VI. Restraints on Blame

CHAPTER VI. RESTRAINTS ,ON BLAME. § 415. The subject-matter of this chapter joins naturally on to that of the last chapter-is, in fact, scarcely to be parted froln it: since critieisms passed in conversation and controversy necessarily imply a kind of blame. But blame, specially so called, is sufficiently distinguishable to be sepa rately treated. Neither sympathy alone, nor judgment alone, serves rightly' to regulate the utterance of blame, either ..in respect of occasion or degree. Sometimes it is a duty to withhold censure, and sometimes censure cannot be withheld without breach of duty. For right guidance many things must be borne in mind. There are the relative positions of the two, as being in SOITle cases parent and child, in some cases employer and employed, in some cases elder and younger; while in SOlne cases they stand in relations of equality and independence. T'here are the characters of the person reproving and the pel'son reproved, as being relatively superior or inferior, either to the other; and there are the effects as liable to be beneficial or injurious, immediately or rernotely or both. The presence or absence of ,vitnesses, too, must be taken into account; as also the degree and manner of the-blanle.

To adjust behaviour in such ways as duly to regard all the facts and circurnstances, there needs active fellow-feeling and also quick perception and much foresight. Wher (313) 314 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. ever possible, it is desirable that tinle should be taken for consideration. § 416. Blame of the most familiar kind is that which the relation of parent and child leads to. In countries where the imperati ve need for having a son results from the belief that only by a son can proper sacrifices be made to a father's ghost, we see clearly implied the conception, which has prevailed down to comparatively modern times, that children exist mainly for the benefit of parents. Along with the prevalence of this conception and along with the enjoining of punishment, ·which accompanied it, the blaming of children could not well be checked by care ful thought for their welfare. In modern tilnes, however, characterized if not by entire inversion of this conception, yet by partial inversion of it, so that very often parents exist chiefly for the benefit of children, the blaming of them has come to be qualified by considerations touching the effects wrQught. The better-natured aI110ng parents in our days, find scope for negative beneficence in often re straining themselves from those fault-findings which irrita tion prornpts.

Insight and s}Tmpathy will, at the cost of some sel£ sacrifice, cause tolerance of that restlessness, mental and bodily, characterizing early life; and will, within reasonable limits, prompt submission to that cross-questioning which children are prone to. The aim will be to find pleasure in giving the desired information; and when the questioning becomes too troubleson1e, to end it, not by words of blaIne but in some indirect way. Constant recognition of the truth that from an unde veloped nature there must not be expected conduct which only a developed nature is capable of, win stop many scoldings. The higher regulative emotions, later than others in coming into play, IT1USt not be counted upon as though fully operative. Remembering this a parent of RESTRAINTS ON BLAME. 315 well-balanced feelings will not harshly condemn minor transgressions. Not that faults are to be passed ove:r in silence, but that disapproval is to be expressed in a moder ated "ray.

Negative beneficence will check a too-frequent blame because of remote effects as well as because of imme diate effects. Perpetual infliction of nloral pain produces callousness and eventually alienation. Both of these con flict with· salutary discipline. A parent who passes over small faults without comment, or at nlost visits thenl with disapproving looks, and reserves open reprobation for serious transgressions, will, other things equal, obtain a control not to be obtained by a harsh parent; for the harsh parent fails to bring into play those Inotives from which good conduct should have· proceeded, and substi tutes for them those lower motives ,vhich dread of him generates. Of course much that is here said of the family circle may be said also of the school. The measures used, punitive in a kindly way, should have in vie"w not only the control of present conduct but the permanent moulding of character; and should form parts of a go~ernment which though mild is not lax.

§ 417. Primarily, the relations of ernployer and employed, or of master and servant, must be such as are implied by conformity to contract. Justice takes precedence of benefi cence; and here, therefore, considerations touching blame are subordinate to considerations touching duty. Fulfil ment of the understanding luade, may rightly be in sisted on, and reproof for non-fulfilment may rightly be uttered-should, indeed, be uttered; for. as healthy social co-operation depends on discharge of engagements, failure in the discharge (unless it is due to adequate unforeseen causes) should not be passed over in silence. Ethical judgments on questions hence arising, are corn316 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. plicated by the consciousness that in the r~lation between employer and employed, and especially in that between master and servant, there is an element scarcely recog nizable by absolute ethics. Though the agreement to render specified services for specified sums, is perfectly consistent with pure equity; yet, since fulfilment of one side of the contract, payment of money, occurs only at intervals while fulfilrnent of the other side by obedience to orders is continuous, there clings to it a feeling not ,vholly different froln that which clings to the obedience of slave to owner (see § 169). Whether, under a reign of absolute ethics, social organization may becorne such as practically to eliminate this feeling, we cannot say; but under such social organizations as we now know, elimination is not possible, and a system of relative ethics has to make the best of forms of conduct which subordination gives rise to.

One way of luaking the best of these forms is to restrain blame in amount and nlanner; so as to keep out of view, as much as nlay be, this undesirable relation. Of the several non-fulfilments of duty, those which have their origin in the dishonest disregard of contracts entered into, are, as above implied, those on which blame may with least hesitation be visited. The withholding of blame in such cases, though it may be suggested by imlnediate sympathy, is not approved by that higher beneficence which recognizes distant results-the reform of the erring individual and the welfare of society. For the individual ,vho, by lack of reproof, is encouraged in lax discharge of functions, is less likely to prosper than if his laxity is checked; and those with whom he may afterwards be engaged will be advantaged by whatever improvelnent is Illade in him. A mode of discipline to be used as much as possible in cases of the above class, may be used also with advan tage in cases of another class-those in which the cause of failure in duty is forgetfulness. In the treatment of RESTRAINTS ON BLAME. 317 servants as in the treatlnent of children, the discipline of the natural react~on should be allowed to act where prac ticable. If they continually find that what has been left un done has eventually to be done, neglect, \vhether due to idleness or to carelessness, iSllOt unlikely to be prevented.

'Vhen one who in winter cannot remember to shut the door, is required to COlne back and shut it, there may be produced a certain arnount of irritation; but the irritation will probably be less than that produced by perpetual scolding, and the desire to avoid trouble will often be effectual. Faults \vhich result frorn stupidity or awkwardness are those which, though frequently visited with the sharpest reproofs, deserve the mildest. Such faults more manifestly than most others arise from inherited defects of organiza tion. A scarcely credible slowness of apprehension, even of simple things, is often found an10ng children of the poor; and those in whom unint~lligence is innate or super-in4uced by ill-nurture, are to be dealt with tenderly. If it is a func tion of beneficence to mitigate, so far as consists with other ends, the injustices of Nature, then the lowly-endowed should not have those injustices of Nature from which they suffer, made harder to bear by the needlessly harsh treat ment of men. Negative beneficence requires that such blame as their failures call for, shall be sparing in amount and gentle in kind!

N o~ for altruistic reasons only, but also for egoistic reasons, should the tendency to blame be kept under restraint. For beyond the direct self-injury caused by excess of it, there is the indirect self-inju'ry arising from failure of its purpose. Those whose fault-finding is perpetual cease to be regarded; and those who, though in authority, but rarely blame, pro duce unusual effects. § 418. What is to be said about the expression 'of blame when the persons concerned are independent of one another 318 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE. -either friends or strangers ~ The question is one to which there seems no general ansvver. Each case ~ust be separately considered. Misbehaviour on the part of a stranger, if not great in degree, may often be best ignored, or at any rate be noticed only by look or manner; since more evil than good is likely to result from words-especially if the mis behaviour is towards ones-self. But if it is of a grave kind, both irnlnediate and remote reasons call for notice of it.

Everyone is bound to resist distinct aggression, alike in his own interests and in the interests of other men; for if no one resists an aggressor he is encouraged in his aggressive ness. If the rnisbehaviour is towards others, the utterance of blame is not therefore uncalled for, but is in some re spects more caned for; since self-interest is no longer a fac tor. Interference, even by words, is in such cases often re sented. ArIlong the vulgar there is comrnonly vented the exclamation-" What is it to you? " and the vulgar-minded in any class usually entertain the thought thus expressed. In such caRes negative beneficence has no place. Any de sire there nlay be not to give pain to the transgressor, is a desire which should be overridden by syolpathy with the injured. Positive beneficence cornes into play. For the transgressor ,vho in such case makes the common rejoinder -" Mind your own business," needs to be told that it is the business of everyone to aid in maintaining harmonious social life, and to defend those who are in-treated by word or deed.

If it is a friend who has misbehaved, towards either self or others, the desire not to give pain by utterance of a reproach, is often so far enforced by the desire not to lose a friend, or not to decrease friendly feeling, that it operates unduly. The negative beneficence Vi,hich in such case pronlpts passivity is not always to be obeyed. Blame may rightly be uttered in defence of personal clailns, and still more may rightly be uttered in defence RESTRAINTS ON BLAME. 319 of the claims of third persons,; ,vhen these have been disregarded. Contemplation of remote effects as ·well as irnmediate effects, will then show. that the disagreeable thing Inust be said, even at the cost of giving serious offence~ But when those concerned are intimate, expression of blarne may often fitly be lirnited to change of behaviour. For while coldness of manner frequently conveys a reproof as distinctly as words, and sOlnetimes even l110re forciLl'y, since it leaves play to the imagination of the person reproved, it has the advantage that it does not inflict pain in the saIne overt way, and gives ll1uch less specific reason for complaint and possible alienation.

§ 419. Along with insufficient restraints on plaIne in some cases, there go, in other cases, restraints that are too great. The utterance of condemnation, or of statements which would lead to condemnation, is often withheld where it is not only deserved but delnanded. In countries where the moral tone is low, we see antago nism to the law and sympathy with the criIninal. The law is regarded by citizens as the common enemy rather than as the common friend. A feeling of kindred nature is shown among ourselves at public schools, ,vith the result that it is a point of honour to shield a transgressor from punishment and a disgrace to inform against him. This feeling goes even to the extent that a smaller boy "rho has been seriously ill treated by a bigger boy, dare not say anything about his grievance to those in authority. If he does, he is sent to Coventry: the result being that no blame comes on him who has deserved it, while blaIne comes on him who has not de' served it.

Influenced very much as they are by school-ethics, many men betray in after life sentiments like these of school-boys; so that not unfrequently they take the side of one who has seriously misbehaved, while they frown" on 320 THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL I..IFE. one who exposes his luisbehaviour. Often, indeed, it seems better to have done wrong than to have drawn attention to the wrong-doing. The strangest anomalies occasionally arise froIn this reluctance to express blame where it is called for. A chairrnan of directors was discovered in treasonable negotiations, injurious to the interests of the company he presided over. His colleagues forced him to resign; and then, by way of "letting hiln down easily," as the phrase goes, gave him a testimonial-a testirnonial which was subscribed to by the melnber of the board who inforrned IIle of the fact. Now, as rightly understood, negative beneficence does not require such withholdings of blanle: quite the contrary.

There can be no ethical justification for a practice which enables demerit to prosper, and makes it dangerous to bring on demerit its normal results. § 420. lVIuch that has been said in this chapter applies, with change of terrl1s, to punishment-the blame which takes the form of hard deeds instead of hard words. Here, as elsewhere, the principle of the natural reaction should "be acted upon whenever it is possible. For instance, though sympathy will rightly cause the occasional un punctuality of an employe to be passed by in silence, yet if the unpunctuality is chronic, maintenance of con tract, in which all citizens are concerned, requires that there shall be experienced the natural reaction, by losing, in some way, part of the sum agreed upon for services. If an enlployer has workulen who constantly corne behind time, he is defrauded of a certain amount of the "rork which was to be given in return for the sum to be paid; and he may rightly deduct an equivalent alnount-may impose fines. Unhappily there are in our present phase of progress, many natures on which neither sense of duty, nor mild expostulation, nor strong words, have any appre ciable effects; and in dealing with theru the nornlal punishRESTRAINTS ON BLAME. 321 ment constituted by. loss of benefit, is called for by jus tice, and must not be interdicted by negative benefi cence.

Respecting punitive deeds as well as punitive words, we Inay say that ,vhere decisive blame is deserved, the function of negative beneficence is that of. preventing the undue severity ,vhich anger-even a legitirhate angeris apt to prornpt. The syrupathy which in some cases checks a direct infliction of pain, and in others suggests mitigation of reproof, may in all cases rightly rein in the excited feelings. ~Ioderation not abstinence is the word. There. is a gen eral notion, taking for its forrnula " Never lose your temper," which assumes that under all circurnstances anger is im proper. This is quite a mistake. Anger is a normal, and in some cases a needful, mode of displaying feeling. Were anger never shown by those who are aggressed upon,aggres sions "Tould be Inultitlldinons. Mankind are at present not sufficiently civilized to dispense with the check which fear puts upon them. Negative beneficence can do DO more than keep anger 'within due bounds.