4. Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology

4 Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology RICHARD M. WEAVER This inquiry concerns some problems posed by the use of rhetoric in the dissemination of a professedly scientific knowledge of man. It assumes that rhetoric in its right character is one of the useful arts and that knowledge about the nature and behavior of man can be gained and should be propagated as widely as possible. The question of what things should precede and enter into that dissemination, however, continues to raise real per plexities. Many of us who read the literature of social science as laymen are conscious of being admitted at a door which bears the watchword "scientific objectivity" and of em.erging at another door which looks out upon a variety of projects for changing, renovating, or revolutionizing society. In consequence, we feel the need of a more explicit account of how the student of society passes from facts to values or statements of policy.

I would reject at the outset any assumption that the man who studies social phenomena either could or should be incapable of indignation and admiration. Such a person, were it possible for him to exist, would have a very limited function, and it is hard to see how he could be a wise counselor about the matters with which he deals. It seems probable that no one would ever devote himself to the study of society unless he had some notion of an 83 84 Scientism and Values "ought," or of the way he would like to see things go. The real focus of this study is on the point at which social science and rhetoric meet and on the question whether this meeting, in the case of what will here be labelled "scientistic" sociology, has re sulted in deception rather than in open and legitimate argument. To begin the inquiry, it will be necessary to say a few things about the nature of rhetoric. 1. Rhetorical and Scientific Discourse Rhetoric is anciently and properly defined as the art of per suasion. We may deduce from this that it is essentially concerned with producing movement, which may take the form of a change of attitude or the adoption of a course of action, or both. This art, whether it presents itself in linguistic or in other forms (and I would suggest that a bank or other business corporation which provides itself with a tall and imposing-looking building is dem onstrating that there is even a rhetoric of matter or of scene), meets the person to whom it is addressed and takes him where the rhetor wishes him to go, even if that "going" is nothing more than an intensification of feeling about something. This means that rhetoric, consciously employed, is never innocent of inten tion, but always has as its object the exerting of some kind of compulsion.

Defining rhetoric thus as the art of persuasion does not, how ever, divorce it entirely from scientific knowledge. My view is that the complete rhetorician is the man of knowledge who has learned, in addition to his knowledge, certain arts, of appeal which have to do with the inspiring of feeling. Indeed, the scientist and the rhetorician both begin with an eye on the nature of things. A rhetoric without a basis in science is inconceivable, because people are moved to action by how they "read" the world or the phenomena of existence, and science is the means of representing these in their existential bearings. People respond according to whether they believe that certain things exist with fixed natures, or whether they accept as true certain lines of cause-and-effect relationship, or whether they accept as true certain other relationConcealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 85 ships, such as the analogical. One might, speaking as a scientist, define man as an animal, or one might assert that government spending is a cause of inflation, or one might assert that war and murder are similar kinds of things. But one could also make these statements as a rhetorician. How, then, can one distinguish be tween the two kinds of statements?

The difference is that science is a partial universe of discourse, which is concerned only with facts and the relationships among them. Rhetoric is concerned with a wider realm, since it must include both the scientific occurrence and the axiological ordering of these facts. For the rhetorician the tendency of the statement is the primary thing, because it indicates his position or point of view in his universe of discourse. Rhetorical presentation al ways carries perspective. The scientific inquirer, on the other hand, is merely noting things as they exist in empirical conjunc tion. He is not passing judgment on them because his present ment, as long as it remains scientific, is not supposed to be any thing more than classificatory. The statement of a scientist that "man is an animal" is intended only to locate man in a biological group as a result of empirical finding; but the rhetorician's state ment of the same thing is not the same in effect. For him the term "animal" is not a mere positive designation, but a term loaded with tendency from the wider context in which he is using it. He is endeavoring to get a response by identifying man with a class of beings toward which a certain attitude is predictable. He has taken the term out of the positive vocabulary and made it dialectical, a distinction I shall take up presently.

It may now be suggested that if the sociologists whom I am here calling "scientistic" had been true scientists, they would have asked at the beginning: What is the real classification of the sub~ ject of our study? And having answered this, they would have asked next: What is the mode of inquiry most appropriate to that study? I am assuming that the answers. to their questions would have told them that their subject matter is largely subjective, that much of it is not susceptible of objective or quantitative measure~ ment, and that all or nearly all their determinations would be inextricably bound up with considerations of value. This would 86 Scientism and Values have advised them that however scientific they might try to be in certain of their procedures-as in the analysis of existing facts the point would be reached where they would have to transcend these and group their facts in categories of significance and value.

But what some of the more influential of them did was. to decide that the phenomena which they were engaged in studying were the same as those which the physical scientists were studying with such impressive results, and that the same methods and much of the same terminology would be appropriate to the prose cution of that study. 2. The Original Rhetorical Maneuver My thesis is that in making this decision they were acting not as scientists, but as rhetoricians, because they were trying to capitalize on a prestige and share in an approbation, in disregard of the nature of the subject they were supposed to be dealing with. Sociology took this turn at a time when the prestige of physical science was very great, possibly greater than it is even today,. since certain limitations had not then been encountered or fully considered. Physical science was beginning to change ··the face of the earth, and it was adding greatly to the wealth-producing machinery of mankind. It was very human for a group engaged in developing a body of knowledge to wish to hitch its wagon to that star. F. A. Hayek, in The CounterRevolution of Science) has related the case as follows Their [the physical scientists'] success was such that they came to exert an extraordinary fascination on those working in other fields, who rapidly began to imitate their teaching and vocabulary .... These [subjects] became increasingly concerned to vindicate their equal status by showing that their methods we:re the same as· those of their more brilliantly successful sisters. rather than by adapting their methods. more and more to their own particular problems.!

Accordingly, the founders of scientistic sociology did not so much arrive independently at a definition of sociology (in doing Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 87 which they would have been scientists) as seek identification, for external reasons, with another field of study. In proceeding thus, they were not trying to state the nature of their subject; they were trying to get a value imputed to it. That this was, their original rhetorical maneuver can be shown in the following way. Rhetoric can be visualized as altogether a process of making this kind of identification. The process is simply that of merging something we would like to see taken as true with something that is believed to be true, of merging something we would like to get accepted with something that is accepted. Such an operation can be seen in the most rudimentary of all rhetorical devices, which is sometimes termed "name-calling." To something that we wish to see accepted, we apply a name carrying prestige; to something that we wish to s,ee rejected, we apply a name that is distasteful. Rhetoric thus works through eulogistic and dys logistic vocabularies. It is the thing-to-be-identified-with that pro vides the impulse, whether favorable or unfavorable. The honest and discriminating rhetorician chooses these things with regard to reason and a defensible scheme of values; the dishonest or un thinking one may seize upon any terms which seem to possess impulse, just to make use of their tractive power.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, the scientistic sociologists applied a prestige-earrying name to their study. They were not classifying in the true sense; they were instigating an attitude. In brief, "social science" is itself a rhetorical expression, not an analytical one. The controversy over their methods and recom mendations which goes on today continues to reflect that fact. \ 3. Positive and Dialectical Terms Having thus assumed the role of scientists, they were under a necessity of maintaining that role. And this called for further "identifications." Perhaps the most mischievous of these has been the collapsing of the distinction between positive and dialectical terms. Since this distinction is of the first importance to those who would deal with these matters critically, I shall try to make clear what is meant by it.

88 Scientism and Values Practically everyone, grants that not all of the terms in our vocabulary refer to the same kind of thing. The difference be tween those which refer to positive entities and those which refer to dialectical ones is of decisive significance for the investigator. "Positive" terms stand for observable objects capable of physical identification and measurement. They are terms, whose referents are things existing objectively in the world, whose presence sup posedly everyone can be brought to acknowledge. "Rock," "tree," and "house" are examples. Positive terms thus make up a "physi calist" vocabulary, inasmuch as they represent the objects of sensory perception (even when these have to be noted hy dials and meters). Properly speaking, there cannot be an argument about a positive term; there can be only a dispute, which is sub ject to settlement by actual observation or measurement.

"Dialectical" terms com,e from a different source, because they take their meaning from the world of idea and action. They are words for essences and principles, and their meaning is reached not through sensory perception, but through the logical processes of definition, inclusion, exclusion, and implication. Since their meaning depends on a concatenation of ideas, what they signify cannot be divorced from the ideological position of the user as revealed by the general context of his discourse. A scientist, as we have noted, locates things in their empirical conjunction, but the user of dialectic must locate the meaning of ,his entities in the logical relationships of his system, and hence his discovery of them cannot be an empirical discovery. For this reason we say that the meaning of "justice" or "goodness" or "fair play" is not "found," but rather "arrived at." It is implied by the world of idea and attitude with which the user started. A dialectical term does not stand for "motion," as the positive term out of science might do, but for "action," which cannot be freed from the idea of purpose and value.

The scientistic sociologist has tried to maintain his scientific stance by endeavoring to give the impression that all the terms he uses are positive and hence can be used with the same "objec tivity" and preciseness as those of the physical scientist. I say he has endeavored to give the impression, because even an impresConcealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 89 sion that this can be done is difficult to induce for any length of time, as I believe the following examples will show. Let us take for -illustration an expression fairly common in sociological parlance today: "the underprivileged," and ask our selves how one determines its meaning. We see at once that it is impossible to reach the meaning of "the underprivileged" without reference to the opposed term, "the privileged." Evidently one has first to form a concept of "the privileged," and this will be in reference to whatever possessions and opportunities are thought of as conferring privilege. The one term is arrived at through logical privation of the other, and neither is conceivable without some original idea frankly carrying evaluation. "Privilege" sug gests, of course, something that people desire, and hence "the priv ileged" are those in whose direction we wish to move; and "the underprivileged" constitute the class we wish to escape from. But where is the Geiger counter with which we could go out into society and locate one of the underprivileged? We would have to use some definition of privilege, arising out of an original inclination toward this or that ideal.

Or let us take the more general expression, "social problem." How is one to become aware of the supposedly objective fact or facts denoted by this expression? According to one sociologist, a social problem is "any situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society and appeals to them as calling for readjustment or remedy by social, i.e., collective, action of some kind or other." 2 At least three items in this definition warn us that a social problem is not something that just anybody could identify, like an elephant in a parade, but something that must be determined by a dialectical operation. First of all, the observer must be competent, which I take to mean trained not just in seeing objective things, but in knowing when ideas or values are threatened by their opposites. This per ception appeals to him for an attitude to be followed by an action, and moreover this. action must be of the putatively most beneficial kind, "social" or "collective."

The point I wish to make here is that the scientistic sociologist is from the very beginning caught up in a plot, as it were, of 90 Scientism and Values attitude and action, and that he cannot divorce the meaning of the incidents from the structure of the plot. The plot is based on a position which takes facts out of empirical conjunction and places them in logical or dialectical constructions. He is therefore not dealing in positive words that have a single fixed meaning when he uses terms that depend on a context for their signification. Another way of expressing this is to say that the terms in his vocabulary are polar, in that their meaning changes according to what they are matched with. And since the sociologist has the opportunity to match them with almost any thing, he is not dealing with scientific invariables when he talks about "the underprivileged" or "a social problem." He is being an ethical philosopher from the beginning, with the responsibility which that implies.

The conclusion comes down to this: Things which are discrimi nated empirically cannot thereafter by the same operation be discriminated dialectically. If one wishes to arrive at a dialectical discrimination, one has to start from a position which makes that possible. 4. Other Forms of ((Identification" This ignoring of the nature of dialectical inquiry is the most serious perversion committed by the scientistic sociologists in seek ing to maintain their identification, but there are other, perhaps more superficial, procedures, whose general end is the same kind of simulation. One of the more noticeable is what might be called pedantic analysis. The scientistic sociologist wishes people to feel that he is just as empirical and thoroughgoing as the natural scientist and that his conclusions are based just as relentlessly on observed data. The desire to present this kind of fa\ade accounts, one may suspect, for the many examples and the extensive use of statistical tables found in the works of some of them. It has been said of certain novelists that they create settings having such a wealth of realistic detail that the reader assumes that the plot which is to follow will be equally realistic, when this may be far from the case. What happens is that the novelist disarms the Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 91 reader with the realism of his setting in order that he may "get away with murder" in his plot. The persuasiveness of the scene is thus counted on to spill over into the action of the story. In like manner, when a treatise on social science is filled with this kind of data, the realism of the latter can influence our acceptance of the thesis, which may, on scrutiny, rest on very dubious con..

structs, such as definitions of units. Along with this there is sometimes a great display of scientific preciseness in formulations. But my reading suggests that some of these writers are often very precise about matters which are not very important and rather imprecise about matters which are. Most likely this is an offsetting process. If there are subjects one cannot afford to be precise about because they are too little understood or because one's views of them are too contrary to traditional beliefs about society, one may be able to maintain an appearance of scientific correctness by taking great pains in the expressing of matters of little consequence. These will afford scope for a display of scholarly punctiliousness and of one's com.. mand of the scientific terminology. At the opposite extreme, but intended for the same effect~ is the practice of being excessively tentative in the statement of conclu sions and generalizations. The natural scientists have won an enviable reputation for modesty in this respect: they seldom allow their desire for results to carry them beyond a statement of what is known or seriously probable. This often calls for a great deal of qualification, so that cautious qualification has become the hall mark of the scientific method. It is my impression, however, that a good many modern sociologists do their qualifying, not for the purpose of protecting the truth, but of protecting themselves.

There is a kind of qualification which is mere hedging. I offer as an example a sentence from an article entitled "Some Neglected Aspects of the Problem of Poverty." The author hegins his defi nition thus: "It would seem that it is nothing more nor less than a comparative social condition depending on a relative control over economic goods, the standard of comparison being a group possessing a maximum of such control, called the rich or wealthy." 3 There appear at the very beginning of this sentence 92 Scientism and Values two important qualifiers: (1) the verb is thrown into a conditional mode by the use of the auxiliary "would," and (2) the verb is not the categorical "is," but the tentative "seem," with its suggestion that one may be dealing only with appearances. This is followed by "nothing more nor less," which is a purely rhetorical flourish, evidently intended to make us feel that the author is going to be definite, whereas he has just advised us' that he is not. What looks like carefulness is mere evasiveness; this writer does not want to assume the risk of saying what poverty is. Instances of such un willingness to make a firm declaratory statement are so numerous that they almost constitute the style of a type of social science writing. With the unwary reader, unfortunately, this style may encourage confidence, whereas it should lead to challenge. 4 5. Appeals to Authority In addition to a language simulating that of science, the scientistic sociologists make use of an external means of per suasion in the form of an appeal to authority. A common prac tice with some of these writers when they are dealing with a subject that is controversial or involved with value judgments is to cite an impressive array of authorities. There is nothing im proper in itself, of course, about the invoking of authority. But when we look at the method of certain of these authors, we are likely to find that the authorities are other social scientists who happen to share the particular view which is being presented.

What looks like an inductive survey of opinions may in fact be a selection of ex parte pronouncements. Still, such marshalling of authorities, often accompanied by a quotation from each to heighten the sense of reality or conviction, can easily give the im pression that all authority is behind the view being advanced. Thus many textbooks on social problems bristle with the names of persons whose claims to authority may be quite unknown to the reader, but whose solemn citation may be depended on to exert a persuasive force.5 One suspects that it is the appearance rather than the real pertinence of the authority which is desired. Along with this there is another, and a more subtle, kind of Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 93 appeal to authority which takes the form of a patter of modern shibboleths. These may be taken from everyday language, but they will be words and expressions associated with leaders of opinion, with current intellectual fashions, with big projects, and with things in general which are supposed to have a great future.

Professor A. H. Hobbs, in his Social Problems and Scientism~ lists among others: modern~ rational~ liberal~ professional~ intergovern mental~ objectivity~ research~ disciplines, workshop, interrelations, human resources) and human development. 6 I would suggest that this language represents an .appeal to the authority of the "modern mind." These are expressions carrying a certain melioristic bias, which one will have difficulty in resisting without putting oneself in the camp of reaction or obscurantism. The repeated use of them has the effect of setting up a kind of incantation, so that to sound in dissonance with them is virtually to brand oneself as antisocial. The reader is left with the alternative of accepting them and of going along on assumptions he does not approve of, or of rejecting them, which would entail continuous argument and would involve taking a position almost impossible to explain to a "modern."

6. Sociology as Deliberative Oratory The use of appeals based on authority brings up again the role of the sociologist as advocate. At the beginning of his treatise on Rhetoric Aristotle divides the art into three kinds: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Epideictic rhetoric is devoted to celebrating (as in the panegyric); forensic rhetoric is concerned with the justice or injustice of things which have already happened; and deliberative oratory is con cerned with the future, since the speaker is urging his audience to do, or to refrain from doing, something or other. "The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or the harmful; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice' and injustice, honor and disgrace, are included as accessory in relation to this." 7 By the terms of this definition a 94 Scientism and Values considerable part of sociological writing must be classified as de liberative oratory, and the practitioners of it as rhetoricians.

When one sets up to advise concerning alternative social courses, one does exactly what the ancient orator in the Areopagus or the forum was doing, however much the abstr.actness of one's lan guage may tend to conceal that fact. As Kenneth Burke has pointed out: ... when you begin talking about the optimum rate of speed at which cuItural change should take place or the optimum proportion between tribal and individualistic motives which should prevail under a given set of economic conditions, you are talking about something very important indeed; but you will find yourself deep in matters of rhetoric, for nothing is more rhetorical in nature than a deliberation as to what is too much or too little, too early or too late.... " 8 A good many current texts on sociology are replete with this kind of deliberation. Martin Neumeyer, in his Social Problems and the Changing Society, while discussing numerous opinions on the topics with which he deals, often steps into the role of judge and advocate. Thus we read: Homicides, suicides, illegitimate births, deaths due to venereal disease and the like seem to be more prevalent where there is low integration in cities. The more adequately a city provides for the health and wel fare of its citizens, the greater the chance of preventing or controlling deviations. Well integrated cities are likely to have a better chance of survival and growth than poorly integrated urban areas.9 It might be contended that this passage is merely descriptive of certain laws of social phenomena. Still, the presence of such phrases as "more adequately," "health and welfare of its citizens,"

and "a hetter chance of survival and growth" show plainly that the passage is written from a standpoint of social meliorism. The same kind of thing is done by George Lundberg, in his Foundations of Sociology, when he becomes a pleader on the sub ject of language itself. He argues that we ought to give up thos,e terms created hy the original myth-and metaphor-making disposiConcealedRhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 95 tion of the human mind in favor of a different "symbolic equip ment." That he is entirely willing to utilize traditional rhetoric in making his point may be seen from the following passage: Untold nervous energy, time, and natural resources are wasted in warfare upon or protection against entirely imaginary monsters con jured up by words. Widespread mental disorders result from constantly finding the world different from the word-maps upon which we rely for guidance and adjustment. Social problems cannot be solved as long as they are stated in terms as primitive and unrealistic as those which attributed disease to demons and witches.lO A feature of another kind indicating that a good many socio logists are engaged in more or less concealed deliberative oratory is the presence in their work of a large amount of enthymematic reasoning. Reasoning in this form is a rhetorical kind of convinc ing, and the enthymeme is actually described by Aristotle as, the "rhetorical syllogism." 11 In the textbooks of logic it is defined as a syllogism with one of the propositions withheld. In the argument All who are patriots should be willing to sacrifice for their country.

You should be willing to sacrifice for your country. the minor premise, "You are a patriot," is missing. It has been omitted because the maker of the argument has assumed that it is granted by the hearer and will be supplied by him to complete the argument. This type of argument is rightly described as rhetorical because the rhetorician always gets his leverage by starting with things that are accepted. By combining these with things he wants to get accepted ("identification" again) he moves on to the conclusion which is his object. In other words, because the rhetorician can assume certain things-because he does not have to demonstrate every proposition in his argument-he can work from statements which are essentially appeals. He studies beforehand the disposi tion of his auditors and takes note of those beliefs which will afford him firm ground-those general convictions about which 96 Scientism and Values one does not have to be deliberative. Hence the enthymeme is rhetorical, as distinguished from the syllogism, because it capi talizes on something already in the mind of the hearer. The speaker tacitly assumes one position, and from this he can move on to the next.

A number of contemporary sociologists, as I read them, use the enthymeme for the purpose of getting accepted a proposition which could be challenged on one ground or another. They make an assumption regarding the nature or goals of society and treat this as if it were universally granted and therefore not in need of explicit assertion. I refer again to Neumeyer's Social Problems and the Changing Society. This work seems to rest its case on an enthymeme which, if expanded to a complete syllogism, would go as follows: If society is democratic and dynamic, these prescriptions are valid. Society is democratic and dynamic. Therefore these prescriptions are valid. What the author does in effect is to withhold his minor premise apparently on the ground that no man of sense and information will question it. Therefore he does not take seriously those who would ask "Is society really democratic .and dynamic?" or "In what ways is society democratic and dynamic?" (What is to take care of societies which are aristocratic and traditional, or do they have no social problems?) Having thus assumed the premise he needs in order to get his conclusion, he can proceed to describe the techniques which would be proper in a democratic and dynamic society, as if they were the only ones to be taken into account.

There is nothing illicit about enthymematic arguments; they are to be encountered frequently wherever argumentation occurs. My point is that something significant is implied by their presence here. Even if weare clear about why the sociologist must argue, why is he ,employing a form of argument recognized as "rhe torical"? This takes us back to the original question regarding his provConcealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 97 ince and specifically to the relationship of what he does to the world of value. A good many current writers in the field seem rather evasive on the subject of values: they admit that the prob lem of value has to be faced; but then they merely circle about it and leave specific values to shift for themselves. Occasionally one takes a more definite stand, as when Francis E. Merrill declares that the values of a social scientist are the values given him by virtue of his membership in a democratic and progressive society.12 Even so respected a thinker as Max Weber seems less than satisfac tory on the two roles of the social scientist. His position is that the distinction between the purely logically deducible and empirical factual assertions, on the one hand, and practical, ethical, or philo sophical judgments, on the other hand, is correct, but that nevertheless ... both problems belong within the area of instruction.I 3 Obviously the problem is how to encompass both of them. What Weber does is to lay down a rule for academic objectivity. The teacher must set as his unconditional duty, in every single case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his lectures less lively or less attrac tive, to make relentlessly clear to his audience, and especially to him self, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced or empirically related facts and which are statements of practical evaluations. 14 My question would be how the sociologist can in good con science leave the first to embark upon the second without having something in the nature of a philosophy of society. His dilemma is that he is perforce a dialectician, but he is without a dialectical basis. He must use dialectical terms, but he has no framework which will provide a consistent extra-empirical reference for them, though we may feel sometimes that we see one trying to force itself through, as in the concept of society's essence as something "dem ocratic and progressive." It seems to me that the dilemma could be faced with more candor and realism. No practical man will deny that the student of society can make use of many of the 98 Scientism and Values findings of positive science. Things must be recognized in their brute empirical existence; we are constantly running into things of which we were unaware until they proclaimed their objectivity by impinging upon our senses. And there are some things which must be counted. A pure subjective idealism is, a luxury which a few thinkers can afford, but it is not a prudential system. I for one can hardly believe that science is, purely ancillary in the sense of finding evidence for what we already believe or wish to believe.

The world is too independent a datum for that. On the other hand, a large part of the subject matter of the student of society does consist of the subjective element in human beings. This has to be recognized as a causative agent. History shows many opinions, highly erroneous or fantastic, which have been active influences on human behavior. This factor has, to be studied, but it cannot be simplistically quantified. Here at least there must be room for speculative inquiry. Finally, the student of society should realize that he is a man writing as a man. He cannot free himself entirely from perspective. His view of things can have a definite bearing on what is regarded as a fact or on how factual units can be employed. To argue that the social scientist should adopt no perspective on matters is per haps in itself to adopt a perspective, but a far less fruitful one than those in which, with proper regard for objective facts, a view point is frankly espoused.

In view of these considerations, why does not social science call itself "social philosophy"? This would widen its universe of dis course, freeing it from the positivistic limitations of science and associating its followers with the love of wisdom. At the same time it would enable them to practice the art of noble rhetoric where it is called for, without unconscious deception and without a feeling that they are compromising their profession. NOTES 1. F. A. Hayek, The CounterRevolution of Science (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 13-14. 2. Clarence M. Case, Outlines of Introductory Sociology (New York, 1924), p.627.

Concealed Rhetoric in Scientistic Sociology 99 3. Merton K. Cameron, "Some Neglected Aspects of the Problem of Pov erty," Social Forces~ VII (September, 1928), 73. 4. T. H. Huxley has such admirable words of advice on this subject that I cannot refrain from including them here: "Be clear though you may be convicted of error. If you are clearly wrong, you may run up against a fact some time and get set right. If you shuffle with your subject and study to use language which will give you a loophole of escape either way, there is no hope for you." Quoted in Aldous Huxley, The Olive Tree (New York, 1937), p. 63. 5. For examples see F. Stuart Chapin, Cultural Change (New York, 1928), p. 203; and Martin H. Neumeyer, Social Problems and the Changing Society (New York, 1953), p. 48. 6. A. H. Hobbs, Social Problems and Scientism (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1953), pp. 51-52. 7. Rhetoric~ 1358b.

8. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York, 1950), p. 45. 9. Neumeyer, op. cit.~ p. 107. 10. George A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology (New York, 1939), p. 47. 11. Rhetoric~ 1356b. Strictly speaking, in the Aristotelian enthymeme all the propositions are present, but one of them, instead of resting on proof, rests upon "signs" or "probabilities." See George Hayward Joyce, S. j., Principles of Logic (London, 1916), pp. 253-255. 12. Francis E. Merrill, H. Warren Dunham, Arnold M. Rose, and Paul W. Tappan, Social Problems (New York, 1950), pp. 83-84. 13. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), p. 1. 14. Ibid., p. 2.