Chapter 4: 4. U.S. Military Plans and Preparations U.S. Relations with Japan

Relations with Japan had been strained for some time. The Roosevelt administration was fully aware of Japan’s dependence on imports. Yet, as we have seen, it had terminated America’s long-standing commercial treaty with her. After January 1940 Japan had to ask permission on a case by case basis whenever she wanted to import from the United States. In July 1940 the administration had further prohibited exports to Japan by requiring her to get a license to purchase aircraft engines and strategic materials. (When sale of aviation gas, defined by the U.S. as 86 octane or higher, was embargoed on July 1, 1940, she had contrived a way to use 76 octane in her planes.^[1]) The administration was tightening an economic noose around Japan’s neck bit by bit, forcing her to look elsewhere for the supplies and materials she had been accustomed to buying from the United States.

The Japanese had considerable commercial interests in southeast Asia, especially in French Indochina (now comprising the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). After France fell in June 1940, Japan had negotiated with the Vichy government of unoccupied France for permission to occupy French Indochina, to take over bases there, and to maintain order. The rather helpless Vichy government had agreed. As trade with the United States became more difficult, Japan’s interests in Indochina gained in importance and she turned more and more in that direction for the foods and raw materials she needed. Trade pacts concluded later with Indochina assured Japan of uninterrupted supplies of rice, rubber, and other needed raw materials.

U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan kept Roosevelt fully advised of her precarious economic situation and urgent need for imports. Chief of Naval Operations (NCO) Stark had warned the president of the danger of imposing an oil embargo on Japan. Stark had “made it known to the State Department in no uncertain terms that in my opinion if Japan’s oil were shut off, she would go to war.” He did not mean “necessarily with us, but . . . if her economic life had been choked and throttled by inability to get oil, she would go somewhere and take it . . . and if I were a Jap, I would” do the same.^[2]

Many people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, the president’s wife, were concerned about what Japan might be planning. In the fall of 1940, she had asked her husband about our continuing shipment of oil to Japan. FDR answered Eleanor on November 13, 1940:

The real answer which you cannot use is that if we forbid oil shipments to Japan, Japan will increase her purchases of Mexican oil and furthermore, may be driven by actual necessity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East. [Signed] F.D.R.^[3]

Thus Roosevelt had been well aware for some time that stopping the export of oil to Japan was fraught with danger. Japan feared also that her assets in the United States might be frozen, making her economic situation still more perilous.

In February 1941 Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador in Tokyo, cabled his Foreign Office in London that Japan would soon move against British-held Singapore, then a vital commercial and communications link between Britain and her overseas dominions and colonies. Anthony Eden, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, called Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese ambassador in London, into his office, and gave him “a thorough hauling over the coals” concerning the “extravagant and sensational telegrams” emanating from the British embassy in Tokyo.^[4] When Eugene H. Dooman, counselor at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, called on Japan’s vice minister for foreign affairs, Chiuchi Ohashi, Ohashi told him that “there was no truth whatever in Sir Robert’s prediction.” Ohashi said he had “repeatedly told Sir Robert that Japan would not move in Singapore or the Dutch East Indies, ‘unless we (the Japanese) are pressed’ (by the imposition of American embargoes).” However, Ohashi went on to say that “if disorders beyond the power of the French to control were to arise in Indochina . . . we would be obliged to step in to suppress the disorders.”^[5] Ohashi’s assertion was one more reminder of the danger inherent in imposing embargoes on Japan.

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall

Chief of staff of the Army at this time was General George C. Marshall. Marshall had graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1901 and began his military career as a second lieutenant in 1902. The Spanish-American War had just ended and he was assigned the task of accompanying infantry troops to the Philippines. He entered World War I as a captain and before it ended was promoted to temporary colonel. In May of the following year, he became aide-de-camp to the World War I hero General John J. Pershing, but was returned to his permanent rank of captain shortly thereafter. After the war he had to begin again to work his way up to colonel, a slow process in peacetime.^[6]

General Douglas MacArthur, a contemporary of Marshall’s but a graduate of West Point (1903), became chief of staff in 1930 and served in that capacity until 1935. At that time, Pershing suggested to MacArthur that he promote Marshall, his former aide, to brigadier general. Marshall had spent most of his career up to that time in service schools and staff positions and had only just attained the rank of full colonel. To round out his experience, so as to become qualified for a generalship, he was given a command assignment with a top regiment. This was during the early years of FDR’s New Deal, when the Army had been asked to help establish the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Marshall devoted so much of his energies to the CCC that his regiment’s training program was found to have suffered seriously. Thus Marshall missed this opportunity to become a general. Pershing continued to press Marshall’s case, but to no avail. Marshall was relegated to the position of senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard (1933–1938).^[7]

Through Marshall’s diligence in working with the CCC, he made a number of friends in the Roosevelt administration. He came to know several persons of influence, notably Judge Advocate Scott Lucas, later a U.S. senator who was to serve on the 1945-1946 Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack; Major General Frank McCoy, Stimson’s long-time aide; and Harry Hopkins, FDR’s close adviser. Pershing also continued to support Marshall. Such friends stood him in good stead as the years went by.

In July 1938 Marshall was brought to Washington as director of war plans. From then on, with the help of Hopkins and others, Marshall advanced rapidly. He was promoted to brigadier general, effective October 1, 1938. On October 15, after only three months in war plans, he was appointed deputy chief of staff. On April 27, 1939, it was announced that Marshall would be advanced over many officers with more seniority to become the Army’s new chief of staff. He took over officially on September 1, 1939, the very day Hitler’s forces marched into Poland, becoming in the process a temporary four-star general—from one to four stars in less than a year!

As chief of staff, Marshall was “the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment.” He was also “charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program.”^[8] The chief of staff’s obligation was to report directly to the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall proved himself to be a loyal and devoted deputy to his superior, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The chief of staff’s responsibility in peacetime—and the United States was still at peace when Marshall took over—was to serve “by direction of the president,” as “Commanding General of the Field Forces.” In that capacity he was to direct “field operations and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the GHQ units.” If war were to break out, he was to continue exercising command of the field forces “until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a Commanding General thereof.”^[9]

Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the Navy when the fleet was in port. More about that later.

The chief of staff and the president were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the army commanders in the field. The secretary of war, a civilian, was outside this line of command.

Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Fleet, Relieved of Command

In January 1941 Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), was notified that he was being relieved of his command in about three weeks. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was named to replace him, effective February 1.

Richardson was “deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,” as he wrote later, “there was some feeling of prospective relief, for I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, and I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.”^[10]

On his return to Washington, Richardson was directed to report to Secretary of the Navy Knox. When he called on Knox on March 24, he asked why he had been removed as CINCUS so peremptorily, after having served only 13 months of the usual 24-month tour of duty. “Why, Richardson,” Knox responded, “when you were here in Washington last October, you hurt the President’s feelings by what you said to him. You should realize that.”^[11]

Richardson’s relief put on notice all top-ranked officers, including his replacement, that Roosevelt would brook no opposition to his plans. It was a warning to all military officers that criticism of FDR, their commander-in-chief under the Constitution, was not tolerated.

General Marshall’s Responsibility for the Fleet

Marshall appointed Lieutenant General Walter C. Short to be commanding general of the Hawaiian department, effective February 7, 1941. That same day, Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel, who had taken over command of the fleet in Pearl Harbor the week before, had written his superior, CNO Stark, about the serious shortages of army materiel needed for the protection of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel had “referred specifically to planes and antiaircraft guns.” Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel didn’t realize that the army was “tragically lacking in this materiel . . . and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.”

Marshall’s letter revealed concern for more than just the Hawaiian situation. Nevertheless, Marshall advised Short that the protection of the fleet was the Army’s major responsibility. “The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us. [Italics in original]. . . . [O]ur first concern is to protect the Fleet.” Marshall told Short of “the pressures on the Department [from other sources] for the limited materiel we have.” However, he believed the existing defenses in Hawaii would discourage an enemy’s attack “if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities.”

Marshall speculated on the most likely threat to Hawaii:

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

However, Marshall reminded Short:

Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel.^[12]

Marshall wrote Short again on March 5, requesting an “early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack.” And he added, “The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.”^[13] Marshall recognized that, as chief of staff, he was responsible for protecting Hawaii, and he was again calling the attention of his Hawaiian commander to that responsibility.

Admiral Kimmel, New Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Strives to Build up Fleet’s Strength in Pearl Harbor

Kimmel realized that, for strategic reasons, the Fleet did not belong at Pearl Harbor. He considered Richardson’s arguments against holding the fleet there valid. Yet Kimmel realized he could not oppose the president on this issue and expect to retain his command. The best he could do was to try to get the materiel needed to defend the fleet. Over the next year, in letter after letter to CNO Stark, he asked for personnel, weapons, radar, destroyers, cruisers, planes, ammunition.^[14]

CNO Admiral Stark gained a reputation for persistence as he continued to appeal to Roosevelt for men and materiel. He once asked FDR for 300,000 men for the Navy. There were a lot of people in the room at the time. FDR, always jovial when he had an audience, simply “threw back his head and laughed.” He then turned to the others in the room and said, “Betty,” referring to Stark by his nickname, “usually begins working early; he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up.”^[15]

To strengthen its defenses, the Navy recommended construction of a battleship and cruiser dry dock at Pearl Harbor.^[16] However, all the funds then available for construction had been allocated. Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Navy’s bureau of yards and docks, which would be building the dry dock, felt he should not go ahead without written authorization. He suggested that Stark ask FDR, in light of the “limited National emergency” then in effect, to authorize the funds in writing. Without being specific as to who had made the request, Stark approached FDR. When he reported back to Moreell, Stark said he had “never seen the president so angry. He pounded the table and asked ‘Who wants something on a piece of paper’?” Tell that bureau chief that he would “give him something on a piece of paper, but it will not be what he expects.”^[17] So Stark, as acting secretary of the navy—the secretary and assistant secretary were away at the time—took on himself the responsibility of authorizing the construction. The dry dock, completed just ten days before the attack, was put to immediate use.

Stark wrote Kimmel of the problems he encountered in obtaining authorization to build up the Navy.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. . . . The President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House.^[18]

In answer to Kimmel’s requests for ships and supplies to bolster the Pacific Fleet, Stark often mentioned the dire straits of the British, whose economic lifeline was being threatened by German submarines. He also cited the demands for supplies being made under the lend-lease program.

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators.^[19]

Admiral Stark Opposes Antagonizing Japan

Roosevelt had been doing his best for months to give the British aid and comfort, although he had been restrained, primarily by public opinion, from openly involving the United States in the war against Germany. Stark shared the president’s desire to enter that war, but he did not always go along with Roosevelt’s risky moves in the Pacific.

Stark’s friendship with FDR was such that he could express himself candidly—and he often did. On February 11, 1941, Stark wrote FDR a long memorandum, cautioning against the tactics he was adopting in the Pacific.^[20] The question of sending a detachment of cruisers on a tour of the Philippines had been discussed at a meeting of top administration officials. FDR had questioned the desirability of such a maneuver, called it a “bluff,” and said he “did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6 [cruisers] . . . in the Philippines in case of sudden attack.” Stark had then “breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.”^[21]

Stark opposed such a move and he explained his reasons:^[22] “Sending a small force [of ships to Manila] would probably be no deterrent to Japan,” Stark wrote, and it would not hinder Japan’s southward advance. Further moves against Japan could “precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem.”

Although the Pacific Fleet was “weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy,” he considered it “a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan’s flank.” It would be “a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet . . . in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific.”

“If we are forced into the war,” Stark continued, “our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East.” The Pacific Fleet should remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. Then, if she moved toward Malaysia in southeast Asia, we would be in a position to

vigorously attack the Mandates [an archipelago of south Pacific islands mandated after World War I to Japan to administer] and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan’s attack on the British and Dutch.

At the same time, we could continue to lend support to the battle in the Atlantic.

Stark recommended against doing anything in the Far East which would reveal our intentions. We should not send “any considerable division . . . to Manila [as that] might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us.” We “should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands [lest the Japanese] smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised.” The Japanese are trained for amphibious operations—we are not—and they would then be able to occupy some of those British-held islands before we could.

To reinforce this position against doing anything that might appear to threaten Japan unless we were ready to fight, Stark quoted from a telegram just received from the U.S. embassy in Tokyo:

Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute[,] the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities.

In spite of his reservations, however, Stark told FDR he was “notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.”

Although he disagreed with the president, he was ready to obey orders. He continued his memorandum to FDR:

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide.

Stark was above all a good soldier, loyal to his commander-in-chief.

On February 25 Stark sent Kimmel a copy of his memorandum. He and Kimmel were good friends and had been for many years, so Stark was straightforward in his analysis of the situation. Stark wrote Kimmel, as he had told FDR he would, that he should make plans for “offensive raids.”^[23] He should

study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier.

“Such adventures,” Stark wrote, might appear “unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint . . . [or] they might prove very profitable.” But, he implied, this was immaterial. “In either case (and this is strictly SECRET) you and I may be ordered to make them.” Therefore, Kimmel realized he would be well advised to consider plans for launching such air raids.

The question of sending a detachment of the fleet to the Far East had been brought up several times. Stark and Kimmel both considered it “unwise.” However, Stark wrote,

even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not.

The attitude of the people in the country with respect to the war was confused, Stark wrote. “I simply can not predict the outcome.” His memo to FDR represented, he said, his “best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation.”

Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor Requests “Intelligence”

In addition to equipment and supplies, a commander in the field also needs intelligence; that is, information, particularly information relevant for military planning and preparations. The Navy Department in Washington inevitably receives such secret or confidential information, which the commanders in the field are entitled to have, and should have, if they are to carry out their duties. After Kimmel took over command of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, he requested not only ships, men, equipment, supplies, and munitions, but also intelligence; he asked Stark to furnish him with whatever “information of a secret nature” was available.^[24]

Stark replied that this was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). “ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed.”^[25]

In 1941, information concerning the location of Japanese merchant vessels was forwarded weekly from Washington by airmail to Pearl Harbor. Thus Kimmel was receiving material on a regular basis. Given that fact, plus Stark’s reassurance that ONI would keep him informed, Kimmel assumed he was being sent, and would be sent, all the information of value that Washington could supply.

Security Leak in Washington

Since August 1940 we had been intercepting and decoding messages sent in the Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated “Purple.” This enabled us to read messages to and from Japan’s embassies all around the world. These secret intercepts came to be called MAGIC and were surrounded by strict security. Except for the cryptographers and translators, they were seen by only a handful of top people in the administration and the services. Then in the spring of 1941 it was discovered that one copy of a decoded Japanese intercept was missing from the files. A “magic translation . . . was lost in the State Department. The Army had sent it to them and it never came back.”^[26] In the words of Commander L.F. Safford, then in charge of communications security, “all hell broke loose.” A missing message was a serious matter. If the Japanese learned we could read messages sent in their complex diplomatic code, which we had deciphered at a cost of much time and effort, they would probably change it. We would then be deprived of an extremely valuable source of intelligence.

Safford and the others concerned with security could not imagine where this missing message had gone. However, in April and May we intercepted several “Purple” messages between Berlin and Tokyo indicating that German intelligence sources, probably in the United States, believed that the U.S. government had deciphered some Japanese codes. Tokyo cabled Berlin on April 16, “We suspect that the several codes Ib, 80 c and OITE d are being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers.” And from Berlin to Tokyo on May 3:

STAHMER called on me this day (evening?) and . . . said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization abroad (or—“in the U.S.”?), and according to information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (or—”fairly”?) reliably established that the U.S. government is reading Ambassador Nomura’s code messages.^[27]

As a result, the Japanese warned their embassies to exercise extreme caution to protect the security of their messages. But, fortunately for the United States, Japan did not heed, or did not realize the full import of, the warnings sent her embassy in Berlin. In any event, her diplomats continued to use their “Purple” diplomatic code.

The American-Dutch-British (ADB) Conversations, Singapore, April 1941

Toward the end of April the scene shifted to Singapore, where a conference of American, Dutch, and British military and naval officers, the so-called ADB Conversations, was held in utmost secrecy. The principals dressed in mufti (civilian attire) to conceal the nature of their visit. The agreement reached on April 27 was subsequently signed by officials of the Associated Powers—the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and India.^[28] The United States was the only signatory not then in the war.

The 33-page ADB report that issued from this Singapore conference was classified MOST SECRET. It described specific moves on the part of Japan that would force the signers of the agreement to recommend that their governments take military action against Japan.

It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. . . .

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra [the narrow strip of land connecting Singapore’s peninsula with the Asian mainland] or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao [on the southeastern-most tip of the Philippines] to Waigeo Island [the northwestern-most island of New Guinea], or the Equator East of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands [northeast of New Caledonia].^[29]

The ADB report also outlined cooperative procedures to be followed by the land, sea, and air forces of the several parties in the event of hostilities. The United States turned down a British request at the meeting that it send the Pacific Fleet to Singapore.

Roosevelt knew these agreements were not constitutional. Yet he sanctioned and continued pressing secretly for still closer ties with Britain and her allies. According to Robert Sherwood, one of FDR’s speechwriters and close advisers, “Roosevelt never overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his immediate or eventual impeachment.”^[30] From the administration’s point of view, therefore, it was imperative that “the very existence of any American-British joint plans, however tentative, had to be kept utterly secret.” Sherwood called it “ironic” that

in all probability, no great damage would have been done had the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans and the Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the Congress and the press, American preparation for war might have been well nigh wrecked and ruined.^[31]

U.S. Ships Transferred from Pacific to Atlantic Fleet

In April 1941 Kimmel learned not only that he would not be receiving the ships he had requested to strengthen his fleet, but that he would be forced to relinquish several destroyers and cruisers to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet. This was in accord with the U.S.-British ABC-1 agreement.

“The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully,” Stark wrote Kimmel on April 19. A detachment of ships—three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers—was to be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. But then the president canceled the authorization for the move and gave specific directions to bring only the one CV (aircraft carrier) and one division of destroyers. The president “did not want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the forces in the Pacific.”^[32]

However, a week later, after a long conference at the White House on April 25, it was decided that the most urgent matter was to go “all out in the Atlantic.” Stark wrote Kimmel the following day that he should get “mentally prepared” because “a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.” Stark anticipated “the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs [battleships], 1 CV [aircraft carrier], 4 CLs [cruisers] and 2 squadrons of destroyers.” And still further detachments from the Pacific Fleet might be expected. Action on the transfer may come “at any time.”^[33]

In May 1941 “a force consisting of three battleships, an aircraft carrier and appropriate supporting vessels . . . about a quarter of the strength of the Pacific Fleet,” was shifted to the Atlantic from Kimmel’s command in the Pacific. These ships then joined “in the ever-extending activities of the Atlantic patrol,” which was lending support to Britain.^[34]

Coordination of U.S. War Plans and Production

By this time, demands for war materiel were being submitted to the United States from all over the world. Requests for supplies and equipment were coming in from the British, beleaguered in the Atlantic and in Singapore; from the Chinese under pressure by the Japanese; and from our own forces in the field. Effective coordination was needed. On May 21, Marshall, under pressure from the War Department, the Office of Production Management, and especially the White House, sought a “complete statement of Army needs—not for 1941 and 1942 but for the actual winning of a war not yet declared.” He asked the various divisions of the War Department general staff to make strategic estimates of our ground, air, and naval situations, and to list items of equipment needed “as an aid to industry in its planning.” The War Plans Division assigned Major (later Lt. Gen.) A.C. Wedemeyer the immense task of researching and assembling from widely scattered sources the necessary data on military requirements, supplies, reserves, and production.^[35]

United States–Japan Diplomatic Conversations: in Washington

Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, had begun negotiations with the United States. Japan was willing to make quite a few concessions from her point of view, and for a while in June 1941, it looked as though an amicable conclusion might be reached. The major bone of contention was the presence of Japanese troops in China. In the course of the discussions, Japan agreed to withdraw most of her troops from China. Subject to further discussion, she would station a few on the northern border

for protection against the entry of communistic elements from Outer Mongolia. . . . The troops which would be maintained for resistance against communistic activities would not under any circumstances interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

Japan then presented a draft proposal suggesting that Roosevelt ask China to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan based on the principles of:^[36] (1) Neighborly friendship; (2) Joint defense against communism; and (3) Economic cooperation.

As befitting an agreement between two sovereign nations, Japan further asserted that these principles implied: (1) Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories; (2) Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace; (3) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China; (4) No annexation, no indemnities; and (5)Independence of Manchoukuo.^[37]

Prompted by her desire for reliable sources of raw materials and given the uncertainty created by the termination of her commercial treaty with the United States, Japan’s draft proposal stated further that if the United States and Japan reached agreement on the basis of these principles, then they would cooperate in providing each other with access to “supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs.”^[38]

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were lukewarm, if not cool, to these proposals. They balked at the Japanese plan for “Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities.”^[39] On June 21, Hull, “handed the Japanese Ambassador a complete rewrite of the draft proposal.”^[40] The talks with the Japanese were stalled.

Hitler’s Invasion of Russia Alters Situation and Expands Call for Worldwide Coordination

During the night of June 21–22 Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R. The Soviets immediately became an enemy of Germany, and Britain immediately became an ally of the Soviets. Once we learned of Germany’s invasion of Russia and of Britain’s alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany, U.S. policy shifted. We released Russian credits, refused to apply the neutrality law to the Soviet Union, and promised American aid to Stalin’s regime.^[41]

Roosevelt called for an additional effort to coordinate war planning and production. On July 9 he sent an urgent message to his secretaries of war and navy asking them to

join . . . in exploring at once the overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies . . . [and] the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies.^[42]

The assignment Marshall had given Wedemeyer in May, to determine the needs of the Army, was to be expanded to include the Navy and Air Corps also. From this “a real Victory Program” was to be developed encompassing, by presidential directive (August 30, 1941), the distribution of munitions as well, not only to U.S. forces, but also to those of Great Britain, Russia, and other countries needing our help.^[43] The War Plans Division’s draft, which Wedemeyer had completed by July 1, became the basis of the more extensive project, and Wedemeyer was assigned “the major responsibility for the new and larger task.”^[44]

In view of the fact that the United States was still officially neutral, security concerning this ultra-secret Victory Program “for the winning of a war not yet declared” was extremely tight. Only five copies were prepared, each numbered and registered. Wedemeyer kept his working copy; he gave one to Stimson for presentation to FDR, and three to his superiors. It was thought that this very limited distribution would prevent any leak.

U.S.-Japan Relations “Treading the Evil Road”

As we have seen, the Japanese had received the permission of the Vichy government of unoccupied France to land troops in French Indochina and to acquire there the rice and other raw materials she desperately needed.^[45] Both the United States and Britain objected to these arrangements. On July 23, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles broke off the talks then going on with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The next day the United States denounced Japan’s actions in French Indochina. Then on July 25, in retaliation for Japan’s Indochina moves and against the advice of Ambassador Grew in Japan and Chief of Naval Operations Stark, FDR by executive order froze all Japanese assets in this country. England followed suit the following day.^[46]

This brought all trade between the United States and Japan to an end. Japan had warned that this drastic measure would leave her in desperate straits. It hurt especially because it deprived her of regular gasoline from which she had been able to produce higher grade aviation gas.^[47] Back in November 1940 Roosevelt had been well aware of the crisis that would arise if Japan were deprived of oil.

Ambassador Grew and Stark understood Japan’s economic plight and realized she might go to war if her oil were shut off. Stark had argued that “unless we were prepared for war—I do not mean prepared in the sense of complete readiness for war, but unless we were ready to accept a war risk, we should not take measures which would cut oil down to the Japanese below that needed for what might be called their normal peace time needs for their industry and their ships.” He said he “never waivered [sic] one inch on that stand.”^[48] Nevertheless, the United States went ahead and imposed sanctions. The die was cast.

Stark cabled his three fleet commanders on July 25 about the economic sanctions. It was expected that these sanctions would include all trade except for a few items for which export licenses would be issued. He advised the commanders to “take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities.”^[49]

All this time, we were still intercepting, decoding, and reading Japanese messages sent in the diplomatic code, “Purple.” Among them was a message dated July 31 from the Japanese foreign minister in Tokyo to Japan’s ambassador in Berlin concerning their desperate economic situation.^[50] A copy was sent to Nomura, the Japanese ambassador in Washington. It read in part:

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory . . . and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road.^[51]

After being decoded and translated, this message was distributed to Roosevelt and his advisers, the few top officials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC. This cable further confirmed Japan’s economic plight and the impending crisis due to the U.S. sanctions.

On August 6 Japan again offered to negotiate.

Japanese Prime Minister Fuminaro Konoye, who represented Japan’s “Peace Party,” suggested a personal meeting with Roosevelt, “with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment [in U.S.-Japan relations] could be brought about.” On August 8 Nomura asked Hull “whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet, say in Honolulu.”^[52] On August 17, the United States rejected this proposal. Hull

made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.^[53]

The First U. S. “Ultimatum” to Japan

The public announcement of the Argentia meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, but said nothing about the tough words FDR had agreed to address to Japan as a result of his conversations with Churchill. It had been “mutually understood” by the men “that the Governments of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the Far East.” Therefore, it had been agreed that Roosevelt should make clear to Japan in no uncertain terms that further aggression against her neighboring countries would not be tolerated, that such aggression would force those countries to take measures to safeguard their rights. Accordingly, once FDR was back in Washington, he informed the Japanese ambassador (August 17) that

if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.^[54]

The next day in a wire signed by Roosevelt, transmitted by the State Department to the U.S. embassy in London, it was reported that FDR and Hull had received the Japanese ambassador and had

made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you [Churchill] and I [FDR] had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.^[55]

This statement was later referred to by Stimson and others as the “first ultimatum” to Japan.

Kimmel Continues to Request Men and Equipment for the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii

Before Kimmel took over as commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on February 1, 1941, he had had an opportunity “to survey the situation” briefly. He had written Stark on January 27 that he was

particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending this base. . . . I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority.

Kimmel was also concerned with the personnel shortage and wrote that he would

probably be required to make recommendations on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction.^[56]

These same complaints had been made before by Kimmel’s predecessor, Richardson, just then being relieved of his command.

Once in command, Kimmel continued to bombard Washington with requests for men and materiel to strengthen the fleet. Yet rather than being strengthened, the fleet was weakened by the transfer in May to the Atlantic of almost a fourth of the Pacific Fleet. Kimmel felt he knew very little of what was going on in Washington, and he persisted in asking for information and supplies.

After Germany attacked Russia, Kimmel wanted to know how this would affect policy.^[57] “Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my province,” Kimmel wrote on July 30,

but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. It is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur.^[58]

Again, on August 12, Kimmel reminded Stark of the fleet’s needs. Kimmel believed the radar equipment was

far behind what it should be. . . . We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean.^[59]

Stark sympathized with Kimmel’s supply problem but was unable to help. He responded on August 22 to several of Kimmel’s more recent requests for men and materiel: “I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.”^[60] Although Kimmel got some results over the months he was in command, he generally got more excuses than results.

The Victory Program Completed

In estimating the military and production requirements of the nation, Wedemeyer had to seek data from many sources. He looked into the status of the shipping, munitions requirements, and munitions production of U.S. troop bases. He explored the situation and capabilities of each of the major combatant nations, the capabilities and probable lines of action of both friendly and Axis powers. It was assumed that “the earliest date when U.S. armed forces could be mobilized, trained, and equipped for extensive operations” would be July 1, 1943.^[61]

The president’s July 9 request had enlarged the scope of Wedemeyer’s survey. A couple of months later, Roosevelt expanded the task still further. In a memorandum to the War Department on August 30, he wrote that he wanted the department, working in cooperation with the Navy Department, to submit to him by September 10, 1941, their

recommendation of distribution of expected United States production of munitions of war as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aided—by important items, quantity, time schedules, and approximate values for the period from the present time until June 30 [1942].

FDR also wanted to receive their

general conclusions as to the over-all production effort of important items needed for victory on the general assumption that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United States and her friends is sufficiently superior to that available to the Axis Powers to insure defeat of the latter.^[62]

Wedemeyer completed his exhaustive study by FDR’s deadline.^[63]

Japan’s Peace Party Falls; Her War Party Takes Over

With our embargo in full effect, Japan’s economic plight was fast deteriorating. In a desperate effort to save his government, Prime Minister Konoye on August 28 renewed his plea for a personal meeting with Roosevelt in Hawaii. The administration did not reply immediately.

By September 23 the conversations with the Japanese ambassador in Washington had “practically reached an impasse.” Stark had a confidential talk with Hull about the situation and then reported to Kimmel: “Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might the situation could only grow more tense.” Stark wrote that Hull kept him pretty well informed and added in a P.S. dated September 29, “if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.”^[64] Once more Kimmel felt reassured that he would be sent any information pertinent to Pearl Harbor.

On October 2, Roosevelt and Hull, after several exchanges of notes, again turned down Konoye’s proposal for a Hawaii meeting.

Two weeks later, on October 6, Konoye, who had been doing his best to maintain peaceful relations between his country and the United States, was forced to resign. Konoye’s successor was an army general, Hideki Tojo. With a government composed primarily of military men, Japan’s “War Party” was in control. The chances of solving Japan’s economic needs by peaceful means faded.

Stark analyzed the Japanese power shift in a cable to his three fleet commanders.

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X. . . . Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X^[65]

In a covering letter to Kimmel, Stark wrote:

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the “possibility”; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.^[66]

Japanese Stocks of Strategic Materials Dangerously Low

Estimates of Japan’s stocks of strategic materials furnished clues to the Japanese situation. Lieutenant Albert E. Hindmarsh, an economic analyst in the far eastern section of Naval Intelligence, had access to all available intelligence, including MAGIC. Hindmarsh was also regularly reading the minutes of the Japanese parliament. By following its debates, he could determine how much the Japanese government was paying per unit for storage of some 23 strategic materials. He then divided these figures into the total amounts shown in the Japanese budget for this purpose. In that way, he was able to calculate the stocks of Japan’s strategic materials still on hand.

At regular intervals Hindmarsh personally took to Roosevelt his estimates of the stocks of these various materials. Japan’s severest shortage was of oil. Our oil embargo, especially the embargo on aviation gasoline, was putting Japan in a desperate plight. Hindmarsh calculated in mid-summer 1941, that she had on hand about 75 million barrels. In a war Hindmarsh figured she would need 52 million barrels per year. She had enough mica, which came from India, for four years. And her stocks of hemp and sisal were sufficient, so she could safely bypass the Philippines. Hindmarsh was able to explain to FDR that, in view of Japan’s economic priorities, she would have to aim first at replenishing her oil stocks; he expected her primary objective would be the Dutch East Indies, where she might expect to get oil production going in some six months or so.^[67]

The October Revolution in ONI

Throughout 1941, a struggle was going on within the Navy Department as to whose responsibility it was to evaluate secret military intelligence and pass it along to the commanders in the field. Both the chief of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, and the chief of Office of Naval Intelligence, Captain Alan G. Kirk, claimed this responsibility. The table of organization at the time seemed to place the responsibility with ONI. And Stark’s March 22 letter to Kimmel supported that position.^[68] However, Turner was aggressive and persistent. He finally persuaded Stark to reduce ONI to a fact-gathering agency, and War Plans assumed the responsibility for evaluating available intelligence and for determining what should be sent to the field commanders. This Occtober 1941 power struggle between ONI and War Plans confused the lines of communication and created doubt as to just where the responsibility actually lay.

Then also in October, Kirk and his top assistant were removed from duty. According to communications-security chief Safford, this was the first time in Navy Department history that both chief and assistant chief of a bureau had been removed from office simultaneously. The previous practice had been to remove only one of the two top men at a time, so as to assure continuity. The third man in charge, then in London, was not involved.

“Berthing Plan” or Harbor Bomb Plot Messages

The shift in ONI leadership took place on October 10, the day after the “berthing plan” message—asking the Japanese consul in Hawaii to report the movements of U.S. naval ships in and out of Pearl Harbor—became available in Washington. Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, who had been serving as commanding officer aboard the battleship USS Mississippi took over as chief of ONI on October 15. Prior to joining the ONI, he had had no experience with naval intelligence “other than attendance at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934.”^[69]

The Pearl Harbor commanders were never advised of the “berthing plan” message. The failure to notify them of its existence and of the other “ships-in-harbor” messages decoded later in Washington, could have been due to failure on the part of those evaluating intelligence to recognize the importance of these messages. It could have been due to disarray accompanying the turnover in ONI personnel. It could have been due to mere negligence. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither War Plans nor ONI notified the Pearl Harbor commanders of those critical messages.

The U.S. Navy’s communications personnel in Hawaii were under instructions to try to solve the Japanese navy code (JN-25). They were not to spend time trying to decipher Japanese intercepts in the Japanese consular code (J-19) or any other code; these were to be mailed to Washington for decoding and translating. Therefore, our people in Hawaii made no attempt to decode and translate these intercepts, but simply forwarded them, as instructed, to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to Washington then was not nonstop. It was by short hops and only twice a week, so it took several days for an airmailed intercept to reach Washington.

One J-19 message, sent from Tokyo on September 24 to Honolulu, was picked up in Hawaii and mailed, undecoded to Washington, where it was decoded, translated, and made available to the top military personnel in Washington on October 9, 1941.^[70] In that message, the foreign minister in Tokyo asked the Japanese consul in Hawaii to set up a system for making regular reports on the movements of U.S. ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. This ships-in-harbor message became known as the “berthing plan,” or as the first of the “bomb plot messages.” Pearl Harbor was not notified.

On November 15 Tokyo sent a cable to Honolulu, translated in Washington on December 3, which read, “As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ‘ships in harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.”^[71] Pearl Harbor was not advised.

On November 29 Tokyo cabled the consul in Honolulu: “We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.”^[72] Washington decoded and translated this message on December 5. Pearl Harbor was not notified.

Many other ships-in-harbor messages referring to Pearl Harbor, some 39 in all, were transmitted back and forth between Tokyo and Honolulu during the two months prior to the Japanese attack. Due to the pressure of other demands on the decoders in Washington, however, only 25 of these crucial intercepts were deciphered, translated, and read before the attack.^[73] Yet not a single one of those 25 deciphered and translated messages was sent to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii—they were not even informed of their existence.

To complete the record, it might be pointed out that intercepted Japanese cables revealed to our authorities in Washington that the Japanese were also watching ship movements in Manila. Some 59 messages were exchanged between Tokyo and the Philippines; all but two were deciphered and translated before December 7. Twenty-seven cables reporting on ship movements in and out of the Panama Canal were intercepted to and from Tokyo, 21 of which were deciphered and read before the attack on Pearl Harbor. We also intercepted eight Japanese cables between Tokyo and the west coast (San Francisco and Seattle), another eight that referred to southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies, and a couple each concerning Vancouver (Canada) and Vladivostok (Russia).^[74]

The record shows that the ships in Pearl Harbor were those most closely under surveillance. Yet no hint was ever given Kimmel or Short that the Japanese, from September 24 on, were plotting regularly on grid charts the locations and movements of ships in Pearl Harbor, and forwarding this information to Tokyo. Nor was any hint ever given Kimmel or Short that as of mid-November, the Japanese consul had been asked to make these reports more frequently, “at a rate of twice a week,” or that he had been asked on November 29 to report “even when there are no ship movements.” In spite of Kimmel’s several requests for intelligence and in spite of the repeated reassurances that he would be kept informed, none of these vital intercepts was forwarded to the Pearl Harbor commanders before the attack.