Chapter 5: 5. Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines Japan and Public Opinion

Japan’s trade situation continued to deteriorate. Her situation was desperate. On November 3, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo cabled Secretary of State Hull that “the greater part of Japan’s commerce has been lost. Japanese industrial production has been dramatically curtailed, and Japan’s national resources have been depleted.” Grew believed that the United States would not be able to avert war in the Far East by continuing to embargo trade with Japan.

He saw world political events crowding in upon Japan, forcing her to take some drastic actions. He cautioned that if diplomacy failed, if Japan did not succeed in her attempts at reconciliation with the United States, he fully expected she would make “an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri, to make [her] impervious to economic embargoes.” The United States should be ready to decide “whether war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies, and needs.” Grew left no room for illusions. He warned in his cable that the United States should not be deceived into thinking that Japan might not

rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. . . . It would be short-sighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber rattling. . . . Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic suddenness to measures which might make inevitable war with the United States.^[1]

There were factions in both Japan and the United States that wanted to maintain peace. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye had sought some agreement with the United States and had even offered to meet with Roosevelt to try to reconcile their differences. He had been rebuffed. As a result, he had been forced to resign. In October a more militant faction had taken over the government of Japan.

In this country the sentiment against our going to war was still widespread. Public opinion polls in the spring of 1941 reported more than 80 percent of the people were against becoming involved.^[2] The America First Committee, established on September 4, 1940, was the most prominent organization that opposed U.S. involvement in the war. Its national chairman was General Robert E. Wood, board chairman of Sears Roebuck and Co. Among its more celebrated members were journalist John T. Flynn; Alice Roosevelt Longworth, daughter of former President Theodore Roosevelt; World War I aviator Edward Rickenbacker; Lillian Gish, star of the early films; Socialist Norman Thomas; and aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh.^[3] Lindbergh, a national hero ever since his dramatic solo flight across the Atlantic in 1927, became America First’s most popular spokesman. When he spoke at New York’s Manhattan Center on April 23, 1941, the hall was jammed with 5,500 people. In subsequent appearances—New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Hollywood, Cleveland, Des Moines, Fort Wayne—he attracted even larger enthusiastic crowds, up to 22,000.^[4]

Others were also working to maintain peace with Japan. Among them were religious groups, the Friends, or Quakers, and the followers of the Reverend E. Stanley Jones, a well-known Methodist missionary. Reverend Jones believed the Japanese were tired of fighting in China and were ready to make peace. He hoped to act as a “catalyst,” to help the various parties reconcile their differences, and had approached high Japanese and Chinese officials informally to learn their reaction to his suggestions. He had talked with officials in the U.S. State Department, and his suggestions had been transmitted by memoranda to the president. He wanted FDR to send a personal cable to the Emperor. Jones had also spoken to groups of ministers, usually finding them receptive to his ideas. By November 1941, Jones seemed to be making some progress with his suggestions.

The pro-peace noninterventionists, however, were gradually being overwhelmed by the pro-British propaganda emanating from the administration and the mass communications media—radio, movies, newsreels, and major newspapers and magazines. Although the majority of the people in the United States still did not want this country to become involved in the war, the climate of opinion was gradually shifting. Antiwar sentiment was beginning to decline.

Washington’s Far Eastern Policy —Warn Japan, Delay Operations to Allow U.S. Build-up in Pacific

Rather than wanting to conciliate Japan, Secretary of State Hull was in favor of issuing an additional warning. Before doing so, however, he sought to determine the Army’s and Navy’s state of readiness. Would the military authorities be ready to support further State Department warnings?

On November 1 the State Department held a meeting on the far eastern situation. Messages from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s head of government at Chungking, and General John Magruder, chief of the American military mission to Chungking, were discussed. Chiang was urging that the United States warn Japan against attacking China through Yunnan, a province in southern China. To present the Navy viewpoint, Chief of Naval Operations Stark and Captain Schuirmann, the Navy liaison with the State Department, were present. They pointed out that Japan had already been warned. The president had told Japan on August 17, when he returned from meeting Churchill at Argentia, that if she continued military aggression against her “neighboring countries,” the United States would be “compelled” to take action.^[5] According to Schuirmann, Hull “desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department.”^[6]

Another meeting was held at the State Department the following day. At that time it was proposed that the British send some planes to Thailand and that Japan be warned against moving into Siberia.^[7] On November 3 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy met. Fifteen top Army and Navy officers were present. The deliberations were strictly confidential; no hint of them was made public. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, reviewed the far eastern situation. He said that a decision had been made several months before “to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort.” This was consistent with the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report (ABC-1) of March 27, 1941. A major war effort in the Pacific, Ingersoll pointed out, “would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas,” and this “would materially affect United States aid to England.” Even if the fleet could be moved to the Far East, he continued, there were no repair facilities at Manila or Singapore.^[8]

Ingersoll then assessed the possibility of a Japanese attack. “Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya.” He gave his recommendations as to what the United States should do in each of these five eventualities. “In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions, the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan, the United States should not declare war.”^[9]

Ingersoll felt “the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.” However, he pointed out, our fleet was “seriously handicapped” at the time for lack of certain major naval units then in the repair yards. He recommended that offensive action in the Far East be deferred until U.S. military strength was built up in the Philippines. From what he said, it was obvious that the U.S. military was not eager to provoke a confrontation with Japan. “[T]he present moment was not the opportune time to get brash.”^[10]

Army and Navy Oppose Ultimatum to Japan Until Phillippine Strength is Developed

Army Chief of Staff Marshall was also at this November 3 meeting. He said he had received information to the effect that the Japanese expected to decide in a couple of days—that would be by November 5—what action they would take. He “emphasized” that it would be dangerous to move the “augmented Army Air Force” away from its present station in the Philippines for he believed that as long as it was there the Japanese would find action against the Philippines or towards the south to be “a very hazardous operation.” Moreover, he expected the Army forces in the Philippines would be of “impressive strength” by mid-December and “this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.”^[11]

It was Marshall’s position that, until U.S. power was sufficiently developed in the Philippines so we would “have something to back up our statements,” the Japanese should not be antagonized unnecessarily. The United States should “make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face,” such as “a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.”^[12] However, he realized that until U.S. forces were built up in the Far East, the situation was delicate.

At the conclusion of these discussions the Joint Board adopted Ingersoll’s proposal, with amendments suggested by Stark and Marshall. A memorandum was to be prepared for the president opposing (1) the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan, (2) military action against Japan if she moved into Yunnan, and (3) support of Chiang Kai-Shek with U.S. military forces. The memorandum was to recommend that the State Department postpone hostilities with Japan as long as possible, and that some agreements be made with Japan “to tide the situation over for the next several months.”

In addition to these recommendations, the memorandum was to (1) point out how a U.S.-Japanese war in the Far East would impair the help the United States was giving Great Britain and the other nations fighting Germany, and (2) emphasize that the United States was not in a position to engage in an offensive operation in the Far East without transferring to the Pacific most of the ships now in the Atlantic.^[13]

Japanese-U.S. Relations “on the Brink of Chaos”

Our facility in decoding and translating intercepted messages sent in the Japanese diplomatic code, “Purple,” had improved dramatically. On November 4, we intercepted, decoded, and translated a message sent from Tokyo earlier that day:

Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. . . . Conditions . . . are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in any sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided . . . to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. . . . If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.^[14]

Japan was announcing that a break in the relations with the United States was imminent. And the top U.S. political and military officials who were cleared to read the secret intelligence known as MAGIC knew it.

Stark and Marshall Memorandum to FDR: Avoid War with Japan;

Issue No Ultimatum to Japan

As agreed at the November 3 meeting of the Joint Board, Marshall and Stark prepared a memorandum for the president, briefing him in some detail with respect to the Far East situation. One by one they pointed out the various reasons why the United States should not issue an ultimatum to Japan that might force her to take drastic action involving the United States in a Pacific war:

1. The U.S. fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese fleet and was not in a position to undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the western Pacific.

2. U.S. military forces in the Philippines were not yet strong enough. They were being reinforced, however, and it was expected that air and submarine strength would be built up by mid-December and that the air forces would reach their projected strength by February or March 1942.

3. British naval and air reinforcements were expected to reach Singapore by February or March.

Marshall and Stark reconfirmed the policies and strategies agreed to in the U.S.-British staff conversations. “War between the United States and Japan should be avoided,” they wrote,

while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.:

1. Territory or mandated territories of the United States, the British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies;

2. Certain parts of Thailand in southeast Asia;

3. Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, and the Loyalty Islands, all in the southwest Pacific.

The memorandum also stated that:

We should not intervene against Japan if she should attack Russia.

We should attempt to weaken Japan economically.

We should not send troops to China, but we should give “[a]ll possible aid short of actual war . . . to the Chinese Central Government.”

U. S. plans should be fully coordinated with the British and the Dutch.

It closed with a strong recommendation: “That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.”^[15]

Note that the territories Marshall and Stark named with whose defenses we were concerned and “whose security to the United States is of very great importance” were all thousands of miles from our shores.

Japan Sets a Deadline for Signing Agreement —To Save U.S. Relations From Falling into “Chaotic Condition”

Marshall had told the Joint Board on November 3 that he had information to the effect that on November 5 the Japanese would decide their course of action. And sure enough! On November 5, we intercepted and read the following November 5 Japanese message to the Washington embassy:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.^[16]

U.S. Cabinet Would Support a Strike Against Japan if She Attacked the British or Dutch in Southeast Asia?

It was customary for the president to hold meetings of his cabinet on Friday mornings, and he held one as usual on Friday, November 7. Secretary of War Stimson had kept a rather complete diary for many years, and he continued the practice throughout his tenure, dictating rather copious notes each morning before going to his office in the War Department. Following the November 7 meeting, Stimson wrote, “The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds.” Hull reported that U.S. relations with Japan had become “extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time.” But, as Marshall and Stark had stated in no uncertain terms in their memorandum to FDR just two days before, the military were anxious to avoid becoming involved in any action with Japan at that time. Nevertheless, according to Stimson’s diary, “our military advisors . . . had urged military action if Japan attacked . . . American, British or Dutch territory.” In anticipation that we might be called on to take some such action under the Singapore agreement with the British and Dutch, the military had been flying heavy B-17 bombers out to the Philippines for some time, whenever they could be spared from other duties. None of the cabinet members except Hull and Stimson knew of this ongoing buildup.

Roosevelt took “an informal vote” of the cabinet members on how the American people might react “if it became necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies.” According to Stimson’s diary, “The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move,” that is, a strike against Japan if she were to attack the British or Dutch in southeast Asia.^[17]

News of “Victory Program” Leaks; Marshall Denies Its Existence

The all-encompassing “Victory Program,” prepared at the Roosevelt’s request had been completed by September 10. It contained estimates of the military needs of the United States and her potential allies, and of the military stocks available worldwide to win a war in which this country was not as yet officially involved. The details and the very existence of the “Victory Program” was a carefully guarded secret. The small number of copies made had been distributed only to a select few military and administration officials. However, if it was to be intelligently implemented, the officers who would be involved had to know about it. Therefore, War Plans Division (WPD) prepared a strategic estimate of the situation, which it circulated in mid-November among War Department officials.^[18]

In spite of the careful security surrounding WPD’s estimate, news of the “Victory Program” leaked out. A rumor circulated in November that an American expeditionary force (AEF) was being planned. If true, this was contrary to Marshall’s testimony before Congress in July when testifying on the extension of Selective Service. At that time, he had discounted any threat of militarism and assured Congress that he was not considering an AEF, but merely “task forces” of 5,000, 15,000, or 30,000 men. Marshall issued a categorical denial to scotch the rumor about an AEF: “There is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere.”^[19]

The Japanese Push for Agreement

The seriousness of the Japanese deadline became increasingly apparent to anyone reading the secret “Purple” dispatches during this period. Japan was sending Nomura repeated reminders of the need for urgency. She realized she had to reach some agreement with the United States. And with this in mind, Ambassador Nomura and representatives of the U.S. State Department continued their discussions.

In a further attempt to bring about an amicable settlement, Japan sent to Washington a second ambassador, Admiral Saburu Kurusu, to assist Nomura. Kurusu, with an American wife, was pro-American. Kurusu’s association with the U.S. dated back to World War I when the two countries were allies. The U.S. government facilitated priority passage for him and for the Japanese Foreign Office secretary who accompanied him to the United States via a Pan American plane.^[20] Kurusu arrived in Washington on November 15. His instructions were to

cooperate with [Nomura] in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to any early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted. . . . [T]he crisis is fast approaching. . . . [D]o everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.^[21]

On November 15 our Navy decoders deciphered and translated a Japanese “Purple” intercept reminding the Japanese ambassador in Washington “that the date [November 25] set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.”^[22]

Nomura immediately cabled Tokyo. He was concerned about what would happen to the Japanese nationals residing in the United States:

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down. . . . It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately. . . . I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.^[23]

Tokyo answered the following day:

…[Y]ou may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. . . . I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.^[24]

We decoded, translated, and read both messages on November 17.

Nomura presented Japan’s newly arrived second ambassador, Kurusu, to Secretary of State Hull on November 17. The three men then proceeded to the White House so that Kurusu might be received formally by the president. After the courtesies were over, Roosevelt brought up the serious misunderstandings between the two countries and expressed his desire to avoid war. The ambassadors said they equally wished for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific. In Kurusu’s words, “[A]ll the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg.” He repeated that some way must be found to avoid war and assured the president that Prime Minister Tojo was also “very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man.”^[25]

Meanwhile, that very afternoon Hull received a cable from Ambassador Grew in Japan. Grew warned that there was “need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions” outside the area of the Chinese theater of operations. It was likely, he said, that the Japanese might take “every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative.” Japan maintained “extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information,” so the embassy’s field of observation was “restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible.” This meant that the U.S. embassy’s naval and military attaches could not be relied on to send “substantial warning.” The Japanese, therefore, were “assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions.”^[26]

The Japanese Ambassadors Continue Trying for Agreement

The two Japanese ambassadors were back at the State Department the following day. Their deadline (November 25) was approaching, and their immediate concern was the difficult position of the Japanese under the U.S.-imposed trade restrictions and asset-freeze. They pointed out that Japan was much more dependent on foreign trade than the United States; she was “hard-pressed,” and thus “desirous” of reaching some agreement.

Hull responded by raising the China question, which had long been a sticking point between the two countries. Would the Japanese be willing to forgo annexation and indemnities, and to respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the principle of equality? Nomura replied that they would be. Hull then asked how many soldiers the Japanese would be willing to withdraw from China. “Possibly 90 per cent,” the ambassador replied. And how long did the Japanese intend to keep that remaining 10 percent in China? The ambassador did not reply directly but “invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol, Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area.”

The next topic was Indochina. When Japan moved troops into that country in July, U.S.-Japanese conversations were interrupted and shipments of petroleum products were discontinued. Kurusu said Japan intended to withdraw her troops from Indochina “as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached.” He asked about the possibility of the United States’s ending the sanctions in the meantime. Hull said he would consult the British and the Dutch on this suggestion.^[27]

The Japanese were tired of fighting China, Kurusu added, and she would go as far as she could in taking the first step toward peace. Nevertheless, the U.S. government refused to make any concessions about aid to China. The situation was complicated by Japan’s military alliance with Germany. Both England and Russia wanted Japan thoroughly occupied with her war in China so that she could not become an active ally of Germany, which would put at risk Britain’s possessions in Asia and Russia’s far eastern territory. Thus U.S. aid to China was, in effect, aid to England and Russia.

Judging from the cable traffic we were reading, it was becoming apparent that Japan was preparing for a definite break in relations with the United States within a very short time. As we have seen, the Japanese embassy in Washington had cabled Tokyo on November 15 to ask advice “as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here” in the event of such a break. Then on November 17 Tokyo responded in a cable that we read on the 19th, asking the Japanese ambassador to advise the several consuls in the United States secretly “to help our citizens who remain behind to work for the common good” and also “to destroy immediately . . . secret documents.” Tokyo would soon wire “a plan for reducing the members of staffs.”^[28]

A break in relations was close!