XV. Absolute and Relative Ethics

OIIAPTER xv. AllSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. § 99. A3 applied to Ethics, the word "absolute" will by nlany be supposed to imply principles of right conduct that exist out of relation to life as conditioned on the Earth-out of relation to time and place, and independent of the Universe as now visible to us_a eternal" principles as they are called. Those, however, who recall the doctrine set forth in First Prinm'ples, will hesitate to put this interpre .. tation on the word. Right, as we can think it, necessitates the thought of not-right, or wrong, for its correlative; and hence, to ascribe rightness to the acts of the Power manifested through phenomena, is to assume the possibility that wrong acts may be committed by this Power. But how come there to exist, apart from this Power, conditions of such kind that subordination of its acts to them makes them right and insubordination wrong.. How can Uncon ditioned Being be subject to co~ditions beyond itself?

If, £01" example, anyone should assert that the Cause of T.hings, conceived in respect of fundamental moral attributes us like ourselves, did right in producing a Universe which, in the course of immeasurable time, has given origin to beings capable of pleasure, and would have done wrong in abstaining from the production of such a Universe; then, the. comment to be made is that, imposing the moral idea~ ABSOLUTE AND RELA'fIVE ETHICS. 259 generated in his finite consciousness, upon the Infinite Existence which transcends consciousness, he goes behind that Infinite Existence and prescribes for it principles of action. As implied in foregoing chapters, right and wrong as conceived by us can exist only in relation to the action& of creatures capable of pleasures and pains; seeing that analysis carries us back to pleasures and pains as the elements out of which the conceptions are framed. But if the word "absolute," as used above, does not rofer to the Unconditioned Being -if the principles of action distinguished as absolute and relative concern tl~ conduct of conditioned beings; in what way are the words to be understood? An explanation of their rneanings will be best conveyed by a criticism on the current conceptions of right and wrong.

§ 100. Conversations about the affairs of life habitually huply the belief that every deed named may be placed under the one head or the other. In discussing a political question, both sides take it for granted that some line of action may be chosen which is right, while all other lines of action are wrong. So, too, is it with judgments on the doings of individuals: each of these is approved 01' disap proved on the assumption that it is definitely classable as good or bad. Even where qualifications are admitted, they are admitted with an implied idea that some such positive characterization is to be made. Nor is it in popular thought and speech only that we see this. If not wholly and definitely yet partially and by implication, the belief is expressed by moralists. In his Methods of Ethics (1st Ed. p. 6.) Mr. Sidgwick says : " That there is in any given circumstances some. one thing which ought to be done and that this can be known, is a fundamental assumption, made not by philosophers only, but by all men who perform any processes of moral reason260 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ing.'.'* In this sentence there is specifically asserted only the last of the above propositions; namely, that, in every case, what U ought to be done" "can be known." Bllt though that "which ought to be done" is not distinctly identified with "the right," it !llay be inferred, in the absence of any indication to t.he contrary, that Mr. Sidgwick regards the two as identical; and doubtless, in so conceiving the postulates of nloral science, he is at one with most, if not all, who have nlade it a subject of study. At first sight, indeed, nothing seems more obvious than that if actions are to be judged at all, these postulates must be accepted. N~vertheless they may both be caned ~n question, and I think it rrlay be shown that neither of them is tenable. Instead of admitting that there is in every case a right and a wrong, it may be contended that in multitudinous c&ses no right, properly so-called, can be alleged, but only a least wrong; and further, it may be contended that in many of these cases where there can be alleged only a least wrong, it is not possible to ascertain with any precision which is the least wrong.

A great part of the perplexities in ethical speculation arise from neglect of this distinction between :right and least wrong-between the absolutely right and the relatively right. And many further perplexities are due to the assumption that it can, in SOlne way, be decided in every case which of two courses is morally obligatory. § 101. The law of abi:;oluteright can take no cognizance of pain, save the cognizance implied by negation. Pain is the correlative of some species of wrong-some kind of diver .. gence from that course of action whicb perfectly fulfils all requirements. If, as was shown in an early chapter, the * I do not find this passage in the second edition; but the omission of it appears to have arisen not from any change of view, but because it did not naturally come into the re-cast form of the argument which the section contains.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 26] conception of good conduct always proves, when analyzed, to be the conception of a conduct which produces a surplus of pleasure somewhere; while, conversely, the conduct concoived as bad proves always to be that which inflicts somewhere a surplus of either positive or negative pain; then the absolutely good, the absolutely right, in conduct, can be that only ,vhich produces pure pleasure-pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere. By inlplication, conduct which has any concomitant of pain, or any painful conse· quence, is partially wrong; and the highest clailn to be nlade for such conduct is, that it is the least wrong which, under the conditions, is possible-the relatively rig-ht. The contents of preceding chapters irnply throughout that, considered fronl the evolution point of view, the acts of men during the transition which has been, is still, and long will be, in progress, must, in nlost cases, be of the kind here classed as least wrong. In proportion to the incongruity between the natures men inherit from the pre-social state, and the requirements of social life, must be the amount of pain entailed by their actions, either on themselves or on others. In so far as pain is suffered, evil is inflicted.; and conduct which inflicts any evil cannot be absolutely good.

1'0 make clear the distinction here inslsted upon between that perfect conduct which is the subject-matter of Absolute Ethics, and that imperfect conduct which is the subject matter of Relative Ethics, some illustrations must be given. § 102. Among the best examples of absoltltely right actions to be named, are those arising where the nature and the req lJirements -have been moulded to one another before social evolution began. Two will here suffice. Consider the relation of a healthy mother to a healthy infant. Between the two there exists a mutual dependence which is a source of pleasure to both. In yielding its natural ftDod to the child" the mother receives gratifioation; and to 262 THE DATA OF ETHICS. the child there comes the satisfaction of appetite-a satis .. fa,ction which ~ccompanies furtherance of life, growth, and in creasing enjoyment. Let the relation be suspended, and on both sides there is suffering.. The mother experiences both bodily pain and mental pain; and the painful sensatiol1 borne by the child, brings as its results physical mischief and I::iome damage to the emotional nature. Thus the act is one that, is to both exclusively pleasurable, while abstention entails pain on both; and it is consequently of the kind we here call absolutely right. In the parental relations of the father we are furnished with a kindred example. If he is well constituted in body and mind, his boy, eager for play, finds in him a sympathetic response; and their frolics, giving mutual pleasure, not only further the child's physical welfare but strengthen that bond of good £eelipg between the two which makes subsequent guidance easier. And then if, repudiating the stupidities of early education as at present conceived and unhappily State-enacted, he has rational ideas of mental developmen t, and sees that the second-hand knowledge gained through books should begin to supplement the first-hand knowledge gained by direct observation, only when a good stock of this has been acquired, he will, with active synlpathy, aid in that exploration of the surrounding world which his boy pursues with delight; giving and receiving gratification from Illonlent to Inoment while furthering ultimate welfare.

Here, again, are actions of a kind purely pleasurable alike in their immediate and remote effects-actions absolutely right. '£he intercourse of adults yields, for the reason assigneJ, relatively few cases that fall cotnpletely within tbe same category. In their transactions from hour to hour, more or less of deduction from pure gratification is caused on one or other side by imperfect :fitness to the requirements. The pleasures men gain by labouring in tqeir vocations and receiving in one form or other returns for their services, ABSOLUTE A.ND RELATIVE E1.'HICS. 263 usuallY-have the drawback that the labours are in a con.. siderable degree displeasurable. Cases, how3ver, do OCCUlt where the energies are so abundant that inaction is irksolue; and where the daily work, not too great in· duration, is of a kind appropriate to the nature; and where, HS a consequenco, pleasure rather than pain is a concomitant. VVhen services yielded by such a one are paid for by another similarly adapted to his occupation, the entire transaction is of the kindw8 are here considering: exchange under agreement between two so constituted, becomes a means of pleasure to both, with no set-off of pain. Bearing in Inind the form of nature which social discipline is producing, as shown in the contrast between savage and civilized, the ilTIplication is that ultimately men's activities at large will assume this character.

Remembering that in the course of organic evolution, the means to enjoyment themselves eventually become sources of enjoyment; and that there is no form of action which may not through the development of appropriate structures become pleasurable; the inference must be that industrial activities carried on through voluntary cooperation, will in time acquire the character of absolute rightness as here conceived. Already, indeed, something like such a state has been reached among certain of those who minister to our resthetic gratifications. The artist of genius-poet, painter, or nlusician-is one who obtains the Ineans of living by acts that are directly pleasurable to him, while they yield, . immediately or 'remotely, pleasures to others. Once more" among absolutely right acts may be named certain of those which we class as benevolent. I say certain of them, because such benevolent acts as entail submission to pain, > positive or negative j that others nlay receive pleasuee, are, by the definition, excluded. But there are benevolent acts' of a kind yielding pleasure solely. Some one who has slipped is saved from falling .by a bystander: a hurt is prevented and satisfaction is felt by both. .A. pedestrian is choosing a dangerous route} or a fellow-passenger ia 264 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

about to alight at the wrong station, and, warned against duing so, is saved from evil: each being, as a consequence, gratified. There is a misunderstanding between friends, and one who sees how it has arisen, explains: the result being agreeable to all. Services to those around in the small affairs of lifo, ll.lay be, and often are, of a kind which there is equal pleasure in giving and receiving. Indeed, RA was urged in the last chapter, the actions of developed altruism n1ust habitually have this character. And so, in countless ways sugge~ted by these few, men may add to one anothers happiness without anywhere producing un happiness-ways which are therefore absolutely right. In contrast with these consider the many actions which from hour to hour are gone through, now with an accompani ment of some pain to the actor and no\v bringing results that are partially painful to others, but which nevertheless are inlperative. As inlplied by antithesis with cases above referred to, the wearisollleness of productive labour as ordinarily pursued, renders it in so far wrong; but then far greater suffering would result, both to the labourer and his family, and therefore far greater wrong woq.ld be done, were this wearisomeness not borne. Though the pains which the care of many children entail on a mother, for,m a considerable set-off from the pleasures secured by them to her children and herself; yet the rniseries, immediate and remote, which neglect would ell~ail so far exceed them, that submission to such pains up to the linlit of physical' ability to bear them, becomes morally imperative as being the least wrong. A. servant who fails to fulfil an agreement in respect of work, or who is perpetually breaking crockery, or who pilfers, may have to suffer pain from being discharged; but since the evils to be borne by all concerned if incapacity or misconduct is tolerated, not in one case only but habitually, must be much greater, such infliction of pain is warranted as a means to preventing' greater pain. Withdrawal of custom from a tradesman whose charges are too high, or ABSOLU']'E AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 265 V?ho~ecommodities are inferior, or who gives short Ill,eas.ure, or who is unpunctual, decreases his welfare, arid perhaps injures his belongings; but as saving him from these evils would imply bearing the evils his conduct causes, and as such regard for his well-being would inlply disregard of the woll-being of some more worthy or more efficient tradesman to whom. the castom would else go, and as, chiefly, general adoption of the implied course, having the effect that the inferior would· not suffer from their· inferiority nor the superior gain by their superiority, would produce universal misery, withdrawal is jU3tified-the act is relatively right.

§ 103. I pass now to the second of the two propositions above enunciated. After recognizing the truth that a large part of hunlan conduct is not absolutely right, but only relatively right, we have to recognize the further truth that in many cases where there is no absolutely right course, but only courses that are more or less wrong, it is not possible to say which is the least wrong. Recurrence to the inttances just given will show this. There is a point up to which it is relatively right for a parent to carry self-sacrifice for the benefit of offspring; and there is a point be~rond which self-sacrifice cannot be pushed without bringing, not only on himself or herself but also on the family, evils greater than those to be prevented by the self-sacrifice. Who sllaH say where this point is? Depending on the ccnstitutions and needs of' those con cerned, it is in no two cases the same, and cannot be by anyone more than guessed. '1'he transgressions or short comings of a servant vary from the trivial to the grave, and the evils which discharge may bring range through countless degrees from slight to serious. The penalty may be in flicted for a very small offence, and then there is wrong done; or after numerous grave offences it may not be inflicted, and again there is wrong doue. How shall be determined the degree of transgression beyond which to 266 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

discharge is less wrong than not to discharge? In like manner with the ~hopkeeper's misdemeanours. No one can sum up either the amount of positive and negative pain which tolerating them involves, nor the amount of positive and negative pain involved by not tolerating them; and in medium cases no one can say where the one exceeds tho other. In men's wider relations frequently occur circumstances under which a decision one or other way is imperative, and yet under which not even the most sensitive conscience helped by the clearest judgment, can decide which of the alternatives is relatively right. Two examples will suffice. Here is a merchant who loses by the failure of a man indebted to him. Unless he gets help he himself will fail; and if he fails he will bring disaster not only on his family but on all who have given him credit. Even if by borrowing he is enabled to meet immediate engagements, he is not s'afe; for the time is one of panic, and others of his debtors by going to the wall may put him in further difficulties. Shall he ask a friend for a loan? On the one hand, is it not wrong forthwith to bring on hin1self, his family, and those who have business relations with him, the evils of his failure? On the other hand, is it not wrong to hopothecate the property of his friend, and lead him too, with his belongings and dependents, into similar risks?

The loan would probably tide hilll over his difficulty; in which case would it not be unjust to his creditors did he refrain from asking it? Contrariwise, the loan would verY' possibly fail to stave off his bankruptcy; in which case i~ not his action in trying to obtain it, practically fraudulent? rl:'llough in extreme cases it may be easy to say which coursa is the least wrong, how is it possible in all those medium caRes where even by the keenest man of business the COll tingencies cannot be calculated? Take, again, the difficulties that not un£requently arise from antagonism between family duties and social duties. Here is a tenant ABSOLUTE A~D RELATIVE ETHICS. 267 farmer whose political principles prompt him to vote in opposition to 'his landlord. If, being a Liberal, he votes for a .Conservative, not only does he by his act say that he thinks what he dOBS not thillk, but he may perhaps assist what he regards as bad legislation: his \rate may by chan.ce turn the election, and on a Parliamentary division asinglH membel' may decide the fate of a measure. Even neglecting, as too improbable, such serious consequences, there is the manifest truth that if all who hold like views with himself, are sin1ilarlJ deterred from electoral expression of them, tlJere must result a different balance of power and a different national policy: making it clear that only by adherence of all to their political principles, can the policy he thinks right be maintained. But now, on the other hand, how can he absol ve himself from responsibility· for the evils which those depending on him may suffer if he fulfils what appears to be a peremptory public duty? Is not his duty to his children even Inore peremptory? Does not the family precede the State j and does not the welfare of the State depend on the welfare of the family? May he, then, take a course which, if the threats uttered are carried out, will eject hirn from his farm; and so cause inability, perhaps temporary perhaps prolopged, to feed his children. rrhe continge.nt evils are infinitely varied in their ratios. In one case the imperativeness of the public duty is great and the evil tlh~t may come on dependents small; in another case the political issue is of trivial moment and the possible injury which tho family may suffer is great; and between these extremes there are all gradativns. Further, the degrees of probability of each result, public and private, range from the nearly certain to the almost impossible. Admitting, then, that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the State; and admit ting that it is wrong to act :in a way likely to injure the family; we have to recognize the fact that in countless cases no one can decide by which of the alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be done.

268 THE DATA OF ETHICS. These instances will sufficiently show that in conduct at large, including men's dealings with themselves, with their families, with their friends, with their debtors and creditors, and with the public, it usually happens that whatever course is taken entails some pain somewhere; forn1ing a deduction from the pleasure achieved, and making the course in so far not absolutely right. Further, they will show that throughout a considerable part of conduct, no guiding principle, no method of estimation, enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right; as causing, proximately and remotely, specially and generally, the great~st surplus of good over evil. ~ 104. And now we are prepared for dealing in 8 syste matic way with the distinction between Absolute Ethics and· Relative Ethics. Scientific truths, of whatever ol'der, are reached by eliminating perturbing or conflicting factors, and recog.

nizing only fundamental factors. When, by dealing with fundamental factors in the abstract, not as presented in actual phenomena but as presented in ideal sE'paration, general laws have been ascertained, it beco1nes possible to draw inferences in concrete cases by taking into account incidental factors. But it is only by first ignoring these and recognizing the essential elements alone. that we can discover the essential truths sought. Take, ~n illustration, the progress of mechanics from its empirical form tu its rational form. All have occasional experience of the fact that a person pushed on one side beyond a certain degree, loses his balance and falls. It is o~served that a stone flung or an arrow shot, does not proceed in a straight line, but comes to the earth after pursuing a course which deviates more and more from its original course. When trying to break a stick across the knee, it is found that success is easier if the stick is seized at considerable distances from ABSOLUTE AND RELATiVE ETHICS. 269 the knee on each side than if seized close to the knee.

Daily use of a spear draws attention to the truth that by thrusting its point under a stone and depressing the shaft, the stone may be raised the more readily the further away the hand is towards the end. Here, then, are sundry expe riences, -eventually grouped into empirical generalizations, which serve to guide conduct in certain simple cases. How does mechanical science evolve from these experiences? To reach a forlnula expressing the powers of· the lever, it supposes a lever which does not, like the stick, admit of being bent, but is absolutely rigid; and it supposes a fulcrum not having a broad surface, like that of one ordinarily used, but a fulcrum without breath; and it supposes that the weight to be raised bear.s on a definite point, instead of bearing over a considerable portion of the lever. Sirnilarly with the leaning body, which, passing a c81~tain inclination, overbalances. Before the truth respecting the relations of centre of gravity and base can be forrnulated, it must be assumed that the surface on which the body stands is un yielding; that the edge of the body itself is .unyielding; and that its nlass, while made to lean more and more, does not change its form-conditions not fulfilled in the cases commonly observed. And so, too, is it with the projectile: determina.tion of its course by deduction from mechanical laws, prirnarily ignores all deviations caused by its Rhape and· by the resistance of the air. The science of rational mechanics is a science which consists of such ideal truths, and can conle into existence only by thus dealing with ideal cases. It remains impossible so long as attention is restricted to con~rete cases presenting all the complications offriction, plasticity, and so forth. But now, after disen tangling certain fundamen'tal mechanical truths, it becomes possible by their help to guide actions better; and it becomes possible to guide them still better when, as presentiy h~ppens, the complicating elements from which they have been disen ta,ngled are themselves taken into accountf At t111 270 THE DATA OF "ETHICS.

advanced stage, the modifying effects of friction are allowed for, and the inferences are qualified to the requisite extent. The theory of the pulley is corrected in its application to actual cases by recognizing the rigidity of cordage; the e:ffects of which are forlTIulated. The stabilities of masses, determinable in the abstract by reference to the centres of gravity of the masses in relation to the bases, come to be determined in the concrete by including altlo their characters in respect of cohesion. rrhe courses of projectiles having been theoretically settled as though they moved through a vaCUUU1, are afterwards settled in more exact correspon dence with fact by taking into account atnl0spheric resistance. .And thus we see illustrated the relation between certain abRolute truths of mechanical science, and certain relative truths which involve them. Weare shown that no scientific establishment of relative truths js possible, until the absolute truths have been formu lated independently. We see that mechanical science fitted for dealing with the real, can arise only after ideal Inechanical science has arisen.

All this holds of moral science. As by early and rude experiences there were inductively reached, vague but par tially-true notions respecting the overbalancing of bodies, th~ motions of missiles, the actions of levers; so by early and rude experiences there were inductively reached, vague but par tially-true notions respecting the effects of men's behaviour on themselves, on one another, and on society: to a cortain extent serving in the last case, as in the first, for the gnidancl' of conduct. Moreover, as this rudimentary mechanical knowledge, though still ren1aining empirical, becomes during early stages of civilization at once more definite and more extensive; RO during early stages of civilization these ethical ideas, still retaining their empirical character, increase in precision and multiplicity. But just as we have seen that mechanical knowledge of the empirical sort can evolve into mechanical science, only by first omitting all qua]ifyin~ ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 271 circumstances, and generalizing in absolute ways the funda..

mental laws of forces; so here we have to see that empiri cal ethics can evolve into rational ethics only by first lleglecting all complicating incidents, and formulating the laws of right action apart from the obscuring effects of special conditions. And the final implication is that just 68 the system of mechanical truths, conceived in ideal separation as absolute, becomes applicable to real mechanical problems in such way that making allowance for all inci dental circumstances there can be reached conclusions far nearer to the truth than cou~d 0therwise be reached; so, a system of ideal ethical truths, expressing the absolutely right, will be applicable to the questions of our transitional state in such ways that, allowing for the friction of an incolTIplete life and the imperfection of existing natures, we may ascertain with approximate correctness what is the relatively right. § 105. In a chapter entitled it Definition of Morality" in Social Staties, I contended that the moral law, properly so called, is the law of the perfect man-is the fOJ'mula of ideal conductis the statement in all cases of that which should be, and cannot recognize in its propositions any elementR implying existence of that which should not be. Instancing questions concerning the right courFe to be taken in cases where wrong has already been done, I alleged that the answers to such questions cannot be given "on purely ethical principles." I argued that"No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as Jepend upon truths .that are themselves absolute. Before there can be exactness in an inference, there must lo-e exactness in the antecedent propositions. A geo metrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight; and that his circles, :md ellipses, and parabolas shall agree with precise definitions-shall perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations.

1£ you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of the straight man. He determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself; show. 19 ~72 THE DATA OF ETHICS. :n what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows how a communH1 of straight men is constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a crookedman forms one of the elements is insoluble by him." Referring to .thisyiew, specifically in tbe first edition of the Methods of Ethics but more generally in th~ second edition, Mr. Sidgwick says :"Those who take this view adduce the analogy of Geometry to show that Ethics ought to deal· with ideally perfect human relations, ju"t as GeChnetry treats of ideally perfect lines and circles. But the most irregular line has definite spatial relations with which Geometry does not refuse to deal: though of course they are more complex than those of a straight line. So in Astronomy, it would be more convenient for purposes of stuuy if the &tars moved in circles, as was once believed: but the fact that they move not in circles but in ellipses, and even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses, does nt>-t take them out of the sphere of scientific investigation: by patience and industry we· have learnt how to reduce to principles and calculate even these more complicated motions. It is, no doubt, a convenient artifice for purposes of instruction to assume that the planets move in perfect ellipses (or even-;:-at an earlier stage of studyin circles) : we thus allow the individual's knowledge to pass through the same gradations in accuracy as that of the race has done.

But what we want, as astronomers, to know is the actual motion of the stars and its causes: and similarly as moralists we naturally inquire what ought to be done in the actual world in which we live." P. 19, Sec. Ed. Beginning with the first of these two staternents, which concerns Geometry, I must confess myself surprised to find my propositions called in question; and after fun con .. sideration I remain at a loss to understand Mr. Sidgwick's mode of viewing the matter. When, in a sentence pre ceding those quoted above, I remarked on the impus8ibility of solving" mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked lines and broken-backed curves," it never occurred to me that I should be met by the direct assertion tha t "Geometry does not refuse to deal" with "the· most irregular line." Mr. Sidgwick states that an irregular line, say such as a child makes in scribbling, has "definite spatial relations." What meaning dpes he .here give to the word "definite." If he means that its relations to space at large are definite in the sense that by an infinite intelligence they would be definable; the reply ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS .. 273 is that to an infinite intelligence aU· spatial relations would be definable: there could be no indefinite spatial relations the word "definite" thus ceasing to mark any distinction.

If, on the other hand, when saying that an irregular line has U definite spatial rela.tions," he means relations knowable definitely by human intelligence; there still comes the questioll.Jhow is the word "definite" to be understood r Surely anything distinguished as definite admits of being defined; but how can we define an irregular line? And if we cannot define the irregular line itself, how can we know its (( spatial· relations" definitely? And how, in the absence. of definition, can Geometry deal with it ? If Mr. Sidgwick lneans that it can be dealt with by the " method of limits," then the reply is that in such cass, not the line itself is dealt with geometrically, but certain definite lines artificially put in ;uasi-definite relations to it: the indefinite becomes c0~nizable only through the medium of the hypo thetically -definite. Turning to the second illustration, the rejoinder to be made is that in so far as it concerns the relations between the ideal and the real, the analogy drawn does not shake but strengthens my argument. For whether considered under its geometrical or under its dynamical aspect, and whether considered in the necessaryorde. of its develop ment or in the order historically displayed, Astronomy shows us throughout, that truths respecting simple, theo retically-exact relati6ns, must be ascertained before truths respecting the complex and practically-inexact relations that actually exist, can be ascertained. As applied to the interpretation of· planetary movements, we see that t,ho t.heory of cycles and epicycles was based on pre~existing knowledge of the circle: the properties of an idnal curve having been learnt, a power was acquired of giving s'ome expression to the celestial motions. Wosee that the Copernican interpretation expressed the facts in terms o£ circular movements otherwise distrib~lted and combined.

274 THE DATA OF ETHICS. We see that Kepler's advance from the conception of circul1t? lllovements to the conception of elliptic movements, was made possible by comparing the facts as they are with the facts as they would be were the movements circular. We see that the subsequently-learnt deviations from elliptic move ments; ,yore learnt only through the pre-supposition that tho movements are elliptical. And we see, lastly, that even no'v predictions concerning the exact positions of planets, after taking account of perturbations, imply constant references to ellipses that are regal·ded as their norrnal or average orbits for the time being. rrhus, ascertainment of the actual truths has been made possible only by pre-ascertainment of certain ideal truths. To be convinced that by no other course could the actual truths have been ascertained, it needs only to suppose anyone saying that it did not concern him, as an astronomer, to know anything about the properties of circles and ellipf3es, but that he had to deal with the Solar System as it exists, to which end it was his business to observe and tabulate positions and directions and· to be guided by the facts as he found them. So, too, is it if we look at the development of dynamical astronomy.

The fil'stproposition in Newton's P1·i-nc1pia deals with the movement of a single body round a single centre of force; and the pheno:Ill4)na of central motion are first formulated in a case which is not simply ideal, but in which there is no specification of the force concerned: detachment from the real is the greatest possible. Again, postnlating a principle of action confornling to an ideal law, the theory of gravitation deals with the several problems of the Solar System in fictitious detachment from the rest; and it makps certain fictitious assumptions, such as that the mass of eacll body concerned is concentrated in its centre of gravity. Only later, after establishing the leading truths by this artifice of disentangling the major factors from the minor factors, is the theory applied to the actual problems in their ascending degrees of complexity j taking in more and more ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 275 of the Dlinor factors. And if we ask whether the· dynamics of·the Solar System could have been established· in any other way, we see that here, too, simple truths holding under ideal conditions, have to be ascertah~ed before real truths existing under complex conditions can be ascertained.

'The alleged necessary precedence of Absolute Ethics over Rela.tive Ethics is thus, I think, further elucidated. One who has followed the general argument thus far, will not deny that an ideal social being may be conceived as so COl1, stituted that his spontaneous activities are congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such beings. In many places, and in various w~ys, I have argued that conformably with the laws of evolution in general, and conformably with the laws of organization in particular, there bas be~en, and is, in progress, an adaptation of humanity to the social state, changing it in the direction of such an ideal congruity. .And the corollary before drawn and here repeated, is that the ultimate man is one in whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all.the req uire ments of his life as carried on in society. If so, it isa necessary implication that there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society. Such a code is that here called Absolute Ethics as distingll:shed from Relative Ethics-a code the injunctions of which are alone to be considered as absolutely right in contrast with those that are relatively right or least wrong; and which, as a system of ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of real conduct.

§ 105. A clear conception of this matter is so important that I must be excused for bringing in aid of it a further illustration, more obviously appropriate as being furnished by organic science instead of by inorganic science. The relation between morality proper and morality as commonly 276 THE DATA OF ETHICS. conceived, is analogous to the relation between physiology and pathelogy; and the course usually pursued by moralists is much like the course of one who studies pathology with. out previous study of physiology. Physiology describes the various functions which, as com. 1,iaed:, constitute and maintain life; and in treating of them it assumeA that they are severally performed in right ways, in due amounts, and in proper order: it recognizes only healthy functions. If it explains digestion, it supposes that the heart is supplying blood and that the visceral nervous syst8m is stimulating the organs immediately concerned.

If it gives a theory of the circulation, it assumes that blood has been produced by the combined actions of the structures devoted to its production, and that it is properly aerated. If the relations between respiration and the vital processes at large are interpreted, it is on the pre-supposition that the heart goes on sending blood, not only to the lungs and to certain nervous centres, but to the diaphragm and intercostal muscles. Physiology ignores failures in the actions of these several organs. It takes no account of imperfec tions, it neglects derangements, it does not recognize pain, it knows nothing of vital wrong. It simply formulates that which goes on as a result of con1plete adaptation of all parts to all needs. That is to say, in relation to the. inner actions constituting bodily life, physiological theory has a position like that which ethical theory, under its absolute form as above conceived, has to the outer actions constituting con duct. The moment cognizance is taken of excess of function, or arrest of function, or defect of function, with the resulting evil, physiology passes into pathology. We begin now to take account of wrong actions in the inner life analogous tn the wrong actions in the outer life taken account of by ordinary theories of morals.

The antithesis thus drawn, however, is but preliminary. A.fter observing the fact that there is a science of vital actions normally carried on, which ignores abnormal actions; ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 277 we have more especially to observe that the science of abnormal actions can reach such. definiteness as is possible to it, only on condition that the science of normal actions has previously become defilJite; or rather, let us say that pathological science depends for its advances on previous advances made by physiological science. The very con 'Ception of disordered action implies a pre-conception of well-ordered aclion. Before it can be decided that the heart is beating faster or slower· than it should, its healthy rate of beating must be learnt; before the pulse can be recog nized as too weak or too strong, its proper strength must be known; and so throughout. Even the rudest and most empirical ideas of diseases, presuppose ideas of the healthy states from .which they are deviations ; and obviously the diagnosis of diseases can become scientific, only as fast as there arises scientific knowledge of organic actions that are undiseased.

Similarly, then, is it with the relation between absolute morality, or the law of perfect right in human conduct, and relative morality which,recognizing wrong iIi hUIlTan con du.ct, has to decide· in what way the wrong deviates from the right, and how the right is to be most nearly approached. When, formulating normal conduct in an ideal society, we have reached a science o£absolute ethics, we have simul taneously reached a science which, when used to interpret the phenomena of real societies in their transitional states, full of the miseries due to non-adaptation (which we may can pathological states) enables us to form approximately true conclusions respecting the natures of the abnormalities~ and the courses which tend most in the dir~ction of the normal. § 106. And now let it he ohserved that the conception of ethics thus set forth, strange as many will think it) is one which really lies latent in the beliefs of m.oralists at large~ rrhough not definitely acknowledged it is vaguely implied in many of their propositions.

278 THE DATA OF ETHICS. From early times downwards we find in ethical specula tions, references to the ideal luau, his acts,his feelings, his judgments. When Sokrates said that well-doing is the thing to be chiefly studied, and that he aehieved it who devoted to the study searching and labour, he made the actions of the superior man his standard, since he gave no other. Plato, in .Mino8, asserts that "the authoritative rescripts or laws are those laid down by the artists or IneH of knowledge in that department;" and the doctrine contained in Laches is that only "the One Wise Man" can estimate the good or evil, or the conlparative value of two alternative ends in each individual case:" an ideal Ulan is postulated. Aristotle says :-" For it is the man whose condition, whether moral or bodily, is in each case perfect who in each case judges rightly, and at once perceives the truth. And herein it is that the perfect man may be said to differ most widely fro In aU others, in that in all such cases he at once perceives the truth, being, as it were, the rule and n1easure of its application." While observing that the Stoics, like other ancient philosophers, failing to distinguish properly between intellect and feel ing, identified wisdom with goodness, we see that they, too, made the perfect man the measure of rectitude. And Epi curl1S, also, regards the wise rnan as the only one who can achieve a happy life-" he alone knows how to do the right thing in the right way."

If in modern tilnes, influenced by theological dogmas concerning human sinfulness, and by a theory of divine ly prescribed conduct, moralists have not so frequently referred to an ideal, yet various references are trace able. We may see one in the dictuln of Kant-" Act only on that maxinl whereby thOll canst at the sanle time will that it should become a universal law." For this implies ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 279 the thought of a society in ,vhich the maxim is acted upon by all and universal bene~t recognized as the effect: there is a conception of ideal conduct under ideal conditions. And though Mr. Sidgwick, in the quotation above made from him, implies that Ethics is concerned with Ulan as he. is, rather than with nlan as he should be; yet, in elsewhere speaking of Ethics as dealing with conduct as it should be, rather than with conduct as it is, he postulates ideal conduct and indirectly the ideal man. On his first page, speaking of Ethics along with Jurisprudence and Politics, he says that they are distinguished "by the characteristic that they t1ttempt to determine not the actual but the ideal-what ought to exist, not what does exist."

It requires only that these various conceptions of an ideal .)ou.duct and of an ideal humanity, should be made consistent ttnd definite, to bring them into agreement with the concep tion ab0ve set forth. At present such conceptions are babituaHJ vague. The ideal man having-been conceived in terms of ilIe current morality, is thereupon erected into a moral stauJard by which the goodness of actions may be judged; and. the reasoning becomes circular. To make the ideal ~an ~erve· as a standard, he has to be defined in terms of the conditions which his nature fulfils-in terms of those objeci.ive requirements which must be met before conduct can be right; and the common defect of these con ceptions of the ideal man, is that they suppose him out· of relation to s'IA'ch conditions. All the above references to him, direct or indirect, imply that the ideal man is supposed to live and 9tct under existing soc,ial conditions. The tacit inquiry is] not what his actions would b~ under circumstances altogether changed, but what they would be under present c~rcumstances. And this inquit"y is futile for two reasons. The coexistence of a perfect man a.nd an imperfect society is impossible; and could the two coexist, the resulting conduct would not furnish the ethical standard sought. In the 280 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

first place, given the laws of life as they are, and a man of ideal nature cannot be produced in a society consisting of men having natures remote from the ideal. As well might we expect a child of English type to be born among Negroes, as expect that among the organically immoral, one who is organically moral will arise. Unless it be denied that character results from inherited structure, it must be admitted that since, :in any society, each individual descends from a stock which, traced back a few generations, ramifies every. where through the society, and participates in its average nature, there must, notwithstanding marked individual diversities, be preserved such community as prevents any one frOln reaching an ideal form while the rest remain far below it. In the second place, ideal conduct such as ethical theory is concerned with, is not possible for the ideal man in the midst of men otherwise constituted.

A.n absolutely just or perfectly sympathetic person, could not live and act according to his nature in a tribe of cannibals. Alnong people who are treacherous and utterly without scruple, entire truthfulness and openness must bring ruin. If all around recognize only the law of the strongest, one whose nature will not allow hirn to inflict pain on others, must go to the wall. There requires a certain congrujty between the conduct of each member of a society and other's conduct. A mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action, cannot be sllccessfull y persisted in-must eventuate in death of self, or posterity, or both. Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. On the evolution hypothesis, the two presuppose one another; and only when they coexist, can there exist that ideal conduct which Absolute Ethics has to formulate, and which Relative Ethics has to take as the standard by which to estimate divergencies from right, or degrees of wrong.