XVI. The Scope of Ethics

CHAPTER XVI. THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. § 107. At the outs-et it was shown that as the conduct with which Ethics deals, is a part of conduct at large, conduct at large must be understood before this part can be understood. After taking a general view of conduct, not human only but sub-human, and not only as existing but as evolving, we saw that Ethics has for its subject-matter the most highly-evolved conduct as displayed by the most highly -evolved being, Man-is a specification of those traits which his conduct assumes on reaching its limit of evolution. Conceived thus as comprehe~.ding the laws of right living at large, Ethics has a wider fi~ld than is commonly assigned' to it. Beyond the conduct commonly approved or repro .. bated as right or wrong, it includes all conduct which furthers or hinders, in either' direct or indirect ways, the welfare of self or others. As foregoing chapters in various places imply, the entire field of Ethics includes the two great divisions, personal and Docia!. There is a class of actions directed to personal ends, 'v11ioh are to be judged in their relations to personal well being, considered apart from the well-being of others: though they secondarily affect fellow-men these primarily affect the agent himself, and must be classed as intrinsically right or wrong according to their beneficial or detrimental effeots on him. There are actions of another class .which 282 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

affect fellow men immediately and renlotely, and which, though their results to selI are not to be ignored, must be judged as good or bad mainly by their results to others. Actions of thiR last class fall into two groups. Those of the one group achieve ends in ways that do or do not unduly interfere with the pursuit of ends by others-actions which, because of this difference, ~e call respectively unjust or just. Those forming the other group are of a kind which influence the states of others without directly interfering with the relations between their labours and the results, in one W8,y or the ot,her-actiolls which we speak of as beneficent or malefi cent. And the conduct which we regard as beneficent is itself subdivisible according as it shows us a self-repression to avoid giving pain, or an expenditure of effort to give pleasure-negative beneficence and positive beneficence. Each of these divisions and subdivisions has to be considered first as a part of Absolute Ethics and then as a part of Relative Ethics. Having seen what its injunctions must be for the ideal man under the implied ideal conditions, we shall be prepared to see how such injunctions are to be most nearly fulfilled by actual men under existing conditions.

§ 108. For reasons already pointed out, a code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite. ~any forms of life, diverging from one another in consider~ble degrees, may be so carried on in society as entirely to fulfil the conditions to harmonious cooperation. And if various types of men adapted to various types of activitieR, may thus lead lives that are severally complete after their kinds, no specific statement of. the activities universally required for personal well-being is possible. But though the particular requirements to be fulfilled for perfect individual well-being, must vary along with variations in the Dlaterial conditions of each society, certain general requirements have to be fulfilled by the individuals of all THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 283. @ocieties. A.n average balance between waste and nutrition has universally to be preserved. Normal vitality inlplies a relation between activity and rest falling within moderate limits of variation. Oontinuance of the society depends on satisfaction of those primarily-personal needs which result in marriage and parenthood. Perfection of individual life hence implies certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all cases, and ,which therefore become part of the subject-matter of Ethics.

That it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to scientific definiteness, can scarcely be said. But ethical requirements may here be to such extent affiliated upon physical necessities, as t~ give them a partially-scientific authority. It is clear that between the expenditure of bodily substance in vital activities, and the taking in of materials from which this substance may be renewed, there is a direct relation. It is clear, too, that there is a direct relation between the wasting of .tissue by effort, and the need for those cessations of effort during which repair may overtake 'vaste. Nor is it less clear that between the rate of mortality and the rate of multiplication in any society, there is a relation such that the last must reach a cortain level before it can balance the first, and prevent disappearance of the society. And it may be inferred that pursuits of other leading ends are, in like manner, determined by certain natural necessities, and from these derive their ethical sanctions. That it will ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct in conformity with such requirements, may be doubted. But the function ot A.bsolute Ethics in relation to private conduct will have been discharged, when it has produced the warrant for its requirements as generally expressed; when it has shown the irnperativeness of obedience to thenl; and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately considering-whethel' the conduct fulfils them as well as may be.

Untler the ethics of personal conduct considered in 284 THE DATA OF ETHICS. relation to existing conditions, have to come all questions concerning the degree in which immediate personal welfare has to be postponed, either to ultimate personal welfare or to the welfare of others. As now carried on, life hourly sots the claims of present self against the claims of future self, and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the interests of other individuals, taken singly or as asso ciated. In many of such cases the decisions can be nothing lnore than compromises; and ethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do no more than aid in making compromises that are the least objectionable. To arrive at the best compromise in any case, implies correct conceptions of the alternative results of this or that course. And, consequently, in so far as the absolute ethics of individual conduct can be made definite, it must help us to decide between conflicting personal requirements, and also between the needs for asserting self and the needs for subordinating self.

~ 109. From that division of Ethics which deals with the right regulation of private conduct, considered apart from the effects directly produced on others, we pass now to that division of Ethics which, considering exclusively the effects of conduct on others, treats of the right regulation of.it with a view to such effects. The first set of regulations coming under this head are those concerning what we distinguish as justice. Individual life is possible only on condition that each organ is paid for its action by an equivalent of blood, while the organism 0-8 a whole obtains from the environment assimilable matters {tat compensate for its efforts; and the mutual dependence uf parts in the social organisln, necessitates that, alike for its total life and the lives of its units, there similarly shall be maintained a due proportion between returns and labours: the natural relation between work and welfare shan be preserved intact. Justice, which formulates the THE· SCOPE OF 'ETHICS. 285 range of conduct and limitations to. condncthence arising, is at .once the most important division of Ethics and the division which admits of the greatest definiteness. That principle of equivalence which meets us when we seek its roots in the laws of individual life,. involves the idea of measure; and on passing to social life, the same principle introduces us to the conception of equity or equalness, in the relations of citizens to one another: the elelnents of the questions arising are quantifat-i'Ve,and lhence the solutions assume a more scientific form. Though, having to recog ..

niZJe differences among individuals due to age, sex, or other cause, "re cannot regard the members of a society as absolutely equal, and therefore cannot deal with problems growing out of their relations with that precision which absolute equality might make possible; yet, considering them as approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature, and dealing with questions of equity on this supposi tion, we may reach conclusions of a sufficiently-definite kind. This division of Ethics considered under its absolute form, has to define the equitable relations among perfect indivi duals who limit one another's spheres of action by coexist ing, and who achieve their ends by cooperation. It has to do much more than this. Beyond justice between ma.n and man, justice between each man and the aggregate of men has to be dealt with by it. The relations betweon the individual and the State, considered as representing all individuals, have to be deduced - an important and. a relatively-difficult matter. What is the ethical warrant for governmental authority? To what ends may it be legiti mately exercised? How far may it rightly be carried? Up to what point is the citizen bound to recognize the collective decisions of other citizens, and beyond what point may he properly refuse to obey them.

These relations, private and public, considered as main~ taived under ideal conditions, having been formulated, there 286 'fHE DATA OF ETHICS. come to be dealt with the analogous relations under real con ditions-absolute justice being the standard, relative jnstic& has to be determined by conRidering how near au approach may, under present circumstances, be made to it. As already implied in various places, it is impossible during stages of transition which necessitate ever-changing com. pro~ises, to fulfil the dictates of absolute equity; and ~0t11ing beyond empirical judgments can be formed of the extent to which they may be, at any given tinie, fulfilled. While war continues and injustice is done between societies, there cannot be anything like complete justice within each society. Militant organization no less than nlilitant action, is jrreconcilable with pure equity; and the inequity implied by it inevitably ramifies throughout all social relations. But there is at every stage in social evolution, a certain range of variation within which it is possible to approach nearer to, or diverge further from, the requirements of absolute equity.

Hence these requirements have ever to be kept in view that relative equity may be ascertained. § 110. Of the two subdivisions into which beneficence falls, the negative and the positive, neither can be specialized. Under ideal conditions the first of them has but a nominal existence; and the second of them passes largely into a transfignred form admitting of but general definition. In the conduct of the ideal nlan among ideal men, that self-regulation which has for its motive to avoid giving pain, pr~cticany disappears. No one having feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect others, there can exist no code of restraints referring to this division of conduct. But though negative beneficence is only a nominal part of Absolute Ethics, it is an actual and considerable part of Relative Ethics. For while luen's natures remain imperfectly adapted to socialli£e, there must continue in them impulses which, causing in some cases the actions we name unjust, cause in other cases the actions we narne unkind-unkind THE SCOPE OJ!' ETHICS. 287 now in deed and now in word; and in respect of these lllodes of behaviour which, though not aggressive, give pain, there arise nunlerous and cOlnplicated problems. Pain is ~ometimes given to others simply by maintaining an equi table claim; pain is at other times given by refusing a ~~<1n~gt ~ g,ud g,~ain atotItel 7 times by maintaining an opinion In these and numerous cases £?uggested by theIn, there have to be answered the questions whether, to avoid inflicting pain, personpl feelings should be sacrificed, and how far sacrificed. Again, in cases of another class, pain is given not by a passive course but by an active course. How far shall a person who has misbehaved be grieved by showing aversion to him? Shall one whose action is to be repro bated, have the reprobation expressed to him or shall nothing be. said? Is it right to annoy by condemning a prejudice which another displays? These and kindred queries have to be answered after taking into account the immediate pain given, the possible benefit caused by giving it, and the possible evil caused by not giving it. In solving probl81lls of this· class, the only help 'Absolut.e Ethics gives, is by enforcing the consideration that inflicting more pain than is necessitated by proper self-regard, or by desire for another's henefit, or by the maintenance of a general principle, is unwarranted. Of positive beneficence under its absolut~ form nothing more specific can be said than that it must become CO~ extensive with whatever sphere remains for it; aIding t.o complete the life of each 8S 8 recipient of services and to exalt the life of each as a renderer of services. As with n developed humanity the desire for it by everyone will 50 increase, and the Sphbl\] {.H exercise of it so decrease, as to involve an altruistic competition, analogous to the existing egoistic competition, it may be that Absolute Ethic~ will eventually include what we before called a higher equity, prescribing the mutual limitations of altruistic acpivities.

Under its relative form" positive beneficence presents nllme 20 288 THE DATA OF ETHICS. l~OUS problems, alike important and difficult, admitting only of empirical solutions. How far is sel£-saerifice for another's benefit to be carried in each case ?-a question which nlu~t be answered differently according to the character of the other, the needs of the other, and the various claims of self o.nd belongings which have to be met. To what extent ondor given circumstances shall private welfare be sub 4 ordinated to public welfare ?-a question to be answered after considering the importance of the end and the seriousness of the sacrifice. What benefit and what detri ment vvill result froIn gratuitous aid yielded to another? f1 question in each case implying an estimate of probabilit,ies Is there any unfair treatulent of sundry others, jnvol ved by n101'e than fair treatment of this one other ? Up to ,vhat lilnit may help be given to the existing generation of the inferior, without entailing mischief on future generationH of the superior? Evidently to thcFe and many kindred questions included in this division of Rel~tive Ethics, approximately true answers only can be given.

But though here Absolute Ethics, by the standard it supplies, does not greatly aid Relative Ethies, yet, as in other cases, it aids somewhat by keeping before con sciousness an ideal conciliation of the variol~s claim.sinvolved; and by suggesting the search for such c'~mpromise among t,heUl, as shall not disregard any, but shall satisfy all to tho greatest extent rracticable.