20. Who Was Guilty?

Chapter Twenty

WHO WAS GUILTY?

THE ATTACK by Japan upon Pearl Harbor provided the long-sought incident that put the United States into the World War. The Japanese, however, had exceeded the Roosevelt administration’s specifications that, in firing the first shot, they should not “allow too much danger to ourselves.” Pearl Harbor was more than a mere token act of hostilities. The Japanese had kept on firing until 2,326 Americans were dead and the Pacific fleet was a wreck. Other disasters were accumulating and were foreseeable. The isolated garrisons of Wake, Guam, and Luzon were soon sacrificed to the Washington war plan.

A catastrophe of such dimensions, if admitted, might have an effect other than rallying a divided country to fight a hard and costly war which more than 80 per cent of the people hadn’t wanted. If admitted, it might have diminished the willingness of the people to forget the provocative course by which the President had by-passed Congress in inviting hostilities. There might have been an attitude of serious questioning toward the acts and the wisdom of Mr. Roosevelt and the men around him. That was the last thing the “commander-in-chief” wanted or could afford.

Soon the administration strategy was clarified. The tremendous defeat at Hawaii was first ascribed to treacherous Japan, launching an attack at the very time that the American government was trying to lead the erring war lords of Nippon into the ways of peace. The administration conveniently forgot to remind the American people of the part played in bringing about the result of December 7 by its campaign of economic warfare, its secret diplomacy, its covert military alliances, the submission of demands which Japan found “humiliating,” and its own complete abandonment of neutrality in favor of nondeclared war.

When it became apparent, a few days after Pearl Harbor, that the manifest failures which contributed to the crushing defeat at Oahu could not be blamed solely on the Japanese, Roosevelt and his associates in the civilian government and high command invented some new villains to divert the guilt from themselves. For the defeat at Pearl Harbor the blame—all of the blame, not part of it—was apportioned between Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. Secretary Knox said they were not on the alert. Roosevelt dismissed them from their commands. The Presidential commission headed by Justice Roberts confirmed the sentence by finding them guilty of dereliction of duty. They were retired. It was announced that some time in the future they would be court martialed. Under such charges, they had no recourse except to keep silent.

So the matter stood for almost four years. With all of the apparatus of wartime censorship and propaganda to support them, the administration leaders felt safe. In 1944, when the clamor for a fair investigation of Pearl Harbor forced Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson to convoke a Navy Court and an Army Board of Inquiry, the administration’s thesis that Kimmel and Short alone were to blame was badly shaken.

The findings of the Army Board reached into the President’s cabinet and the high command in assessing the blame. It charged offenses to Secretary of State Hull, Chief of Staff Marshall, and Chief of War Plans Gerow, in addition to Short.¹ President Truman and Secretary Stimson, now that suspicion was beginning to be directed toward Roosevelt’s official circle and the administration’s service pets, felt constrained to overrule the Army Board. Stimson termed the criticism of Hull “uncalled for” and that of Marshall “entirely unjustified.”² Truman endeavored to court martial the American people.

“The country,” he said, “was not ready for preparedness. . . . I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.”³

The Navy Court’s report was as distasteful to the administration as had been the Army Board’s. The court refused to adopt the postulate that Kimmel was guilty of anything. “Based upon the facts established,” the report stated, “the court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.”⁴

Adm. King, commander-in-chief of the fleet, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal could not let that stand. They appended supplemental statements of their own to the court’s report which had the effect of overruling their own investigators. They decreed that Adm. Kimmel was not to hold any post in the Navy “which requires the exercise of superior judgment.” In order not to make too glaring a demonstration of prejudice, they threw Adm. Stark to the wolves, returning the same specification against him.⁵

Finally, Congress stepped into the Pearl Harbor controversy. An investigation could not be forestalled, so the administration decided the prudent thing was to make the inquiry its own. The majority party initiated the investigation, decreed its conditions, and controlled its course. Public hearings could not be avoided, nor could Kimmel and Short be bound to their four-year silence. For the first time testimony was taken in the open, and for the first time the Hawaiian commanders were able to submit a defense to the public.

Adm. Kimmel, tracing the involutions of previous investigations, said of the Roberts inquiry, “I had no way of knowing what evidence had been given the commission other than my own testimony. It was more than two years after the commission concluded its proceedings before I was permitted to know what evidence had been presented to the commission.” When he did read the record, Kimmel said, he found substantial inaccuracies and misrepresentations.⁶

Of the proceedings of the Navy Court the admiral said:

I was present at all hearings, was represented by counsel, introduced evidence, examined, and cross-examined witnesses. This proceeding was the only one of the secret investigations of Pearl Harbor in which these basic American rights were accorded to me.

The Naval Court of Inquiry found unanimously that there was no ground for criticism of my decisions or actions. The findings of the Naval Court were not made public, however, until August 28, 1945. When they appeared in the press, I learned for the first time that the Naval Court of Inquiry had found that I was not guilty of any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment.

On February 6, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting permission to read the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Naval Court. On February 13, 1945, the Secretary of the Navy denied my request.

In May of 1945, long after the Naval Court of Inquiry had filed its report, the Secretary of the Navy detailed Adm. Hewitt to conduct a further secret investigation into Pearl Harbor. I learned from the public press that the investigation had begun. On May 8, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary requesting permission to be present at the hearings before Adm. Hewitt, to introduce evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The Secretary of the Navy denied my request in a letter of May 14, 1945.

On May 24, 1945 I wrote again to the Secretary requesting that he reconsider his decision to exclude me from the Hewitt investigation. The Secretary of the Navy never replied. The Hewitt investigation went ahead in secret.

On the basis of this secret investigation, the Secretary, in effect, set aside the verdict of the Naval Court of Inquiry.⁷

The even more devious history of the endeavor of Secretary Stimson to make charges stick against Gen. Short was traced during the congressional hearings by Senator Ferguson and Representative Keefe.

The War Department bureau of public relations on February 28, 1942, issued a press release entitled “Retirement of Gen. Short Approved.” This release read:

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 1942, of the application for retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short “without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action.”

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court martial of Gen. Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.”⁸

“I understand, then, from that, that the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts report you would be court martialed at some time?” Senator Ferguson said to Short.

“He at least stated that he had directed this to be drawn,” Short replied.

“Now, did you ever do anything in any way to prevent that court martial—the charges being filed?”

“I did not,” Short responded. “In fact, I signed a waiver that I would agree to a court martial within six months after termination of hostilities.”

“Now, have you ever made any direct request for a court martial trial?”

“I have not.”

“And you have done nothing, as I understand it, to prevent such a trial?”

“I have not.”

“You are prepared, then, to defend any trial that the government may start? Is that the way it stands?”

“That is the way it stands.”⁹

Ferguson then developed that on April 20, 1942, the judge advocate general’s office, acting on instructions from Secretary Stimson, prepared court martial charges against Short alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with eleven specifications. A memorandum dated November 27, 1944, which was attached to the judge advocate’s specifications of two and a half years before, stated, “The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were never approved by the judge advocate or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they were never made public.”¹⁰

This indicated that Stimson had done his best to hang something on Short, but that the Army’s chief legal officer considered the case so weak that he did not even bring it to the attention of the Secretary, let alone to public trial. Senator Ferguson then read the specifications to Short and asked him to plead them. Short pleaded not guilty to each of them in turn.¹¹

Ferguson asked Short whether he had any knowledge or opinions as to why independent investigations were undertaken for Secretary Stimson by Maj. Gen. Cramer, Maj. Clausen, and Col. Clarke.

As to the Clausen inquiry, Short said, “I think that there is an explanation of that. You have to read between the lines.”¹² The general, as an aid to interlinear reading, referred to a memorandum relating to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board which Judge Advocate General Cramer sent to Stimson November 25, 1944.

Cramer suggested to Stimson that the board report had raised certain questions which “might advantageously be pursued.” He continued, “I do not mean to suggest that the board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.”¹³

Short remarked that Gen. Marshall had testified that in all of his service he had never heard of a reviewing officer, if he were dissatisfied with the findings of a court martial or a board, taking such action as Cramer had here recommended. Marshall had said that the normal action was to refer the proceedings back to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken, if that were desired, or to direct that a review of their findings be made by the board, after which the review would then be returned to the reviewing officer. Short remarked:

In this case the judge advocate general goes out of his way to state he does not want it referred back to the board, but suggests an officer who had been on duty with the board. . . . Lieut. Col. Clausen, who was a major at the time, was assistant recorder of the board. Unquestionably Gen. Cramer had in his mind the recommending of Col. Clausen at the time he made that recommendation, which would have taken the further investigation out of the hands of the Army Board and placed it in the hands of a selected individual.

“Now, in your experience in the Army, did you ever know of that [happening]?” Senator Ferguson asked.

“I have never known of it.”

“Now, as I understand it, before a real review of these findings was made, they sent Maj. Clausen out?”

“I think the review had been made, but it was not what they wanted.”

“Oh. Now, that is what you are reading between the lines, that when they read this report they were not satisfied and they used the words ‘certain personnel’ in there?”

“And they apparently did not believe they could get what they wanted out of the Army Board,” Short said.¹⁴

Short said that even after Clausen had done his service in attempting to tear down the Army Board report, the judge advocate general was still constrained to inform Secretary Stimson that he could not prove any offense against Short.¹⁵ This opinion had been held by the judge advocate general’s office ever since January 27, 1942, three days after the Roberts Commission had accused Short of dereliction of duty. In a memorandum of that date, the judge advocate general informed Stimson:

Gen. Short’s nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events, was, insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.¹⁶

On November 25, 1944, two days after Clausen had submitted his special report, Judge Advocate General Cramer again admitted that nothing had been turned up which would incriminate Short. He informed Stimson,

I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the board’s proceedings and pointing out that Gen. Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation, the matter could later be re-examined in the light of such additional evidence.¹⁷

Ferguson developed that, the Clausen investigation having proved a flop from the viewpoint of Secretary Stimson and the administration, they tried again—this time by dispatching Col. Carter Clarke to conduct still another inquiry. Clarke had been of previous service as a go-between to Governor Dewey when Gen. Marshall, by crying up “national security,” had steered Dewey off the subject of Pearl Harbor during the 1944 Presidential campaign.

“How do you account for that investigation by Carter Clarke after Clausen got through?” the Senator asked Short.

“It is pretty difficult to say just what they were attempting to do,” Short responded. “They were apparently wanting to find out exactly what every man holding an important position in G-2 would say about their estimates, and so forth, and it was a very difficult report to get ahold of.”

“And do you know whether or not it indicated in any way that there had been an investigation by G-2 for the President and that there had been some changes made in it by Gen. Marshall?”

“Somewhere—I have forgotten whether it was in that report or not, but somewhere—I have run across something of that kind.”

At this point Representative Murphy of Pennsylvania interjected, “Isn’t it fair to say that after reading it, there is a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a Gen. Spalding and others who had some kind of a rumor going about that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was unequivocally, absolutely, and positively contradicted?”

“But there is also more in it,” Ferguson rejoined. “I think at some time Carter Clarke should appear and give us the reason for it.”¹⁸

Clarke was never summoned as a witness to explain what he knew about the charge that Marshall had tampered with evidence relating to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Short rendered an oblique judgment on the process by which Stimson and high officers in the War Department had endeavored to fasten all of the blame for the Pearl Harbor attack upon him when he remarked, “I would like to say that I would never at any time try to pass the buck to any single subordinate. My decision was made on the information that the War Department had furnished me, and I had no desire and absolutely never took any steps to pass the buck to some individual man below me.”¹⁹

Ferguson, referring to the opinion Cramer had submitted to Stimson, read the following passage,

There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln’s refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. I am therefore forced to conclude that if Gen. Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction, there is considerable likelihood the court would adjudge his sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

“Would that lead us to believe, then,” Ferguson inquired, “that he was of the opinion that he was concerned with the sentence, and they were concerned with that alone?”

“I would say they were greatly concerned with the effect on public opinion,” Short responded, “and that they wanted to be very careful and not try me on something where they would fail and the effect would bounce back on them.”²⁰

Gen. Cramer, in a memorandum to the chief of staff and Secretary of War on the advisability of court martial proceedings, stated, “As to whether Gen. Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge.”

“Why,” asked Ferguson, “would the judge advocate be concerned in advance and before he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty?”

“It would look like he was thinking of the possible effect on public opinion,” Short replied. “If I were tried and found not guilty, or given a very mild sentence, the public would tend to feel that there had been no justification. That is the only conclusion I can draw.”

Cramer’s memorandum went on,

As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, Gen. Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous as it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken.

My experience with courts martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were guilty of contributory causes.

Senator Ferguson said, “I want to ask you this question in relation to that: Couldn’t that have been cured by trying all that were guilty of contributory causes?”

“Yes, sir,” Short agreed.

“Do you know whether or not the War Department has ever considered the question of trying all that were guilty of contributory causes, or causes, of the disaster at Pearl Harbor?”

“I am quite sure,” Short responded, “they have never made a public statement to that effect.”²¹

The Joint Congressional Committee, after conducting hearings for seventy days and compiling a record of 10 million words, finally was ready to render judgment. The majority party, naturally, wrote the majority report. It rehearsed the familiar theme that Kimmel and Short were to blame, but conceded that “the errors of the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.” The War Plans Division of the War Department and the Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of both the War and Navy Departments were criticized incidentally, with no individuals named.²³ Inasmuch as the majority party showed every desire to continue soaring to election victories on Roosevelt’s magic carpet, the late commander-in-chief was dealt with tenderly.²⁴

The minority report of Senators Ferguson and Brewster, dismissing the majority report as “illogical and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence,” named some new names. For the first time in any investigation, Roosevelt, Knox, and Stimson were flatly accused of responsibility, and Secretary Hull was inferentially accused. The report concluded:

Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and having analyzed the same in the foregoing conclusions of fact and responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and ultimate conclusion:

The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of interdependent responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field in charge of the fleet and of the naval base.

The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities were inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable information, matériel, trained manpower and clear orders from Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders on the spot.

The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential to the defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military authorities:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT—President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON—Secretary of War.

FRANK KNOX—Secretary of the Navy.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL—General, Chief of Staff of the Army.

HAROLD R. STARK—Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

LEONARD T. GEROW—Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff, of War Plans Division.

The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the military commanders:

WALTER C. SHORT—Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL—Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.

Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of Japanese-American negotiations, bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility stemming from the commander-in-chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.²⁵

In support of these conclusions, the minority report²⁶ submitted a classic statement of the responsibilities of Roosevelt in the exercise of his duties, charging him not only with failure in discharging those duties as they bore on the events of December 7, but emphasizing that his responsibility encompassed the acts of his subordinates. The report stated:

The President of the United States was responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate co-operation among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the chief of staff, and the chief of naval operations, in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, to compel such co-operation and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people of the United States.

As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of the President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Constitution and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil.

The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appointments and treaties by the Senate.

The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints high officers, civil and military.

He is chief magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to the maintenance and operation of the military and naval establishments.

Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the United States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretary of State, such duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his own instructions and authorizations.

Under the Constitution the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and with the approval of the Senate he appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns them to their duties in his discretion except in the case of the chief of staff and chief of naval operations—these appointments must be approved by the Senate.

And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense powers in one magistrate—not in a directory or a single official checked by a council, as was proposed in the Convention of 1787?

The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of The Federalist. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural Executive was to assure “energy in the executive,” “a due dependence on the people,” and “a due responsibility.” A plural executive, it is there argued, “tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion . . . ; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of persons they trust . . . .”

The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations, powers, and duties of the military establishments under the President particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation to them; in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions to the civil secretaries and also directly to the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations.

Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the chief executive.

From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt was President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States and in him were vested all executive powers under the Constitution and the laws.

He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and retained him in that office during this period.

He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all chiefs of staff and chiefs of naval operations during this period.

He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and he assigned them to their posts of duty.

In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with supreme executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we have more recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940, on a subject of administrative actions, President Roosevelt said: “There were two or three cardinal principles; and one of them is the fact that you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him” (Papers, 1940, p. 623).

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Although there were two departments for the administration of military and naval affairs during this period, they were both under the supreme direction of the President as chief executive and Commander-in-Chief in all matters relative to separate and joint planning for defense and war, to disposition of forces and materiel, to preparedness for operation in case of an attack. In respect of the President’s power, the two departments were one agency for over-all planning and operational purposes.

The President had power to issue directions and orders to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and indirectly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and on occasions used this power.

Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize the Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed it necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation between the departments. Since he did not reorganize the two departments under that act, he must have deemed them properly constructed as they were.

By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during this period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations of diplomatic decisions and war plans.

In fine, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Kimmel were all men of President Roosevelt’s own choice—not hang-over appointees from another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed—and the President had ample power to direct them, coordinate their activities, and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies in the defense of the United States.

Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotiations, the President decided long before December 7, at least as early as the Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation for that war. Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an overt act by Japan—an attack on territory of the United States. Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and dispositions necessary to that end were taken.

During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings, discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that attack—or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack effectively.

In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding conclusions and more of the same kind that could be cited, this failure cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the President of the United States.

Specifically, the report said of the culpability of Roosevelt and his associates in failing to place American forces in Hawaii on an all-out alert when war was known to be at hand:

The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.

The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack or attacks was recognized by the President and his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare war was vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Minister Churchill, who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Conference, again suggested to President Roosevelt, on November 30, 1941, that the President inform the Japanese that further aggression on their part would compel him “to place the gravest issues before Congress” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roosevelt must have given serious thought to the constitutional difficulty during the several days prior to December 7, while he was considering plans for a special message to Congress.

After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress it then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warning messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly formulated as to mean to them an all-out alert of the forces under their command.²⁷

Having decided to abide Japanese action to open the war, the report continues, “the appropriate high authorities in Washington . . . had every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.” The report states:²⁸

For the purpose of taking concerted actions in fulfillment of the duties imposed upon them, authorities in Washington formed two groups or organizations with a view to co-ordinating the operations of the civil and military branches of the executive department. If these groups were so loosely constituted as not to deserve the name of organizations, this was due to a failure on the part of the members to make them effective bodies for the discharge of their co-ordinating responsibilities.

The first of these two groups consisted of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, the chief of staff, and the chief of naval operations. Sometimes it was called colloquially the “War Council.”

The second group included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the chief of staff and the chief of naval operations, and occasionally commanding general of Air Force, General Arnold. This group was sometimes colloquially called the “War Cabinet.”

The use of these terms—“War Council” and “War Cabinet”—while the country was still at peace seems to indicate that high civil and military authorities in Washington were thinking in terms of war and should have been more alert to the probable events of war such as an attack upon our most important outpost and fleet in the Pacific.

Each of these groups or organizations—

“was a sort of clearinghouse for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group.” (Italics supplied.)

If it be argued that these groups were loosely constituted and met irregularly and informally and hence were not organizations in the strict sense of the term [they met once a week at least and had other irregular and additional meetings], it remains a fact that they existed for the purposes described. Furthermore, if, owing to their loose constitution, they did not discharge their duties efficiently, it also remains a fact that the President had the power, and the corresponding duty, to transform either or both of these groups into positive organizations with positive obligations in respect of exchanging information, making decisions, co-ordinating the civil and military branches of the executive department, and framing orders to outpost commanders.

At all events, these groups had every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war went out to the Hawaiian commanders and the President had the power and duty to see that this was done directly or through the agency of these groups, especially the second—the “War Cabinet.”

For this nonco-operation and mismanagement, high authorities in Washington were fully responsible. . . .

These conclusions are underlined by the following:²⁹

These instances of failure on the part of high authorities in Washington to perform acts of duty and judgment required by their respective offices, and many others that could be cited, merely point to the greatest failure of all, namely, the failure of those authorities to organize for the war they regarded as immediately imminent. Here the conclusions reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to the War Department apply to the whole executive department of which it was a part:

“A few men, without organization in a true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been the result of carefully directed commands, instead of actions taken by conference. We were preparing for war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their content by compromise instead of by command. . . .”

To this comment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board should have added that powerful individuals among these authorities were reaching decisions on their own motion and taking actions of a dangerous nature on their own motion, despite all the conferring, talking, and compromising, were proceeding as if there was no organization in the government of the United States that was charged with preparing for and waging war.

Nor is this confusion and pulling at cross-purposes to be explained away by any such vague assertion as the Army Pearl Harbor Board offered: “that it was a product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy.” Failures to perform duties commensurate with the powers vested in officials by the Constitution and the law cannot be justified by appeals to any overriding requirements of democracy. Provisions for organizing the executive department and the supreme command of the armed forces of the United States were incorporated in the Constitution and the law, and adequate powers to organize and unify for operating purposes all subsidiary agencies were vested in the President of the United States.

As to President Truman’s attempt to saddle the blame for Pearl Harbor upon the American people, Senators Ferguson and Brewster observe:³⁰

The contention coming from so high an authority as President Truman on August 3,1945, that the “country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,” cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken. . . .

How could the American people be held responsible for the secret diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.

A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril. If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the exclusive secret information of the President and his advisers, public opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their leader’s actions.

On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to the President and his close advisers that Japan had informed Hitler on December 1 that war was imminent. . . .

The Secretary of War, the President and his advisers also were fully aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these movements would involve the United States in war.

Notwithstanding his intimate knowledge of the imminence of war, the Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5 that the negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite the extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the “War Cabinet,” the President permitted the Senate and House of Representatives to adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of December 8 without having informed them of the impending danger to the country. This seems to follow consistently the understanding observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the President a proposed draft of a mesage to Congress which was never used. Mr. Hull said: “I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities.” (JCC, Ex. 19).

How could the American people be responsible for the warlike operations conducted from Washington over which the people had no control and about which they were never informed?

In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies upon the enemy’s first overt act to insure effective popular support for the nation’s final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close co-ordination between American public opinion and American diplomacy.

Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era. Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration by all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who lost their lives. . . .

In our opinion, the evidence before this committee indicates that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of official judgment, management, co-operation, and action as were displayed by authorities and agents of the United States in connection with the events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.^*

Certainly the United States was neither informed nor alerted when Roosevelt and the men whose intentions coincided with his (because their fortunes rode with him) were warping the nation into war in 1941. The motives of these men are to this day obscure. They are even more obscure in the light of the default of all promises concerning the objectives of World War II.

Failure of the administration’s domestic policy can account for the desire to go to war. Roosevelt’s personal ambition and his urge to win a place in world-history can account for it. The opportunities afforded by wartime regimentation to tighten a political hold upon the country can account for it. Subservience to foreign interests can account for it.

Desire for glory and enhanced status could have contributed to it. Men in the regular establishments of the Army and Navy who saw the vision of spectacular commands and stars upon their shoulders after years of humdrum duty in offices, posts, and barracks would hardly oppose the politicians, whatever their motives. All of them were enlisted, long before Pearl Harbor, in Roosevelt’s conspiracy to fight an unacknowledged and unconstitutional war in the Atlantic. All of them were parties, before December 7, 1941, in his secret war alliance with the British and Dutch in the Pacific.

But, given the benefit of every doubt, credited with a sincere belief that the United States was in deadly peril and that it must fight if it were to stand, all of these men still must answer for much. With absolute knowledge of war, they refused to communicate that knowledge, clearly, unequivocally, and in time, to the men in the field upon whom the blow would fall. The silence in Washington can yield to no other explanation than a desire to do nothing that would deter or forestall the attack which would produce the overt act so long and so fervently sought. When the price of silence proved to be 2,326 lives, it was necessary to add two more victims to the list—Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

In the course of the years, however, there was a significant change in assaying responsibility for the disaster of December 7. It became apparent that the attempt to explain away Pearl Harbor as the consequence of purely local command failures would not succeed. National policy, as directed by the Roosevelt administration in its program of steering the country into war, came under searching scrutiny. It became increasingly clear that this policy was neither open nor honest, and that the commanders in Hawaii were hoodwinked no more and no less than the American people had been—that they were ignored, as Congress was ignored, until they were presented with the consequences of that policy on December 7 and the attempt was then made to render them accountable for it.

By subtle gradations, however, the men who had most confidently asserted the guilt of the Hawaiian commanders were driven at length into the defense of themselves. The accusers became the accused. Finally, in an unsolicited “Summary of My Views as to the Responsibility of Members of the Army,” submitted to the congressional committee, Stimson is found querulously apologizing for Mr. Roosevelt, himself, and the rest of the war-makers. He states:

Many of the discussions on this subject indicate a failure to grasp the fundamental difference between the duties of an outpost commander and those of the commander-in-chief of an army or nation and his military advisers. The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied.

On the other hand, the commander-in-chief of the nation (and his advisers)—particularly of a nation which has been as habitually neglectful of the possibility of war as our own—has much more difficult and complex duties to fulfill. Unlike the outpost commander, he must constantly watch, study, and estimate where the principal or most dangerous attack is most likely to come, in order that he may most effectively distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet it. He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or fortified and that they are not all equally capable of defense. He knows also that from time to time they are of greatly varying importance to the grand strategy of the war.

For all these reasons he is compelled to give account and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence agencies in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innumerable problems which are constantly arising in the performance of the foregoing duties.³²

Stimson’s intention is plain enough. He is still trying to persuade the American people that Pearl Harbor is purely a matter of military responsibility. But no amount of excuses will palliate the conduct of President Roosevelt and his advisers. The offense of which they stand convicted is not failure to discharge their responsibilities, but calculated refusal to do so.

They failed—with calculation—to keep the United States out of war and to avoid a clash with Japan. They reckoned with cold detachment the risk of manipulating a delegated enemy into firing the first shot, and they forced 3,000 unsuspecting men at Pearl Harbor to accept that risk. The “warnings” they sent to Hawaii failed—and were so phrased and so handled as to insure failure.

Pearl Harbor provided the American war party with the means of escaping dependence on a hesitant Congress in taking a reluctant people into war. Then the very scale of the disaster gave Roosevelt and his advisers the opportunity to distract attention from the policy which had produced the disaster. By cleverly leading the people to regard December 7 as a purely military calamity and by inciting the public to fix the blame for it upon the field commanders, Roosevelt and his administration hoped that the policy of which Pearl Harbor was the inevitable product would never be questioned.

Pearl Harbor was the first action of the acknowledged war, and the last battle of a secret war upon which the administration had long since embarked. The secret war was waged against nations which the leadership of this country had chosen as enemies months before they became formal enemies by a declaration of war. It was waged also, by psychological means, by propaganda, and deception, against the American people, who were thought by their leaders to be laggard in embracing war. The people were told that acts which were equivalent to war were intended to keep the nation out of war. Constitutional processes existed only to be circumvented, until finally the war-making power of Congress was reduced to the act of ratifying an accomplished fact.

* The 21 conclusions of the minority in building an integrated case against those whom it held responsible for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor will be found in the Appendix.³¹