III. Good and Bad Conduct

CHAPTER III. GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. ~ 8. By c01'1lparing·it~ meanings' in different connenolls (ind observing what they have in common, we learn +,he essential meaning of a word; and the essential meaning of a word that is variously applied, may best be learnt by comparing with one another those applications of it which diverge most·widely. Let us thus ascertain what good and bad mean. In which case~ do we distinguish as good, a knife, a guu, u, house? And what trait leads us to speak 9£ a bad umbrella or a bad pair of boots? The characters hero predicated by the words good and bad, are not intrinsio characters; for apart from human wants, such things, have neither merits nor demerits. We call these articles good or had according as they .are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. The good knife is one which will cut j the good gun is one which carries far and true; the good house is one which duly yields the shelter, comfort, and accommodation sought for. Conversely, the badnesA alleged of the umbrella or the pair of boots, ref81's to thoir failures in fulfilling the endso£ keeping .~ff the rain and comfortably protecting the feet, ~tvith due regard to appear ...

ances. So is it when Ne pass from inanimate objects to inanimato actions. We call a day bad in which storms prevent us from satisfying certain of our desires. A.

22 1 1 HEDATA OF ETHICS. good season is the expression used when the weather has favoured the production of. valuable crops. If from. lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones, ",ve simiJarly find that these words in their current applications refer to efficient subservience. The goodness or badness of a pointer or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all other attributes of tllese creatures, refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting the ends men use thorn for, and in the other case to the qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support human life. And those doin5~s of men which, morally considered, are indifferent, we class as good or bad according to their success or failure. A good jump is a jump which) remoter ends ignored, well achieves the immediate purpose of a jump; and a stroke at billiards is called good when the movements are skilfully adjusted to the requirements. Oppositely, the badness of a walk that is shuffling and an utterance that is indistinct, is alleged because of the relative non-adaptations of the acts to the ends.

Thus recognizing the meanings of good and bad as other wise used, we shall understand better their meanings as used in characterizing conduct under its ethical aspects. Here, too, observation shows that we apply them according as the adjustments of acts to ends are, or are not, efficient. This truth is somewhat disguised. The entanglement of social relations is such, that men's actions often simul .. taneously affect the welfares of self, of offspring, and of fellow-citizens. Hence results confusion in judging of actions as good or bad; since actions well fitted ·~o achieve ends of one order, may prevent ends of the other orders frolu being achieved. Nevertheless, when we disentangle tho three orders of ends, and consider each separately, it be comes clear that the conduct which achieves each kind of end is regarded as relatively good; and is l"egarded as relatively bad if it fails to achieve it.

Take first the primary set of adjustments-those sub.GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 23 serving individual life. Apart from approval or disapproval of his ulterior aims, a man who fights is said to make a good defence, if his defence is well adapted for self-preservation; and, the judgments on ot.her aspects of his conduct remain ing the same, he brings down on himsolf 'an unfavourable verdict, .in so far as his immediitte acts are concerned, if these are futile. 1'he goodness ascribed to a' man of business, as such, is measured by the activity and ability with which he buys and sells to advantage; aud may coexist with a hard treatnlent of dependents which is repro bated. Though in repeatedly lending money to a friend who sinks one loan after another, a man is doing that which, con sidered in itself is held praiseworthy; yet, if he does it to the extent of bringing on his own ruin, he is held blameworthy for a self-sacrifice carried too far. And thus is it with the opinio~s we express from hour to .hour on those acts of people around which bear on their health and personal wel fare. "You should not. have done that;" is the reproof given to one who crosses the street amid a dangerous rush of vehicles. " You ought to have changed your clothes;" is said to another who has taken cold after getting wet. "You were right to take a r8cejpt;" "you were wrong to invest without advice ;" are common criticisms. All such approving and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion that, other things equal, conduct is right or wrong according as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or do not further the general end of self,;.,preservation.

These ethical judgments we pass on self-regarding acts are ordinarily little emphasized; partly because the prolnpt. 'ings of 'the self-regarding desires, generally strong enough, do not need moral enforcement, and partly because the promptings of the other-regarding desires, less strong, and often over-ridden, do need moral enforcement. Henc6 results a contrast. On turning to that second .class of adjustments of acts to ends which subserve the rearing of offspring, we DO longer find any obscurity in the application 24 THE DATA OF ETHICS. of the words good and bad to them, according as they are efficient or inefficient. The expressions good nursing and bad nursing, whether they refer to the supply of food, the quality and amount of cLothing, or the due nlinistration to infantine wan'ts from hour to .hour, tacitly recognize as special ends· which ought to be fulfilled, the furthering of the vital functions, with a view to the general end of con tinued life and growth. .A. mother is called good who, ministering to all the physical needs of her children, also adjusts her behaviour in ways conducive to their mental health; and· a bad father is one who either does not provide the necessaries of life for his family, or otherwise acts in a manner injurious to their bodies or minds. Similarly of the education given to them, or provided for them. Goodness 01"

badness is affirmed of it (often with little consistency, how ever) according as its methods are so adapted to physical· and psychical requirements, as to further the children's lives for the time being, while preparing them for carrying Oil complete and prolonged adult life. Most eIl1phatic, however, are the applications of the 'words good and bad to conduct throughout that third division of it comprising the deeds by which men affect one another. In maintaining their own lives and fostering their offspring, men's adjustments of acts to ends are so apt to hinder the kindred adjustments of other men, that insistance on the needful limitations has to be perpetual; and the miHchiefs caused by men's interferences with one another's life-sub serving actions are so great, that tbe interdicts have to be perelnptory. Hence the fact that the words good and bad have corne to be specially associated with acts which further the cOlnplete living of others and acts which obstruct their con1plete living. Goodness, standing by itself, suggest~, above all other things, the' conduct of one who aids the sick in re-acquiring normal vitality, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves 1 defends those who are threatened with harm in person, pro· GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 25 perty, or reputation, and aids whatever promisestoimprove the living ofall his fellows.. Contrariwise, badness brings to mind, as its leading correlative, the conduct of one who, in carrying on his own life, damages the ··liyes of others by irjuring their bodies, destroying their possessions, defraud ..

mg them, calun111iatingthem. Always, then, acts are called good or .bad,· according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends; and 'vhat ever incon sistency there is in our uses of the words, arises from inconsistencyo£ the ends. Here, however, the study of' conduct in general, and of the evolution of conduct,· have urepared us to harmonize these interpretations. The fore;. going exposition· shows that the conduct to which we apply the name good, is the relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved. We SttW that evolution, tending ever towards self-preserv9.tion, reaches its lilnit when individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth; and now we see that, leaving other ends aside, weregttrd as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the cond uct tending to self-destruction. It was shown that along with increas ing po·wer of maintaining individual life, which evolution brings, there goes increasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny, and that in this direction .evolu tion reaches its lin1it when the needful number of young, preserved to n1aturity, are then fit for a life that is COlil pletein fulness and duration; and here it turns out that parental conduct is called good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this ideal result. Lastly, we inferped that· establishment of an associated state, both makes possible and requires a form of conduct such that life may be COIn ..

pleted in each and in his offspring, not only without pre venting conlpletion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others; and we have found above, that this is the form o£conduct most emphatically termed good. Moreover, just as we there saw that evolution becomes the highest possible 26 " THE DATA OF ETHICS. when the conduct siulultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow 1118n; so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the con duct conceived as best, when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time. § 9. Is there any postulate involved in these judgments on conduct? Is there any assumption made in calling good the acts conducive to life, in self or others, and "bad those which directly or indirectly tend towards death, special or general ? Yes; an assuruption of extreme significance has been made-an assnmption underlying all moral estimates.

The question to be definitely raised and answered before entering on any ethical discussion, is the question of late much agitated-Is life worth" living? Shall we take the pessimiEt view? or shall we take the optimist view? or shall we, after weighing pessimistic and optimistic argu ments, conclude that the balance is in favour of a qualified optimism? On the answer to this question depends entirely every decision concerning the goodness or badness of conduct. By those who think life is not a be~1efit but a misfortune, conduct which prolongs it is to be blamed rather than praised: the ending of an undesirable existence being the thing to be wished, that which causes the ending of it mURt be applauded; while actions furthering its continuance, either in self or others, must be reprobated. Those who, on the other hand, take an optimistic view) or who) if not "pure optimists, yet hold that in life the good exceeds the evil, are committed to opposite estima.tes; and lllust regard as conduct to be approved that which fosters life in .self and others, and as conduct to be disapproved that which injures or endangers life in self or others.

The ultimate qU8stion, therefore, is-Has evolution been a mistake; nnd especially that evolution which improves the adjustment .:>£ acts to ends in ascending stages of organiza~ GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 27 tionr If it is held that there had better not have been any animate existence at all, and ~hat the sooner it comes to an end the better; then one set of conclusions with, respect to conduct emerges. If, contrariwise, it is held that there is a balance in favour of animate existence, and if, still further, t it is held that in the future this balance may be increased; then the opposite set of conclusions emerges. Even should it be alleged that the worth of life is not to be judged by its intrinsic character, but -rather by its extrinsic sequences by cortain results to be anticipated when life has passed -the ultimate issue reappears in a new shape. For though the accompanying creed may negative a deliberate shortening of life that is miserable, it cannot justify a gratuitous lengthening of such life. Legislation conducive to increased longevity would, on the pessimistic view, remain blameable; while it would be praiseworthy on the optimistic view.

But now, have these irreconcilable opinions anything in common? 1\1en being divisible into two schools differing on· this ultimate question, the inquiry arises-Is there anything which their radically-opposed yiews alike take for granted? In the optimistic proposition, tacitly made when using the words good and bad after the ordinary manner; and in the pessimistic proposition overtly made, which inlplies that the words good and bad should be used in the reverse senses; does examination disclose any joint pro position-any proposition which, contained in both of them, nlay be held more certain than either-any universally asserted proposition? § 10. Yes, there is one postulate in which pessimists nTl(l optimists agree. Both their arguments assume it to he self-evident that life is good or bad, according as it doe~, Ol" does not, bring a surplus of a.greeable feeling 0 The pessimist says he condemns life because it results in more pain than pleasure. The optimist defenas life in the belief thatl it 28 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

brings more pleasure than pain. Each makes the kind of sen· tiency which accompanies life the test. They agree that the justification for life as-a state of being, turns on this issue whether the average consciousness rises above indifference point into pleasurable feeling _or falls below it into painful feeling. The implication common to their antagonist views is) that conduct should. conduce to preservation of the indi .. 'Vidual, of the family, and of the society, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery .. Changing the venue cannot alter the verdict. If either the pessimist, while saying that the pains of life predolllillate, or the optimist, while saying that the plea,sures pred.ominate, urges that the pains borne here are to be compensated by pleasures received hereafter; and that so life, whether or not justified in its immediate results, is justified in its ultimate results; the iluplication remains the same.

The decision is still reached by balancing pleasures against pains. Animate existence would be jndged by both a curse, if to a surplus of misery borne her2, were added a surplus of misery to be borne hereafter. And for either to regard animate existence as a blessing, if here its pains were held to exceed its -pleasures, he must hold that here after its pleasures will exceed its pains. Thus there is no escape from the adtnission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so ilnplying that life is a blesRing and not a curse, ,ve are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful. One theory only is imaginable in pursuance of which other interpretations of good and bad can be gi ven. Thi~ theory is that men were created with the intention that they should be sources of lnisery to themselves; and that they are bound to continue living that their creator may _have the satisfaction of contemplating their misery. Though this is Hot a theory avowedly entertained by many-though it is not formulated by any in this distinct way; yet not a few do GOOD AND ··BAD CONDUCT. 29 aceept it under a disguised form. Inferior creeds are. per vaded by the belief that the sight ofsufferil1gis pleasing to the gods. Derived fro.m·bloodthirsty ancestors,. such gods are naturally conceived as gratified by the infliction of pain: when living tlleydelighted in torturing other being;~; .and witnessing torture is supposed still to give them. delight.

The implied c~nceptions long survive. It needs but to name Indian fakirs who hang on hooks and Eastern dervishes who gash· themselves, to show that in· societies considerably ad vanced,are still to be found many who thil1kthat submission to a,nguish brings divine favour. And without enlarging on fasts and penances, it will be clear that there has existed, and still exists, ·among Christian peoples, the belief that the Deity .whom Jephthah .thought to propitiatebysacri ficinghis .daughter, may be propitiated by self-inflicted pains. Further, the conception accompanying this,that acts pleasing to self are offensive to God, has survived alpng with it, and still widely prevails; if not in .formulated . dogmas, yet in beliefs that are manifestly operative. Doubtless, ·in modern days such ·.··beliefs have assumed qualified forms. The satisfactions. which ferocious gods were supposed to feel in contemplating tortures,· has. been, in large measure, transformed into· the satisfaction felt. by·a deity in contemplating thatsel£-infliction of pain which is held to further eventual happiness~ But clearly those who enter tain this modified view, are excluded· from ·the class whose position we are here considering. Restricting ourselves to this class-:-.supposing .that from the .savage who immola.tes victimstoa cannibal god, there are descendants among the civilized, who hold that. mankind were made for suffering, and that it is their duty to continue living in misery for tho delight of.• their maker, we can only recognize the fact.that devil-worshippers are not yet extinct.

Omitting people of this classj if· there areany,.as beyond or beneath argument, we find that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the final justification for .maintaining life, 30 THE DATA OF ETHICS. c~~n only be the reception from it of a surplus of pleasurablt) feeling over painful feeling; and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve life or hinder life, only on this supposition. And here we are brought round to those prin1ary mean ings of the 'words goou and bad, which we passed over when considering their secondary, meanings. For on remen1bel'ing that we call good and bad the things whic.h inllnediately produce agreeable and disagreeable sensatioD8, and also the sensations themselvesa good wine, a good appetite,a bad sn1elJ, a bad headache-we see that by referring directly to pleasures and pains, these meanings harmonize with those which indirectly refer to pleasures and pains. If we call good the enjoyable state itself, as a good laugh ··-if we call gc.od the proximate cause of an enjoyable state, as good music-if we call good any agent which conduces immediately or ren10tely to an el1joyablt~ state, as a good shop, a good teacher-if we call good Donsidered intrinsically, each act so arljusted to its end as to further self-preservation and that surplus of enjoyment which makes self-preservation desirable-if we call good every kind of conduct which aids the lives of others, and do this under the belief that life brings more happiness than misery; then it becomes undeniable that, tf;tking into account imrnediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable.

§ 11. Sundry influences-moral, theological, and political -conspire to make people disguise from themselves this truth. As in narrower cases so in this widest case, they become so pre-occupied with the means by which an end is achieved, as eventually to mistake it for the end. Just as money, which is a means of satisfying wants, comes to be regarded by a nliser as the sole thing to be worked for, leaving the wants unsatisfied; so the conduct men have found preferable because most conducive to happiness) haa GOOD AND· BAD CONDUCT. 31 come to be thought of as intrinsically preferable: not only to be made a proximate ep.d (which it s,pould be), but to be made an ultimate end, to the exclusion ~f the true ultimate end. And yet cross-examin~tion quickly compels everyone to confess the true ultimate end. trust as the n1iser, asked to justify himself, is obliged to allege the power of money to purchase desirable things, as his reason for prizing it; so the moralist who thinks this conduct intrinsically good and that intrinsically bad, if pushel1 home, has no choice but to fall back on their pleasure-giving and pain-giving effects. To pro.ve this it needs but to observe how impossible it would be to think of them as we do, if their effects were reversed.

Suppose that gashes and bruises caused agreeable sensa tions, and brought in their train increased power of doing work aI;ld receiving enjoyment; should we l'egal~d assault in the same manner as at present? Or suppose that self nlutilation, say by cutting off a hand, was both intrinsically pleasant and furthered performance of the processes by which personal welfare and the welfare of dependents is achieved; should we hold as now, that deliberate injury to one's own body is to be reprobated? Or again, suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions, by brightening his prospects; would theft be counted among crimes, as in existing law-books and moral codes? In these extreme cases, no one can deny that what we call the badness of actions is ascribed to them solely for the reason that they entail pain, immediate or remote, and would not be 80 ascribed did they entail pleasure.

If we exalnine our conceptions on their obverse side, this general fact forces itse1£ on our attention ,vith equal dis tinctness. Imagine that ministering to a sick person always increased the pains of illness. Irnagine that an orphan's relatives who took charge of it., thereby necessal"ily brought miseries upon it. Imagine that liquidating another man's pecuniary claiU18 on you redounded to his disad vantago. 4 32 THE DATA OF ETHICS. Imagine that crediting a man with noble behaviour hindered his social welfare and consequent gratification. What should we say to these acts which now fall into the class we call praiseworthy? Should we not contrariwise class them as bla,]ueworthy ? Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced fornls of good ana bad conduct, we find it unquestionable that ou!' ideas ot their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere. And this truth is brought out with equal clearness by examining' the standards of different moral schools; for analysis shows that every one of them derives its authority from this ultiluate standard.

Ethical systems are roughly distinguishable according as they take for their cardinal ideas (1) the character of the agent; (2) the nature of his motive; (3) the quality of his deeds; and (4) the results. Each of these may be character ized as good or bad; and those who do not estirnate a mode of life by its effects on happiness, estin1ate it by the implied goodness or badness in the agent, in his motive, or in his deeds. We have perfection in the agent set up as a test by which conduct is to be judged. Apart from the agent we have his feeling considered as moral. And apart from the feeling we have his action considered as virtuous. Though the distinctions thus indicated have so little definiteness that the words n1arking them are used inter changeably, yet th8re correspond to them doctrines partially unlike one another; which we may here conveniently examine separately, with the view of showing that all their tests of goodness are derivative.

§ 12. It i~ stral1ge that a notion so abstract as that of perfection, 01' a certain ideal completeness of nature, should evel' have been thought one fronl which a systeu1 of guidance can be evolved; as it was in a general way by Plato sud more distinctly by Jonathan Edwardes. Perfection i~ GOOD AND BAD OONDUCT. 33 synonymous with.goodness in the highest degree; and hence ~o define good conduct in terms of perfection, is indirectly to define good conduct in terms of itself. Naturally, therefore, it happens that the notion ofperfectioll like the notion of goodness can be framed only in relation to ends. We allege imperfection of any inani mate t,hing, as a tool, if it lacks some part needful for effectual action, or if some pnrt is so shaped as not to fulfil its purpose in the best rnanner. Perfection is alleged of a watch if it keeps exact time, however plain its case ; and imperfection is alleged of it because of inaccurate tinie-keeping, however beautifully it is ornamented. Though we call things imperfect if we detect in them any injuries or flaws, even when these do not detract from efficiency; yet we do this because they imply that inferior workmanship, or that wear and tear, with. which inefficiency is commonly joined in experience: absence of minor imperfections being habitually associated with absence of. major imperfections.

As applied to living things, the word perfection has the same meaning.. The idea of perfect shape in a race-horse is derived by generalization from those observed traits of race horses which' have usually gone along with attainment of the highest speed; and the idea of perfect constitution in a race-h.orse similarily refers to the endurance which enables him to continue that speed for the longest time. With men, physically considered, it is' the same: we are able to furnish no other test of perfection, than that of complete power in all the organs to fulfil their respective fnnctions. That our conception of perfect balance among the internal parts, and of perfect proportion among the external parts, originate~ thus, is nlade clear by observing that imperfection of any viscus, as lungs, heart, or liver, is ascribed for no· otl1el' reason than inability to meet in full the demands .which the activities of the organism make on it; and on observ ing that the conception of insufficient size, or of too great size, in a limb, is derived from accumulated experiences 34 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

respecting that ratio among the limbs \vbich furthers in the highest degree the performance of all needful actions. And of perfection in mental nature we have no other measure. If imperfection of memory, of judgn1ent, of temper, if; alleged, it is alleged because of inadequacy to the require. ments of life; and to imagine a perfect balance of the intellectual powers and of the emotions, is to imagine that proportion among them which ensures an entire discharge o~ each and every obligation as the occasion calls for it. So that the perfection of man considered as an agent, means the being const.ituted for effecting complete adjust.ment of acts to ends of every kind. And since, as shown above, the conlplete adjustment of acts to ends is that which both secures and constitutes the life that is most evolved, alike in breadth and length; while, as also shown, the justifica tion for whatever increases life is the reception from life of more happiness than misery; it follows that conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature. To be fully convinced of this it needs but to observe how the proposition looks when inverted. It needs but to suppose that every approach towards perfection involved greater misery to self, or others, or both, to show by opposi tion that approach to perfection really means approach to that which secures great1er happiness.

§ 13. Pass we now from the view of those who make excel lence of being the standard, to the view of those who make virtuousness of action the standard. I do not here refer to Dl0ralists who, having decided empirically or rationally, ind1Jc tiveiy or deductively, that acts of certain kinds have the character we call virtuous, argue that such acts are to be performed without regard to proximate consequences: thefa have ample justification. But I refer to moralists who l:rrrpposethemselves to have conceptions of virtue as an end, nnderived from any other end-who think that the idea. of vh,tue is not resolvable into simpler ideas.

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 85 This is the doctrine iwhich appears to have been enter tained by Aristotle. I say) appears to have been, because his Btatements are far from consistent with one another. Recog. nizing happiness as the supreme end of human endeavour, it 'would at first sight se8m that he cannot be taken f.tJ typical of those who make virtue the supreme end. Yet he puts himself in this category by seeking to define happinese in terms of virtue, instead of defining virtue i~ terms of happiness. The imperfect separation of words from things, which characterizes Greek speculation in general, seems to have been the cause .of this. In priulitive thought the name and the object named, are associated in such wise that the one is regarded as apart of the other-so much so, that knowing a savage's name is considered by him as having some of his being, and a consequent power to work evil on hinl. This belief in a real connexion between word and thing, continuing through lovrer stages of progreRs, and long surviving in tJle tacit assumption that the meanings of words are intrinsic, pervades the dialogues of Plato, and is traceable even in Aristotle. For otherwise it is not easy to see why he should have so incornpletely dissociated t,ha abstract idea of happinesR from particular forms of happiness. Naturally where the divorcing of words as symbols, frolll things as syll1boliz8d, is imperfect, there 111Ust be difficulty in giving to abstract words a sufficiently abstract meaning. If in the first stages of language the concrete name cannot be separated in thought fron1 the concrete obj(ct it be10ngs to, it is inferable that in the course of forming successively higher grades of abstraot name;;, there will have to be resisted the tendency to interpret each more abstract name in terllls of sorne oue class of the less abstract names it covers. Hence, I think, the fact that Aristotle supposes happiness to be associated with some one order of hUl1lan activities, rat.her than with all orders of hun1an activities. Instead of including in it the pleasurable feelings accompanying actions that 86 THE DATA OF ETIIl(,'S.

constitute mere living, which actions he says man has in common with vegetables; and instead of making it include the mental states which the life of external perception yields, which he says man has in comn10n with anima1s at large; he ex~ludes these from his idea of happiness, and includes in it only the modes of consciousness accompanying rational lifo. Asserting that the proper work of man a consists in the active exercise of the mental capacities conformably to reason;" he concludes that "the supreme good of man will consist in perforrning this work with excellence or virtue: herein he will. obtain happiness." And he finds confirmation for his view in its correspondence with views previously enunciated; saying-a our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue; for we say that it consists in the action of virtue; that is, not merely in the possession, but in the use."

Now the ilnplied belief that virtue can be defined other~ wise than in ternlS of happiness (for else the proposition is that happiness is to be obtained by actions conducive to happiness) is allied to the Platonic belief that there is an ideal or absolute good, which gives to particular and relative goods their property of goodness; and an argU111ent analogous to that which Aristotle uses against Plato's conception of good, may be used against his own conception of virtue. As with good so with virtue-it is not singular but plural: in Aristotle's own classification, virtue, when treated of at large, is transformed into virtues. Those which he calls virtues, must be so called in consequence of some ~omlnon character that is either intrinsic or extrinsic. We ruay class things together either because they are mado alike by all having in theulselves some peculiarity, as we do vertebrate animals because they all have vertebral columns; or "re may class them together because of some community in their outer relations, as when we group saws, knives, mallets, harrows, under the head of tools. Are the virtues classed as fH&ch because of some intrinsic community of nature? TheIl GOOD AND :BAD CONDUCT. 37 the,,-e Inustbe identifiable a common trait in ail the cardinal virtues which Aristotle specifies-u Courage, Temperance, Liberality, l\fagnanirnity, Magnificence,Meekness, Amiability or Friendliness, Truthfulness, J llstice." What nowis the teait possessed in cornmon by l\1agnificence and l\leekness? and if any such COUlmon trait can be disel;tangled, is it that which also con,st.itutes theess.ential trait in Truthfulness?

The answer mu~t be-No. The virtues, then, not being classed as such becaus~ of an instrinsic community of character, must be classed as s~ch becauseo£something extrinsic; and this something ca~ be nothing else than the happiness which Aristotle says Iconsists in the practice of thern. They are united by their comnlon relation to this result; while they are not united by their inner natures. Perhaps still more clearly lnay the inference be drawn thus :-If virtue is prirnordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct andcouduct that is pleasure giving in its total effects on self, or others, or both j and if there is not· a necessary correspondence, it is conceivable that the conduct. classed as virtuous should be pain-giving in its total effects. That we may see the consequence of so conceiving it, let us take the two viitues con sidered as typically such in ancient times and in modern times-courage and chastity. By the hypothesis, then, courage, displayed alike in sel£·,defence and in defence of country, is to be conceived as not only entailing pains incidentally, but as· being necessarily a cause of misery to the individual and to the .State ; while, by implication, the absence of it redounds to personal and general well-being.

Similarly, by the hypothesis, we have to conceive that irregular sexual relations are. directly and indirectly bene· ficial-that adultery is conducive to domestic harmony and the careful rearing of children; while marital relations in proportion as they are persistent, generate discord between husband and wife and entail on their offspring, suffuring, 38 THE DATA. OF ETHICS. disease, and death. Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could still be thought of as virtues though thus pro ductive of misery, it lTInst be admitted that the conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness· producing conrluct; and that as this holds of all the virtues, h~wever otherwise unlike, it is frorn their conduciveness to hnp piness that they come to be classed as virtues. ~ 14. When from those ethical estimates which take perfection of nature, or virtuousness of action, as tests, we pass to those which take for test rectitude of motive, 'we .

approach the intuitional theory of morals; and we may conveniently deal with such estimates by a criticism on this theory. By the intuitional theory I here mean, not that which recognizes as produced by the inherited effects of continued experiences, the feelings of liking and aversion we have to acts of certain kinds ; but I mean the theory which regards such feelings as divinely given, and as independent of results experienced by self or ancestors. "There is therefore," says Hutcheson, ('as each one by close attention and reflection nlay con vince himsel£, a natural and imnlediate determination to approve certain affections, and actions consequent upon them;" and since, in comInon with others of his time, he believes in the special creation of man, and all other beings, this" natural sense of imnlediate excellence" he considers as a supernaturally-derived guide. Though he says that the feelings and acts thus intuitively recogni~~ed as good, (( all agree in one general character, of tending to the happiness of others;" yet he is obliged to conceive this as a pre-or dd.ined correspondence. Nevertheless, it may be shown that conduciveness to happiness, here represented as an incidental trait of the acts which receive these innate moral approvals, if really the test by which these approvals are recognized as moral. The intuitionists place confidence in these verdicts of conscience, simply because they vaguely, if 110t distinctlYJ GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 89 perceive them to be consonant with the disclosures of that ultimate test. Observe the proof.

By the hypothesis, the wrongness of murder is known by a moral intuition which the human mind was originally constituted 'to yield; and the hypothesis therefore negatives the adnlission that this sense of its wrongness arises, imme diately or remotely, from the consciousness that murder involves deduction from happiness, directly and indirectlye But if you ask an adherent of this doctrine to contrast his intuition with that of the Fijian, who, considering murderan honourable action, is restless until he has distinguished himself by killing sonle one; and if you inquire of him in what way the civilized intuition is to be justified in opposition to the intuition of the savage; no course is open save that of showing how conformity to the one conduces to well-being, while conformity to the other entails suffering, individual and general. When asked why the moral sense which tells him that it is wrong to take another lnan's goods, should be obeyed rather than the moral sense of a 'rurcoman) \vho proves how meritorious he considers theft to be by making pilgrimages to the tombs of noted robbers to make offerings; the intuitionist can do nothing but urge that, certainly unde"I" conditions like ours, if not also under conditions like those of the Turcolnans, disregard of men's claims to theil~ property not only inflicts immediate misery} but in volves a social state inconsistent with happiness.

Or if, again, there is required from him a justification for his feeling of repugnance to lying, in contrast with the feeling of an Egyptian, who prides himself on skill in lying (even thinking it praiseworthy to deceive without AllY further end than that of practising deception); he can do no more than point to the social prosperity furthered by entire trust between Ulan and man, and the social dis organization that follows universal untruthfnlness-conse quences that are necessarily conducive to agreeable feelings It,nd disagreeable feeling's respectively.

40 THE nATA OF ETHICS. The unavoidable conclusion is, then, that the intuitionist does not, and cannot, ignore the ultimate derivations of right and wrong from pleasure and pain. However much he may be guided, and rightly guided, by the decisions of conscience respecting the characters of acts; he has come to have confidence in these decisions because he perceives, vaguely but positively, that conformity to them furthers the welfare of himself and others, and that disregard of them entails in the long run suffering on all. Require hinl to name any moral-sense judgment by which he knows as right, some kind of act that will bring a surplus of pain, taki ng into account the totals in this life and ill any assumed othe,r life, and you Thud him unable to name one: a fact proving that underneath all these intuitions respecting the' goodness or bat1ness of acts, there lies the fundamental assulnption that acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or increase their misery.

§ 14. It is curious to see how the devil-worship of the savage, 8urviying in various disguises an10ng theci vilized, and leaving as one of its products that asceticism which in many forlns and degrees still prevails widely, is to be found influencing in nlarked ways, nlen who have apparently emancipated themselves, not only from primitive supersti .. tions but frorn more developed superstitions. Views of life and conduct which originated with those who propitiated deified ancestors by self-tortures, enter even still into the ethical theories of many persons who have years since cast away the theology of the past, and suppose themselves to bo no longer influenced by it. In the writings of one 'who rejects dogmatic Chl'istianity toget,her with the Hebrew cult which preceded it, a career of conquest costing tens of thousands of lives, is narrated with a sYlnpathy comparable to that rejoicing which· the Hebrew traditions show us over destruction of enemies in GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT.

the name of God. You may find, too, a delight in contem .. plating the exercise of despotic power, joined with insistance on the saJutariness of a state in which the wills of slaves and citizens, are humbly subject to the wills of masters and rulers-a sentiment also reminding us of that ancient ~ Oriental life which biblical narratives portray. Along with this ,vorship of the strong man-along with this justification of whate-veT force may be needed for carrying out his ambitiuu--along with thi& yearning for a form of society in 'which supremacy of the few is unrestrained and the virtue of tihe lnany consists in obedience to theln; we not unnaturally find repudiation of the ethical theory which takes, in some shape or other, the greatest happiiless as the end of conduct: we not unnaturally find this utilital'ian philosophy designated by the oontemptuous title of "pig-philosophy." And then, serving to show what comprehension there has been of the philosophy so nicknamed,we are told that not happiness but blessedness must be the end.

Obviously, the implication is that blessedness is not a kind of happiness; and this implication at once suggests the question-What mode of feeling is it? If it is a state of consciousness· at all, it is necessarily one of three states painful, indifferent, or pleasurable. Does it leave the possessor at the zero point of sentiency? Then it leave~ him just as he would be if he had not got it. Does it not leave him at the zero point? Then it must leave him below zero or above zero. Each of these possibilities may be conceived under two fC!"IDS. That to which the term blessedness is applied, may be a particular state of consciousness-one among the many states tlat occur; and on this supposition we have to recog nize it as a pleasurable state, an indifferent state, Ol~ a painful state. Otherwise, blessedness is a word not appll~able to a particular state of consciousness, but characterizes the aggre gate of its states; and in this case the average of the aggregate is to be conceived as one in whi~h the pleasurable THE DATA OF ETHICS.

predominates, or one in ~hich the painful predominateo, or one in 'which pleasures and pains exactly cancel Olle another. Let us take in turn these two imaginable applications of tho word. (( Blessed are the Il1cI'ciful;" "Blessed are the peace l)laker~ ;" "Blessed i~ he that consic1ereth the poor;" are sayings which we may fairly take as conveying the accepted ILleenillgof blessedness. "\Vhat now shall we say of one who is, for the time being, blessed in performing an act of mercy? Is his n1ental state pleasurable? If so the hypothesis is abandoned: blessedness is a particular form of happiness. Js the state indifferent or painful? In that case the blessed man is so devoid of synlpathy that relieving another fronl pain, or the fear of pain, leaves hiul either wholly unmoved, or gives him ~n unpleasant emotion. Again, if one who is blessed in 111aking peace receives no gratification from the act, then seeing 111en· injure each other does not affect hin1 at all, or gives him a pleasure which is changed into a pai.n when he prevents the injury. Once luore, to say that the blessedness of one who" considereth the poor" implies no ag'reeable feeling, is to say that his consideration for the poor leaves hin1 without feeling or entails on him a disagreeable feeling. So that if blessedness is a particular mode or con sciousness tenlporarily existing as a concomitant of each kind of beneficent action, those who deny that it is a pleasure, or constituent of happiness, confess thenlselves either not pleased by the welfare of others or displeased by it.

Otherwise understood, blessedness D1USt, as we have seen, refer to the totality of feelings experienced during the life of cne who occupies himself with the actions; the ,vord con notes. This also presents the three possibilities-surplus of pleasures, surplus of pains, equality of the two. If the plc:asurable states are in excess, then the blessed life can be distinguished froill any other pleasurable life only by the relativo aUlount, or the quality, of its pleasures: it is a life which makes happiness of a certain kind and degree its end j GOOD AND· BAD CONDUCT. 43 and the assunlption that blessedness is not a form of happi ness, lapses. If the blessed life is one in which the pleasures and pains received balance one· another, so producing an average that is indifferent; or if it is one in which the pleasures are out-balanced, by the pains; then the blessed life has the character which the pessimist alleges of life at large, and therefore regards it as cursed. Annihilation is best, he 'Will argue; since if an average that is indifferent is the out come of the blessed life, annihilation at once achieves it; and if a surplus of suffering is the outcorne of this. highest kind of life called blessed, still more should life in general be ended.

A. possible rejoinder rnust be named and disposed of. While it is admitted that the particular kind of consciousness accompanying conduct that is blessed, is pleasurable; it may be contended that pursuance of this condu.;;t and receipt of the pleasure, brings by the inlplied self-denial, and per sistent effort, and perhaps bodily injury, a suffering that exceeds it in amount. And it may then be .urged that blessedness, characterized by this excess of aggregate pains over aggregate pleasures, sbould nevertheless be pursued as an end, rather than the happiness constituted by excess of pleasures over pains. But now, defensible though this 'conception of blessedness may be when limited to one indi vidual, or S0111e individuals, it becomes indefensible when extended to all individuals; as it must be if blessedness is taken for the end of conduct. To see this we need but ask for what purpose are these pains in excess of pleasures to be borne. Blessedness being the ideal state for all persons; and the self-sacrifices made by each person in pursuance of this ideal state, having for their end to help all other persons in achieving the like ideal state; it rosults that the blessed though painful state of each, is to be acquired by furthering the like blessed though painful states of others: the blessed consciousness is to be constituted by the con..

templation of their consciousnesses in a condition of average 44 THE DATA OF ETHICS. suffering. Does anyone accept this inference? If not, hi~ rejection of it involves the admission that the nlotive fer bearing pains in performing acts called blessed, is not the obtaining for others like pains of blessedness, but the obtain. ing of pleasures fOl~ others; and that thus pleasure somewherA is the tacitly-implied ultimate end. In brief, then, blessedness has for its necessary condition of existence, illcreased happiness, positive or negative, in sonle consciousness or other; and disappears utterly if we assume that the actions called blessed, are known to cause decrease of happiness in others as well as in the actor. § 15. To make clear the meaning of the general argument set forth in this chapter, its snccessive parts must be briefly summarized. That which in the last chapter we found to be highly evolved conduct, is that which, in this chapter, we find to be what is called good conduct; and the ideal goal to the natural evolution of conduct there recognized,' ·we here recognize as the ideal standard of cond uct ethically con..

sidered. The acts adjusted to ends, which 'while constituting the outer visible life from moment to moment further the con tinuance of life, we saw become, as evolution progresses, better adjusted; until finally they make the life of each individual entire in length and breadth, at the sanle time that they efficiently subserve the rearing of young, and do both these not only without hindering other individuals from doing the like, but while giving aid to them in doing t,he like. And here we see that goodness is asserted of such (~onduct under each of these three aspects. Other things equal, well-adjusted self-conserving acts we call good; other things equal, we call good the acts that are well adjusted for bringing up progeny capable of complete living; and other things equal, we ascribe goodness to acts which further the complete living of others.

GOOD ANDBADCONDUC~ 45 This judging as good, conduct· which conduces to life in each and all, we found to involve the assumption that animate existence is desirable. By the pessimist, conduct which subserves life· cannot consistently be called good: to call it good irnplies some form of optimism. W ~ saw, how ever, that pessinlists and optimists both start with tho postulate that life is a blessing or a curse, according as the average. consciousness accompanying it is pleasurable or painful. And since avowed or implied pessimists, and optimists of one or other shade, taken together constitute all men, it results that this postulate is universally accepted. Whence it follows that if we call good the conduct conducive to life, we can do so only with the implication that it is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains. The truth that conduct is considered by us as good or bad, according as its aggregate results, to self or others or both, are pleasurable or painful, we found on examination to be involved in all the current judgments on conduct: the proof being that reversing the applications of the words creates absurdities. And we found. that every other pro posed standard of conduct derives its authority from this standard. Whether perfection of nature is the assigned proper aim, or virtuousness of action, or rectitude of motive, we saw that definition of the perfection, the virtue, the recti tude, inevitably brings us down to happiness experienced in some form, at some time, by some person, as the funda men.tal idea.. Nor could we discover any intelligible con cept.ion of blessedness, save one which implies a raising of consciousness, individual or general, to a happier state j either by mitigating pains or increasing pleasures.

Even with those who judge cf conduct from the religious point of view, rather than from the ethical point of view, it is the same. Men· who seek to propit:ate God by inflicting pains on themselves, or refrain from pleasures to avoid offending him, do so to escape greater ultiluate pains or to get greater ultimate pleasures. If by positive or negative 46 THE DA'rA OF ETHICS. suffering here, they expected to achieve more suffering here after, they 'would not do as they do. That which they now think duty they would not think duty if it promised eternal misery instead of eternal happiness. Nay, if there be any who believe that human beings were created to be unhappy, and that t.hey ought to continue living to display their unhappiness for the satisfaction of their creator, such believers are obliged to use this standard of judgment; for the pleasure of their diabolical god is the elld to bo achieved.

So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name gratification, enjoyrnent, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some tin1e, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable elenlent of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition. * It has been remarked, quite truly, that this is a somewhat inconsistent comparison to be made by me; remembering my partial denial of the doc trine that space is a form of intellectual intuition (see Principles of P.~y('holo[JY, § 399). Contending, as I do, that space is a form of the intuitions yielded by touch and vision only, and is not a form of the intuitions which we know as sounds and odours, I ought to have said that happiness is more truly a form of moral intuition than space is a form of intellectual intuition: being, as we see, a universal form of it. .