The Relics of Intervention; C. Carson

ClarenceB. Carson THE RELICS OF INTERVENTION: 4. New Deal Collective Planning The New Deal RELICS of the New Deal are still very much a part of the political ma chinery under which we live. The bent to inflation, which is still in the process of destroying our money, was firmly established during the New Deal. The notion that it is the busi ness of government to support and look after a goodly portion of the population was articulated in par ticular programs, many of which are still in operation. The practice of government attempting to manage the economy is a relic of New Deal efforts to institute a planned econ omy. The preference for the collec tive over the individual is around in hundreds of government prescripDr. Carson has written and taught extensively, spe cializing in American intellectual history. He is the author of several books and a frequent contributor to The Freeman and other scholarly journals.

414 tions to this day. They are relics of enthusiasms of a bygone era. For none of them is this more clearly the case than for collective planning. At this remove in time from the early days of the New Deal, it is dif ficult to recapture, even in imagi nation, the heady enthusiasm among a goodly number of intellectuals for a governmentally planned economy. So far as can now be told, they be lieved that a bright new day was dawning, that national planning would result in an organically inte grated economy in which everyone would joyfully work for the common good, and that American society would be freed at last from those an tagonisms arising, as General Hugh Johnson put it, from "the murderous doctrine of savage and wolfish indi vidualism, looking to dog-eat-dog and NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANNING 415 devil take the hindmost."l That eco nomic planning would arouse its own antagonisms, that it would have to be imposed by government, and that its tendency was toward totalitari anism was something that either these intellectuals did not know or would not accept.

An Exciting Experiment A part of this enthusiasm for col lective planning can be accounted for by the fact that it had not yet been discredited by recent experience. Fascist Italy was still in the forma tive years in its experiments with syndicalism when the New Deal was being shaped. The Soviet Union was just finishing its first five-year plan, and Stalin applying the brakes by proclaiming that those imposing it were "dizzy with success." The fail ure of "democratic socialism" in En gland was still fifteen years in the future. But to look at it that way is to back into an explanation of New Deal enthusiasm for a planned economy. National planning was in the wind at the time. More broadly, it consti tuted much of the intellectual weather for most radical and refor mist intellectuals. The main sources of this enthusiasm were in Europe. As I have pointed out in an earlier article, Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and mobilization of the economy during World War I pro vided some of the impetus toward the planned econo~y. But Italian Fas cism and Soviet Communism were the models whi¢h excited the imag ination of many intellectuals as the 1920s gave way!to the 1930s. In this, Americans wer~ following the lead of European intellectuals. One his torian goes so far as to say "that many of the best minds of the West saw fascism and communism as the only real alternatives of their times."2 Those who took their orientation from Moscow were taught, of course, that those countries which persisted in clinging to capitalism would in evitably become fascist.

There is not much direct evidence, not much know* to me, anyway, that any considerable number of Ameri cans were enamored with Italian Fascism. An intellectual historian of Europe has said that "Mussolini was widely admireq even in the democ racies. Had he not produced an order in his nation which the democracies were apparently incapable of pro ducing? From, Churchill (who ex pressed his admiration as late as 1938) to those who praised the Duce for making tra~ns run on time, the wave of admiration accepted fascism as an alternative to ideologies which proclaimed a more thorough social and economic revolution."3 If that was the case in the United States, the admirers 'were mostly of the closet variety.' An exception that tends to prove the rule was Lincoln Steffens who had, by the 1930s, 416 THE FREEMAN July grown old in the socialist cause and could openly praise Mussolini in his Autobiography.4 Even so, there were overtones of Italian Fascism in the early New Deal, especially in the National Re covery Administration, the Agricul tural Adjustment Administration, and the semi-military Civilian Con servation Corps. There were the ap peals to national unity, the national planning motif, the military dis plays, on "NRA Days," the parades, the organization of farmers, work ers, and industries into groups, and so on. Some of the New Dealers, at least, were aware of parallels but tried to avoid calling attention to the fact. For ex:ample, Rexford G. Tug well notes that Roosevelt did not want mention made of the parallel between Mussolini's youth army working on rural projects when he set up the Civilian 'Conservation Corps.5 When General Hugh John son reviewed the day long "NRA Day" parade in New York City, he says that he took care not to raise his arm lest it be interpreted as a Fascist salute. That did not keep a photograph from being published, however, which apparently had caught him in the stance. Johnson surmised that it must have been someone else's arm. 6 But it was Soviet Communism which kindled the enthusiasm for many American intellectuals for collective planning. One historian who has explored some of these re lationships in a book has a chapter entitled, "Soviet Russia: Lodestone of the American Liberal."7 Another says that "The whole conception of a 'social experiment,' the whole notion of planned human intervention into social processes to raise the welfare of the people, had become linked in the minds of America's intellectual and social leaders with the practice of the Soviet Union." This was ac complished mainly, he says, by ar ticles and books written by some of the "several hundreds of travelers to the Soviet Union" in the 1920s.8 Eu gene Lyons said, "The fact is that American liberals were hopelessly dazzled by the idea of 'planning' ....

Nearly every college professor, poet, social worker, engineer or schoolboy who returned from Russia brought the stereotyped formulas and statis tical patterns to swell the shiny mountain of self-deception. The more articulate wrote books. Almost as many books on the 'Soviet experi ment' were published in 1931 as in the preceding thirteen years."9 The Russian Model Among these travelers to the So viet Union during this period were John Dewey, Rexford G. Tugwell, Paul Douglas, Stuart Chase, Jane Addams, Robert M. LaFollette, Maxwell S. Stewart, George Soule, Edmund Wilson, and many, many others. Among the abundant litera1982 NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANNING 417 ture favoring economic planning, much of it written by people who had traveled to the Soviet Union, here is a sampling of titles from the period: John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia (1929), Sherwood Eddy, The Challenge of Russia (1931), George S. Counts, The Soviet Challenge to America (1931), Bruce Bliven, "Rus sia Marches Up a Mountain," New Republic (1931), Charles A. Beard, "The Rationality of Planned' Econ omy," in America Faces the Future (1932), Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Principle of Planning and the Insti tution of Laissez-Faire," American Economic Review (1932), Stuart Chase, A New Deal (1932), Chester Davis, "Toward Planned Harvests,"

Review of Reviews (1933), and Max well S. Stewart, "Where Everyone Has a Job," Survey Graphic (1931). The impact of Soviet planning on American thinkers, many of whom influenced the New Deal, may come out even clearer from a few quota tions. The New York Times declared that Stalin's first Five-Year Plan was the "most extraordinary enterprise in the economic history of the world."lO Stuart Chase proclaimed that it was "exciting, stimulating, challenging."ll John Dewey said of the Soviet undertaking, "In some re spects, it is already a searching spir itual challenge as it is an economic challenge to coordinate and plan."12 "Why," cried Stuart Chase, "should Russians have all the fun in remaking a world."13qieorge Soule said, "We could not assimilate the hard dog mas and terminology of Marxism ... , but we were irtesistibly attracted by the idea of plcllnned use of modern industrial tecQnique."

Advisersto Roosevelt The New Deal was well equipped with enthusiasts for collective plan ning from the outset. Rexford G. Tugwell spent much time during 1932 with Root;evelt, and, whenever he could make' an opportunity to do so, worked to' convince him of the necessi ty for p[anning. After Roose velt's nomination, Tugwell sent him a memorandum in which he admon ished the futulte President to pursue planning, sayiillg, in part: "It is not proposed to have the government run industry; it is proposed to have gov ernment furnish the requisite lead ership; protect our resources; ar range for national balance; secure its citizens' acce~s to goods, employ ment and security; and rise to the challenge of planning that concert of interests of wl).ich I have spoken be fore."14 By the time, he was inaugurated, Roosevelt had i managed to attract a goodly number of people to the gov ernment, to join others already there, who were eag~r to initiate planning.

Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Ag ricul ture, exprtessed his desire for a new era in mystic terms to Roose velt. "I feel for a short time yet," he 418 THE FREEMAN July said, "that we must deal with the ... 'flame less ones' who with one last dying gasp will strive to re-animate their dying giant 'Capitalism.' Mr. President, you can be the 'flaming one,' the one with an ever upward surging spirit to lead us into the time when the children of men can sing again."15 Much more prosaically, Senator Robert Wagner of New York said, while urging the passage of the Na tional Industrial Recovery Act: "I do not think we will ever have industry in order until we have nationally planned economy."16 Donald Rich berg, who eventually replaced Gen eral Hugh Johnson as head ofNRA, told a Senate committee that "A na tionally planned economy is the only salvation of our present situation and the only hope for the future."17 Ray mond Moley, a speech writer for Roosevelt, declared that what was needed was "a policy of cooperative business-government planning."l8 Jerome Frank, general counsel in the Agriculture Department, held that "Just as America took an important step forward when it rejected politi cal anarchy and integrated this con tinent into one nation, so it needs now to press forward to a deliberate economic integration."19 The NRA and the AAA The two most direct and extensive New Deal experiments in collective planning were those made under the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

Both were passed during the Hun dred Days of the emergency session of Congress which met on March 9, 1933 and adjourned on June 16. Be fore discussing these, however, there was another act passed during this session which may make clearer the animus behind national planning, why it was considered necessary, and what view of economics sustained it. It was the act creating the Tennes see Valley Authority, an act autho rizing the creation of a whole series of dams and locks on the Tennessee River. There are two things that are es pecially strange about TVA. The first is that the act should have been passed in the midst of a special ses sion of Congress called to deal with an emergency. Even if it be granted that TVA might eventually bring benefits to a region, it is difficult to see its relevance to dealing with an emergency. The building ofdams and locks on a mighty river is not some thing done in weeks or months but in years. Nor is it at all clear that the most obvious products visual ized, electricity, water transport, and fertilizers would be of such great benefit, even when they came. Fer tilizer could be bought less, expen sively elsewhere; the capacity to produce more electricity than was being sold already existed, accord ing to private power companies; and 1982 NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANNING 419 river transport had been largely dis placed. The second strange thing is that government ownership of TVA became sacrosanct, as those few na tional politicians who have ex pressed themselves in favor of di vestment discovered, to their sorrow usually. Indeed, no New Deal pro gram has ever been so secure from political criticism, unless Social Se curity might possibly be.

The TVA Idea TVA represents something other than what it is as an engineering feat or its economic value. It is a symbol. Therein lies the main ex planation for its having been under taken so expeditiously as well as for its treatment as a sacred object. It is a symbol of government planning. Arthur E. Morgan, the first chair man of the board set up to govern TVA, expressed the symbolic pur pose forthrightly. He said, "The TVA is not primarily a dam-building job, a fertilizer job or power-transmis sion job." It is an example of man's "efforts to bring order out of chaos." Or, as Arthur Schlesinger summa rized his belief, TVA "was an exper iment in social reconstruction .... "20 Whether any New Dealer ever for mulated the ways in which TVA symbolized government planning, I do not know, but what follows covers some of the ways it must. In the first place, the Tennessee River, as it was in 1933, is an apt symbol of the way New Dealers thought of a free economy. The sources of the Tennessee are in the mountains ofT~nnessee, North Car olina and Virginia. It is formed by the joining of the Holston and Clinch rivers at Knoxwille. From there it flows south to Chattanooga, thence southwestward to Guntersville, Al abama, then northwestward through Alabama into Mississippi, then northward bac~ through Tennessee, through the tip lof Kentucky to Pad ucah, where it empties into the Ohio.

It is approximately 650 miles long. In that whole length, there was only one dam, of consequence, in 1933, the one at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. It was, so to speak, largely in a "state of nature," wilq, and untamed. For much of its length it was unnaviga ble. When the snows melted in the mountains and the spring rains . came, it rampaged through cities, flooded the low lands, and washed minerals and topsoil away. In the summer and fan it dwindled so that it would not be qeep enough in places for navigation. Most of the vast force of its waters was wasted, and its navigational uses undeveloped. That is much the way New Deal ers thought or a free economy. It tended to get Ol.1lt of balance perpet ually, much as ia river does in wet and dry seasons'. As the river floods, so there is overiproduction in a free economy. Demand does not keep pace with supply. There are booms and 420 THE FREEMAN July busts. There is the waste of unem ployment. Goods go unsold while some people are in need.

In the second place, TVA symbol ized the New Deal solution to the problem. The solution was to use the power of government to control the river, to build dams, locks, and lakes, to stop the flooding by filling the lakes in the wet season and keeping a portion of the waters in dry season so that the level would he higher. The force of the river would be har nessed for electricity. Channels would be deepened and locks would be used to raise boats so that they could go up or downstream on wa ters that were level. Just so, the New Dealers expected to even out and balance the economy by planning. In the third place, the results of planning in the TVA were visible and concrete, by contrast with much of industrial planning, for example. So far as TVA was a symbol of govern ment planning, it was a symbol that could be looked at, touched, and heard. The locks and dams can be seen and touched. The water rush ing down the spillways can be heard.

The lakes are great bodies of water that can be seen from highways or bridges, or traveled on by boat. The AnalogyBreaks Down The analogy by which the TVA might be a symbol of collective plan ning generally does not stand up un der critical examination, of course. Men are not drops of water whose activities may be stopped by govern ment dams and whose energies may be impounded for later use. They are animate, sensate, and rational beings with minds and wills of their own. The employment of their energies is self-directed and guided by their own desires and p\lrposes. Nor is an economy analogous to a flowing stream, except in the loosest and most imprecise sense. Economy is that which results from the deci sions of people in producing, buying, selling, and consuming. Unless force intervene to prevent it, an economy will tend always toward balance through the continual adjustments that go on.

The New Dealers did not accept this view of the matter. They pro fessed to believe that the economy was out of balance and that this could only be corrected by planning and the application of force. Neither the National Recovery Administration (NRA) nor the Agricultural Adjust ment Administration (AAA) may have considered men as if they were drops of water, though they did con tain their energies as if by dam, and minorities in elective decisions were often given short shrift. The most immediate purpose of the NRA and AAA was to raise prices, especially of farm products, and wages of industrial workers. The main device for doing this was the reduction of production, though 1982 NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANN1NG 421 monetary inflation was supposed to provide the means for it to occur. The NRA operated through industrial codes. Ideally, these codes were sup posed to be drawn up by represen tatives of companies and workers.

Thus, there would be a cotton textile code, a steel code, a shoemakers code, a farm equipment code, and so on. But the matter was not left entirely to these representatives. The Presi·· dent of the United States was autho rized to alter the codes, ifhe saw fit, or to provide codes if those within an industry failed to do so. To Restrain Competition These NRA codes were typically concerned with restricting competi.· tion within an industry, reducing hours of labor, and raising prices and wages. Employers were usually for·· bidden to employ children under 1E; years old. A minimum wage throughout the industry and a work week of 40 hours were ordinarily specified. Further, the Cotton Tex·· tile Code, for example, forbade em·· ployers to use "productive rna·· chinery in the cotton textile industry for more than two shifts of 40 hours per week. "21 Planning was supposed to be accomplished by the companies and workers acting in concert with government. Nor was it simply ma jor industries that were governed by codes initially; any and every sort of undertaking was included. Thus, "Code 450 regulated the Dog Food Industry, Cod¢ 427 the Curled Hair Manufacturing Industry and Horse Hair Dressing Industry, and Code 262 the Shoulder Pad Manufactur ing Industry. ~n New York, I. 'Izzy' Herk, executiJve secretary of Code 348, brought order to the Burlesque Theatrical Industry by insisting that no production could feature more than four strips."22 Apparently, they did not restriet the number of gar ments to be removed.

The AAA was expected to do for agricul ture much the same sort of thing that NRA would for industry, only more. F~rmers were reckoned to be in much, worse condition than manufacturer$ and industrial work ers. The firsti task with them, ac cording to the planners, was to bring farm income up to a parity (as it was called) with industrial income. The years 1909-1 914 were chosen as a base for most ifarm staple products, and the aim was to raise farm prices to a level that would give them an income equivalent to the ratio be tween farm apd industry that pre vailed in the base period. The main device for accomplishing this was reduction of pnoduction of staples. So dramatic was the need for reduction, New Dealers tthought, that a consid erable portion pf the 1933 cotton crop was plowed up and many small pigs put to death. i Thereafter, farmers were induced ito plant less by gov ernment subsioies for those who "co operated." Uinder the first AAA 422 THE FREEMAN July (1933-1936), the money to pay for the various benefits paid to farmers came from a tax on processors. Many farmers had long believed, of course, that the middlemen got the profits from their endeavors. The New Deal gave this spurious notion legal standing by levying the tax.

Collective Performance of Producers and Government The "collective" aspect of this planning had two facets. One was the participation of farmers, indus trialists, and workers in the pro grams. Farmers voted on such mat ters as crop controls, and there were local committees to oversee partici pation in the programs. Industrial ists and workers, as already noted, had representatives in drawing codes under the NRA. The other facet was in government participation. Here, New Dealers emphasized the demo cratic character of the government and, through a kind of collectivized democracy concept, even the acti v ity of government could be con ceived as collective. Most of this was window dressing. Government agencies bought compliances where they could and otherwise forced it upon many of those who would not otherwise have participated. Her bert Hoover observed rather testily, in 1934, that those in power had as sumed the authority "To enforce most of these powers where they affect the individual by fine and imprisonment through prosecution in the courts, with a further reserved au thori ty in many trades through li cense to deprive men of their busi ness and livelihood without any appeal to the courts."23 That the NRA was a failure in col lective planning is generally con ceded. It could be argued that it never had a sufficient trial. After all, the NRA only got under way in mid 1933, and the Supreme Court de clared its central authorizing provi sions unconstitutional in 1935. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for most of the court, declared that "We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional del egation of legislative power."24 But within the administration the use fulness of the code-making approach was being sharply questioned before the Supreme Court decision. 25 The hassle of getting the codes made and enforcing them was exceedingly troublesome from beginning to end.

The NRA was in retreat before the court decision, and no effort was ever made to revive collective planning by the industries themselves. Actually, the AAA, too, was de clared unconstitutional, or at least crucial provisions of the act bring ing it into being were. The challenge of the processing tax came before the Supreme Court in 1936. The court affirmed the judgment of an appeals court that the government could not collect the tax. Many books have 1982 NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANNING 423 treated the decision as if it merely nullified the tax. But the court opin ion made clear that it was not the tax itself but the end for which it was used that was contrary to the Constitution. Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority ofthe court, declared that "powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agri cultural production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden." Further, he pointed out that "appropriations and expenditures under contracts for proper governmental purposes can not justify contracts which are not within federal power. And contracts for the reduction of acreage and the control of production are outside the range of that power."26 The Presi·, dent and Congress were undaunted, however, and major provisions of the act were reenacted in 1936, and the AAA itself was born again in 1938.

This last followed upon a counterat·· tack on the court in 1937. Their constitutionality and de mise or continuation aside, how ever, both the NRA and AAA failed in their missions. They made no sig·· nificant contributions-none at all but brief and temporary ones-to ending the depression. Indeed, they only helped to prolong it. Not only did they try to reduce production but also to freeze it in its recent pattern. New enterprises in old industries were discouraged. There were attempts to make employers keep the same number of employees and farm landlords to k~ep the same number of tenants. The Agricultural Adjust ment Act of ,1933 provided that farmers who 'made proper reduc tions in cotton acreage should not increase "commercial fertilization per acre." It also declared that cotton producers sho~ld not "use the land taken out of cotton production for the production fori sale ... of any other nationally produced agricultural commodity ... '."27 Counterproductive Measures The thrust of these programs was in the opposit¢ direction from what was needed. Ifi people have material needs, are unemployed or underem ployed, the solution for them is ei ther to produc~ for themselves what they need or produce for sale in the market enough of what is wanted to be able to buy what they need. These things require more, not less, pro duction and changes in production activities, not ithe freezing of them into patterns of the past. That is not to say that government would have had greater success in planning in creased production. Some things were already beingi produced in greater quantities than could be profitably produced for the market. Any gen eral effort to solve the problem was doomed to failure, for the problem was one of individuals, families, and other produciJng units. Only they could solve it.

424 THE FREEMAN July "Planning" vs. the Free Market PLANNING always involves compulsion. This may be disguised in various ways. The government Planners will, of course, try to persuade people that the Master Plan has been drawn up for their own good, and that the only persons who are going to be coerced are those whose plans are "not in the public interest." The Planners will say, in the newly fashionable phraseology, that their plans are not "imperative," but merely "indicative." They will make a great parade of "democracy," freedom, cooperation, and noncompulsion by "consulting all groups"-"Labor," "Industry," the Government, even "Consumers Representatives" -in drawing up the Master Plan and the specific "goals" or "targets." Of course, if they could really succeed in giving everybody his proportionate weight and voice and freedom of choice, if everybody were allowed to pursue the plan of production or consump tion of specific goods and services that he had intended to pursue or would have pursued anyway, then the whole Plan would be useless and pointless, a complete waste of energy and time.

HENRY HAZLITT Although the NRA was aban doned and the AAA was modified (and many particular programs re duced or abandoned over the years), they left most important residues which are still very much with us. The most important relic is the idea that government is responsible for the functioning of the economy. This undergirds the notion, which has surfaced in hundreds of ways since the 1930s, that government can take action and plan so as to make the economy work well. It surfaced in the idea that government can manipulate the currency to prevent depressions and insure prosperity, in the Employment Act of 1946 in which the government assumed the re sponsibility for following policies to assure full employment, in the Council of Economic Advisers which Presidents have, in controls over wages and prices, in attempts to maintain or increase purchasing power, in land use programs, in gov ernment empowerment of labor unions, in the still existent crop sub sidy programs, and so on and on. The idea of collective planning is present 1982 NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE PLANNING 425 in the government mandated hear ings which must be held before com munities make changes or institute programs. Government participa tion in collective planning is a major ingredient in the environmental protection rules and regulations. In deed, it would be an encyclopedic ef fort to explore all the ways that gov ernment is today involved in economic planning for Americans.

A Discredited Relic Government economic planning is a relic. It is a relic of the New Deal. It is a relic of enthusiasms which go back to the 1920s, to World War I, to Italian Fascism, to Soviet Com munism, and to World War II eco nomic controls. It is a relic of fas cism which was on its way to being discredited and was already in ill re pute before the New Deal programs were enacted. It is a relic of national socialism, which failed in Britain and led to massive oppression in the des~ perate effort to make it work in the Soviet Union. It has been discred .. ited in theory and practice. i Next: New Deal Welfarism. -FOOTNOTESIQuoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 88. 2George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 378. 3/bid., po 353. 4See Schlesinger~ op. cit., pp. 142, 208. 5Rexford G. Tug\fell, The Brains TrUst (New York: Viking, 1968), p. 71.

6Hugh S. Johnson, "NRA Ballyhoo" in Wil liam E. Leuchtenburg, ed., The New Deal (Co lumbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 47. 7Frank A. WarrE;m, III, Liberals and Com munism (BloomiIligton: Indiaha University Press, 1966), ch. 4. 8Lewis S. Feuer, i"American Travelers to the Soviet Union," American Quarterly (Summer, 1962). ' 9Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade (New Ro chelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1970, originally pub. 1941), pp. 103+"04. lOQuoted in Wa.rr~n, op. cit., p. 70. ll/bid., p. 66. 12Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., p. 107. 13QuQtedin Warr¢n, op. cit.; p. 59. 14Tugwell, op. cit.., p. 527. 15Quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 32-33, 16William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 58. 17Quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 93. 18/bid; 19/bid;,p. 94. 2°/bid., p. 327. 21Henry S. Comtnager, ed., Documents of American History (New York: Appleton-Cen tury-Crofts, 1962), voL II, p. 277.

22Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 69. 23Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (Rockford, Ill.: The iHerbert Hoover Presiden tial Libra.ry Association, 1971, originally pub. 1934), p. 78. 24Commager, op. cit., p. 281. 25See Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 161-62. 26Commager, op. cit., pp. 250-51. 27/bid.,p. 243.