6. Review of George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin

6. Review of George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin

August 23, 1962

Dr. Ivan R. Bierly

William Volker Fund

Dear Ivan:

George F. Kennan’s Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin suffers from what may be called a “split personality.”¹⁰⁸ It is shot through with a basic inconsistency. On the one hand, in the bulk of his factual discussion and presentation of the history of the Russian Revolution and subsequent Soviet foreign relations with the West, Kennan stresses such themes as the culpability of the West for intervention in the Russian civil war, the desirability of a flexible and “realistic” approach to the Soviet Union, etc.

On the other hand, interspersed with this theme are numerous passages of hard-hitting anti-Soviet diatribes, which are strongly reminiscent of the “absolutists” in the United States who espouse a “tough” view toward the Soviet Union. Not only are these passages totally inconsistent and contradictory with the remainder, indeed the bulk, of the work, but they are irrelevant to the context in which they are placed, so that one gets the distinct impression that these passages have been inserted bodily into an alien organon, like so many raisins in a cake.

When we find that this book was composed in pieces over a period of several years—lectures at Oxford in 1957–58, lectures at Harvard in 1961, then, further additions to the book in 1961—the strong suspicion wells up that the different “levels” were composed for delivery at different times. Indeed, if we may speculate further, it would not be surprising if the bulk of the “flexible” lectures were composed for delivery in the congenial atmosphere of Oxford several years ago, and that the anti-Soviet diatribes were inserted in the final version to “appease” a much more strongly anti-Soviet American audience (especially the congressmen about to consider the Kennan appointment as ambassador to Yugoslavia).

Here are several examples of the inconsistency of the “two Kennans”: early in the work he makes the flat statement that Communism is an international monolithic conspiracy directed by Moscow—and makes this as a general statement, not as a limited historical observation; and yet later in the work he stresses the non-monolithic nature of present-day Communism and the various internal conflicts between China and Russia, etc.

Another example: Kennan’s fascinating discussion of the Allied intervention in the Russian civil war in its details consists of a vigorous attack on that intervention; and yet in his general statements summing up before and after, Kennan goes out of his way to justify failure of the Allies to have normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Further, Kennan scoffs at the Soviet historians’ conclusion that the Allied intervention was anti-Bolshevik in intent. Kennan ripostes that the purpose of the intervention was, rather, to bolster the war against Germany. This is very true as to the origin of the intervention, but what then was the reason for the continued Allied intervention from November 11, 1918 till early 1920, over a year after the war was over? The only possible logical reason is anti-Bolshevik intervention, and Kennan grudgingly concedes this in his detailed discussion, though not in his general summary.

Even in detailed discussion, Kennan’s “two faces” are revealed. Thus, the Allies at Versailles sent a note to both the Reds and the Whites proposing peace and normal relations on the basis of an immediate truce on both sides—a proposal, if anything, loaded against the Reds, who were steadily winning out in the civil war. Yet the Whites, with characteristic overoptimism, flatly rejected the note, while the Reds replied ambiguously. At this point, Kennan, who favored the peace offer, castigates the Reds for insults and evasion, and has nothing to say about the flat White rejection.

Kennan’s confusions extend to other areas as well; thus, when dealing with World War I, Kennan is steadily and excellently “revisionist,” attacking the idea of unconditional surrender, total victory, etc., whereas in dealing with Germany and World War II, Kennan’s revisionism, “realism,” etc. mysteriously fade away, and we see repeated the usual clichés about Hitler’s aggression, of the shameful appeasement at Munich, of the cynical treachery of both sides in the Hitler-Stalin Pact, etc. Nowhere does Kennan show any sign of the sort of revisionism set forth in the brilliant work of A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War.

Further, Kennan has to walk a particularly fallacious line, in trying (a) to attack appeasement of Hitler, and (b) at the same time robbing the Soviets of the “credit” for launching the policy of “collective security” against Hitler in the 1930s.

Another typical example of Kennan’s inconsistency is his flat general statement that the Communists consider all non-Communist governments as equally reprehensible; if that were so, of course, then there would have been no proposal for a “popular front” against fascism, as well as none of the recent recognition of the “superiority,” from the Communist point of view, of “neutaralist” over “imperialist” governments. Indeed, Kennan himself recognizes the dual hostility of Communists toward capitalism and imperialism, which implies logically that Communists are less unfavorable to non-imperialist capitalist than to imperialist-capitalist states.

Also, at one point, Kennan points out that the Hungarian Communist government of Béla Kun, just after World War I, had no connection with Moscow, while, in one of his general attacks, he accuses Moscow of controlling this early Hungarian soviet.

For the discriminating reader, there is much interesting and even fascinating material in the Kennan book. This is particularly true of the period of Kennan’s specialty, the Russian Revolution and civil war, although even here there is much material omitted—Kennan does not pretend to write here a definitive history, but rather to present some insights as an interpretive essay on the history of Soviet foreign policy. The story of the Allied intervention in Siberia, the incredible mishaps of the Czech legionnaires, and the regime of Admiral Kolchak is almost “worth the price of admission.”

And the best feature of the book is its brilliant and graceful writing style, which undoubtedly accounts for its long stay on the best-seller lists. But these could not offset Kennan’s theoretical confusions in deciding possible National Book Foundation distribution.