10. The Last of the Japanese Moderates

Chapter Ten

THE LAST OF THE JAPANESE MODERATES

WITH PREPARATIONS for war cut and dried, and the war itself already fairly under way in the Atlantic, diplomatic negotiations supposed to preserve peace in the Pacific went on in Washington. Ambassador Grew, in a moment of optimism some two months before the Pearl Harbor attack, had given a description of the mission of diplomacy. After reviewing America’s differences with Japan, he said:

In facing these difficult and highly complicated problems, let us not forget that diplomacy is essentially our first line of national defense, while our Navy is but the second line and our Army, let us hope, the third line. If the first line, diplomacy, is successful, those other lines will never have to be brought into action, even although that first line is immeasurably strengthened by the mere presence of those other lines, the reserves behind the front. It is the first line, diplomacy, that must bear the responsibility for avoiding the necessity of ever using those reserves, and it is in that light that I look on my duties here in Japan.¹

American diplomacy, however, did not accomplish this purpose. It failed even to delay the coming of war until the nation was prepared. The minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (p. 3) said of American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations:

The question of the wisdom of the foreign policy pursued by the government of the United States is excluded by the terms of the committee’s instructions. In any case, to go into this issue would involve the committee in the complexities of history extending back more than 50 years and in matters of opinion which cannot be settled by reference to anything as positive and definite as the Constitution, laws, and established administrative practices of the United States government. To understand the questions involved, however, an examination of our relations in the Far East, and of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to December 7, 1941, are part and parcel of the explanation of the responsibilities involved in this inquiry.

Diplomacy failed because diplomacy was not employed to avert war, but to make certain its coming. Grew himself has described his mission to Tokyo as a labor of peace, but as early as December 14, 1940, when, as one Groton schoolfellow to another, he addressed a “Dear Frank” letter to Mr. Roosevelt, he seems to have grown tired of the struggle. In that letter he told the President that it was a question of “when” we were to call a halt to Japan’s expansion rather than “whether.”

“About Japan and all her works,” he said. “It seems to me in creasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some day, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.” He then expressed the belief that “we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.”²

Replying on January 21, 1941, Roosevelt said, “I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.”³ The President then spoke of American policy in the Pacific in relation to the efforts of the British in the war in Europe:

The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of “possibility” so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward insuring our own security must envisage both sending supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.⁴

The President then proclaimed it to be the extraordinary duty of the United States not only to support Britain in the European war, but to accept a stewardship entailing the protection of Britain’s colonial empire while Britain was occupied in Europe. He said:

The conflict [in Europe] may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the Western and Southern Pacific as might occur during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within bounds.⁵

In order to preserve British imperialism in Asia and the Pacific, therefore, the United States must see to it that Japan was “kept within bounds.” The subsequent course of American diplomacy in dealing with Japan may be interpreted in this light.

“Is it fair to say,” Senator Ferguson inquired of Grew before the congressional committee, “that you foresaw war between the United States and Japan?”

“I was doing all in my power to avert war,” Grew said. “That is the only position a diplomatic representative should take. . . . The clash need not have been military. Economic measures might have brought Japan to a position to deal with us.”

“Was it your opinion that Japan would fight or that she was bluffing?”

“I never thought Japan was bluffing,” the ambassador replied. “I thought they would fight under certain circumstances.”⁶

In February, 1941, at a time when Grew was remarking, “The outlook for the future of the relations between Japan and the United States has never been darker,”⁷ Adm. Nomura arrived in Washington as the new Japanese ambassador. Nomura, known as an admirer of the United States and Britain, had inherited a difficult job. Facing him were Americans who made no effort to conceal their skepticism of his and Japan’s intentions. At his back, in Tokyo, were the jingoists of the Japanese army and navy, who did not want any mission of peace to succeed, and the agents of Hitler’s Germany, spinning their intrigues to involve Japan and the United States in a war which would take America off Germany’s back and tie the untrustworthy Japanese firmly to their Axis alliance.

When Nomura was sent to the United States, Grew noted that

the Germans here are doing everything possible to prevent Adm. Nomura from going to Washington and to bring about a partial or complete break in diplomatic relations with the United States, and they are also about to intensify their efforts to embroil the two countries and to propel the [Japanese] southward advance.⁸

Almost at once upon his arrival in Washington, Nomura opened negotiations looking toward a solution of Japan’s difficulties with the United States. In his first interview with the President on February 14, the admiral referred to the chauvinistic military group in Japan as being the chief obstacle to a moderate policy.⁹ He also pointed out, according to a memorandum written by Secretary Hull on March 8, that the people of Japan with few exceptions were very much averse to getting into war with the United States.¹⁰

On April 9 an informal draft, outlining the basis of a cordial resolution of the outstanding differences between the two nations was presented to the State Department by private Japanese and American individuals.¹¹ It provided that the United States would request the Chiang Kai-shek government to negotiate a peace with Japan which would be based on the guaranty of an independent China, withdrawal of Japanese troops, no indemnities or territorial changes, recognition of Manchukuo, and coalescence of the Wang Ching-Wei Chinese puppet government with that of Chiang.

The Japanese were to pledge “no large-scale concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory” and the “Open Door” was to be resumed. The draft agreement stipulated that if the Chinese rejected a settlement tendered through President Roosevelt on these terms, America was to discontinue supplying aid to Chiang’s government.

Japan was to undertake to limit the military grouping among nations not then involved in the European war, and would execute its commitments under the tripartite pact only if one of its partners were “aggressively attacked” by a power not then involved. In return, the United States would pledge to stay out of any “aggressive alliance” designed to assist one nation against another. Both Japan and the United States were to guarantee the independence of the Philippines.¹²

The draft of April 9 had been prepared by its private sponsors in collaboration with Ambassador Nomura. Secretary Hull, after first expressing skepticism that the time was opportune for it to be presented as a basis for negotiations, finally agreed that it could be used as a framework for beginning discussions if it were supplemented with the following points:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific, except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.¹³

On May 12 Nomura submitted an official revision of the April 9 draft to Secretary Hull, the principal changes being that the United States was to pledge to take no “aggressive measures” against any other nation, and was to acknowledge Premier Konoye’s basis for a settlement in China, providing for a neighborly friendship between China and Japan, joint defense against communism, and economic co-operation not based upon any Japanese attempt to attain economic monopoly.¹⁴

Four days later the State Department submitted revisions of these proposals, in which the American pledge to discontinue assistance to China if Chiang refused the Japanese peace tender was rejected, the Konoye principles were not stated in the text, and the proviso that China and Japan should undertake joint defense against communism was rephrased to read “parallel measures of defense against subversive activities from external sources.” Recognition of Manchukuo was left for later negotiations between China and Japan. Secretary Hull also insisted that this country should not be bound to any course of action which would limit all-out assistance to Britain in its fight with the Axis partners in Europe, and Nomura was asked to state that Japan’s Axis commitments were not inconsistent with the policy of permitting America to intervene against its partners in the tripartite pact.¹⁵

A week later, after Foreign Minister Matsuoka had stated Japan’s obligations to support Germany in the event of American entry into the war in Europe, Hull informed Nomura that there could be little progress in negotiations until Japan, in effect, agreed that we should be permitted a free hand to give aid to Britain, even if that should lead to the United States being drawn into the European war. Nomura expressed the view that Matsuoka was talking for home consumption. The ambassador said that Japan would make its own independent decision as to its Axis obligations, and that once the proposed American-Japanese agreement was signed it “would cause a weakening in the influence of the jingoes.”¹⁶

On May 31 Hull again revised the draft basis for negotiations by inserting the provision, “Obviously, the provisions of the pact do not apply to involvement [in the European war] through acts of self-defense.” The “joint defense against communism” clause now became “co-operative defense against injurious communistic activities,” and was tentatively to provide for the continued presence of some Japanese troops in China.¹⁷ Two days later Nomura informed Hull that he and his associates were in agreement with the document as it stood, except for some changes in phraseology, but Hull remained distrustful, even to the extent of questioning whether Japan sincerely desired a settlement.¹⁸

The negotiations now stalled on the issue of whether Japan was to permit the United States to carry intervention as far as it liked in Europe without obliging Japan to honor its commitments under the tripartite pact. On June 21 Hull handed Nomura a complete revision of the American draft,¹⁹ and accompanied it with an oral statement that it was illusory to expect substantial results from an agreement between the two countries as long as certain Japanese leaders were committed to the support of Germany.²⁰

Nomura on July 15 expressed Japan’s objections to the American attitude in saying that “Japan could not give a blank check for anything that America might call self-defense.”²¹ Japan, however, did take measures to meet the objections Hull had stated June 21 against pro-German Japanese leaders when the Konoye cabinet was revised on July 18 and Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who had signed the tripartite pact in behalf of Japan, was dropped.²²

On July 2 representations were made by Tadao Wikawa, an officer of the Capital Cooperative Bank of Japan, to the State Department that he had been informed by J. P. Morgan & Co. that diplomatic conversations had already been closed by the United States, and that Japanese funds in this country were soon to be frozen.²³ This intelligence, which preceded by twenty-three days the actual issuance of the freezing order, did not bring any tangible response from the State Department. On July 25 the freezing order was issued,²⁴ and Britain followed suit the next day. On the same day, as has been noted before, the United States also prohibited the export of petroleum, petroleum products, and scrap metal without a specific license from the administrator of export control. These measures were supposedly taken in retaliation for Japanese assumption of military control over Indo-China, which occurred July 21, but in view of Wikawa’s complaint three weeks earlier about the impending freezing order, it seems clear that they had been meditated for some time.

That the Roosevelt administration embarked upon its program of economic sanctions against Japan with the clear understanding that these measures might easily precipitate war is amply documented. The question had been fully explored by Ambassador Grew in what he called his “green light” dispatch of September 12, 1940, to the State Department. After reviewing the trend of events in the Far East, the ambassador urged the United States to embark on a course of economic sanctions in order to curb Japanese military expansion.

Of this message Mr. Grew remarked in his book, Ten Years In Japan, “Another important event, from my point of view, was the sending to Washington in September of what I can only call my ‘green light’ telegram, perhaps the most significant message sent to Washington in all the eight years of my mission to Japan.”²⁵

Discussing the risks of adopting a policy of sanctions against Japan, Grew remarked, in his message to the State Department,

I have expressed the opinion in previous communications that American-Japanese relations would be set on a downward curve if sanctions were applied by the United States. It is true that measures are now justified by our new program of national preparedness which need not fall within the category of outright sanctions. On the other hand, the probability must be contemplated that drastic embargoes on such important products as oil, of which a super-abundance is known to be possessed by the United States, would be interpreted by the people and government of Japan as actual sanctions and some form of retaliation might and would follow. The risks would depend not so much upon the careful calculations of the Japanese government as upon the uncalculating “do or die” temper of the army and navy should they impute to the United States the responsibility for the failure of their plans for expansion. It may be that such retaliation would take the form of counter-measures by the government but it would be more likely that it would be some sudden stroke by the navy or army without the prior authorization or knowledge of the government. These dangers constitute an imponderable element which cannot be weighed with assurance at any given moment. However, it would be shortsighted to deny their existence or to formulate policy and adopt measures without fully considering these potential risks in determining the wisdom of facing them squarely.

Grew said, however, that it was impossible to stand still when Japan and its Axis partners represented a way of life which threatened Britain and America as the “leaders of a large world-wide group of English speaking peoples.” He remarked,

In general, the uses of diplomacy are bankrupt in attempting to deal with such powers. Occasionally diplomacy may retard, but it cannot stem the tide effectively. Only by force or the display of force can these powers be prevented from attaining their objectives.

American interests in the Pacific are definitely threatened by her [Japan’s] policy of southward expansion, which is a thrust at the British empire in the east. Admittedly America’s security has depended in a measure upon the British fleet, which has been in turn and could only have been supported by the British empire. If the support of the British empire in this, her hour of travail, is conceived to be in our interest, and most emphatically do I so conceive it, we must strive by every means to preserve the status quo in the Pacific, at least until the war in Europe has been won or lost.²⁶

Before the Congressional Investigating Committee, Senator Ferguson asked Grew, “Why did you send the ’green light’ telegram?”

“Because the time had come to apply economic measures,” Grew replied.²⁷

That the American government and military services were well aware that the imposition of oil sanctions would force Japan into further aggressions was demonstrated at the congressional committee hearings. For example, Senator Ferguson asked Adm. Stark, “About the oil question, and your attitude toward Japan: Did you not testify before the Navy Court that after the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan in the summer of 1941, you stated that Japan would go somewhere and take it [oil], and that if you were a Jap you would?”

“I think that is correct,” Stark responded. “I stated it, and I stated in the State Department, as I recall, that if a complete shutdown was made on the Japanese, throttling her commercial life and her internal life, and her essential normal peace life by stopping her from getting oil, the natural thing for a Jap was to say, ‘Well, I will go down and take it.’”²⁸

Ferguson then asked whether Stark recalled a White House conference on July 24, 1941, when Roosevelt said he had told Ambassador Nomura that, should Japan attack to get oil by force, the Dutch and British would go to war against her.

When Stark said he had no recollection of this statement, Ferguson read the following transcript of the President’s remarks to Nomura:

The President said that if Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch, without a shadow of a doubt, would resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result.²⁹

“Now,” Ferguson said, “do you know whether or not shortly after that, in fact, in about 48 hours, the embargo did go on?”

“The embargo went on, as I recall,” Stark replied, “on the 26th. This is the 24th. Yes, sir.”³⁰

Ferguson then read a memorandum of a conversation on July 25, 1941, between Arthur A. Ballantine, Assistant Secretary of State, and Col. Iwakuro, Japanese military attaché in Washington. Col. Iwakuro stated that, in view of the imposition of the oil embargo, Japan would have no alternative sooner or later but to go into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies for oil and other materials.

“Now, Admiral,” said Ferguson, “taking the high ranking officials in our government, you said that you thought sanctions such as this oil, etc., would bring war on ultimately. Who else agreed with you?”

Stark replied that he believed the State Department, Army leaders, and practically all high officials in Washington took that position. He read from Peace and War:

Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by a show of superior force, involves serious risk of war. The President and heads of the Army and Navy and Department of State were in constant consultation through this period regarding all the aspects of the diplomatic and military situation.³¹

Ferguson then produced a covering letter written by Stark July 22, 1941, to Undersecretary of State Welles, attached to which was an analysis of the expected effects of an oil embargo which had been drafted by Adm. Turner. This analysis set forth the Navy’s official position on the advisability of imposing the embargo, as attested by a notation from Stark to Welles saying, “I concur in general.”³²

Turner, in his analysis, said,

It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result. . . . Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months’ war operations.

Turner said, however, that an

embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war.

In listing his conclusions, Adm. Turner said,

An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if practicable, be postponed until Japan is engaged in a war in Siberia. It may well be that Japan has decided against an early attack on the British and Dutch, but has decided to occupy Indo-China and to strengthen her position there, also to attack the Russians in Siberia. Should this prove to be the case, it seems probable that the United States could engage in war in the Atlantic, and that Japan, would not intervene for the time being, even against the British.

Turner’s final recommendation was “that trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time.”³³

Three days after the Navy counselled the State Department and Roosevelt against the embargo, the President imposed it.

Four days before the freezing and embargo orders, Nomura, perturbed by the turn events were taking, endeavored to see in turn Secretary Hull and Adm. Stark, but, unable to reach either, finally called on Adm. Turner. Turner’s report of this conversation depicts Nomura as speaking with considerable frankness as one naval officer to another:

Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100 per cent agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by treaty to Germany, and this treaty could not be denounced at this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan’s hands, and that these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it seemed to be to Japan’s interest to do so. Japan’s future acts will be dominated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.

The ambassador also told Adm. Turner that, as a result of the United States export restrictions, Japan’s economic position was bad and steadily getting worse. American and British military support to China, in contrast, was steadily increasing. Nomura informed Turner that within the next few days Japan would occupy Indo-China. He expressed himself as personally opposed to this move, and feared that the United States would take further military and economic action in reprisal. He proposed that if the United States could change its policy in regard to the Japanese embargo and aid to China, and that if it could bring itself to agree to permitting Japanese troop concentrations on the border of Inner Mongolia, whatever action was taken by the United States in the Atlantic would not be of great concern to Japan.

This was the Japanese proposal in its plainest form, and Adm. Turner inferred that it would mean Japanese troop withdrawal from the greater part of China.³⁴

On July 23, however, Welles, who was acting as Secretary of State, told Nomura there was no basis for pursuing further the conversations between Japan and the United States.³⁵ This statement provoked such profound concern in Tokyo that the new Japanese foreign minister, Adm. Teijiro Toyoda, informed Grew on July 26 that he had “hardly slept at all during recent nights.”³⁶ Adm. Nomura, however, left Welles after expressing the hope that no hasty conclusions would be reached and after voicing his own “belief that a friendly adjustment could still be found.”³⁷

President Roosevelt on July 24 proposed that if Japan would withdraw its troops from Indo-China, he would make every effort to obtain an agreement from the British, Dutch, and Chinese for the neutralization of this area. Nomura responded that withdrawal, with the attendant problem of saving face, presented difficulties that were probably insuperable.³⁸ The fact that Roosevelt’s suggestion was not received in Tokyo until after news of the American freezing order, thus increasing Japanese resentment, made it clear to Grew that the proposal could not be favorably considered at that time.³⁹

On August 6 Nomura informed Hull that Japan would pledge that “it will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China would be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident.”

In return for these concessions, Japan asked that the United States agree that Japanese citizens in the Philippines would not be discriminated against, that the United States would suspend its military measures in the Southwest Pacific, and, on the successful conclusion of the conversations, would attempt to induce Britain and Holland to take similar steps; that normal trade relations would be restored by the United States; that both nations were to co-operate in assuring free access to the natural resources of the Southwest Pacific and East Asia, and that the United States was to “use its good offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese government and the Chiang Kai-shek régime for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China Incident.”⁴⁰ Hull’s formal reply termed these proposals “lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President.”⁴¹

Thus, when Roosevelt went off to the Atlantic conference, where he promised Churchill that the United States would take an uncompromising position against Japan, even if it resulted in war, the negotiations in Washington were stalemated.

When the President returned from his meeting at sea to present Nomura with his warning of August 17 that America would fight, the Japanese ambassador brought up the plan for a radical solution of Japan’s differences with this country. It was nothing less than that Roosevelt should hold a Pacific conference with Premier Prince Konoye, just as he had held an Atlantic conference with Churchill, and that face to face the leaders of the two countries should achieve a settlement once and for all.

Adm. Nomura told the President that Prince Konoye “feels so seriously and earnestly about preserving [peaceful] relations that he would be disposed to meet the President midway, geographically speaking, between our two countries and sit down together and talk the matter out in a peaceful spirit.”⁴²

This proposal was not new with the Japanese. It had first been suggested in the formal draft of April 9 presented by nonofficial Japanese and Americans to the State Department as the outline for resolution of the strained relations between the two countries. It had then been proposed that this meeting be held during May at Honolulu. Thus the idea of a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting preceded the Atlantic conference by four months.⁴³

On August 8,⁴⁴ two days before Roosevelt met Churchill off Newfoundland, and again on August 16,⁴⁵ Nomura repeated his request for a meeting between the President and Konoye to Secretary Hull, but Hull gave him no encouragement. On August 17 Nomura submitted the plan directly to Roosevelt. The President made no direct reply at the time.

In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda, pressing Ambassador Grew to support such a meeting, expressed high hopes that it would solve all of the difficulties. Grew personally appealed for “very prayerful consideration” of the proposal “for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States.” The ambassador wrote Secretary Hull,

Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable.⁴⁶

The hopes of the Japanese moderates were centered on this plan.*

They believed that the best hope of peace was for peace elements in Japan to establish themselves firmly in control, as against the military extremists, and to co-operate with the United States in shifting Pacific relationships onto a new basis. It was believed, however, that a certain measure of immediate agreement was a prerequisite to establishing the moderates in control, because it would form a counterweight on Japanese public opinion against the pressures of the militarists and of axis propaganda. Finally, on August 23, Roosevelt said that if such a meeting was to be held, it might be arranged for about October 15, but Nomura stressed the urgency of an earlier date.⁴⁷

On August 27 Prime Minister Konoye sent a personal appeal to Roosevelt for a meeting “as soon as possible.”⁴⁸ The President, although willing to meet Churchill, now raised difficulties about getting away for twenty-one days to go as far as Hawaii. He suggested that if the meeting were held in Juneau, Alaska, it would require only about two weeks of his time and would allow for about a three- or four-day conversation.⁴⁹ Nomura replied that Juneau was acceptable, and that Konoye would get there in about ten days by warship. He suggested the period between September 21 and 25 as most suitable for the meeting.⁵⁰

Hull took the position that all of the decisions to be reached at the proposed meeting should be agreed to preliminary to it, and looked upon Juneau as merely a ratification meeting. He brought up the serious consequences to both governments if the meeting failed to reach an agreement, but he did not give equal consideration to the hazards of having no meeting at all. Nomura tried to allay his doubts, particularly as to the crucial question of Japan’s commitments under the tripartite pact, by saying that this alliance would present no difficulties at the conference because “the Japanese people regarded their adherence to the Axis as merely nominal and . . . he could not conceive of his people being prepared to go to war with the United States for the sake of Germany.” He asserted, however, that for the United States to demand that Japan grant America a blank check for any action against Germany “was equivalent to asking for a nullification of the tripartite pact,” and that he did not think Japan’s leaders were willing to go that far as long as they were subject to pressure, if not belligerent action, by a combination consisting of the United States, Britain, and Holland.⁵¹

On September 3 Roosevelt submitted a formal reply to Konoye’s proposal for a meeting, adopting the view expressed by Hull that preliminary agreements were necessary to insure a successful out-come.⁵² But, at the same time, he said that such preliminary agreements would have to be submitted to and discussed with the British, Chinese, and Dutch before he could take them up in negotiations with Konoye.⁵³ This proviso not only made an early meeting a practical impossibility, but reduced the possibility of arranging a conference at all. It demonstrated unmistakably that this country already had an alliance, admitted or not, with China and the western imperialisms and was conducting its diplomacy much more with the view to protecting their interests than its own.

Prince Konoye, in his memoirs, stated that on August 28 Roosevelt had summoned Nomura and told him, “I desire a meeting of about three days with Prince Konoye.” But something happened, Konoye continued, and Roosevelt’s enthusiasm cooled between then and September 3.⁵⁴ Although the conference project continued to be discussed, it had been rendered a dead letter by the President’s attitude. The American diplomatic representatives in Tokyo noted that, almost until the very end, Konoye and the moderate element were willing to go to almost any lengths to bring off the meeting and avert war. Eugene Dooman reported on September 18 that an understanding had been reached among influential elements in Japan enabling Konoye to give Roosevelt direct oral assurance in regard to the tripartite pact which “would be entirely satisfactory to the President.”⁵⁵

On September 27, Foreign Minister Toyoda again urged a Pacific conference in describing to Ambassador Grew his concern over the growing tension in relations between Japan and America. He said that he hoped for an adjustment, not only for the sake of the two countries, but in the belief that such a step “would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.” Toyoda said:

Since assuming my post two months ago, I’ve been working on the matter of adjusting Japanese-U.S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.

Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedent of an instance where the premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and, through that, of maintaining peace in the Pacific, and, indeed, for the world.

Maintenance of peace is Japan’s sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U.S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

Toyoda said that the vessel to transport Konoye and his party to the meeting had already been selected, and the personnel of the party, including generals and admirals, had been decided upon. “We are in a position to start at any moment now,” he said.⁵⁶

Toyoda further told Grew,

Time, as I have often said, is a vital factor from both internal and international viewpoints. The decision [whether to hold the conference] must be made as soon as possible. So I desire to ask for the most speedy and sincere consideration of the American government. I may add that, as regards the date for the meeting, October 10-15 will suit the Japanese government.

Finally, by way of a conclusion, I should like to say that negotiations of this sort require sincerity and mutual confidence. I need not dwell on the character, the convictions, and faith of Prince Konoye as well as his political position, all of which are well known to Your Excellency. Without Prince Konoye and the present cabinet under him, an opportunity for Japanese-American rapprochement is likely to be lost for some time to come. I wish to emphasize again the urgent necessity of having the proposed meeting at the earliest possible date.⁵⁷

On September 29 Grew sent a strong plea to Washington in behalf of the meeting. He left no doubt of the alternative if Konoye’s request were spurned.

In this message the American ambassador said that the advent of the Konoye-Toyoda régime had given American diplomacy a new lease on life. Expressing hope that “so propitious a period be not permitted to slip by,” Grew said that in his opinion the time had arrived when “liberal elements in Japan might come to the top” if encouraged. He said that the United States must choose between a policy of economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation.

If the Konoye proposal for a conference leading to rapprochement were rejected, Grew continued, Konoye’s cabinet would fall, a military dictatorship would come into power, “unbridled acts” might be expected, and a situation would result “in which it will be difficult to avoid war.” Grew said Konoye, while unable to renounce the Axis alliance, would reduce Japan’s adherence to “a dead letter.” The Roosevelt-Konoye conference, the ambassador concluded, presented “the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific.”⁵⁸

This forecast was prophetic. Roosevelt was being offered the chance that might have avoided war. He chose to refuse it. Events then followed their inevitable course.*

After dispatching this message, Grew commented in his journal:

For a prime minister of Japan thus to shatter all precedent and tradition in this land of subservience to precedent and tradition, and to wish to come hat in hand, so to speak, to meet the President of the United States on American soil, is a gauge of the determination of the government to undo the vast harm already accomplished in alienating our powerful and progressively angry country.⁵⁹

Even in the face of such representations, Secretary Hull remained obdurate and maintained that Japan’s failure to make specific advance commitments was a sign of insincerity and evidenced the intention to continue a policy of aggression.⁶⁰ In Japan such unwillingness to compromise, Dooman observed, occasioned doubt whether the United States ever intended to come to an agreement.⁶¹ Roosevelt and Hull refused to act and matters drifted along until the outside date of October 15 proposed by Toyoda for the conference had slipped by. On the following day, October 16, the Konoye cabinet resigned and Gen. Tojo and the militarists took over the government of Japan.

“Although I knew that the failure of progress in the American-Japanese negotiations would almost certainly bring about Konoye’s fall sooner or later,” Grew said, “I had not looked for it so soon.”⁶²

In an exchange of letters with Konoye the following day, Grew warmly commended the former premier for his “distinguished official service” to Japan.⁶³ Later Grew commented:

The reason why I mentioned his outstanding service was the fact that he alone tried to reverse the engine, and tried hard and courageously, even risking his life and having a very close call as it was. Whatever mistakes he made directing Japan’s policy, he had the sense and the courage to recognize those mistakes and to try to start his country on a new orientation of friendship with the United States.⁶⁴

Konoye had indeed pursued his policy at the risk of his life. On August 14, Baron Hiranuma, the 75-year old vice-premier in his cabinet, had been struck by two bullets fired by a member of the Black Dragon Society who found the moderation of the government intolerable. The incident was interpreted as a warning that Konoye and the moderates who were endeavoring to avert a war with the United States must go.⁶⁵

Konoye, facing an order from American military occupation headquarters for his arrest as a war criminal, ended his life with poison December 16, 1945. In Oscar Wilde’s De Profundis, one of the last books Konoye had read, this passage was underlined: “Society as we have constituted it will have no place for me, has none to offer; but nature, whose swift rains fall on the unjust and just alike, will have clefts in the rocks where I may hide, and secret valleys in whose silence I may weep undisturbed.”⁶⁶

No one else wept for the lost peace.

*The majority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (p. 48) states: “That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unquestioned. But for many years the government of that nation had been divided into two schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to think in terms of international good will with the other dominated by the militarism of the war lords who had always ultimately resolved Japanese policy.”

*President Roosevelt’s responsibility in conducting diplomacy was described in the minority report of the Joint Congressional Committee (p. 12) as follows:

“The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from March 4, 1933, to Dec. 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin D. Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws, and established practice of the United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, such correspondence and communications relating thereto as he deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to him it was the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed of all transactions that were critical in nature and especially those involving the possible use of the armed forces of the United States.”