IV. Ways of Judging Conduct

CHAPTER IV. WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. § 17. Intellectual progress is by no one trait so ade quately characterized, as by development of the idea of causation; since development of this idea involves develop ment of so luany other ideas. Before any way can be made, thought and language must have advanced far enough to render properties or attributes thinkable as such, apart from. objects; which, in low stages of human intelligence, they are not. Again, even the silnplest notion of cause, as we under stand it, can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped into a simple generalization; and through all ascending steps, higher notions of causation imply wider notions of generality. Further, as there must be clustered in the mind, concrete causes of many kinds before there can emerge the conception or cause, apart from particular causes; it follows that progress in abstractness of thought is implied.

Concomitantls, there is implied the recognition of constant relations among phenomena, generating ideas of uniformity of sequence and of coexistence~the idea of natural law. ~rhese advances can go on only as fast as perceptions and resulting thoughts, are made definite by the use of measureSj serving to £amilarize the mind with exact correspondence, truth, certainty. And only when growing science accumulates examples of quantitative relations, foreseen and verified, t.hroughout Q widening range of phenomena, does causation 5 48 THE DATA OF ETHICS. come to be conceived as necessary and universal. So that though all these cardinal conceptions aid one another in developing, we may properly say that the conception of causation especially depends for its .development on the developn1ents of the rest; and therefore is the best measure of intellectual development at large. How slowly, as a consequence of its dependence, the conception of causation evolves, a glance at the evidence shows. We hear with surprise of the savage who, falling down a precipice, ascribes the failure of his foothold to a malicious demon; and we smile at the kindred notion of the ancient Greek, that his death was prevented by a goddess who nnfastened for him the thong of the helmet by which his enemy was dragging him. But daily, without surprise, we hear men who describe themselves as saved from ship wreck by" divine interposition," who speak of having " providentially" missed a train which met with a fatal disaster, and who call it a " mercy" to have escaped injury from a falling chimney-pot-men who, in such ca~es, recognize physical causation no more tha,n do the uncivilized or semi-civilized. The Veddah who thinks that failure to hit an animal with his arrow, resulted from inadequate invocation of an ancestral spirit, and the Christian priest who says prayers over a sick man in the expectation that the course of his disease will so be stayed., differ only in respect of the agent from whom they expect supernatural aid "and the phenomena to be altered by him: the necessary relations among causes and effects are tacitly ignored by the last as much as by the first. Deficient belief in causation is, indeed, exemplified even in those whose discipline has been specially fitted to generate this belief-even in men of science. For a generation after geologists had become uniformitarians in Geology, they remained catastrophists in Biology: while recognizing none but natural agencies in the genesis of the Earth's crust, they ascribed to supernatural agency the genesis of the organisms on its surface. Nay more-among WAYS-OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 49 thOMwho are convinced that liVing things in genera have been evolved· by the continued interaction of forces everywhere operating, there are some who make an excep tion of man; or who, if they admit that his body has been evolved in the same manner as the bodies of othe.r creatures~ allege that his mind has been not. evolved but specially created. If, then, universal and necess~ry causation is only now approaching full recognition, even by those whose investigations are daily re-illustrating it, we may expect to find it very little recognized among men at .large, whose culture has not been calculated to impress them with it; and we may expect to find it least recognized by them in respect of those classes of phenomena amid which, in consequence of their complexity, causation is most difficult to trace-the psychical, the social, the moral.

Why do I here make these reflections on what seems an irrelevant subject? I do it because on studying the various ethical theories, I am struck with the fact that they· are all characterized either by entire absence of the idea of causation, or by inadequate presence of it. Whether theological, political, intuitional, or utilitarian, they all display, if not in the same degree, still, each in a large degree, the defects which result from this lack. We will consider them in the order named. § 18. The school Df morals properly to be considered as the. still-extant representative of the most ancient school, is that which recognizes no other rule of conduct than the . alleged vvill of God. It originates with the 'Savage whose only restraint beyond fear of his fellow man, is fear of an ancestral spirit; and whose notion of moral duty as dis tinguished from his notion of social prudence, :trises from this fear. Here the ethical doctrine and the religious doctrine are identical-have in no degree diffei·entiated.

This primitive form of ethical doctrine, changed only by the gradual dying out multitudinous minor supernatural 50 THE DATA OF ETHICS. agents and acconlpanying development of one universal supernatural agent, survives in great strength down to ourown day. Religion::;creeds, established and dissenting, all embody / the belief that right and wrong are right and wrong simply in virtue of divine enactment. ADd this tacit assumption has passed from systems of theology into systems of morality; or rather, let us say that moral systenls in early stages of developnlent, little Cliffel'entiated from the accompanying theological Rystems, have participated in this assnmption. We see this in the ,yorks of the Stoics, as well as in the works of certain Christian moralists. Anlong recent ones I may instance the Essays on the P1 0 inciples of },tloyality, by Jonathan Dymond, a Quaker, which makes "the authority of the Deity the sole ground of duty, and His conlmunicated will the only ultimate standard. of right and wrong." Nor is it by writers belonging to so relatively unphilosophical a sect only, that this view is held; it is held with a difference by writers belonging to sects contrariwise distinguished.

For these assert that in the absence of belief in a deity, there wonldbe no 1110ral guidance; and this amounts to asserting that moral truths have no other origin than the will of God, which, if not considered as revealed in sacred writings, must be considered as revealed in conscience. This assumption when examined, proves to be suicidal. If there are no other origins for right and wrong than this enunciated or intuited divine will, then, as alleged, were there no knowledge of the divine will, the acts now known as wrong would not be known as wrong. But if 111en did not know such acts to be wrong because contrary to the divine will, and so, in comnlitting them, did not offend by disobe dience; and if they could not otherwise know them to be wrong; then they might commit them indifferently with the nets now classed as right: the results, pra,ctically considered, would be the saUle. In so far as secular lllatters are concerned, there would be no difference between the two; for to say that in the affairs of life, any evils would arise WAYS o.F JUDGING CONDUCT. 61 from continuing to do the acts called wrong and ceasing to do the acts called right, is to say that these produce in themselves certain mischievous consequences and certain beneficial consequences; which is to say there is anotller scnrce for moral rules than the revealed or inferred divine will: they may be established by induction from thesf\ observed consequences.

From this implication I see no escape. It must be either admitted or denied that the acts called good and the acts called bad, naturally conduce, the one to human well-being and the other to human ill-being. Is it admitted? Th~n the admission alTIOuntsto an assertion that the conduciveness is shown by experience; and this involves abandonment of the doctrine that there is no· origin for morals apart from divine injunctions. Is it denied, that acts classed as good and bad differ in their effects? Then it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs would go op just as wen in ignorance of the distinction; and the alleged need for commandments from God disappears. And here we see how entirely wanting is the conception of cause. This notion that such al1d such actions are made respectively good and bad simply by divine injunction, is tantamount 'to the notion that such and such actions have not in the nature of things such and such kinds of effects.

If there is not an unconsciousness of causation there is an ignoring of it. § 19. Following Plato and Aristotle, who make State enactments the sources of right and wrong; and following lIobbes, who holds that there can be neither justice nor injustice till a regularly-constituted coercive power exists to issue and enforce commands; not a few modern t.hinkers hold that there is no other orjgjn for good and bad in conduct than law. And this implies the belief that moral obligation ol'iginates with Acts of Parliament, and can be changed this way or that way by majorities. They ridicule 52 THE DATA OF ETHICS. the idea. that men have any natural rights, and allege tb;:tt rights are wholly results of convention: the necessary implication being that duties are so too. Before considering ·whether this theory coheres with outside truths, let us observe how far it is coherent within itself. In pursuance of his argument that rights and duties (Tiginate with established social arrangements, llobbes says" \Vhere no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and eyery man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust.

But when a covenant is made, then to break it is 'LfJnjust; and the definition of INJUS'l.'IOE, is no other than the not perfo/rrnanceof covenant. And whatsoever is not unju-,t, is just . •••Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the .peItormance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater th An the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant."* In this paragraph the essential propositions are :-justice is fulfilment of covenant; fulfiln1ent of covenant implies a power enforcing it: "just and unjust can have no place" unless men are compelled to perform their covenants. But this is to sa.y that nlen cannot perforrn their covenants without conlpulsion. Grant that justice is perforn1ance of covenant. Now suppose it to be performed voluntarily: there is justice. In such case, however, there is justice in the absence of coercion; which is contrary to the hypothesis .. rrhe only con..

ceivable rejoinder is an absurd one :-voluntary perform .. ance of covenant is impossible. Assert this, and the doctrine that right and wrong come into existence with the establish .. ment of sovereignty is defensible. Decline to assert it, and the doctrjne vanishes. From inner incongruities pass now to outer ones. 'rhe justification for his doctrine of absolute civil authority as the source of rules of conduct, Hobbes seeks in the miserio8 entailed by the chronic war between man and nlan which must exist in the absence or society; holding that under any k.ind of govel'nment a better .life is possible than in the state of * LeViathan. ch. xv.

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 53 nature. Now whether we accept the gratuitous and baseless theory that men surrendered their liberties to a sovereign power of some kind, with a view to' the pronlised increase of satisfactions; or whether we accept the rational theory, inductively based, that a state of political subordination gradually became established through experience. of the increased satisfactions derived under it; it equally rernains· obvious that the acts of the sovereign power have no other warrant than their subservience to the purpose for' which it canle into existence. The necessities which initiate government, thernselves prescribe the actions of govern ment. If its a~tions do not respond to the necessities, they are unwarranted. 'rhe authority of law is, then, by the hypothesis, derived; altd can never transcend the authority of that fronl which it is derived. If general good, or welfare, or utility, is the supreUle end; and if State-enact ments are justified as means to this supreme' end; then, State-enactnlents have such authority only as arises' from conduciveness to this supreme end. When they are right, it is only because the original authority endorses them; and they are wrong if they do not bear its endorsernent.

That is to say, conduct cannot be made good or bad 'by law; but its goodness or badness is to the last determined by its effects as naturally furthering, or not furthering, the liveEt of citizens. Still more when considered in the concrete, than when considered in the abstract, do the views of Hobbes and his disciples prove to be inconsistent. J aining i1\ the general belief that without such security for life as enables men to go fearlessly about their business, the,.~e can be neither happiness nor prosperity, individual or general, they agree that measures for preventing murder, Inan:31aughber,assault, &c., are requisite; and they advocate this or that penal system as furnishing the best deterrents: so arguing, both in respect of the evils and the rem.edies" that s~ch and such causes will, by the nature of things, produce such and such 54 THM DATA OF ET HIU~. effects. They recognize as inferable aP1'iOTi, the truth that nlen will not lay by property unless they can count with great probability on reaping advantages from it; that consoquently where robbery is unchecked, or where {\ rapacious ruler appropriates whatever earnings his subjects do not effectually hide, production will scarcely exceed iwmediate consumption; and that necessarily there will ·be none of that accumulation of capital required for social development, with all its aids to welfare. In neither ~as~, however, do they perceive that they are tacityassert in!!. the need for certain restraints on conduct as deducible from the necessary conditions to complete life in the social sta.te; and are so making the authority of law derivative and. not original.

If it be said by any belonging to this school, that certain moral obligations to be distinguished as cardinal, must be a.dmitted to have a basis deeper than legislation, and that it is for legislation not to c)'eate bub merely to enforce them if, I say, admitting this, they go on to allege a legislative origin for minor claims and duties; then we have the implication that whereas sonle kinds. of conduct do, in the n~,ture of things, tend to work out certain kinds of results, other kinds ot conduct do not, in the nature ot things, tend to work out certain kinds of results. While of these acts tbe naturally good or bad consequences must be allowed, it m}},y be denied of those ltcts that they have naturally good or bad consequences. Only after asserting this can it be consistently asserted that acts of the last class are made right or wrong by law. For if such acts have any intrinsic tendencies to produce beneficial or mischievous effects, then these intrinsic tendencies furnish the warrant tor legislative requirements or interdicts; and to E'ay that the requirements or interdicts make them right or wrong, is to say that they have no intrinsic tendencies to produce beneficial or IDlschievou3 effects.

Here, then, we have another theory betraying deficient WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 55 consciousness of causation. An adequate consciousness of causation yields the irresistible belief that fronl the most serious to the most trivial actions of men in society, there must flow consequences which, quite apart fronl legal agency, conduce to well-being or ill-being in greater or smaUer degrees. If tnurders are socially injurious whether forbidden by law or not-if one man's appropriation of another's gains by force, brings special and general evils, whether it is or is not contrary to a ruler's edicts-if non fulfilment of contract, if cheating, if adulteration, work mis chiefs on a community in proportion as they are common, quite irrespective of prohibitions; then, is it· not manifest that the like holds throughout all the details of men's behaviour? Is it not clear that when legislation insists on certain acts which have naturally beneficial effects, and forbids others that have naturally injurious effects, the acts are not made good or bad by legislation; but the legislation derives its authority from the natural effects of the acts? Non-recogni tion of this implies non-recognition of natural causation.

§ 20. Nor is it otherwise with the pure intuitionists, who hold that moral perceptions are innate in the original sense-thinkers whose view is that men have been divinely endowed with moral faculties; not that these have re sulted from inherited· modifications caused by accumulated experiences. To affirm that we know some things to be right and other things to be wrong, by virtue of a supernaturally given conscience; and thus tacitly to affirm that we de not otherwise know right fr~)ll1 wrong; is tacitly to deny anJ natural I elations between acts and results. For if there , exist any such relations, then we may ascertain by induction, or deduction, or both, what these are. And if it be admitted that because or such natural relations, happiness is produced by this kind of conduct, which is therefore to be approved, while misery is produced by that kind of conduct" which is 56 THE DATA. OF ETHICS.

therefore to be condelnned j then it is admitted that the rightness or wrongness of actions are determinable, and must finally be determined, by the goodness or badness or the effects that flow from them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. It may, indeed, be rejoined that effects are deliberatel,f ignored by tihis school; vvhichteaches that courses recognized by moral intuition as right, must be pursued without regard to consequences. "But on inquiry it turns out that the conse quences to be disregarded are particular consequences, and not general consequences. When, for example, it is said that property lost by another ought to be restored irrespec tive of evil to the finder, who possibly may, by restoring it, lose that which would have preserved hinl from starvation, it is meant that in pursuance of the principle, the immediate and special consequences must be "disregarded, not the diffused and remote consequences. By which we are shown that though the theory forbids overt recognition of causa1jion, there is an unavowed recognition of it.

And this in1plies the trait to which I am drawing attention. rrhe conception of natural causation is so imperfectly developed, that there is only an indistinct consciousness that throughout the whole of hl1nlan conduct, necessary relations of causes and effects prevail; and that from them are ultimately derived all moral rules, however much these may be proximately derived from moral intuitions. § 21. Strange to say, even the utilitarian school, which, at first sight, appears to be distinguished from the rest by recognizing natural causation, is, if not so far from complet~ recognition of it, yet very far. Conduct, according to its theory, is to be estimated by observation of results. When, in sufficiently numerous cases,. it has been found that behaviour of this kind works evil while behaviour of that kind works good, these kinds 0f behaviour are to be judged as wrong and right respectively.

'WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 57 Now though it seems that the origin of moral rules in natural causes, is thus asserted by implication, it is but partially assorted. The implication is simply that we are to ascertain by induction that such and such mischiefs or benefits do go along with such and such acts; and are then to infer that the like relations will hold in future. But acceptance of these generalizations and the inferences from them, does not amount to recognition of causation in the full sense or the word o So long as only Borne relation between cause and effect in conduct is recognized, and not the relation, a complet0ly-scientific form of knowledge has not been reached. At present, utilitarians pay no· attention to this distinction. Even when it i3 pointed out, they· disregard the fact that empirical utilitarianism is but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to rational utilitarianism.

In a letter to 1\11'. Mill, written some sixteen years ago, repudiating the title anti-utilitarian which he had applied to me (a letter subsequently published in Mr. Bain's work on Jj[entctland JYloral Science), I endeavoured to make· clear tho difference above indicated; and I must here· quote certain passages from that letter. The view for which I contend is, that Morality properly so-called-the science of right conduct-has for its object to determine how and 'U.,hy certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain others modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessar{ consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the 'business of Moral Science to deduce, fi'om the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Ha"ing done this, its deductions are to be recogmzed ao Jaws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation Qf happiness or misery.

l~el'haps an analogy will most clearly 8how my meaning. During its emly stages, planetary Astronomy consisted .of nothing more than accum ulat~d observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and planets; from which accumulated observations it came by and by to be empirically predic~ed, with an approach to truth, that certain of the heavenly bodie~ wouid have certain positions. at certain times. But the modern science of planetary Astronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation-deductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain times. Now, the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient and 58 THE DATA OF ETHICS. modem Astronomy, is analogous to the kind of relation which, I conreive, exists between the Expendiency-Morality and Moral Science properly so called. And the objection which I have to the current Utilitarianism is, that it recognizes no more developed form of Morality-does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of Moral Science.

Doubtless if utIlitarians are asked. whethe it can be by nlere chance that this kind of action works evil and that works good, they will answer-No: they will adnlit that such sequences are parts of a necessary order among phenomena. But though this truth is beyond question; and though if there are causal relations between acts and their results, rules of conduct can become scientific only when they are deduced from these causal relations; there continues to be entire satisfaction with that form of utilitarianism in which these causal relations are practically ignored. It is supposed that in future, as now, utility is to be determined only by ob.servation of results; and that there is no possibility of knowing by deduction from fundamental principle~, what conduct fjnu~t be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial. § 22. To make more specific that conception of ethical science here indicll,ted, let me present it under a concrete aspect; beginning with a simple illustration and compli cating this illustration by successive steps.

If, by tying its main artery, we stop m.ost of the blood going to a limb} then, for as long as the limb perfornls its function, those parts which are called into play must be wasted faster than they are repaired: whence eventual disablement. The relation between due receipt of nutritiv~ lnatters through its arteries, and due discharge of its duHoe bjl' the limb, is a part of the physical order. If, instead of cutting off the supply to a particular limb, w~ bleed the p~tient largely, so drafting away the materials needed for repairing not one limb but all limbs, and not limbs only but viscera, there results both a muscular debility and an' enfeeblement of the vital functions. Here, again, cause and WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 59 'effect are necessarily related. The lllischief th~t results from great depletion, results apart trom any divine' command, or political enactment, or ill.oral intuition. Now advance a step.