5. Fiduciary Responsibility and the Improbability Principle

5 Fiduciary Responsibility and the Improbability Principle JAMES W. WIGGINS The behavioral sciences, in so far as they attempt to be sciences, share with other sciences several articles of faith. Among these are the use of relevant concepts, prediction based on prob abilities, a commitment to objectivity, avoidance of value posi tions, a search for all the evidence, and a public methodology which allows fellow scientists to test conclusions through replica tion. The scientist, qua scientist, is com,mitted to the presentation of the results of his studies regardless of his personal approval or disapproval of his findings. "He is neutral in the sense that he will accept without personal reservation what his evidence has revealed." 1 He is, by definition, opposed to personal or other censorship which seeks to control or direct his search for such aspects of truth as his methods allow him to apprehend.

The social scientist, then, like other scientists, has a kind of fiduciary responsibility 2 both to his fellows and to the larger soci ety which supports him and his search. There can be little doubt that, in the long run, his fiduciary responsibility must be accepted and expressed with all care, if that society is to continue to give him its confidence and support. The purpose of this p.aper is to call attention to the apparent 100 Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 101 reversal of a number of the canons of social science in conse quence of the value commitments of the scientist, which threatens potential or actual loss of confidence by social scientists in their own work. But more importantly, this reversal threatens loss of public confidence that fiduciary responsibility is being honored. 1. The Value Commitments The discovery of value commitments which interfere with expressions of science requires neither unusual insight nor ex tensive examination of the literature. P.articularistic espousals are stated directly and clearly in the public pronouncements of some officers of national professional organizations and in some com mittees authorized to represent officially the organized member ship of the behavioral science fields involved. Basic agreement on value positions and on programs of related actions are stated directly or are clearly implied in papers presented to professional meetings, sometimes published later, and in journals as reviewers address a congenial audience. These values and goals of action seem to be assumed to be so pervasive, so standardized, so mono lithic, that reviewers approach the point of saying, "Of course, we all oppose (or support) this sort of thing." 3 But nowhere are the commitments of supposed "value-free"

behavioral scientists better expressed than in the platforms. of some of the affiliates of national professional societies. The af filiates typically form an independent organization, dedicated to one or several programs of action, and establish a journal. The next step is for the group to petition for legitimacy, that is, for affiliation with the general-and relatively respected-national organization of their profession. This affiliation, if established, both legitimizes the "action" or value-oriented group and adds to its actions the apparent backing of the larger organization. An analogous procedu re wou ld involve the organization of Catholic sociologists who are members of the American Socio logical Association into a Society for. the Propagation of the Faith. The members of the new society would then petition for affiliation with the American Sociological Association-and, as members of 102 Scientism and Values the latter body, vote for affiliation. Thus. would the Jewish, Unitarian, and Baptist (as well as atheist) sociologists come ap parently to support the propagation of the Catholic faith. It is not suggested that this effort will ever be made, and certainly not that this particular effort would ever be successful if made.

But similar efforts have been made and have been successful. The Society for the Study of Social Problems "is .an affiliate of the American Sociological Association. Its recurrent value statements may be derived from analysis of the various issues of Social Prob lems) the publication of this special-interest group. In the words of the respected Ernest W. Burgess: It is fitting at this time to restate the objectives of our Society and to define the role that is envisioned for this new Journal. First, the organization of the Society is a recognition of the growing importance of research on social problems. There is. the continuing challenge presented by the crucial situations. confronting American society to the development of policies and programs of action. Cer tainly the know ledge gained from social science research is basic to wise formulation of policy and to the choice of effective programs of dealing with these situations. 4 (Italics added.) Professor Otto Kline berg, in the lead article of the first issue of Social Problems) and on pages immediately following Burgess' statement (above) expressed himself as follows: ... Those of us who concern ours.elves with social issues or social problems, in the hope that we can contribute something to the im provement of human relations, are not in,frequently looked upon with suspicion, as if we were somehow proving unfaithful to our scientific Hippocratic Oath.

The fact remains that such a concern is growing rapidly .... 5 Later in the same issue, Donald V. McGranahan writes: I think we can all agree that not much is really known about the human implications of technological change in countries that are Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 103 called economically "underdeveloped." We cannot readily generalize from studies in Western culture, because the conditions· are so different in the economically underdeveloped areas.6 But on the preceding page, Byron L. Fox had pointed out that "Accordingly, it is logical to apply well-established sociological principles, concepts and schemes of analysis at the world level." 7 (Italics added.) McGranahan, however, continues: At times social scientists who are liberal and forward-looking citizens of their own countries give an impression of conservatism[l] when they look at underdeveloped areas and stress only the dangers and evils of developmen t. . . .8 One point that has impressed me recently while reading E. H. Carr's The New Society is the possibility that certain conditions which have been considered socially undesirable consequences of development in the West may, in fact, have played a functional role in the process of development .... the situation in which unemployed men in England were allowed to go hungry in the early part of the 19th century was the result of the demand created by the industrial revolution "to drive a hitherto predominantly rural working class into urban work shops and factories." ... Two possible methods of getting labor into the new industries, were considered during the period-starvation and forced labor ... and the policy of starving labor into factories was followed. 9 Although it must be admitted that McGranahan does not ad vocate either starvation or slavery, he does conclude by saying, H •••let me repeat my plea that in vieWing the human implications of technological change we do not become so fascinated by the bad as to forget the good, and so protective of the present cultures of underdeveloped areas as to wish to preserve these cultures against the very idea of progress which we embrace for our selves." 10 Such missionary zeal for remaking underdeveloped countries, 104 Scientism and Values whatever the cost, is comparable to the remarks of Nels Anderson about the development of the underdeveloped U.S.S.R .

. . . in most Communist countries systematic efforts have been made to change the ways of life and work of rural people. The farmer must be separated from his traditions. Thus efforts have been made, ap parently with much resistance, but still with a measure of success, to force farmers into various types of modernized collective groups. Whatever the merit of these urban-conceived schemes, their objective is to hasten a process which might in the long run take place any way ..." 11 This is an interestingly euphemistic way of describing the liqui dation of peasants and suggests that something like genocide might well be supported if development, as conceived by some social scientists, is thus facilitated. For some years the Society for the Study of Social Problems was closely associated with the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and in fact held joint meetings with the sister group. On the instance of the latter group, this association has been ended, although it is not clear to the writer whether one or the other of these groups became too scientific or whether there was a difference about platform planks)2 In ,any case, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues continues its affiliation with the American Psychological Association, while it (the former) continues publication of its Journal of Social Issues. The imprint of the American Psychological Association on the frontispiece is a kind of imprimatur which has apparent value for the espousals of the Journal.

A third case in point is the Society for Applied Anthropology, with its house organ, Human Organization. It should be noted that this action group has not become an affiliate of the American Anthropological Association. Its goals are relevant, however, to the present interest. "Its primary object is 4the promotion of scientific investigation of the principles controlling the relations of human beings to one another and the encouragement of the wide application of these principles to practical problems.' " 13 And Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 105 in another connection, clarifying the Code of Ethics of the Society for Applied Anthropology, the reader is informed: It has been emphasized in discussions that the applied anthropologist may properly work for a partisan group within a society (e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Anti-Saloon League, the Planned Parenthood League, the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the National Conference .of Christians and Jews, etc.) recognizing that such groups are a significant and important part of our social life and that im provements in the functioning and understanding of anyone such group can be valuable to the whole society .. .14 It appears, therefore, that-discounting minor differences and interdisciplinary rivalry-one might accept the inaugural state ment of Burgess on Social Problems) that H •••It will join with such kindred publications as the Journal of Social Issues and Human Organization in promoting interdisciplinary exchange of ideas and cooperation in interdisciplinary research. In short, it will enable the Society for the Study of Social Problems to share its interests with a broader public -and to accomplish its several mis sions more effectively." 15 In summary, it is rather obvious that substantial value positions are explicitly stated as b.asic to the efforts of at least the identified groups of professional behavioral scientists. The determination to remake people, societies, and, in fact, the whole world shows clearly in the foregoing, regardless of costs, in some cases at least, and regardless of the resistance of part or the whole of the popula tions whose ways of life are displeasing to the scientists. This ,aim can be understood perhaps in connection with another value, held equally dear-the equalitarian orientation.I 5a The effort to show that eVffybody is, or is about to be, completely equal must hold an element of uncertainty. If this is the fact, or is about to be the fact, of human existence, it becomes clearly illogical and unneces sary to make it the goal of a social movement. (The social scientists are, of course, exempt from equality, since they are in charge.) In the pursuit of the goal of new creation, the capitalist eco nomic system must be inevitably suspect, since it distributes 106 Scientism and Values rewards as if some people were unequal. It has also become in creasingly clear that the system of Communism also cannot be trusted, since it also rewards (not to say punishes) people as if they were unequal. I6 Almost inevitably, but certainly factually, the usurpation of the function of creator produces. a consistenly nega tive attitude toward organized religion, which has for millennia offered its own conception of a Creator. I7 2. T he Rejection of Concepts Concepts in social science gain and retain their place pri maril y through their varied functions in distinguishing, invoking, and predicting properties extracted from reality which are rele vant to the particular science concerned. IS Discarding concepts which have significant predictive and discriminating value because of emotional pain is hardly congruent with the public avowals of science. The following discussion will present the possibility that the equalitarian position is so strong that important concepts have withered if they stood in the way.

The chief identified inequality under active consideration by social scientists at present in the United States is the inequality of so-called minority groups. The term itself suggests persecution and is primarily open to argument, since the people so identified include such majorities as Catholics in Boston, Jews in parts of New York City, and Negroes in southern Mississippi. And tech nically, they are not groups, but categories. However that may be, within the minority category, the in equalities between the Caucasian and Negroid races attract most attention and continuing efforts to reduce inequality. As a social movement, this has much to commend it. As science, it is scien tism. This effort has led its exponents to seek the abolition of a significant concept from the language of social and physical science. The concept of race is significant for psychology if it is useful, ultimately, in predicting the emergence of properties (behavior) in which the psychologist is interested. It is a valid concept for sociology if through its use significant social or socioFiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 107 logical phenomena may be clarified, identified, or predicted. The same can be said for other sciences, such as biology, anatomy, or physical anthropology.I8 This is not to say that the specific word is crucial. The concept may be identified as "tepic," or NMC 2, or by any others of an almost limitless range of symbols. The point under consideration is the nature of the concept, not the symbol.

A. L. Kroeber, perhaps the "dean" of living anthropologists, has written, "A race is a valid biological concept. It is a group united by heredity: a breed or genetic strain or subspecies ... Physical anthropology, being concerned with man's organic features, is properly and necessarily concerned with the human races." 19 This statement is supported by anatomists, who can cite hundreds of structural differences between physical types. classified by the concept of race, by physicians who accept patients from more than one race, and by a variety of researchers in other fields. A fairly early effort to discredit the concept was that of anthropologist Ashley Montagu, in the publication of Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race. 19a A more recent example is the somewhat testy correction by biologist Bentley Glass of a quotation in Saturday Review ascribed to Glass, and stating that differences in intelligence between races of men do exist. Glass had said ((may exist, but we have no way of knowing." Professor Glass does not even believe in intelligence tests, apparently, but he certainly does not believe in race. 20 One of the most direct admissions of the impact of values on concepts, and even on the concealment of findings causing emo tional anguish, came out of extended discussions of the "Statement of Human Rights," 21 published by the American Anthropological Association during the immediate post-World War II period. For present purposes it is well to begin with a communication from anthropologist John W. Bennett, in reply to previous comments by Julian Steward and H. G. Barnett. Barnett and Steward, said Bennett, were incomplete and unrealistic.

The arguments of Julian Steward and H. G. Barnett in their inter .. esting critiques of the Statement on Human Rights, published under 108 Scientism and Values the sponsorship of the Executive Board of this Association, may be summarized as follows: (1) Science cannot, through the medium of scientific method, demonstrate the validity or "rightness" of any particular point of view toward what is "good" for society and per sonality. (2) An attempt to do so perforce involves the scientist in contradictions and pushes him into the peculiar position of elevating his empirical knowledge to the level of values. (3) Therefore, science, on the one hand, and value-making, policy-making, and moral-making, on the other, are incompatible, and the individual must choose which of these he intends to pursue. (4) They conclude that (a) profes sionals as a group had best avoid the field of social pronouncement and value-supporting and adhere to science (Steward); and (b) the support of social movements and causes is all right and even advis able, but let us do so honestly with a frank declaration of our position, abandoning the attempt to justify our stand scientifically (Barnett) .22 Having thus discarded a reasoned statement of the method, function, and goals of science, Bennett stated what he considered the anthropologist's position and warned that science must stand aside while the position is defended.

. . . In the quarter-century of our discussion of racism a similar con tradictory argument has been used: on the one hand, we have said that there are no differences between human groups; on the other, we have specified the scientific possibilities of difference and have discovered some. Scientifically we know that differences between human varieties can and do exist; ideologically it serves our purpose to deny them. We have had our cake and eaten it too, but few anthro pologists would deplore our participation in the racist issue. We apparently took the course in that particular issue of not daring to admit the existence of differences, since we felt that a categorical denial had more social value than a half-admission of difference. 23 (Italics added.) But it is in his footnote that he drops the seventh veil: Some of us say that the differences, while present, are unimportant. We say this, however, with a sinking feeling, since it always throws us open to the sneer: "See, first you said all races were equal, and now Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 109 you say they aren't. Make up your mind." In the whole racist struggle we have done much more than merely say, "Your facts are wrong,"

but have always insisted that the use of the myths for purposes of repression and discrimination were also wrong. Barnett's position would really tend to imply that we must withdraw from antiracist propagandizing.24 (Italics added.) These quotations were originally published more than a decade ago and may consequently be considered out of date. The recent presidential address of E. Adamson Hoebel, of the American Anthropological Association, in December, 1957, promised a con tinuing dedication to science and antagonism to propagandizing: ... Professional anthropology achieves its basic strength through its freedom from major concern with immediately practical problems. Freedom from dominance by public policy and social reform. interests lends to anthropology, as Riesman has observed, a greater degree of objectivity and scientific imaginativeness than obtains in political science and sociology.... 25 The day after the delivery of his address, however, Dr. Hoebel was quoted in The New York Times as having said, "The ques tion of where they [children] should go to school is a burning issue, but the anthropologists are joined together on the side of integration."26 It is not difficult at this point to understand why the anthro pologist who wishes to study race and to publish his findings feels oppressed. Dr. Carleton S. Coon, University of Pennsylvania, outstanding physical anthropologist, said in 1951: "This tendency has been carried so far that it is difficult to have a truly scientific, objective book on race published or reviewed"; and in 1954, "Basing their ideas on the concept of the brotherhood of man, certain writers, who are mostly social anthropologists, consider it immoral to study race, and produce book after book exposing it as a 'myth.' Their argument is that because the study of race once gave ammunition to racial fascists who misused it, we should pretend that races do not exist." 27 110 Scientism and Values But let us look in on the deliberations of the American Associa tion of Physical Anthropologists. These are the men who are dedicated to the study of the structure of man as an index to human behavior. Anthropologist John Gillin, having publicly challenged statements by Dr. W. Critz George, of the University of North Carolina's Medical School faculty, to the effect that there are significant differences between the races, appealed to the physical anthropologists to support his position. What was the action of the physical anthropologists?

Amidst qualifications that this scientific (sic) society could not pass on any political matter (Coon and Thieme), that Gillin's, quoted newspaper statement was not quite accurate since there have not been "hundreds of investigations" bearing on racial superiority (Spuhler), that it (the report) could be adopted unchanged (Tappen), that the statement was unclear as it stood (Howell) and ineffective (Gavan), two general feelings emerged: that the society should back a man in a difficult position asking for the society's support (Cobb, Coon, Howells, Howell, Gruber, Thieme, Aginsky, etc.) and that we might stress the lack of anthropological data which might justify racial discrimination (Washburn, Greulich, Spuhler, Kraus, etc.). Brozek pointed out that this hydra-headed subject of discussion raised (1) the question of what we can do to help John Gillin [Note: This is a scientific question?], (2) racial and ethnic discrimination as, a social phenomenon, and (3) the need for a scientific statement with proper definitions on the subject of biological superiority versus inferiority.28 (Italics added.) After further consideration of what could be done to help John Gillin in his argument with Dr. George, the society voted "overwhelmingly" that "They support Dr. John Gillin in, his recent position in this respect." 29 3. The Improbability Principle Physical anthropologists do not concentrate on the study of behavior, but rather attend to structure. Sociologists, and psy..

chologists study behavior and have a number of interests· in Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle III common. Both fields of study, when they are most scientific, depend on statistical methods expressing probabilities. The con cept of statistical significance describes a degree of association between an independent variable (cause) and a dependent variable (effect) greater than can be explained by chance. Such a statement oversimplifies and is especially unsatisfactory in the inferential use of cause and effect. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that, if specified classes of phenomena are associated with other specified phenom ena more frequently than would be explained by chance, this finding would be useful in prediction. Thus, the concept of race and certain other" phenomena are more frequently associated than chance would allow. In this area the sociologist and the psychologist are not without data. Otto Klineberg's often cited Race Differences is used as a basic source. An exhaustive study for the period, and a careful one, it is ordinarily mentioned in support of the statement that Northern Negroes made higher scores on World War I Army Alpha tests than did Southern Whites. Seldom is the fact men tioned that Northern Whites. consistently surpassed Northern Negroes. 3o A more recent study of the many published comparisons of in telligence by racial categories, The Testing of Negro Intelligence) by psychologist Audrey M. Shuey, has been met so far by silence from the reviewers in professional journals. One reviewer did give it attention, under the title, "Cat on the Hot Tin Roof," which suggests the unfavorable verdict. (An almost automatic party line of silence or sneer comparable to the one in this country does not yet seem to exist in Great Britain. 'Thus, Professor Shuey's book is praised as a "painstaking and valuable contribution to the litera ture of social and racial differences" by W. D. Wall of the National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales in his review of the book in the Sociological Review [December, 1959], published by the University College of North Staffordshire.) It is possible to follow the propagandizing scientist one step further. It is not only difficult for him to examine and report find ings suggesting significant correlations between race and other 112 Scientism and Values variables, but he may also completely reverse his methodology and embrace the principle of improbability. The logic of improbabil ity is illustrated by this reasoning. Far from accepting the state ment of the anthropologists that race is not a significant discrimi nating concept, the improbability scientist calls attention to his occasional finding that an exceptional member of the "minority"

race performs better than the average of the "privileged" race. He then seeks to convince us that the "minority" is superior by citing the improbable finding of a negligible number of cases. When the data all point overwhelmingly in an undesired direction, they may be explained away through the application of special criteria ordi narily ignored in the evaluation of scientific research. Sociologist George Lundberg recently commented insightfully on this "state of affairs." There are doubtless many reasons for this state of affairs. I should like to call special attention to only one of them because, although it reveals. a laudable human quality, it is inimical to objective analysis. I refer to the sympathy of social scientists, as well as most other people, for certain currently disadvantaged minorities. One shrinks from too rigorous or objective examination of people whose misfortunes one recognizes and deplores. As one of my friends (the editor of a leading journal of opinion) put it on reading the analysis which follows below: "Regardless of the logic and the facts~ we must lean over back· wards in the special cases before us because a more realis tic view would merely be seized upon by the prejudiced as vindication of their hostility. Any aid or comfort to this group is in the direction of Hitlerism, convent-burning, etc. That danger transcends all other considerations." This attitude is certainly understandable, and one cannot help but admire it as a finely motivated position. Yet I believe that in the long run it only injures the cause it seeks to advance. In objective scientific analysis there can be no "leaning over" backwards or forwards~ of the type contemplated. Any leaning toward or away from conclusions scientifically wart:anted in order to conform to desired ulterior ends, however laudable under existing mores, is recog nized by all scientists as a negation of science.31 That there are some publicly identified social scientists who do not let the problem interfere with their espousals is shown in the Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 113 exchange some years ago between Gustav Ichheiser and the late Louis Wirth. Ichheiser rather innocently pointed out that "It is a universal human fact that people tend to consider different those who look different .... minorities are likely to interpret as a plot what is only a natural majority reaction to personal differences." 32 Wirth wrote that these statements could not possibly be correct because there were people who had been socialized to ignore dif ferences in skin color and hair form. Furthermore, he added that "White people who even share more intimate experiences with Negroes [than dancing] are not necessarily deceiving themselves in thinking there is no significant difference between them." 33 Wirth said that the ability to discern differences and to relate oneself to people in terms of these recognized differences was prejudice. "I ... consider anyone prejudiced who ... approaches a new experience with a preconceived judgment and assigns that experience to a preformed category." 34 Prejudice clearly is not, by this definition, a valid concept, since the typical relationship of man to man is based on such classification, not to mention the relationship of man to maid.

Wirth's scientific language was gracefully expressed when he vented his spleen (scientifically?) on Ichheiser, thus: As far as I know, no one with any sens,e in the field of race relations [i.e., no scientist] seeks to deny differences in physical characteristics [This excludes the physical anthropologists cited above, because they have no sense] or even in cultural characteristics. They do, however, object to the chauvinistic [scientific epithet?] racialist suggestion that the two invariably [Italics added. Very high positive correlation which absolutely nobody suggests] go together. Ichheiser concluded by a resort to analogy: We treat dogs and cats as two different animals, not because of a cultural definition, but because cats and dogs look different, and if social scientists (as presidents of a council on dog-cat relations) would start to convince the common man that dogs and cats are alike, and "only" look different, the sole result of such an action would be that the common man would start to laugh about social scientists. Even dogs and cats themselves would not accept this redefinition. 35 114 Scientism and Values The present writer has no interest, for the purposes of this pre sentation, in the question of racial differences. Certainly he has no interest in restricting opportunity arbitrarily beyond the absolute minimum required for social order in any society. But he is pub licly identified as a sociologist, and, being so identified, he is alarmed at the cited tendencies to ignore the rigorous require ments of the scientific quest for knowledge because of value com mitments. It is amazing that the threat to the profession is not more widely recognized and that there is so little effort to allay the "sinking feeling" to which Bennett referred above.

I t would be unfair to conclude the paper on a note of complete pessimism about the behavioral scientists, in spite of the value positions, the rejection of concepts, and the acceptance of the im probability principle. The "minorities" which attract most atten tion are the loudest, and it is hoped that the "scientists" who have been considered here are themselves a minority. Fortunately there is a model available. Dr. C. P. Oberndorf, in his presidential address to the American Psychopathological Asso ciation in 1954, described the necessity of overcoming personal preferences in the light of scientific "truth." Terms such as option, discrimination, preference, selectivity, and segregation are generally in disfavor in the social scheme and phi losophy of 'a democracy such as we live in. So, at the outset, I wish to make unequivocally clear my agreement with this philosophy and opposition to legalized segregation in the social scheme. . . .

The need for a second hospital for the insane in New Mexico is great .... However it is likely that should a new hospital be designated exclusively for Spanish and Indians, or Anglos and Indians, staffed correspondingly, incensed protestations against such segregation might arise from each of the three groups concerned-and this in the face of the obvious benefits, from the psychiatric angle, which such separa tions, might yield. . . . Certain groups to which we belong, being biologically determined, never change. They are: sex, (2) age, and (3) color groupings. The question of separating the first group (sex) in hospitalization is never questioned and rarely is the second, namely, the undesirability of mixing children with adults, and more recently, of ever growing num bers of old-age psychotics with the average adult age group.

FiduciaryResponsibility and Improbability Principle 115 . Some years ago the question came up in the Committee for Mental Hygiene Among Negroes of the impossibility for Negroes to avail themselves of treatment in the best private mental hospitals in the New York area. An ever-increasing number of Negroes, mostly from the fields of amusement, literature, and sports, can afford such accommodation. Therefore, in line with the contention of this presen tation, I suggested the establishment of an endowed mental hospital for Negroes with private quarters, similar to the one (Hillside Hos pital) I had proposed in 1922 for Jews, which would cater to the latter's, linguistic and ritual needs. It was based solely upon the opinion that it is simpler to achieve a restitution to health when the patient's confidence is gained and this is more readily attainable in a setting in general sympathy and empathy with his previous experience.

However, a Negro member of this committee, a journalist, quietly replied, "Doctor, others see a different solution of the problem" distinctly indicating the exertion of pressure to force a change in the position of established white institutions, completely misunderstand ing the psychiatric basis of my proposal. It would seem, then, that an institution such as the Veterans Hos pital at Tuskegee, where an all-Negro staff of psychiatrists and nurses administers treatment to an all-Negro patient population, serves this particular group more efficiently than would be possible with a white staff.36 Dr. Oberndorf thus states his value pOSItIon, but clearly and logically moves it aside when his professional and scientific deci sions must be made. He, it appears, is willing to "accept the conse quences of scientific discovery, even when \t makes him, emotion ally uncomfortable." I can find no conclusion for this paper that compares with an excerpt from an article by Morton Cronin, who, strangely for pres ent purposes, is a professor of English. After pointing out that the intellectual (under which concept we may subsume the social scientist) always enjoys a larger measure of freedom than the aver age citizen, he continues: Now it may be that a given population as a whole should be freer than it is to express opinions. But no matter how free it becomes in this respect, its intellectuals-if it has any-must be freer. This may be undemocratic, as the scientist's (sic) special right or the judge's may be, 116 Scientism and Values but without these special rights we can have no scientists, judges,. or intellectuals.

I must now recite the killjoy lesson that exceptional privileges usually entail exceptional obligations. The intellectual's most im portant obligation consists in maintaining a greater degree of inde pendence, integrity, and candor in his relations with the world than can be reasonably expected of most men. His primary duty is to tell the whole tm th as he sees it, in detail as well as, in general. His primary duty is not to make that truth prevail. In fact, if he slips too deeply into the tactical maneuvers of social action, especially those which require close organizational ties, he will, like a judge who wades in politics, evoke the suspicion that he can no longer be trusted with his special prerogative. And this suspicion will be justified by the common experience of mankind. For when an individual becomes profoundly involved in a program of political action, he usually can not be counted on to make a fair assessment of opposing programs.

Such involvement on the part of an intellectual will be enough to establish the presumption that he has stopped being an intellectual and can now with propriety be treated as factionalists treat one an. other. 37 NOTES 1. Arnold W. Green, Sociology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), 3rd ed., p. 7. 2. Talcott Parsons, "Some Problems Confronting Sociology as a Profession," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, No.4 (August, 1959), pp. 547-559. 3. Curiously, and perhaps unfortunately, most of these values and goals of action seem to have one basic source: resentment. Professor George Simpson of Brooklyn College in his book Sociologist A broad (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959) writes with charming candor: "Anyone who hopes to wind up as a good sociologist must, I think, start origi nally with some hurt, some feeling of resentment against the society ex istent, which leads him to find out what is wrong with that society.

Wishing to relieve his own dissatisfaction, he seeks to universalize his hurt and is thus led on to discover why human beings have to suffer. And he will remain a good sociologist only so long as the hurt or re sentment continues to exercise some influence on his professional be havior." (p. 168.) 4. "The Aims of the Society for· the Study of Social Problems, "Social Problems, Vol. I (1953), pp. 2-3. 5. "Prospects and Problems in Ethnic Relations," Social Problems, Vol. I (1958), p. 4.

Fiduciary Responsibility and Improbability Principle 117 6. "Some Remarks on the Human Implications of Technological Change in Underdeveloped Areas," Social Problems, Vol. I (1953), p. 13. 7. "The Cold War and American Domestic Problems," Social Problems, Vol. I (1953), p. 12. 8. Op. cit., p. 14. 9. Op. cit., pp. 13, 14. 10. Opt cit.} p. 14. II. Nels Anderson, The Urban Community: A World Perspective (New York, 1959), pp. 101, 475. 12. It is not impossible that this development is related to the extension of state laws for licensing professional psychologists in recent years. There is some inference here that sociologists and anthropologists are no longer legitimately concerned with the social issues staked out by psy chologists. See discussions in American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 3, 4 (1959). 13. Human Organization, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring, 1950), p. 1. 14. Ibid., Vol. X, No.2 (Summer, 1951), p. 32.

15. Burgess, op. cit., p. 3. l5a. For those who reject this value, the label "authoritarian personality" has been developed and documented at length, and with multiple tabu lations. 16. See Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York, 1957). 17. Auguste Comte, it will be remembered, established a new "organized" religion. But a cursory glance into introductory textbooks in sociology will confirm this point. While there are a few exceptions, the very popu lar Sociology, by Wm. F. Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff, in its various editions has divided events into two categories: fact (i.e., science) and fantasy (religion). It is not suggested that science should espouse or ganized religion, but neither should science attack it-as science. See also, in this connection, C. P. Oberndorf, "Selectivity and Option for Psychiatry," American Journal of Psychiatry, April 1954, p. 754. 18. Professor Wolfram Eberhard, sociologist and anthropologist at the Uni versity of California in Berkeley, pointed to the mental block produced by egalitarian commitments in much of American social science, when he examined why the ethnologist Richard Thurnwald has had so little impact in the United States: "Thurnwald started out from the point from which many theories started, the obvious connections between the economic system of a society and its societal structure. But keeping away from the one-sidedness of economic determinism, he tried by careful field-work or by painstaking study of the reported data to uncover the exact type of economic-social interrelations .... This led him to his theory of 'superstratification' as a factor of decisive importance .... Re sistance against this theory in the United States seems to stem basically from a feeling that to accept as 'normal' a hierarchical order of people in all higher organized societies would go against a belief in democracy."

(Uln Memoriam Richard Thurnwald," Revista do museu Paulista, Sao Paulo, Vol. IX, 1955, pp. 297 £.) 19. A. L. Kroeber, A nthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948), p. 124.

118 Scientism and Values 19a. New York, 1943. 20. Saturday Review, Nov. 16, p. 58. 21. American Anthropologist, N. S., Vol. XLIX (1947), pp. 539-543. 22. Ibid., Vol. LI (1949), p. 329. 23. Ibid., p. 331. 24. Ibid., pp. 334, 335. 25. American Anthropologist, N. S., Vol. LX (1958), p. 635. 26. December 30, 1957. 27. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. CXCVIII (Nov., 1956), p. 31. 28. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, N. S., Vol. XIV (1956), pp. 366-7. 29. Loc. cit. Gillin's statement included the remark that "Science has shown that all living human beings are members of a single zoological species, Homo sapiens." The concept of species is a useful, although arbitrary, taxonomic device. But scientism consists in part of dramatically invoking scientific jargon to overawe the layman. It is probable that both Pro fessor Gillin and laymen recognize differences among members of single species and really consider some of them important.

30. New York, 1935. 31. "Some Neglected Aspects of the Minorities Problem," Modern Age, Vol. II (Summer, 1958), pp. 287-288. It would be interesting to know the reaction of an editor of a professional journal if offered the manuscript of this balanced and realistic treatment. 32. "Factors in Race Relations," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LIV, No.4 (January, 1949), p. 395. 33. Op. cit., p. 400. 34. Loc. cit. 35. Op. cit., p. 401. 36. "Selectivity and Option for Psychiatry," American Journal of Psychiatry, April, 1954, pp. 754-758. 37. "The American Intellectual," AAUP Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No.2 (June, 1958), pp. 409-410.