11. Diplomacy for D-Day

Chapter Eleven

DIPLOMACY FOR D-DAY

DESPITE THE accession of Gen. Tojo and a military government, all hope was not yet lost. Tojo started the war and has been brought to dock as a war criminal, but he was not installed as premier with the purpose of embarking upon a conflict with the United States which would end in the ruin of Japan. The danger that the conflict would materialize lay, as far as Japan was concerned, in the insensate ambitions of the military extremists.¹ The strategy of Hirohito and his advisers was, therefore, to vest in a representative of this very element responsibility for the policies and conduct of the Japanese government, in the hope that by so doing a restraining influence could be exerted over the hotheads by one of their own number.

Ambassador Grew wrote in his journal October 20,

Despite the fact that, as anticipated, the Konoye government was succeeded not by a civilian but by a military man, indications of a willingness on the part of the Tojo government to proceed with the conversations . . . would imply that it is premature to stigmatize the Tojo government as a military dictatorship committed to the furtherance of policies which might be expected to bring about armed conflict with the United States.

Noting that Tojo, as distinguished from previous Japanese military prime ministers, was not a retired officer, but a full general in active service, Grew observed, “It would be logical, therefore, to expect that Gen. Tojo, in retaining his active rank in the army, will as a result be in a position to exercise a larger degree of control over army extremist groups.”²

As further encouragement to hopes for preserving peace, Grew reported to the State Department that “a reliable Japanese informant” had told him that

just prior to the fall of the Konoye cabinet a conference of the leading members of the privy council and of the Japanese armed forces had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they would be prepared to pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with the United States. The representatives of the army and navy who attended the conference did not reply to the Emperor’s question, whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes.

The Emperor’s definite stand necessitated the selection of a prime minister who would be in a position effectively to control the army, the ensuing resignation of Prince Konoye, and the appointment of Gen. Tojo who, while remaining in the active army list, is committed to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations.³

There was, in fact, an active appreciation, especially on the part of the Japanese navy, that it might well be an invitation to disaster to undertake a war against the United States. Konoye, in his memoirs, asserted that Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander-in-chief of the combined imperial fleets, when asked what the chances were if a war should develop, told him, “If they say it must be done, we will run around at will for about half a year or a year, but if it stretches into two or three years, I have no confidence in a successful ending.”⁴

The Roosevelt administration had already kicked over the best hope of preserving peace when it refused to strengthen the hand of Konoye, and a plain warning of the consequences, embodying an inferential criticism of the Roosevelt policy toward Japan, was dispatched by Ambassador Grew to Hull on November 3. Grew said that if efforts at conciliation were to fail,

the ambassador foresees a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan once more back to the former Japanese position or even farther. This would lead to what he has described as an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri, to make Japan impervious to economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to foreign pressure. It is realized by observers who feel Japanese national temper and psychology from day to day that, beyond peradventure, this contingency not only is possible but is probable.

. . . The view that war probably would be averted, though there might be some risk of war, by progressively imposing drastic economic measures is an uncertain and dangerous hypothesis upon which to base considered United States policy and measures. War would not be averted by such a course, if it is taken. . . . The primary point to be decided involves the question whether war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies, and needs in the case of failure of the first line of national defense, namely, diplomacy, since it would be possible only on the basis of such a decision for the Roosevelt administration to follow a course which would be divested as much as possible of elements of uncertainty, speculation, and opinion. The ambassador does not doubt that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to be, already has been debated fully and adopted, because the sands are running fast.⁵

Grew was here saying that Roosevelt and his administration had already committed themselves to war, and that the policy of economic strangulation and the refusal to support the Konoye government as the one hope of peace were merely symptoms of the fundamental decision already reached.

Grew continued,

The ambassador . . . does not at all mean to imply that Washington is pursuing an undeliberated policy. Nor does he intend to advocate for a single moment any “appeasement” of Japan. . . . The ambassador’s purpose is only to insure against the United States becoming involved in war with Japan because of any possible misconception of Japan’s capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. . . . He points out the shortsightedness of underestimating Japan’s obvious preparations to implement an alternative program in the event the peace program fails.

He adds that similarly it would be shortsighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber-rattling, merely intended to give moral support to the high-pressure diplomacy of Japan. Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.⁶

The Japanese government, however, would make one further endeavor to reach a solution. Even before the collapse of the Konoye cabinet, it had been determined to dispatch Saburo Kurusu, an experienced diplomat, to Washington to assist Nomura in this final attempt to come to an understanding.⁷ Kurusu left Tokyo on his mission November 5. With or without his knowledge—and Kurusu, as well as Nomura, professed after the war that he had no advance knowledge of the Pearl Harbor stroke⁸—the Tojo government had already set a deadline for reaching an understanding with the United States. Upon his departure, Kurusu said that he refused to take a later Clipper for “technical reasons.”⁹ The obvious inference was that he was working within a fixed time limit. Nor were the reasons for this decision difficult to perceive.

By November the economic war initiated by the United States had already reduced Japan to a desperate pass. Not only had Japanese assets been frozen by the Americans, British, and Dutch, cutting off trade with these countries, but the Panama Canal had been closed to Japanese shipping. These actions, together with the trade stagnation incident to the Russo-German war, had cut off about 75 per cent of Japan’s normal imports, causing a serious food shortage and weakening the general economy.¹⁰ These dislocations were so severe that, according to the information given Grew November 7 by “a leading Japanese,” the Tojo government had

decided the limits to which it will be possible to go in an endeavor to meet the desires of the United States, but nevertheless should these concessions be regarded as inadequate by the government of the United States, it is of the highest importance that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down.¹¹

This insistence that the conversations be continued, even if there were recognition of failure on both sides, again hints that a deadline had already been established for agreement, after which any further conversations would be merely for the purpose of deceiving the none too prescient administration in Washington and its Army and Navy command. The Japanese pretense of keeping up the conversations after November 26 was, in fact, designed to stall for time until a military plan already set in train could be executed.

When Grew complained to his informant of the bellicose tone of the Japanese press, his visitor merely remarked that “frightened dogs bark and the greater the fright the louder the bark,” adding that “at present the military party in Japan are frightened by the prospects opening up before them.”¹²

Even before Kurusu arrived in Washington, however, the new Tojo government had displayed a disposition to strive for an understanding by authorizing Nomura to present to Secretary Hull on November 7 a memorandum dealing with the disposition of Japanese troops on the Asiatic mainland and pledging that all troops, with the exception of garrisons in North China and Inner Mongolia, would be withdrawn from China within two years after the conclusion of a peace, and that Japanese troops would also be withdrawn from Indo-China after the conclusion of the Chinese war.¹³ Three days later Nomura again endeavored to satisfy President Roosevelt’s concern about Japan’s commitments under the Axis pact by saying, “All I have to ask you is to ‘read between the lines’ and to accept the formula as satisfactory.”¹⁴

In Tokyo Shigenori Togo, the new Japanese foreign minister, spoke grimly to Grew on November 10 of America’s refusal to display what he termed “sincerity.” Grew said that the minister stated:

The population of this country is steadily and rapidly increasing; that it was now about 100 million; and it was necessary to assure raw materials necessary for their existence. It was his opinion that unless the American government realizes this fact as among the realities of the situation, successful conclusion to the conversations would be difficult. During the conversations carried on for a period of more than six months, the Japanese government had repeatedly made proposals calculated to approach the American point of view, but the American government for its part had taken a more advanced position. Those being the facts, “we in Japan are led to wonder what is the degree of sincerity of the American government in continuing with the conversations.” He said that national sentiment will not tolerate further protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion.

Later in the conversation Togo asserted that “the freezing by the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the direct use of force.”

The minister also inquired of Grew why America took a holier-than-thou attitude toward Japanese military activity, voicing “his impression that the American government is now resorting, under the plea of self-defense, to measures over and beyond those that are generally recognized by international law.”¹⁵

All of these many months the American government had considered its discussions with the Japanese merely as preliminary and exploratory conversations, but now the Japanese deemed that they had advanced sufficiently to be raised to the level of “formal and official negotiations.”¹⁶ The Japanese also pleaded for more speed in the negotiations, but were answered by Roosevelt with the statement that the six months already consumed was but a short time to deal with such important problems. He then counseled patience.¹⁷ Foreign Minister Togo was described as “shocked” on hearing from Nomura that Hull and Roosevelt did not appreciate the urgency of the negotiations and the necessity to bring them to an early successful conclusion. Japan was so thoroughly subjected to militaristic propaganda that Togo realized, like Konoye before him, according to the statement of Grew, that he was endangering his position and even his life by opposing extremist groups and keeping the negotiations alive.¹⁸

On November 15, however, Secretary Hull said he would not even enter the stage of negotiations until Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands had been consulted, and that he objected to receiving “ultimatums” on the question of speeding up the discussions because, he said, the United States had been pursuing a peaceful course all the while and the Japanese government was the one which had been “violating law and order.” He added that to reach an agreement while Japan’s obligations to Germany remained in force would cause so much outcry in this country that he “might well be lynched.”¹⁹

Hull now suggested a new commercial agreement providing for co-operation by the United States and Japan in reducing trade barriers generally, and restoring normal trade between the two countries, except as each might find it necessary to restrict exports for its own security and self-defense.²⁰ American embargo orders against Japan had not mentioned that country by name but had generally prohibited exports of certain products except to the western hemisphere and Great Britain in the interest of “self-defense,” so that resort to the same phrase in Hull’s new offer could be interpreted as constituting an escape clause by which this country could give Japan a promise but no tangible benefits.

Upon Kurusu’s arrival in Washington November 17, Hull threw cold water on his mission at the outset by insisting on an outright Japanese disavowal of the tripartite pact before discussing anything else, and expressing the opinion that Kurusu had nothing new to offer.²¹ Hull, in continuing conference sessions, displayed no more readiness to compromise, stating at a meeting November 18, “We can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences.”²² Kurusu told Hull that, while he could not say that Japan would abrogate the tripartite pact, “Japan might do something that would ‘outshine’ the tripartite pact.”²³ Hull was not impressed. When Kurusu then asked for a State Department formula by which Japan could deal with her Axis obligations, Hull dismissed the request with the statement that “this was a matter for Japan to work out.”²⁴ Nomura, also pressing for some means to change Japan’s course, pointed out that “big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased around slowly and gradually.”²⁵

To attain this end, the Japanese on November 20 and 21 made what was to be their last offer. This was the so-called modus vivendi which was to serve until some further agreement could be reached. Hull asked whether the Japanese proposal was intended as a temporary step to help organize public opinion in Japan and whether the Japanese emissaries intended afterward to continue the conversations, looking to the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Kurusu replied in the affirmative.

According to the State Department account,

Mr. Kurusu said that some immediate relief was necessary and that if the patient needed a thousand dollars to effect a cure, an offer of $300 would not accomplish the purpose. . . . The secretary replied that although the Japanese proposal was addressed to the American government, he had thought it advisable to see whether other countries would contribute and he found that they would like to move gradually.

This view entirely discounted Kurusu’s insistence that some kind of speedy settlement, even of a stop-gap character, was necessary. “The ambassador,” Hull said, “explained that Japan needed a quick settlement and that its psychological value would be great.”²⁶ But Hull couldn’t, or wouldn’t, move that fast.

The Japanese proposals were as follows:

(1) The governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both governments shall co-operate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.²⁷

In regard to the Axis pact, Kurusu stated, Japan undertook to interpret its commitments “freely and independently.” He declared that the Japanese government “would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign power; it [would] accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice.”²⁸

This was as far as Japan had ever gone in disavowing the war threat of the pact, but Hull noted that he “did not think this would be of any particular help and so dismissed it.”²⁹ The Secretary also objected to the clause specifying that the United States would refrain from “actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.” This clause apparently required suspension of American aid to Chiang, and the Secretary said that the purpose of our aid to China was the same as that of our aid to Britain³⁰—implying an all-out American support of Chinese victory, regardless of its effect upon relations with Japan. On November 22 Hull further insisted that Japanese troops be withdrawn not only from southern Indo-China, but from all of that country.³¹

On November 24 Grew reported from Tokyo that Foreign Minister Togo expressed perplexity concerning the reasons of the American government for not accepting the Japanese proposal. Togo said he did not expect American aid to China to be discontinued until such time as negotiations between China and Japan were to begin, at which time he assumed hostilities would have ceased. Grew concluded from these remarks that this point in the Japanese proposal was primarily intended to save face.³²

Long after the event, Secretary Hull would describe the Japanese proposals of November 20 and 21 as the “final Japanese proposition, an ultimatum.”³³ On November 26 he submitted the American counter-proposal, and it meant war. Grew noted in his diary on November 29 that when Hull’s proposals became known in Japan, most Japanese leaders, among them Togo and Prince Konoye, were “very pessimistic.”³⁴ On December 5 he reported having received a letter from a prominent Japanese who said that almost all of the people with whom he had talked believe “that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us.”³⁵

On November 30 the Japanese state of mind was reflected in a bellicose speech delivered by Premier Gen. Tojo under the auspices of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and Dai Nippon East Asia League. The Premier asserted:

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.³⁶

Hull’s proposals of November 26 were clearly unacceptable to the Japanese and were known to be so in advance by the Secretary. They made it clear that the State Department had reached the end of negotiations. On the day before submitting them to Nomura and Kurusu, Hull expressed the belief at a meeting of the war council “that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan, that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the question of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.” He also expressed his judgment “that any plan for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense.”³⁷ In the light of these opinions, Hull could not have expected much to come of his proposals of the following day.

Roosevelt also had no misconceptions about what would happen when the proposals were tendered Japan. In a message to Prime Minister Churchill on November 24, he stated, “I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.”³⁸ Again, at a meeting at the White House on noon of the 25th, the day before Hull handed the President’s counter-proposals to Japan, Roosevelt “brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps [as soon as] next Monday.”³⁹

Hull stated before the Congressional Investigating Committee that he conducted his diplomacy in close collaboration with the British, Australian, Dutch, and Chinese governments, all of which were consulted in the preparation of the November 26 note,⁴⁰ and whose views, particularly those of the Chinese, he accommodated, even though they had a profound effect upon bringing on the war.

One of his memoranda, for instance, showed that on November 25, the day before he submitted the American terms to Japan, he consulted Ambassador Halifax, who wanted the proposals to the Japanese to include removal of all Jap troops and naval and air forces from Indo-China, instead of permitting 25,000 troops to remain, as Hull had suggested. The American secretary amended his government’s terms to accommodate the British ambassador’s view.⁴¹

Halifax also wanted Hull’s relaxation of economic restrictions to be amended to forbid export to Japan of all goods “of direct importance to the war potential, in particular, oil.” Halifax said the British were anxious to “facilitate Hull’s difficult task,” but said the British empire’s economic structure was so complicated that Britain considered it impracticable “to give carte blanche to diplomatic representatives.”⁴²

In a message to Roosevelt on November 26, Churchill acknowledged receipt from the President of a “message about Japan” informing the British government of Hull’s submission of his ultimatum to the Japanese envoys on that date. Churchill told the President, “It is for you to handle this business.”

“There is only one point that disquiets us,” Churchill went on. “What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.”⁴³

Churchill could have spared himself his worries about the Chinese. They were taking care of themselves. The fact was brought out at the congressional hearings that Hull cast away the last hope of averting war by yielding to their importunities.

Before he submitted his document of November 26, which the Army Pearl Harbor Board described as “touching the button that started the war,”⁴⁴ Hull had inclined toward the idea of submitting a modus vivendi of his own to effect a three months’ truce with Japan. This scheme was in the forefront of his mind as late as the morning of the 25th, as attested by Secretary of War Stimson. Stimson said:

At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull’s office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months’ truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but I did not think that there was any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.⁴⁵ In return for the propositions which they were to do, namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation. We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the department, and I got hold of Marshall.⁴⁶

With the chief of staff, Stimson then went to the White House, where, together with Secretaries Knox and Hull and Adm. Stark, they heard the President make his prediction of a Japanese attack “perhaps next Monday.”

On the following day, November 26, Stimson learned that Hull had determined to abandon the modus vivendi. Stimson recounted,

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over—to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition—when he showed it to them; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of three months.

Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that it would play into the hands of his, Chiang’s, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I had called up Hull this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above—that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose.⁴⁷

When Adm. Stark was examined before the congressional committee, Representative Gearhart brought up the White House conference at noon on the 25th and asked whether Hull at that time gave any intimation that he proposed to abandon the proposal for a three months’ truce. Stark said he could not recall, but that Hull, in a memorandum of November 27, mentioned that as early as the 25th he was considering abandoning the modus vivendi and on the 26th did abandon it.

“Well, weren’t you very, very much disturbed, and wasn’t Gen. Marshall very much disturbed by the progress of that conference in the things that were said and the things that were being planned by Mr. Hull?” asked Gearhart.

“We were disturbed because we thought things were heading up so fast toward a showdown, if you will, and we wanted more time and it began to look as though we were not going to get it,” Stark replied. “If you read the modus vivendi, it is nothing like so drastic as the so-called ten-point note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understanding that the ten points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the points which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under the modus vivendi, and that the modus vivendi would provide some weeks, or three months, to discuss these particular points, and that then the modus vivendi was thrown overboard and the points with which you are all familiar were handed to the Japanese.”

“It has been stated,” Gearhart said, “that the modus vivendi was abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to it. Was any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude toward the modus vivendi in that meeting of the 25th?”

“I do not recall that it was,” Stark replied. “I have an extremely clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he felt about the modus vivendi separate from that meeting of the 25th.”

“You heard the President say in the course of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as next Monday?”

“Yes, I recall that.”⁴⁸

A memorandum by Secretary Hull to Roosevelt of November 26 was produced. It read:

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese government:

1. A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic, peaceful settlement for the Pacific area which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on, to be carried on if agreeable to both governments with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking towards a general agreement which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations. In view of the opposition of the Chinese government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and Australian governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will natturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese ambassador and hand to him a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.⁴⁹

Commenting upon Hull’s change of mind, which resulted in the abandonment of the modus vivendi, Stark said, “I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull’s mind the message from Chiang Kai-shek and it jellied on the 26th.”⁵⁰

Stimson first heard of Hull’s decision to substitute his ultimatum for the modus vivendi on November 27, one day after the Secretary of State’s interview with the Japanese envoys. Stimson related,

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his finale had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy.”

I then called the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position.⁵¹

Adm. Stark said that he probably first heard on November 27 that Hull had thrown over the modus vivendi and had submitted his ten-point ultimatum. He said he recalled Hull’s statement that “it was now up to the Army and Navy” which, to his mind, “pointed clearly to the fact that he [Hull] had no hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement in the Pacific through further negotiations.”

“When I learned of it, I considered it very important, particularly as we were playing for time,” Stark said.⁵²

Returning to the influence exerted by the Chinese in inducing Hull to abandon the modus vivendi, Senator Ferguson produced the message transmitted to Secretary Stimson on November 25 by T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law. Stark identified it as the message which had disturbed Hull.

“Isn’t it true that the Chinese government not only went to the Secretary of State but they went to other agencies and Mr. Hull was upset about it?” Ferguson asked.

“Very much upset.”

Ferguson asked whether the Chinese had not put pressure even on Congress to induce Hull to abandon the truce proposal.

“That is my understanding, and confirmed, without any question, by Mr. Hull’s statement to me that they were crying appeasement on the Hill, another thing which greatly perturbed him.”⁵³

Ferguson then produced a memorandum by Hull of a conversation he had had on November 25 with the Chinese ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, which bore the title, “Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to Modus Vivendi” Describing his conversation with Dr. Hu, Hull said:

I said very recently that the Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is of attack to the Burma Road, to Indo-China, and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this proposal of mine and the President’s does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indo-China and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek says is an imminent danger.⁵⁴

Stark commented on this as follows: “I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his telling me that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that the Chinese themselves should have supported him, because he was doing this in their behalf, and that apparently they didn’t understand it. Also he pointed out that the British, he thought, were only half-way supporting it.”⁵⁵

“Now, will you tell us why the modus vivendi was not sent?” Ferguson asked Stark. “You were one of the top officials representing the United States Navy, and this would be a naval war in the Pacific, would it not?”

“Largely, yes. I always looked on it as largely a naval war.”

Stark said that both he and Gen. Marshall were fighting for time, “because the defense of the Philippines, which was an Army problem,” required a greater state of readiness for war.⁵⁶

Stark then referred to a memorandum of a conversation November 29 between Hull and Lord Halifax, in which Hull stated:

The British ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japanese, with special reference to the question of the proposed modus vivendi. This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, had sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different cabinet officers and high officials in this government other than the State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are.

I added that Chiang Kai-shek had his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other’s views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek’s loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal that the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan. Every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.⁵⁷

“I felt the same way about the impropriety of flooding all of Washington in the manner in which Mr. Hull stated,” Stark remarked. “I thought they should have gone to him with all of their troubles and not gone into the highways and byways.”

“But after we are all through, it is apparent that Mr. Hull followed just what the Chinese wanted?” asked Senator Ferguson.

“He did. He broke off so far as the modus vivendi is concerned,” replied Stark. “And he gives extensive reasons there for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek’s thoughts that even a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to continue. He talked it over, I assume, with his Chief and he came to that conclusion.”

“But, Admiral,” said Ferguson, “isn’t this true, that when you take what Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that he was not going to follow that route—rather that he was going to follow what he wanted. It was a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it not?”

“I do not know if he criticized so much,” Stark replied, “although he may have criticized Chinese understanding in some respects. That, I would say, could have been resolved and set straight between Mr. Hull and the ambassador. But when it was broadcast, and Mr. Hull gained the impression that even here at the capitol he was considered guilty of appeasement, that may have influenced him in the action which he took.”

“Now, wait. Do I understand, then, that the opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had something to do with his throwing out the modus vivendi and putting in the note of the 26th?”

“Whether or not that criticism which was being leveled at him in official Washington had anything to do with his final decision only Mr. Hull could answer,” replied Stark. “I do know that it greatly annoyed him.”⁵⁸

This was the background when Nomura and Kurusu called at the State Department at 5:45 P.M. on November 26, to be handed the American terms. The Chinese had got under Hull’s skin with their shouts about “appeasement,” and the Secretary of State, with Roosevelt’s blessing, responded by kicking peace out the window.⁵⁹ The proposals he submitted to Japan were as follows:

(1) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

(2) Both governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai governments an agreement whereunder each of the governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

(3) The government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

(4) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or régime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

(5) Both governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concession and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

(6) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

(7) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

(8) Both governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

(9) Both governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

(10) Both governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.⁶⁰

Lindley and Davis candidly remark,

When the document was out of his hands, . . . Mr. Hull had a feeling that it somehow put an end to the grueling, anxious year and a half since Sedan, the period of the diplomatic defensive during which the White House and Department of State, lacking military might, had deployed the country’s moral suasion and economic strength around the globe in an effort to keep war from our shores. Mr. Hull regretfully thought he might have kept the peace a little longer without sacrifice of vital interests, but the issue of war or peace had been taken out of his hands.⁶¹

Points 3, 4, and 9, requiring withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China and Indo-China, Japanese recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek régime, and abandonment of the Axis, were the most important of the ten demands and promises. “After the Japanese had read the documents,” Assistant Secretary of State Joseph W. Ballantine recounted, “Mr. Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi. Hull said that it was. Kurusu said he “did not see how his government could consider paragraphs 3 and 4 of the proposed agreement and that if the United States should expect that Japan was to take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him, Japan could not agree.”

After looking over the American terms further, Kurusu said that when he and Nomura reported the American answer, their government “would be likely to throw up its hands.” He suggested that it might be better if they did not refer the statement to Tokyo before discussing its contents further, but Hull said that the proposal “was as far as we would go at this time.” When Hull repeatedly referred to public opinion as conditioning his actions, asserting that he “might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan,” Adm. Nomura remarked that “sometimes statesmen of firm conviction fail to get sympathizers among the public; that only wise men could see far ahead and sometimes suffered martyrdom; but that life’s span was short and that one could only do his duty.”

Kurusu said that he felt that the American response to the Japanese proposals was “tantamount to meaning the end,” and asked again whether the United States were not interested in a modus Vivendi. Hull dismissed the question by saying, “We have explored that.”⁶²

On the following day the two Japanese ambassadors called with Hull on President Roosevelt. They expressed disappointment about the failure of any agreement regarding a modus vivendi. The President refused to temper the American proposals and told the ambassadors,

We remain convinced that Japan’s own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan’s own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.⁶³

Replying to this, Kurusu, in an interview with Hull on December 1, “disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between Japan’s purposes and Hitler’s purposes,” while Nomura

pointed out that wars never settle anything and that war in the Pacific would be a tragedy, but he added that the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to keep Japan fighting with China and to keep Japan strangled. He said that the Japanese people feel that they were faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or fighting. The ambassador said that he was still trying to save the situation.⁶⁴

Hull did not even profess still to be trying. On November 29, he told Lord Halifax that “the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy.” He said further that it would be

a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk.⁶⁵

These military moves were indeed in train. The day before Hull submitted the President’s ten-point program, the Japanese fleet which would descend upon Pearl Harbor had already put to sea from Hitokappu Bay. In view of the irreconcilable attitude of both governments, it was now almost beyond the bounds of possibility that the striking force would be recalled from its mission, but even as late as December 2 Adm. Nagano again ascertained from Adm. Yamamoto that the fleet could be turned in its course if a settlement should somehow be attained.⁶⁶ Although conversations continued in Washington off and on during the ensuing ten days, they did not change the status, and the fact that war was inevitable was apparent to both sides.

On December 2, for instance, Undersecretary Welles complained of Japanese military activity in Indo-China and elsewhere, reading a statement from Roosevelt conveying implied notice that the United States would act under his warning of August 17 in the event of new Japanese aggression. Mr. Roosevelt said:

The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression. . . . Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya, or either through coercion or through the actual use of force, for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude toward which is well known, and which has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese government.⁶⁷

To this Nomura, foreshadowing the final Japanese answer, replied,

The Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; . . . they believe they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure.⁶⁸

On December 5 Adm. Nomura told Hull that the Japanese were “alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the Southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries recently had flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense.”⁶⁹ If the ambassador was waxing sardonic, the effect was lost upon Hull. The Secretary of State remarked after some further discourse that “we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.”⁷⁰

The only other development preceding the outbreak of war was President Roosevelt’s direct appeal to Hirohito on December 6, which, as Hull later remarked, was “for the record.”⁷¹ The message was withheld from Ambassador Grew for ten and a half hours and was finally placed in the hands of the Emperor at 3:00 A.M., Tokyo time, December 8, twenty minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁷² In the course of his remarks Roosevelt stated:

During the past weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character. . . . The people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya, and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions. . . . It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. None of the people whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.⁷³

The first response was at Pearl Harbor. The second came at 6:00 A.M., Tokyo time, December 8, when Japanese imperial headquarters announced that a state of war existed with the United States and Great Britain.⁷⁴ The third came several hours after the attack had begun when Foreign Minister Togo made an oral statement “as a reply” from the emperor to the President to the effect that establishment of peace “in the Pacific and consequently of the world has been the cherished desire of his Majesty, for the realization of which he has hitherto made the government to continue its earnest endeavors.”⁷⁵

In Washington, Adm. Nomura asked for an appointment with Secretary Hull on December 7 at 1:00 P.M. (7:30 A.M., Hawaii time), but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45, as he was not quite ready. He and Kurusu arrived at the State Department at 2:05 and were received by Hull at 2:20. The attack on Pearl Harbor had begun at 1:20 P.M., Washington time. Nomura stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 P.M. the document he handed Hull, but that decoding had prevented him from fulfilling his orders.⁷⁶ The document which was handed Hull was Japan’s reply to the American statement of November 26.

Although the Japanese ambassadors did not know it, the contents of this document were fully known to leaders of the American government and the military and naval services in advance of the interview.* The Japanese reply was a long statement which rejected every thesis in the Hull proposals and accused the American government of adopting a course of action which “menaces the empire’s existence itself and disparages its honor and prestige.”

In the course of this reply, the Japanese government said,

Whereas the American government . . . objects to Japanese attempts to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned, as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the last hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialist exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world. . . .

Obviously, it is the intention of the American government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American government has finally been lost.

The Japanese government regrets to have to notify hereby the American government that in view of the attitude of the American government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.⁷⁷

Hull, who had word of the actual attack half an hour before he received the Japanese emissaries, expressed great indignation to them over their government’s language in rejecting his terms. He told them:

I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous distortions and falsehoods; infamous distortions and falsehoods on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.⁷⁸

The need for politeness was over. It was war.

In a statement to the press later that day, Hull stated,

Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United States. At the very moment when representatives of the Japanese government were discussing with representatives of this government, at the request of the former, principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace, including the United States. . . . It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent.⁷⁹

In his message to Congress December 8 requesting a declaration of war, Roosevelt used similar language, referring to December 7 as “a date which will live in infamy,” stating that the Japanese had attacked “suddenly and deliberately,” again describing the attack as “unprovoked and dastardly,” and asserting, “Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.” The pretense of surprise was emphasized in the statement, “While the [Japanese] reply [of December 7] stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.”⁸⁰

This high-flown condemnation is customary under the circumstances, but it is hard to see how the attack at Pearl Harbor could have been regarded as a completely unprovoked and unexpected act of treachery, for both governments had resigned themselves to war, and it was just a question of time when one of them should take the step that led to open hostilities. What was not known at the time, and would not be known until almost four years later, was that Hull, Roosevelt, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Navy high command and Army general staff had clear and indisputable evidence long before December 7 that Japan was going to fight, and that it would open the war on the date that it did at the place that it did. All of the professions of Roosevelt and Hull, therefore, that the Japanese assault was a totally unforeseen event were, to this degree, counterfeit, while the diplomacy they had pursued had made war inevitable, as both well knew.⁸¹

On the night of December 7, Prime Minister Churchill later would recall, he was sitting with John G. Winant, the American ambassador, at his country residence, Chequers, listening to a news broadcast. “Quite casually,” he said, “came an item that the Japanese had attacked United States shipping in the Pacific. It passed almost without our realizing it, and then suddenly we realized what had happened.”

Churchill obtained a connection with the White House on the trans-Atlantic telephone.

“We are all in the same boat now,” said the President.⁸²

The United States was in the war—not only against Japan but “all the way,” as Roosevelt triumphantly announced in his radio address to the nation on the night of December 9.⁸³

*Cf. pp. 194, 196.