aux X/Xc et XXc siecles (Geneva, 1959), 10fl. 4. Alfred Weber (Farewell to European History [London, 1947]; Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie [2nd ed., Munich, 1950]) thought it very likely that a new human type might emerge and described this· "fourth man" in a bitterly disillusioned 262 NOTES manner. Cf. the critical comment in my Introduction to the collec tion of essays Kommt der vierte Mensch? (Ziirich, 1952).

5. See the works of poet-philosophers Max Picard (The Flight from God [London and Chicago:,1951]; Hitler in Ourselves [Chi cago, 1947]; World of Silence [London and Chicago, 1952]; Zerstorte und unzerstorbare Welt [Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1951]) and Rudolf Kassner (Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert [Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1947]) . 6. I have in mind especially F. A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (London, 1944). For an account of what the world situation looked like to many people fifteen years ago, see, for example, E. H. Carr's Conditions of Peace (London, 1942) and my review of the German edition of this book in Neue Schweizer Rundschau (October, 1943). 7. See my book The Solution of the German Problem (New York, 1947), especially the final chapter, which diagnoses the economic ailment and prescribes a cure that is more or less the same as the one subsequently adopted. See also my contribution "Das deutsche Wirtschaftsexperiment-Beispiel und Lehre" to A. Hunold (ed.), Vollbeschiiftigung, Inflation und Planwirtschaft (Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1951), as well as my Ein Jahrzehnt sozialer Marktwirtschaft in Deutschland und seine Lehren (Koln-Marienburg, 1958).

8. See especially the report on the German economic situation which I prepared in the summer of 1950 at the request of the Ade nauer government: 1st die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik richtig? (Stuttgart, 1950.) 9. The argument that a tax ratio (that is, the proportion of na tional income absorbed by the budget) exceeding, say, one-fourth of the national income must, in the long run, be inflationary has been propounded, above all, by Colin Clark, first in his paper "Public Finance and Changes in the Value of Money," Economic Journal (December, 1945). There may be different views about the critical percentage (cf. the discussion in The Review of Economics and Sta tistics [August, 1952] ), but the principle itself seems unexception able. For an important contribution on this subject, see G. Schmol263 A HUMANE ECONOMY ders, "Steuersystem und Wettbewerbsordnung," ORDO, Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1950).

10. Henry C. Simons, "Reflections on Syndicalism," Journal of Political Economy (March, 1944), reprinted in Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago, 1948); Fritz Machlup, Monopolistic Wage Determination as a Part of the General Problem of Monopoly (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1947) ; Goetz Briefs, Zwischen Kapitalismus und Syndikalismus (Bern, 1952); Hans Willgerodt, "Die Krisis cler sozialen Sicherheit und das Lohnprob lem," ORDO, Jahrbuch fiir die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesell schaft (1955). See also Chapters IV and V of this volume. CHAPTER II 1. On the subject of mass society, see Hendrik de Man, Vermas sung und Kulturverfall (Bern, 1951) ; Robert A. Nisbet, The Quest for Community (New York, 1953); David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950) ; Hans Freyer, Theorie des gegenwiirti gen Zeitalters (Stuttgart, 1955); Kirk, A Program for Conserva tives; A. Hunold (ed.) , Masse und Demol£ratie (Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1957) .

2. While the Protestant churches do not take up any uniform position on this point, the Catholic church has always viewed popu lation growth with optimism and sympathy, or at any rate has re j ected the possibility of influencing the birth rate. But it has no doubt been sensitive to the conflict between its own position and the undeniable problems of demographic expansion. There are indica tions that such awareness is growing. A striking example is the posi tive point of view on birth control which the Jesuit Father Stanislas de Lestapis took up at the World Population Conference in Rome in 1954. A few years earlier, in 1951, Pope Pius XII had sanctioned the practice of observing the "safe periods." (New York Times, September 10, 1954) In Japan, the dissemination of information and the establishment of advisory centers, often under government auspices, have led to a 264 NOTES reduction of the birth rate from 34 in 1947 to 20 in 1954. Large private firms, too, are helping to promote birth control ('Rev. W. A.

Kaschmitter, "Japan's Population Problem," Migration News [1956], 1). 3. On the population problem, see Robert C. Cook, Human Fer tility (London, 1951); Harrison Brown, The Challenge of Man's Future (New York, 1954); Edward Hyams, Soil and Civilization (London and New York, 1952); Frank L. McDougall, "Food and Population," International Conciliation (December, 1952) ; Henry H. Villard, "Some Notes on Population and Living Levels," The Review of Economics and Statistics (May, 1955). This may be the place to quote the following passage from a Ger man newspaper: "The more Europe becomes industrialized and motorized and the more uniform the pattern of consumption be comes, the more people long to get away from the crowd, at least during their holidays, and to escape into undisturbed calm. The seacoast, for all its being a rather m.elancholy place sometimes, does offer these people guaranteed solitude, at least on one side, provided they have a house right on the shore." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 13, 1956) No comment is needed.

Collectors of historical detail and anecdotes will be interested to read what Wilhelm Grimm wrote in a letter in 1823: "Much as I should like to be in Berlin for a while, I have misgivings about living there or in any large town. Last year, someone I know in the civil service there told me that all through the summer he didn't get be yond the city gates into the country more than three times." (Wil helm Grimm in a letter to Savigny dated September 9, 1823, in Briefe der Gebriider Crimm an Savigny [Berlin-Bielefeld, 1953], 331) Jacob Grimm wrote much the same thing about Hamburg in a letter dated November 5, 1817. 4. On this subject, reflect on what Jules Romains has written in Le Probleme numero un (Paris, 1947), 71-85. We shall be led to similar considerations in the subsequent chapter on inflation. 5. For more detail, see my lectures on "Economic Order and International Law" at The Hague .Academy of International Law 265 A HUMANE ECONOMY (Recueil des cours 1954 [Leiden, 1955], 207-70) and my book Internationale Ordnung-heute (Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1954), 101-63.

The problem is stated very clearly by the British historian Herbert Butterfield in Christianity, Diplomacy and War (New York, 1953), 79-101. 6. See L. Albert Hahn, Common Sense Economics (New York, 1956), 183-84; A. R. Sweezy, "Population Growth and Investment Opportunity," Quarterly Journal of Economics (November, 1940) ; S. Enke, "Speculation on Population Growth and Economic Devel opment," Quarterly Journal of Economics (February, 1957). 7. In the German Bundestag recently, according to the record of the proceedings, there occurred an incident in which a three-word Latin phrase (vigilia pretium libertatis, NATO's motto) provoked a Social Democratic Deputy to this angry interruption: "Speak Ger man in the German Parliament!" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 26, 1956) The battle which is being waged against the teaching of Latin, even in Italy, must be explained by the same kind of resent ment. The American Russell Kirk (The Conservative Mind [2nd ed., Chicago, 1954], 381) aptly remarks: "When our universities and colleges devote themselves to turning out specialists and technicians and businessmen, they deprive society of its intellectual aristocracy and, presently, undermine the very social tranquillity upon which modern specialization and technical achievement are founded." We might add that even on the practical plane classical education usu ally comes off best because the intellectual and moral discipline it imposes, as no other type of education does, provides excellent train ing in the rapid grasping of any problem, no matter what kind. It is highly characteristic of modern mass society and the concomitant obsession with social affairs (cf. my Mass und Mitte [Erlenbach Ziirich, 1950], 60ff.) that the favor denied the humanities is instead lavished upon the social sciences. We can get some idea of how exaggeratedly popular the latter are when we learn that there are forty thousand college graduates in the United States who describe themselves as "social scientists," which means that there is one so cial scientist for everyone hundred farmers or twenty-five school266 NOTES teachers or five physicians (William Schlamm, in Faith and Free dom [February, 1955]).

The mixture of puerile rubbernecking and abject fear with which the non-Communist world recently reacted to the Communist show piece of the first artificial earth satellite gives one a horrifying in sight into our society's spiritual condition. One of the silliest reac tions, though by no means surprising, was that people earnestly pro posed that in order to catch up with the Russians' alleged technical lead, we should hurriedly transform all our schools into factories turning out engineers, physicists, and chemists and throw Thucydi des, Cicero, Shakespeare, and Goethe on the scrap heap. It is un necessary to say that great achievements in the fields of physics, chemistry, and mathematics thrive best in the soil of classical educa tion, with its strict training of the mind, that the abandonment of this education would be cultural suicide, and that the Americans would be well advised to retransform their schools into institutions where the mind is disciplined by classical education.

8. John Stuart Mill's testimony can be found in Chapter III of his famous essay On Liberty (London, 1859). Several decades later, American conditions inspired Herman Melville, author of Moby Dick, to write the following lines: Myriads playing pigmy parts Debased into equality: In glut of all material arts A civic barbarism may be: Man disennobled--brutalized By popular science·-atheized Into a smatterer: Dead level of rank commonplace: An Anglo-Saxon China, see May on your vast plains shame the race In the Dark Ages of Democracy. (Quoted from Erik R. von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Liberty or Equality: The Challenge of Our Time [London, 1952],25.) 267 A HUMANE ECONOMY 9. Cf. my essay "Die Kellerraume unserer Kultur," Neue Schwei zer Rundschau (November, 1949). 10. Cf. ibid. 11. On the delightful subject of the history of children's books and their literary significance, see Paul Hazard, Books, Children and Men (Boston, 1947) and J. Dyrenfurth-Graebsch, Geschichte des deutschen Jugendbuches (Hamburg, 1951).

12. The decay of our civilized languages can be measured by various indicators, not least by disregard of accepted usage, increas ing impoverishment of grammar and expression, coarseness of taste, and lack of logical discipline. Eventually, people cease even to be aware of the downward trend. The phenomenon can be observed in all countries, even in one that is as linguistically sure footed as France. 13. "Meanwhile, I have been passing the time with Niebuhr's and Volney's travels in Syria and Egypt, and I would thoroughly recommend this sort of reading to anyone discouraged by. the pres ent bad political outlook. Such books bring home to us what a bless ing it is, after all, to have been born in Europe. It is really inexplica ble that man's creative forces should be active in only so small a part of the earth, while all those vast peoples simply do not count as far as human progress is concerned." (Friedrich Schiller in a letter to Goethe dated January 26, 1798) 14. Peter Viereck, Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals (Boston, 1953). See also the refreshing book by Charles Baudouin entitled The Myth of Modernity (London, 1950).

15. De Man, Ope cit. 16. No one who knew the United States, say, twenty-five years ago and looks at the present situation can help being struck by the horrifying decline in the average level of reading matter as a result of the pressure of mass culture. Most of the then famous and widely read American periodicals, such as American Mercury, Scribner's, Century, Harper's Magazine, or Atlantic Monthly, have either dis appeared or have sunk into insignificance, thereby depriving the public of a lively forum of discussion. Today's scene is dominated 268 NOTES by illustrated mass magazines and synthetic products like Reader's Digest, while serious publications have to wage a constant struggle for survival. As regards books, the mere fact that wage increases have accentuated the need for mass production (today a book can hardly be published without loss unless it can sell at least ten thou sand copies) makes it increasingly difficult to publish books that do not cater to mass tastes (cf. my essay "A European Looks at Ameri can Intellectuals," The National Review [November 10, 1956]).

To pretend that the trend of developments is any different in Euro pean countries would be foolishly self-deluding and smug. The de cline of German literature, also chiefly due to the impact of mass culture, has been frankly described by Walter Muschg in his Die Zerstorung der deutschen Literatur (Bern, 1956): "The creative writer has lost his place in society because society itself is disinte grating and because its conception of literature is called in question. Anonymous forces, stronger than any individual, are conquering the world. The creative writer's most dangerous enemy is not po litical dictatorship but the technical-mindedness of the masses, who would rather have a comfortable life than freedom." The scene is dominated by illustrated tabloids of a level which could hardly be lower, shamelessly sensation-mongering magazines have sales fig ures that approach the American ones, and screaming headlines are considered good journalism. As regards England, there is an im pressive though perhaps rather too pessimistic description in Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice, 298-310.

17. The following quotation is from Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (New York, Knopf, 19418), Vol. II, Bk. IV, Ch. 6, p. 318: "I think, then, that the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike anything that ever before existed in the world; our contemporaries will find no prototype of it in their memories. I seek in vain for an expression that will ac curately convey the whole of the idea I have formed of it; the old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate: the thing itself is new, and since I cannot name, I must attempt to define it. "I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may 269 A HUMANE ECONOMY appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly en deavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country."

18. Many important contributions to the subject of mass de mocracy have appeared in recent years: Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Ope cit.; W. Martini, Das Ende aZZer Sicherheit (Stuttgart, 1954); G. W. Keeton, The Passing of Parliament (London, 1952); Nisbet, Ope cit.; F. A. Hayek, "Entstehung und Verfall des Rechtsstaatsideals," in A. Hunold (ed.), Wirtschaft ohne Wunder (Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1953) ; J. L. Tahnon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (Lon don, 1952) ; Rene Gillouin, Man's Hangman Is Man (Mundelein, Illinois, 1957) ; Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston, 1955); Lord Percy of Newcastle, The Heresy of Democ racy (London, 1954) ; Hannah Arendt, "Authority in the Twentieth Century," The Review of Politics (October, 1956) ; P. Worsthorne, "Democracy v. Liberty," Encounter (January, 1956) ; Christopher Dawson, "The Birth of Democracy," The Review of Politics (Janu ary, 1957). Dawson quotes Thomas Paine as the American prophet of revolutionary democracy. In his famous Common Sense (1776), Paine exclaims: "We have it in our power to begin the world all over again. A situation similar to the present hath not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand, and a race of men perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains are to receive their portion of freedom from the event of a few months." Fortunately, the influence of men like Alexander Hamil ton, James Madison, and John Adams was strong enough to prevail against the Jacobin views of Thomas Paine and his disciples.

270 NOTES The phenomenon of "eternal Jacobinism," which, incidentally, is also an essential element of Communism, has not yet been sufficiently clarified. In particular, less attention than the subject merits has been paid to the characteristic idea of revolutionary new begin nings-as if all the preceding millennia had been waiting for our own higher illumination and purer intentions. Yet it should be obvi ous how impo~tant and fateful this idea is. There is an a priori pre sumption that it contains more than a little theology, and this is very plain in the works of Rousseau and also of Paine, as Dawson makes clear. A Catholic variant of this idea started with Lamennais, who imagines that in our day the darkness is suddenly being lifted from the peoples of the world and replaced by progress. Lamennais has become the pioneer of a Catholic progressivist movement, a Jacobin ism of the Cross, which is softening up even the Catholic masses for totalitarian democracy and Communism-most of all in Lamen nais' own country. In the orthodox Eastern churches the same heresy has found occasional supporters, for example N. Berdyaev.

19. On isolation of the individual in mass society, see A. Riistow, "Vereinzelung," Vierkandt Festschrift Gegenwartsprobleme der Soziologie (Potsdam, 1949); Paul Halmos, Solitude and Privacy (London, 1952) ; and Riesman, Ope cit. 20. The quotation is from Joachim Bodamer, Gesundheit und technische Welt (Stuttgart, 1955), 203. See also Hermann Fried mann, Das Gemiit, Gedanken zu einer Thymologie (Munich, 1956), and Au service de la personne, medecine et monde nouveau (Paris, 1959), a symposium of European physicians working under the leadership of Paul Tournier. 21. Goethe's Faust, an abridged version translated by Louis MacNeice (London, 1951), 283. 22. Charles Morgan, Liberties of the Mind (London, 1951), Ill. 23. Apart from Bernanos, this subject has occupied many other contemporary writers, including T. S. Eliot and Evelyn Waugh, but I know of no penetrating analysis, except for an excellent chapter in Kirk's A Program for Conservative.s. In a later work, Beyond the 271 A HUMANE ECONOMY Dreams of Avarice, Kirk repeatedly refers to the "Age of Bore dom." The real discoverer of "social ennui" is probably Dean W. R.

luge (A Pacifist in Trouble [London, 1939]). 24. The quotation is from W. H. R. Rivers, Essays on the De population of Melanesia.(cited by Kirk in A Program for Conserva tives, 104). One may wonder, incidentally, whether the detractors of romanticism are at all aware of the part played in the colored peoples' regrettable antagonism toward the West by their dislike of what they call Western "materialism." Their dislike of it is at least as great as their desire to emulate us and the envy that is caused by the difficulty of emulation. 25. Richard I(aufmann, SilddeutscheZeitung, October 6.7, 1956, with reference to a survey on the "use of leisure in an industrial town" arranged by the Westphalian Institute of Journalism. The famous Kinsey Report, whose repulsive emphasis on the merely physical is in itself a sign of our times, also has its bearing on this subject, for what else is this rampant and obsessive sexuality but the expression of an infinitely bored society that is merely acerbating its boredom with such erotic degradation? More than anything else, this report demonstrates how our world is on the brink of dying of boredom like the Melanesians. With regard to Great Britain, Rown tree and Lavers, Ope cit., have painted a no less depressing picture of the boredom of mass society.

Women, to the extent that they remain interested in their house holds and children and perhaps also as a result of their different nature, have. a better chance of compensation; there is a presump tion, therefore, that modern mass society affects and bores men more than women (cf. Ludwig Paneth, Riitsel Mann [Zurich, 1946] ; Bodamer, Ope cit., 49ff.). Finally, the question of how old people fare in this society has called forth a vast amount of literature. It is indeed a very important question and one that opens up grim per spectives. What happens to children has already been discussed in the text of this volume. 272 NOTES 26. Colm Brogan, The Democrat at the Supper Table (London, 1945),17l. 27. Tocqueville, Ope cit., VoL II, Bk. II, Ch. 15, p. 145. See also his observations in ibid., Ch. 17. 28. Arnold Weber, "Zur Psychologie des Fernsehens," Schweizer Monatshefte (Fehruary, 1957). Weber is a professor of child psy chiatry at the University of Bern.

29. In Switzerland, the revolt against technological utilitarian ism has admirably expressed in Emil Egli's essay "Auf trag und Grenzen der Technisierung," Die Schweiz, Jahrbuch der Neuen Helvetischen Gesellschaft (1956). 30. Charles Baudouin (op. cit., 21) raises the question of whether the vandalism of the last war's bom.bing is not appropriate to the spirit of irreverent and destructive modernism. In fact, there was no strategic (not to mention moral) justification for the destruction of ancient town centers. These town centers are a thorn in the flesh of avant-garde architects. A last and rather touching vestige of shame (or maybe a thought for tourist interest) has preserved the eighteenth -century British Governor's Palace in Boston amidst that city's concrete-and-glass canyons, although, of course, the build ing's nobility, set anl0ng oppressive dreariness and ugliness, is all the more eloquent proof of modern barbarity. It is significant that the stream of Americans which inundates Europe each year is not matched by an opposing stream of Europeans visiting America and that there is no European counterpart to the type of American weary of his continent and coming to settle in Europe, such as was depicted in some of Sinclair Lewis' novels. The ultimate reason is that Ameri cans still find in the Old World some vitamin of the soul which they often miss in the New. It is in this light that the Europeans' sedulous imitation of America should be judged.

31. See some highly pertinent observations in Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice, 308-309. This is a further reason for the decline of the arts (see Note 16 above). I do not know whether any attempt 273 A HUMANE ECONOMY has been made to interpret modern surrealist and abstract art in this light, but it seems to me that the point of view stressed here should not be neglected if we are to understand a school of painting which, at best, produces something like wallpaper patterns. This point of view might help. to develop in one important respect the excellent analyses by Hans Sedlmayr (Die Revolution der modernen Kunst [Hamburg, 1955]) and Wladimir Weidle (Les abeilles d'Aristee, Essai sur Ie destin actuel des lettres et des arts [3rd ed., Paris, 1954] ) If today's visual arts increasingly lose their "content" (see Max Picard, Die Atomisierung der modernen Kunst [Hamburg, 1954 J and the impressive last chapter of Peter Meyer's Europiiische Kunst geschichte [Vol. II, Ziirich, 1948]), the most obvious explanation is that they, too, are succumbing to the realities of modern mass society. We can summarize the situation by saying that the artist's position in our society cannot be assessed without being treated as part of our overall pathological picture. In this, the artist plays a dual role: (1) as a symptom of the decline of "bourgeois" society, that is, as an essential part of a process in which the artist appears as the prototype of rootlessness and, since the romantic age, even prides himself on his "creative" disdain of the despised Philistine; and (2) as a victim of the selfsame process, which increasingly turns creative art into business, which steadily diminishes the de mand forgenuine art-partly for technical reasons (photography, radio, films, television, better methods of reproduction, etc.) and partly for sociological ones (disappearance of patronage, mass cul ture, proletarianization, etc.)-and which subjects creative produc tion to the modern laws of quantity and speed, and the artist to the law of supply and demand. We shall have more to say about this in another context.

32. New York Times, June 27, 1955. As regards Great Britain, a recent poll among 5,603 Cambridge undergraduates revealed that 11 percent of the men respondents and 34 per cent of the women had "decided" to emigrate after graduation and that 27 per cent of 274 NOTES the men and 15 per cent of the women had "considered" doing so. Even allowing for the fact that only 6 per cent of the total replied to these particular questions, the proportion is higher than that of emigrants in general to total population (Economist[February 9, 1957]). The reasons given-dissati.sfaction, disgruntIement-cor respond to those suggested in the text. 33. "The strength of the romantic current always corresponds precisely to the alienation of the exponents of a refined civilization from the general human base." (Meyer, Ope cit., 349) CHAPTER III 1. Among contemporary economists who have turned their at tention to the ethical framework of the economy, we may mention J. M. Clark, The Ethical Basis of Economic Freedom (The Kazanjian Foundation Lectures, 1955) and David McCord Wright, Democracy and Progress (New York, 1948). It is also pertinent to recall the following passages from J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi's Nouveaux principes d'economie politique (2nd ed., Paris, 1827) : "The mass of the people, and the philosophers, too, seem to forget that the in crease of wealth is not the purpose of political economy but the means at its disposal for insuring 1the happiness of all." (p. iv) "When England forgets people for thinking of things, is she not sacrificing the aim to the means?" (p. ix) "A nation where no one suffers want, but where no one has enough leisure or enough well being to give full scope to his feelings and thought, is only half civilized, even if its lower classes have a fair chance of happiness."

(p. 2) Indeed, the entire first chapter of this book is well worth rereading. 2. Cf. my two treatises, Borgkauf im Lichte sozialethischer Kritik (Koln and Berlin, 1954) and Vorgegessen Brat (Koln and Berlin, 1955) . 3. Another apposite example of the progressive decline of the 275 A HUMANE ECONOMY significance of ownership and related norms and institutions is the deteriorating morale of debtors at the expense of creditors. This development can be observed in many countries. The courts are lenient in cases of default and bankruptcy, and the result is that the creditor is often deprived of his rights and property in the name of mistaken "social justice." It should hardly be necessary to point to the expropriation of landlords because of rent control in many countries or to the effects of progressive personal taxes. 4. From the characteristically plentiful recent literature, we may mention, apart from the works cited in Note I above: F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (London, 1935); K. E. Boulding, The Organizational Revolution (New York, 1953) ; Daniel Villey, "The l\1arket Economy and Roman Catholic Thought," International Economic Papers (No.9, 1959) ; G. Del Vecchio, Diritto ed Econo mia (2nd ed., Rome, 1954); W.Weddigen, Wirtschaftsethik (Berlin-Munich, 1951); A. Dudley Ward (ed.), The Goals of Eco nomic Life (New York, 1953) ; and D. L. Munby, Christianity and Economic Problems (London, 1956).

5. The relevant discussion has been fully reported by Carlo Antoni in A. Hunold (ed.), Die freie Welt im kalten Krieg (Erlen bach-Ziirich, 1955). 6. The idea here expressed is treated more fully in my book The Social Crisis of Our Time, 225-27. 7. The economist who rejects utilitarianism .finds himself in the distinguished company of J. M. Keynes, who has this to say about the Benthamite tradition: "But I do now regard that as the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of modem civilisation and is responsible for its present moral decay." (J. M. Keynes, Two Memoirs [London, 1949],96) In connection with the passage from Macaulay's Essays mentioned in the text, we recall Bentham's re mark: "While Xenophon was writing his history and Euclid teach ing geometry, Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense under pre tence of talking wisdom and morality." (Quoted from .Time and Tide [May 19, 1956]) There is a clearly visible road from this kind 276 NOTES of Philistine utilitarianism to positivism and the philosophy of logical analysis.

8. For more detail, see my essay "Gegenhaltung und Gegengesin nung del' freien Welt," in Die freie Welt im kalten Krieg, 183-21l. 9. For an exposition of the overall problem, see my study "Un entwickelte Lander," ORDO, Jahrbuch fiir die Ordnung von Wirt schaft und Gesellschaft (1953), 63-113. For the topical case of the Arab world, see Walter L. LaQueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London, 1957). 10. Apart from LaQueur's book, see also Emil Brunner, "Japan heute," Schweizer Monatshefte (March, 1955) ; Ramswarup, Gandh ism and Communism (New Delhi, 1955), in which we find this state ment: "Our intellectualized leftist conscience sees nothing hut illiteracy, inadequacy, misery and frustration around and hopes to remove these by the blueprints of 5-year plans. Gandhiji, on the other hand, brought a message of hope and suggested ways of im provement, not by destroying existing patterns but by bearing with them, by improving them." (p. 11) ; Harry D. Gideonse, "Colonial Experience and the Social Context of Economic Development Pro grams," in R. A. Solo (ed.), Economics and the Public Interest (New Brunswick, 1955) ; F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of Nations (New York, 1952) ; Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1954); M. R. Masani, "The Communist Party in India," Pacific Affairs (March, 1951).

11. Admirably apposite is Theodor Mommsen's summing up of the staleness of ancient Rome, which formed the background for a personage like Catiline: "When a man no longer enjoys his work but works merely in order to procure himself enjoyments as quickly as possible, then it is only an accident if he does not become a crimi nal." (Quoted from OUo Seel, Cicero [Stuttgart, 1953], 66) 12. Wilhelm Ropke, "A European Looks at American Intellec tuals," The National Review (November 10, 1956). The literature on this important subject reflects the facts, for it is divided into the two extremes of anti-capitalist intellectuals on the one hand and 277 A HUMANE ECONOMY anti-intellectual capitalists on the other. This means that the prob lem as such is lost to view. This weakness is also apparent in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Capitalism and the Historians (Chicago, 1954), how.. ever valuable this book is in other respects as a corrective of our ideas about economic history. Cf. my review ("Der 'Kapitalismus' und die Wirtschaftshistoriker") in Neue Zurcher Zeitung, No. 614 (March 16, 1954).

13. On the ethical "middle level" of the market economy, see M. Pantaleoni, Du caractere logique des differences d'opinions qui separent les economistes (Geneva, 1897); Wilhelm Ropke, Die Lehre von der Wirtschaft (8th ed., Erlenbach-Ziirich, 1958),41-46; and idem, Internationale Ordnung-heute, 116-35. 14. Cf. my essay "Unentwickelte Lander," ORDO, Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschajt (1953). 15. How Christianity overcame this phase in the course of its de velopment as a dogma and a church and how it came once more to acknowledge the cultural value of "loving oneself" is very evident from Augustine's example. Cf. Hans von Soden, Urchristentum und Geschichte (Tiibingen, 1951), 56-89. 16. Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays (Lon don, 1907), 28. Lord Acton was a Catholic and might well have invoked St. Thomas Aquinas: "Ordinatius res humanre tractantur, si singulis immineat propria cura alicuius rei procurandre; esset autem con fusio, si quilibet indistincte qurelibet procuraret." (Summa Thea logiae, II, II, 66,2. Quoted from Joseph Hoffner, "Die Funktionen des Privateigentums in der freien Welt," in E. von Beckerath, F. W.

Meyer, and A. Miiller-Armack (eds.), Wirtschaftsfragen der freien Welt- [Erhard-Festschrift, Frankfurt a. M., 1957], 122.) We might also recall the Pilgrim Fathers, the first English colo nizers of New England, who, devout Calvinists as they were, thought they could set up a purely communist system of agriculture; but a few years later, they were forced by the catastrophic decline in yields to change over to a market system and private ownership. 278 NOTES 17. The part played by the art collector's passion in the lives of American multimillionaires of the past generation is described in an entertaining biography of the art dealer who supplied them: S. N. Behrman, Duveen (London, 1952). Their names are immortalized in the art galleries they created, which include the National Gallery in Washington, the Frick Gallery, and special collections at the Metropolitan Museum in New York. It seems as if this back door to immortality was one of Duveen's most effective selling points.

On the other hand, even supreme intellectual achievements are not always free from the profit motive, as Goethe's example shows. It seems that it was an attractive offer by his publisher, Cotta, which finally led Goethe to complete his Faust. Schiller had solicited this offer behind Goethe's back; we have his letter to Cotta of March 24, 1800: "I am afraid Goethe will completely neglect his Faust, into which so much work has already gone, unless some stimulus from outside in the form of an attractive offer stirs him to take up this great work once more and finish it..•. However, he expects a large profit, for he knows that this work is awaited with suspense in Ger many. I am convinced that you can get him, by means of a brilliant offer, to complete this work in the cOlmingsummer." Goethe's prompt reaction can be seen in his letter to Schiller of April 11, 1800. But who would therefore deprecate the profit motive?

18. "The Benthamite delusion that politics and economics could be managed on considerations purely material has exposed us to a desolate individualism in which every man and every class looks upon all other men and classes as dangerous competitors, when in reality no man and no class can continue long in safety and pros perity without the bond of sympathy and the reign of justice." (Rus sell Kirk, "Social Justice and Mass Culture," The Review of Politics [October, 1954], 447) If we want to understand fully this error of liberal immanent ism, which we first meet in such disarming purity in Say's youthful work Olbie, then in the writings of Bentham and his school, and which had a last bright flicker in Herbert Spencer's work, we must remember that at that time the liberation from really 279 A HUMANE ECONOMY constrictive bonds was an absorbing task, while the moral reserves were still intact enough to be taken for granted. A similar situation existed in Germany after 1945, when it was necessary to give priority to the need of overcoming intolerable poverty by releasing the eco nomic forces weakened by repressed inflation. The one-sidedness of nineteenth-century individualism was paralleled by the equally con spicuous one-sidedness of political individualism, whose fatal ideal of unitarian democracy can be understood as a reaction to the plural istic petrification of the ancien regime.

The roots of the moral blindness of individualism and utilitarian ism naturally reach far back into the eighteenth century, to Helve tius, Holbach, Lamettrie, and D'Alembert, just as its ramifications, ultimately reach forward to Marx and Engels. 19. Cf. my book International Economic Disintegration (3rd ed., London, 1950), 67ff., and my course of lectures on "Economic Or der and International Law" at The Hague Academy of International Law (Recueil des Cours 1954 [Leiden, 1955]). 20. Cf. Goetz Briefs, "Grenzmoral in der pluralistischen Gesell schaft," in Wirtschaftsfragen der freien Welt. 21. The problems of competition and the dilemma it so often in... volves can be studied very well in the example of universities. If one knows the system of those countries where the lecturer draws at... tendance fees and therefore has a financial interest in the outward success of his lectures, one realizes how poisonous an atmosphere o£ rivalry can thus be created and how the teacher is tempted to court outward success more than is right and proper. On the other hand, this system provides a good stimulant for weaker characters who are not sufficiently conscious of the obligations of their office.

22. The idea of nobilitas naturalis is, of course, so old that it is difficult to trace its spiritual genealogy. It may be worth noting, though, that the idea was quite familiar to a democrat like Thomas· Jefferson, who is above any suspicion of reactionary opinions. On October 28, 1813, Jefferson wrote to John Adams, who was a con servative: "1 agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among; 280 NOTES men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. • • •The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts and government of society. And indeed it would have heen inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of society." (A. Koch and W. Peden, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson [Modern Library, New York], 632-33) The application to the particular case of the market economy can be found in my hook The Social Crisis oj Our Time, 134ft See also Wright, Ope cit., 25fJ.

23. We again quote an author beyond suspicion: "[The legisla tor] has not fulfilled his task if, in his desire to insure equal satis faction of all needs, he renders impossible the full development of outstanding individuals, if he prevents anyone from rising above his fellows, if he cannot produce anyone as an example to the human race, as a leader in discoveries which will benefit all." (Simonde de Sismondi, Ope cit., II, 2) The same idea is forcefully expressed by Alexis de Tocqueville in his DemocTt~cy in America. See also L. Baudin, "Die Theorie der EHten," in Masse und Demokratie, 39-54. 24. H. K. Rothel, Die Hansestiidte (Munich, 1955), 9l. 25. W. H. Hutt, Economists and the Public (London, 1936); Wilhelm Ropke, "Der wissenschaftliche Ort der Nationalokonomie," 8tudium Generale (July, 1953). 26. See my Mass und Mitte, 200-218. Since that book was pub lished, I have become even more firmly convinced that advertising, in all of its forms and with all of its effects, one of the foremost of which is to encourage the concentration of firms, is one of the most serious problems of our time and should receive the most critical lttention of those few who can still afford to speak up without fear )f being crushed by the powerful interests dominating this field.

Iowever, the interested parties are likely to put up fierce resistance, s we know from experience. To give a sample of it, and at the same me to illustrate the point of view developed in the text, I quote the llowing sentences from an article against the limitation of outdoor 281 A HUMANE ECONOMY advertising: "With all due respect to the tidiness of our towns and landscapes and to the need of protecting monuments of nature, art, and culture, the aesthete's susceptibilities must today yield to the very concrete claims of life..•. Undoubtedly, town and country would be prettier without posters and obviously also without the rush of traffic and all the other well-known inevitable troubles and distinguishing marks of modern business activity. But all of this, whether good or unpleasant, cannot be painted out of modern public and business life by, as it were, faking the picture with the brush of a buildings-preservation policy." (Nieder sachsische Wirtschaft [July 20, 1954]) It is hardly possible to state more crudely an opinion whose power is, unfortunately, only too easy to imagine.

27. See Note 2 above and the works to which it refers. 28. On East-West trade, see Wilhelm Ropke, "Aussenhandel im Dienst der Politik," ORDO, Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirt schaft und Gesellschaft (1956), 45-65. 29. On economic policy in a mass democracy, see Lippmann, Ope cit.; Felix Somary, Democracy at Bay: A Diagnosis and a Prog nosis (New York, 1952) ; Lord Percy of Newcastle, Ope cit.; Gil louin, Ope cit.; Kirk, "Social Justice and Mass Culture," The Review, of Politics (October, 1954) ; and Wright, Ope cit. Modern "television, democracy" is the nadir of the downward development so far. 30. Bertrand de Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, histoire naturelle de sa' croissance (Geneva, 1945), 390ff. 31. Benjamin Constant, Oeuvres politiques (ed. Louandre, Paris' 1874), 248f. 32. On pressure groups, see Boulding, Ope cit., and A. Riisto~' Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1957), Vol. II 171ff. On the "labour standard," see J. R. Hicks, "Economic Found tions of Wage Policy," Economic Journal (September, 1955), 39 33. Wilhelm Ropke, Wohnungszwangswirtschaft-ein europl sahes Problem (Dusseldorf, 1951); M. Friedmann and George Stigler, "Roofs or Ceilings?" Popular Essays on Current Proble,' VoL I, No.2 (September, 1946) ; Alfred Amonn, "Normalisier1' 282 NOTES der Wohnungswirtschaft in grundsatzlicher Sicht," Schweizer Monatshefte (June, 1953). A comprehensive postwar exposition of this hair-raising chapter of economic policy has yet to he written.

The true state of affairs became clear to me recently when I received a letter from a German socialist politician. He wrote that by now everybody was of one mind about this troublesome matter but that he would be glad to hear from me concerning what one couId do about it in practice ..I replied that that was not my business but his. I expected of him, I said, that he should openly defend in public the view which he had expressed in his letter to me, and I proposed that as a beginning we publish our correspondence. I received no reply. 34. The prototype of the modern economocrat is the eighteenth century physiocrat. The physiocrats-or economistes, led by Ques nay-are clearly the ancestors of al][ the power-thirsty, cocksure, and arrogant planners and organizers. Walter Bagehot (Biographical Studies [London, 1881], 269f.) paints a vivid picture of them. He says that a contemporary of Quesnay's wrote of him that he was convinced that he had reduced economic theory to a mere calcula tion and to axioms of irrefutable evidence. Tocqueville (L'ancien regime et la revolution [1856], Chapter 3) says of the physiocrats: "They not only abhor certain privileges, but all diversity: they would worship equality even if it meant general slavery. Whatever does not fit in with their designs has to be smashed. They have little respect for contracts and none for private rights; or rather, they do not, strictly speaking, admit private rights at all, but only the common benefit."

CHAPTER IV 1. An extensive discussion of the Beveridge Plan is to be found in my book Civitas Humana (London, 1948), 142-48. In his Full Employment in a Free Society (London, 1944), the creator of this famous plan, by means of which Great Britain became the model of 283 A HUMANE ECONOMY the welfare state, subsequently contributed much to complementing the egalitarian ideology of the welfare state with the ideology of inflationary "full employment." See the pertinent critique of this second Beveridge plan in Henry C. Simons, "The Beveridge Pro gram: An Unsympathetic Interpretation," Journal of Political Economy (September, 1945), reprinted in Economic Policy for a Free Society, 277-312; Lionel Robbins, The Economist in the Twen tieth Century (London, 1954), 18-40. Both critics come to the cor rect conclusion, now confirmed by facts, that the full-employment policy advocated by Beveridge must result in inflation. It is much to Lord Beveridge's credit that he himself later repeatedly and frankly criticized the development which his first plan set in motion.

In his later hook Voluntary Action (London, 1948), for instance, he took occasion to place voluntary group aid in its proper light. How ever, he seems never to have realized how great a part he played in the development he criticized. Not long ago, he frankly declared in a lecture that inflation was destroying the savings which he had set aside for his own old age; it may therefore happen, he said, that he would live longer than he could afford to. But he does not seem to have grasped that a large part of the responsibility for this inflation, which erodes his savings and threatens his carefree remaining years, belongs to his own creation, the welfare state, together with overfull employment, also a subject of his praise. He appears as the pathetic figure of a man who does not know that he himself sawed off the branch on which he sat. 2. Colin Clark, Welfare and Taxation (Oxford, 1954); A. C.

Pigou, "Some Aspects of the Welfare State," Diogenes (July, 1954) ; Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, 1951); Hans Willgerodt, "Die Krisis der sozialen Sicherheit und das Lohnproblem," ORDO, Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirt schalt und Gesellschaft (1955), 145-87. 3. Lionel Robbins, "Freedom and Order," in Economics and Public Policy (Washington, 1955), 152. A few lines earlier, Rob hins says: "In a society in which incentive and allocation depend on 284 NOTES private enterprise and the market, a continuous redistribution of income and property in the interests of a pattern of equality, or something approximating to equality, is almost a contradiction in terms." 4. Helmut Schoeck, "Das Problem des Neides in der Massen.. demokratie," in Masse und Demokratie, 239-72. 5. '''The hatred that men bear to privilege increases in propor tion as privileges become fewer and less considerable, so that demo..

cratic passions would seem to burn most fiercely just when they have least fuel. I have already given the reason for this phenomenon. When all conditions are unequal, no inequality is so great as to offend the eye, whereas the slightest dissimilarity is odious in the midst of general uniformity; the more complete this uniformity is, the more insupportable the sight of such a difference becomes. Hence it is natural that the love of equality should constantly increase together with equality itself, and that it should grow by what it feeds on. This never dying, ever kindling hatred which sets a democratic peo.. pIe against the smallest privileges is peculiarly favorable to the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the representative of the state alone. The sovereign, being necessarily and incontestably above all citizens, does not excite their envy, and each of them thinks that he strips his equals of the prerogatives that he concedes to the crown." (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II, Book IV, Chapter 3, p. 295. My italics.) 6. A discussion of the demand for equality and all of its conse quences is to be found in my earlier book Mass und Mitte, 65-75. I still subscribe to that critique, as well as to my serious misgivings about that subtle and therefore most tempting form of equality which goes by the name of equality of opportunity. The arguments I put forward then would seem to be convincing enough, in particular the argument that it would be completely arbitrary to aim at equality of opportunity only in material matters susceptible to the leveling action of the state, while inequality rnust be accepted in other fields -unequal health, unequal intelligence, unequal character. If, there ..

285 A HUMANE ECONOMY fore, opportunities are to be really the same, the material conditions (the income and wealth of the child's parents) must be measured out in such doses that they add up with the non-material and non· equaIizable conditions to "equal opportunity." Suppose a child has poor health but his parents can, at least, equip him with better ma· terial conditions for the struggle of life. Now what possible justifica tion is there in depriving him even of these? Should not the others be glad to have inherited a healthy stomach, a sound heart, or nerves of steel? How is all that to be calculated? In this light the incessant redistribution which strict equality of opportunity presupposes looks even more outrageous than it does in any case. Furthermore, if it is just that a man may· own private property-and the advocates of equality of opportunity fortunately do not go so far as to deny it why should it be unjust that his children benefit by it? I may do anything I like with my income and wealth-I may build a house, buy a television set, acquire a luxury car, travel around the world only one thing I may not do, namely, give my children the best and most careful education. For the rest, we shall see in the next chapter that the claim for equality of opportunity corresponds to an extreme ideal of liberalism according to which a continuous race of all for everything is desirable. The question arises: by what right is this race to stop at the national frontiers?

7. Heinrich Heine, Deutschland, Kaput I. It should be obvious that the collective utilitarianism and epicureanism of the welfare state ideology is closely connected with the disappearance of belief in transcendence and immortality. Cf. Aloys Wenzl, Unsterblichkeit (Bern, 1951). 8. Colm Brogan, The Educational Revolution (London, 1954), paints a vivid picture of Great Britain, which, for the time being, re· mains an extreme case. In the United States, "classless," as applied to education, is a make-believe, as in many other fields, since par ents are free to send their children to private schools if they want them to have a better education than can be·expected in the public schools. The only drawback is that this is far more expensive than 286 NOTES the much-maligned school fees current in European countries for good public schools. We possess a vast documentation concerning the appalling deterioration of the educational level entailed by so cialization of education. Another important factor is that if so many young people go to the universities, the non-academic groups of the population are continuously deprived of their most intelligent and enterprising elements (Erik R. von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Freiheit oder Gleichheit? [Salzburg, 1953], 473) and family ties are disrupted.

See also Note 1 to Chapter V of this volume. 9. Hermann Levy, National Health Insurance: A Critical Study (London, 1944) ; M. Palyi, Compulsory Medical Care and the Wel fare State (Chicago, 1950) ; F. Roberts, The Cost of Health (Lon don, 1952); Werner Bosch, Patient, Arzt, Kasse (Heidelberg, 1954) ; H. Birkhauser, "Der Arzt und der soziale Gedanke in der Medizin," Schweizerische Medizinische Wochenschrift, No. 5 (1956) . 10. Concerning the National Health Service, a distinguished British economist writes: "The important economic question about that scheme was this: if there is a service the demand for which at zero price is almost infinitely great, if no steps are taken to increase the supply, if the cost curve is rising rapidly, if every citizen is guaranteed by law the best possible medical service and if there is no obvious method of rationing, what will happen? I do not recall any British economist, before the event, asking these simple ques tions." (J. Jewkes, in Economics and Public Policy, 96) Compare this with the observation by M. Palyi (op. cit., 71) : "The abolish ..

ment altogether of a compulsory sickness scheme, once established, even if bankrupt and unsatisfactory, is beyond imagination. It has never happened." A further testimony: "Enthusiasts for nationalized medicine found themselves in competition with the enthusiasts for extended education, state subsidized housing, higher state pensions and benefits, and a dozen other schernes with a strong emotional and vote-catching appeal. ... I believe that the contemporary and scien tific conception of medicine cannot flourish fully and firmly where 287 A HUMANE ECONOMY medicine has been socialized." (Cohn Brogan, "The Price of Free Medicine," The Freeman [June, 1956]) Finally, a British physician confirms this view: "The cost to the country in money is easily ex· pressed, understood, accepted, amended or rejected. The cost to the country in health and happiness which will result from the degrada tion of doctors is beyond our powers of comprehension." (Scott Ed ward, "Retreat from Responsibility," Time and Tide [October 10, 1953]) 11. On the illusion of the welfare state, see Colin Clark, Ope cit., and M. J. Bonn, "Paradoxien eines Wohlfahrtsstaates," Aussen.

politik (April, 1953). 12. This is, among other things, what Colin Clark's proposals come to. Compare the following recent report from Belgium (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, No. 1209 [April 27, 1957]). The socialist Minis ter of Labor proposed, by means of the method now fashionable everywhere, to raise the income limit of compulsory state insurance and to merge the various private pension funds into a state fund. The result was a storm of indignation among the workers and trade unions. The social charges of Belgian industry had risen in twelve years from 25 per cent of the wage bill to 41 per cent, and the Bel gian workers and employees decided that this was enough-more than enough. They asked such awkward questions as whether there was still any reasonable relationship between the growing social con· tributions and actual services and whether there were no cheaper ways of obtaining old-age insurance.

13. It is normal to deplore the fate of men like Winckelmann, Herder, HebbeI, Racine, and many others whose genius was handi capped by poverty, but the point is that all of them succeeded in coming to the top, thanks to the diversified structure of society in their time. Encouragement and help were to be had in many places and from many people: the master of a school, a princely patron, a secretarial post, a hospitable country mansion. In these circum stances there was a very high probability of being able to set one's foot on the rung of some ladder; at any rate, to say the least, this 288 NOTES probability could well stand comparison with the likelihood that no genius will go unnoticed in the present welfare state. How the rise of talent was possible at that time in the most adverse circumstances is impressively seen in Winckelmann's life. (C. Justi, Winck elmann und seine Z eitgenossen [2nd ed., Leipzig, 1898], I, 22 and 28) Many other biographies testify 1to the same thing. Take, for in stance, the life of Scharnhorst, a tenant farmer's son from Han nover, who received tuition in mathematics from a retired major (this happened in my own village) and was then sent to a small mili tary college by the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe. One cannot help being both touched and astonished. by the climbing feats of these men as they rose, from one foothold to the next, in society. It is not so certain that the socialized chairlift of the welfare state always achieves the same successes. In other respects, too, our age of the welfare state has little reason to consider itself so superior to the social hardships of the past. A little more modesty is indicated in relation to our forebears. Anyone who, like myself, has grown up in the simple conditions of a village can easily remember the time when the different classes stood together in a neighborly way, where as today they are far removed from. each other. The real inequality of men has not diminished but has increased during the last one hundred years. As an example, take ZeIter, who started out as a builder's apprentice and ended up as a professor of music and close friend of Goethe without losing contact with his own milieu. "A life of this kind," Paulsen wrote as long ago as the end of the last cen· tury (Ein System der Ethik [2nd ed., Berlin, 1891], 727), "would be inconceivable today. Nowadays ZeIter would have gone through secondary school and studied architecture, he would have learned to draw and calculate, would have taken mechanics and history of art, and he would have become an architect and officer of the reserve and would never have built a single wall. He would have been an; employer of masons, not their fellow and instructor. Or else he would have remained a mason and a fellow of masons, but then h~ 289 A HUMANE ECONOMY would not have gained the friendship of a Geheimrat and minister, nor become a professor of music."

14. I entirely agree with the incisive criticism recently expressed hy two distinguished contemporary economists: F. A. Hayek, "Pro gressive Taxation Reconsidered," in Mary Sennholz (ed.), Free dom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises (New York, 1956), 265-84; Wright, op. cit., 94ft 15. Cf. Chester C. Nash, "The Contribution of Life Insurance to Social Security in the United States," International Labour Review (July, 1955). For corresponding Swiss figures, see E. Marchand, "Le developpement de l'assurance en Suisse," Journal des Associa tions Patronales 1906-1956. In 1953, the last year for which fig ures are available, the sums paid out by insurance companies ex· ceeded the payments of old-age and widows' insurance by nearly one hundred million francs. 16. The idea that economic laws exclude the possibility of the broad masses' providing for themselves by means of the accumula tion of property and that these same economic laws make this self provision a privilege of the few could grow only in the soil of popu lar Keynesianism. I discussed this in more detail in my articles "Prohleme der kollektiven Altersversicherung" (Frankfurter Allge meine Zeitung, February 25, 1956) and "Das Problem der Lebens vorsorge in der Freien Gesellschaft" (Individual-und Sozialver.

sicherung als Mittel der Vorsorge [Bielefeld, 1956]), and I am pleased to quote now the clear and careful analysis by Hans Will gerodt, "Das Sparen auf der Anklagebank der Sozialreformer," ORDO, Jahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesell schaft (1957), 175-98. Note also his comments on the pay-as-you-go system, with which I am in full agreement. 17. The problem of a sliding scale of pensions-called "dynamic pensions" in Germany and introduced, in somewhat modified form, in the spring of 1957-is discussed in my essays referred to in the preceding note. See also H.-J. Riistow, Zur volkswirtschaftlichen Problematik der dynamischen Sozialrente (Berlin-Munich, 1956) ; 290 NOTES Das Problem der Rentenre form, Aktionsgemeinschaft soziaIe Markt wirtschaft, Tagungsprotokoll No.6 (Ludwigsburg, 1956). 18. Morgan, op.cit., 122. 19. This particular form of the claim for international justice is all but forgotten today. I discussed it with the severity it deserves in my book Internationale Ordnung--heute, 164ff.

20. See my L'economie mondiale aux XIXe et XXe siecles, 165 220. 21. A typical work is G. Myrdal, An International Economy (New York, 1956). (See also P. T. Bauer's review of Myrdal's book, Economic Journal [March, 1959], and my own critical comments in Wirtschafts fragen der freien Welt, 493ff.) The part played by plain envy in this, as in the national welfare state, is rightly stressed by Helmut Schoeck, "Der Masochismus des Abendlandes," in A. Hunold (ed.), Europa-Besinnung und Hoffnung (Erlenhach~Ziir. ich, 1957). 22. Ropke, Internationale Ordnung-heute, 118, 133, and 24l. 23. We get a good idea of the new interpretation of modern eco nomic historians in F. A. Hayek (ed.), Capitalism and the His· torians. However, as I have shown in my review of this book ("Der 'Kapitalismus' und die Wirtschaftshistoriker, " Neue Zurcher Z ei· tung, No. 614 [March 16, 1954]), the pendulum now swings too far the other way. We may work out that the proletarians of that time ate more meat and drank more heer than we had so far thought and that materially things were only half as bad (though in my view even half would have been bad enough), but the crucial fact remains that they were proletarians in the widest anq most unpleasant mean· ing of the word and that it was the first time in history that masses of them took the stage, together with their counterpart, the "capioo talists." Modern economic and social historians would be well ad~ vised to share and analyze the contemporary witnesses' rather cred· itable feeling that this was a catastrophe. A large and by no means unimportant part of our own cultural crisis goes back to that time, and we cannot simply turn black into white and a minus into a plus.

291 A HUMANE ECONOMY This cannot be passed over in silence without leaving the most im portant aspect of the discussion unilluminated. 24. Wilhelm Ropke, "Offene und zuriickgestaute Inflation," Kyklos (1947), 1; idem., "Repressed Inflation," Kyklos (1947),3. One of the harshest features of repressed inflation are the monetary "reforms" by which accumulated excess purchasing power due to the "repression" of inflation is periodically removed by calling in and converting cash holdings. Repressed inflation is nowadays really successful and comprehensive only in Communist countries because only they are ruthless enough and possess the required omnipotence of state and police. The example of Poland shows that any curtailment of this omnipotence breaks the dam. We are re minded that the National Socialist system of repressed inflation col lapsed in 1945 at the same time as the political regime. Inflation, in its worst form of repressed inflation, is endemic in all Communist countries and indeed follows necessarily from the nature of the economic system, which is not so in the Western world. Inflation and collectivism are inseparable. (Cf. Wilhelm Ropke, The Problem of Economic Order [Cairo, 1951],29-35) 25. A. J. Brown, The Great Inflation 1939-1951 (London, 1955).

26. Irving Babbitt,. Democracy and Leadership (Boston, 1924), 205-209. 27. Wilhelm Ropke, "Alte und neue Okonomie," in Wirtschaft ohne Wunder, 66-96. 28. On the gold standard, see my Internationale Ordnung heute, 110fI. 29. For a more detailed analysis, see my articles "Das Dilemma der importierten Inflation," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, No. 2128 (July 28, 1956), and "Nochmals: das Dilemma der importierten Infla tion," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, No. 2798 (October 7, 1956). What I said there still seems valid. Imported inflation raises fewer problems inasmuch as it is a very obvious and accessible source of inflation. On the other hand, recent experience has shown it to be exceedingly difficult to deal with because there are great obstacles to the two 292 NOTES methods by which it could be removed, that is, devaluation in the country with stronger inflationary pressure and revaluation in the country with weaker inflationary pressure. Devaluation is resisted by governments because it is a reflection on their political prestige; revaluation is resisted by all of the economic interests which stand to suffer thereby.

30. The attentive observer of contemporary politics will find plenty of occasions to note the forces at work. The most recent exam ple, and the one most familiar to German-speaking readers, is the German pensions reform (see Note 17 above) and the manner in which it was steam-rollered through Parliament. It was a most de pressing spectacle to see how lightly government and Parliament took the immense responsibility which this measure implied. The law overrides all of the urgent recommendations to reverse course and to stimulate self-provision and individual responsibility. On the contrary, it is likely to impair saving considerably, not only because compulsory public provision is expanded, but also because the latter is largely put on a pay··as-you-go basis. Those who are responsible for this blow to saving have neither the excuse of not knowing the contrary arguments in good time nor of having seri ously disproved them. No account at all was taken of the important and justified question of whether pensioners should not rather bene fit from the economy's genuine productivity increase by means of an increase in their real income, that is, in the form of price reduc tions.

31. It would be rewarding to examine this in the greatest possible variety of fields, such as for example, in the mounting cost of the upkeep of historic monuments. It has become a serious problem to keep a city like Venice from falling into decay, although modern mass tourism does help. Nearly all of the articles of the antique trade or old Oriental carpets, etc., are steeply rising in price, and although this is in part due to chronic inflation, the secular rise in the prices of handmade goods plays its part, too. A similar argu ment applies to the real estate market. Here again the high prices 293 A HUl\tIANE ECONOMY are in part due to chronic inflation, but in part they reflect the natural price increase of a good made scarce by population growth and urbanization in industrial countries, especially such circum scribed ones as Switzerland and Germany. 32. One of the earliest and clearest expositions of these relation ..

ships is to be found in Joseph A. Schumpeter, "The March into Socialism," American Economic Review (May, 1950). Note that Lord Beveridge (Full Employment in a Free Society) recommended overfull employment as an ideal state of affairs. "He demands a sellers' market for labor-a continuous excess of vacant jobs over idle hands-which obviously invites flight into assets via the labor market. Since it would mean an inflationary spiral of wage-rate in crease even in the absence of any labor organization, Beveridge is naturally solicitous lest the trade-unions make demands which would frustrate efforts to sustain the value of money.... To expect labor monopolies not to demand monopolistic wages is, under any circum stances, unrealistic. To ask, with Sir William, that they use their power to keep wage rates below the competitive level is quixotic." (Simons, Ope cit., 291f.) 33. B. C. Roberts, "Towards a Rational Wages Structure," Lloyds Bank Review (April, 1957), 5.

34. To show how many errors are still current, even in circles where one would expect a more informed judgment, I quote Jeanne Hersch, an intelligent and lovable social philosopher who, in her Ideologies et realites (Paris, 1956), 40, accuses me of some sort of moral defect because I think that a minimum of unemployment is necessary. This is precisely the kind of economically ignorant moral ism which I had in mind and commented on earlier. 35. Central-bank policy might conceivably be complemented, or even replaced, by the immobilization of budget surpluses as a means to remove excess demand. But to discuss this question would take us too far here. It is connected with the yet more general question of whether public finance should take over the function of monetary control, which has hitherto been fulfilled by the central bank's credit 294 NOTES policy. This could be done by means of appropriate changes in taxa tion and expenditure, deflation to be met by deficit spending and inflation by the accumulation of unspent budget surpluses. I am ashamed to say that I must take my share of the blame for creating this concept of "functional finance" (Krise und Konjunktur [1932] and my subsequent book Crises and Cycles [1936] ) ,but I am forced to admit now that it has stood the test neither of counter-arguments nor of experience. I agree entirely with the devastating criticism by Melchior Palyi (Commercial and Financial Chronicle [April 18, 1957]) and Friedrich A. Lutz (Notenbank und Fiskalpolitik, a lec ture published by the Landeszentralbank von Baden-Wiirttemberg in 1957). That part of the concept which is topical today, namely, the accumulation of budget surpluses as a means of combating in flation, is invalidated, at the very least, by the unrealistic assump tion that in a modern democracy any budget surplus could be pro tected against the parliamentary appetite for larger expenditure.

36. Jacques Chastenet, L'enfance de la Troisieme 1870-1879 (Paris, 1952), 29 and 80, where the original sources are quoted. 37. "The franc Germinal, whose weight and fineness were not subject to government interference, was not only the instrument of French prosperity, but one of the solid bases of France's prestige. It is neither Bergson's putting intuition above reason nor the Euro pean nations' fratricidal wars which caused the real downfall of the edifice built, largely by the French., during the eighteenth and nine teenth centuries. This edifice collapsed when the inviolability of money ceased to be an article of faith, when governments assumed power over money and imagined they had the divine faculty of making something out of nothing." (Jacques Chastenet, La France de M. Fallieres [Paris, 1949], 127) 38. I know of no comprehensive attempt to think through all of the implications of "simmering permanent inflation." Some salient points are discussed in F. A. Lutz, "Inflationsgefahr und Konjunk turpolitik," Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (June, 1957).

295 A HUMANE ECONOMY CHAPTER V 1. Here is one of these Jacobin opinions: "We proscribe the re gional spirit, whether of the department or the commune; we hold that it is odious and contrary to all principles that some municipali ties should be rich and others poor, that some should have vast pos sessions and others nothing but debts." (Memoires de Carnot, I, 278, quoted from H. Taine, La revolution, III, 107) "We want no more local interests, memories, dialects, or patriotism. There must be only one bond among individuals, namely that which ties them to society as a whole. We shall break all the others; we cannot tolerate indi vidual groupings, and we shall do OUI best to disintegrate the most tenacious of them all, the family." This is how Taine acutely sums up this Jacobin ideology. It is no accident that Carnot is the man who later became the creator of the mass armies based on compul sory military service. Few other institutions are so conducive to centralization and concentration of power; Bertrand de Jouvenel (Du Pouvoir, histoire naturelle de sa croissance, Ilf!.) says it results in a modern Minotaur. A democracy inspired by the Jacobin myth of the sovereignty of the people rather than by the liberal idea that those governed should control government is bound to develop into a centralist "democratic despotism." There is fairly general agree ment on this point today, but a little more alertness is called for to detect the underlying social philosophy in the contemptuous talk of the detractors of federalism, small nations, or small firms. We should look upon this kind of talk, which is now fashionable among so-called progressives, as a half -open door through which we get a glimpse of a house furnished in the Jacobin-Napoleonic style.

2. The term "liberalism" may be interpreted in a number of ways. In Switzerland, for example, political parties call themselves liberal when they are just as much conservative, in the sense in which Jacob Burckhardt and Alexandre Vinet may be called both conserva tive and liberal. Liberalism is the basic concept of the Swiss state, and anyone who defends it today against collectivist tendencies calls 296 NOTES himself a liberal. In Italy, the liberals are, on the one· hand, anti collectivist conservatives and, on the other, anti-clerical progressives who are anxious not to lose their connections with the Left. In Ger many, the government's policy is liberal, but its chief exponent is a party which calls itself Christian Democratic, while the "liberals" are in the opposition. Such concepts are comparable to a musical instrument of a certain compass: in the highest and lowest registers it reaches into the range of another instrument, as does the viola into the ranges of the violin and the violoncello, but we still associate with each instrument the idea of a definite range which characterizes its sound. Thus the concept of liberalism has, in Europe, a consider able breadth within which its significance fluctuates. Much the same is true of America, except that the compass there is shifted consider ably to the Left. Certain horder notes are common to both variants of liberalism, but the average range is so different in America and Europe that the two concepts are almost the opposite of each· other.

The American associates with liberalism mostly notes which we in Europe would associate with the Social Democratic register. The New Deal, trade-unionism, planning, centralism, inflationary poli cies, radical taxation of income and wealth-all that is known as "liberal" in America, though this term certainly covers a lot of things which we in Europe would call by the same name. Confusion is even worse confounded by the fact that the concept is usurped by people and movements that are distinguished from Communists only by pretending that they are not. 3. No less a man than Proudhon has said the same thing: "Thus the systems of centralization, imperialism, communism, absolut ism-all of these words are synonymous-derive from popular ideals. In the social contract, as conceived by Rousseau and the Jacobins, the citizen divests himself of his sovereignty; the town council, the departmental and provincial administrations are ab sorbed by central authorities and are no more than agencies under the direct control of the ministry. . • . State power invades every sphere, lays its hands on everything and usurps everything finally, 297 A HUMANE ECONOMY forever: army and navy, administration, jurisdiction, police, educa tion, public building; hanks, stock exchanges, credit, insurance, pub lic assistance, saving, charity; forests, canals, rivers; religion, fi nance, customs, trade, agriculture, industry, transport. And on top of everything heavy taxation, which takes one-fourth of the nation's gross social product." (Du principe federatif [Paris, 1863], 69) I have italicized the last sentence in order to direct the reader's atten ..

tion to Proudhon's perspicacity .. It is easy to see why the centrist Marx hated this decentrist from the bottom of his heart. 4. "In America I saw the freest and most enlightened men placed in the happiest circumstances that the world affords; it seemed to me as if a cloud habitually hung upon their brow, and I thought them serious and almost sad, even in their pleasures .... Their taste for physical gratifications must be regarded as the original source of that secret disquietude which the actions of the Americans betray and of that inconstancy of which they daily afford fresh exam.. pIes.... If in addition to the taste for physical well-being a social condition be added in which neither laws nor customs retain any person in his place, there is a great additional stimulant to his rest lessness of temper. Men will then be seen continually to change their track for fear of missing the shortest cut to happiness .... Wnen all the privileges of birth and fortune are abolished, when all profes sions are accessible to all, and a man's own energies may place him at the top of anyone of them, an easy and unbounded career seems open to his ambition and he will readily persuade himself that he is born to no common destinies. But this is an erroneous notion, which is corrected by daily experience. . • . They have swept away the privileges of some of their fellow creatures which stood in their way, but they have opened the door to universal competition ....

This constant strife between the inclination springing from the equality of condition and the means it supplies to satisfy them harasses and wearies the mind." (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, Book II, Chapter 12, 136-38) More than thirty years ago, I found that of sixty-nine settlers in a typical agri298 NOTES cultural district of the United States only twenty-three had any farm ing experience; the others included two circus musicians, three blacksmiths, two divers, two carpenters, two butchers, three cow herds, one ship's machinist, three publicans, and three old maids. (Wilhelm Ropke, "Das Agrarproblem der Vereinigten Staaten," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 58, p. 492) 5. On Frederic Le Play, see my Civitas Humana, 111. 6. Zahme Xenien, V. The inscription on Loyola's tomb in the Church of the Gesu in Rome is by an unknown author and reads: Non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minima, divinum est. (I must thank Dr. Franz Seiler and Dr. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn for this information.) Holderlin used it, with a slight alteration, as a motto for his Hyperion.

7. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter V; similarly, Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1939), 143-44. The reference to Montesquieu and Mosca suggests that it would be rewarding to write a history of the concepts of centrism and decentrism, but to my knowledge this has never been done. 1 myself attempted an out· line in my essay "Zentralisierung lllnd Dezentralisierung als Leit Hnien der Wirtschaftspolitik," in Ernest Lagler and Johannes Messner (eds.), Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und soziale Ordnung (Vienna, 1952), 20fI. 8. It is difficult to separate the desirable from the undesirable. I tried to do so in 1950 in a report to the Adenauer government on German economic policy (1st die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik richtig? ). I think that what 1 said there is still valid. On the one hand, every sympathy and encouragement are due the workers' and employees' wish to be taken into the management's confidence and to know about the company's affairs, which gives them a correspond ing share of responsibility; the same can be said of their desire for protection against arbitrary treatment, as well as their wish to iden tify themselves with the company, any conflicts of interest about wage policy notwithstanding. On the other hand, it is necessary to 299 A HUMANE ECONOMY reject firmly any attempt to do away with subordination in decisions involving the success of the enterprise or to put part of the responsi bility upon people who are not qualified for it by virtue of any ex pert knowledge, training, or talent and who assume no correspond ing risks. Such claims must be resisted all the more forcefully be cause they often merely conceal an attempt by the trade-unions to extend their power to the company's management. Most of all is resistance indicated when the co-management system is used as the thin end of a wedge, with the intention to upset an economic order which, being a market economy, makes the market the source of the commands which the management's decisions try to interpret cor rectly. By far the best and most thorough exposition of this subject is Franz Bohm, "Das wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmungsrecht der Arbeiter im Betrieb," ORDO, lahrbuch fur die Ordnung von Wirt schalt und Gesellschaft (1951).

9. To give some idea of the consequences of the closed shop in England, we cite the case of Mr. Bonsor, which recently did at least arouse some public interest. The unfortunate man was a musician who had fallen behind in his union dues when out of work, but who was not allowed to accept a job until he had paid up his arrears. He eventually died as a casual worker. (Time and Tide [July 20, 1957]) 10. There is a lot more to be said about economic concentration, especially with respect to the influence of taxation and company law, than I said in my earlier works The Social Crisis of Our Time, Civitas Humana, and Mass und Mitte. See also Joachim Kahl, Macht und Markt (Berlin, 1956). The best exposition of the influence of taxation known to me is to be found in the April, 1957 issue of Wirtschaftsberichte der Berliner Bank, which was devoted to "the disease of the German capital market." It is rightly pointed out that the "birth rate" of industrial firms, that is, the number of new firms, has sunk alarmingly low, which suggests that there is something fundamentally wrong with the capital market and the tax system.

This adds rigidity to an already concentrated economic structure. 300 NOTES It may well be that nobody really wanted all this, and thoroughgoing reforms may therefore have good prospects. About the part played by advertising in fostering concentration, see my Mass und Mitte, 213ff. Meanwhile, the danger has been enhanced by television, which should have been a touchstone by which to prove whether man dominates technology or technology man; but even Switzerland failed this test. 11. G. Haberler, "Die wirtschaftliche Integration Europas," in Wirtschaftsfragen der freien Welt, 521-30; Ropke, Internationale Ordnung-heute, 308-17; idem., L'economie mondiale aux XIXe et XXe siecles, 135-62. 12. We rnay go so far as to suggest an inner kinship between Keynes and Picasso. Even if we did not know that they belong to the same era, we could guess it by the dehumanization which is charac· teristic of both. They also resemble each other in their alternation between the classical and the ultra-modern. Keynes greatly admired Picasso (R. Harrod, The Life of J. M. Keynes [London, 1951], 318) , and Picasso himself, of course, is a Communist.

13. This idea is brilliantly developed in Daniel Villey, "Examen de conscience de l'economie politique," Revue d'Economie Politique (1951), 845-80. 14. The problem of the use of mathematics in economics has re· ceived scant attention. We may cite a discussion in the November, 1954 issue of The Review of Economics and Statistics; Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (New Haven, 1949), 347-54; and G. I. Stigler, Five Lectures on Economic Problems (London, 1950). 15. The discouraging experiences of Great Britain are described in detail and very frankly by Ely Devons, "Statistics as a Basis for Policy," Lloyds Bank Review (July, 1954). Even so conciliatory a man as D. H. Robertson says about the British planners that "the extreme inaccuracy of their forecasts ... would have had even more unfortunate consequences if the errors had not on several occasions providentially cancelled one another out." (Erik Lundberg [ed.], The Business Cycle in the Postwar World [London, 1955], 10) See 301 A HUMANE ECONOMY also Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History (New Haven, 1957).

16. Much confusion has been created by certain modern theories of "perfect" competition. Not only do these theories define competi tion in so perfectionist a manner that the necessary conditions can, a priori, hardly be expected to obtain in the economy, and not only has this theoretical toy nourished a pessimism which, as it were, suspects monopolistic rad~oactivity everywhere in the market econ omy, but this model of "perfect" competition also simply eliminates the dynamic nature of competition, which is precisely the basis of the arguments in favor of competition and the competitive market economy. The abstract mathematical model's concept of competi tion must be replaced with the concept of "active" or "workable", competition, as J. M. Clark calls it, which stresses the competitors' incessant struggle for the consumer's favor. Cf. J. M. Clark, "Toward a Concept ofWorkable Competition," American Economic Review (June, 1940); F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago, 1948) ; Wilhelm Ropke, "Wettbewerb: Konkurrenzsys tern," in Handworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, which is to be published in the near future.

17. The great English writer Norman Angell provides an excel· lent illustration. In his autobiography (After All, Autobiography of Norman Angell [London, 1951], 102) he tells the story of how there was, at a certain stage, a proposal that he take over a Paris paper for which he had previously been working, and thereby be come an entrepreneur. But he suddenly developed a "most appalling funk" because of the responsibility for all those whose livelihood would then depend upon him. When things went wrong for the pa per, the kicks would be for him; when they went right, he would be regarded as a "capitalist exploiter." 18. The statement about Pitt is quoted from Bagehot, Ope cit., 131, and that about Alexander von Humboldt from Briefwechsel und Gespriiche Alexander von Humboldts mit einem jungen Freunde (Berlin, 1861), 137. 302 INDEX Acton, Lord John, 120, 278 n. 16 Adams, John, 133, 270 n. 18, 280 n.22 Advertising: ill effects of, 86; power of, 137; Dangers from excess of, 138 Agnosticism: social results of, 9 Agriculture, 206 Amonn, Alfred, 282-83 n. 33 Anarchism, liberal: Denies ethical foundation of economic system, 123 Angell, Norman, 302 n. 17 Anti-capitalism, 115 Anti-intellectualism, 115 Arendt, Hannah, 270 n. 18 Aswan Dam, 44 Auerbach, Berthold, 38 Austria: as example of market economy, 25; achievement by of bal ance-of-payments equilibrium, 252 Babbitt, Irving, ·191-92, 292 n. 26 Bacon, Francis, 108 Bagehot, Walter, 283 n. 34, 302 n. 18 Bank of France, 218 Banks: as counterweight against government power over money, 196 Bastiat, Frederic, 33, 165 Baudin, L., 281 n. 23 Baudouin, Charles, 268 n. 14, 273 n. 30 Bauer, P. T., 291 n. 21 Beckerath, E. von, 278 n. 16 Behrman, S.N., 279 n. 17 Belgium: return of to market econ omy, 22 Bentham, Jeremy, 279 n. 18 Berdyaev, N., 271 n. 18 Berenson, Bernard, 88 Bernanos, Georges, 80 Beveridge, Sir William Henry, 294 n.32 Beveridge Plan, 153, 164, 283 D. 1 Birkhauser, H., 287 n. 9 Bodamer, Joachim, 78, 130., 271 n.